EAP Multiple Pre-Shared Keys (EAP-MPSK) Method

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

The existing PSK-based EAP methods, EAP-GPSK [RFC5433], EAP-PSK [RFC4764], EAP-SAKE [RFC4763] and EAP-PAX [RFC4746], assumed that only one PSK had been configured for the EAP peer and server. A single PSK does not provide perfect forward secrecy [RFC5433].
Compromise of the PSK leads to compromise of recorded past sessions. Moreover, compromise of the PSK enables the attacker to impersonate the peer and the server, and it allows the adversary to compromise future sessions. One solution is to use multiple PSKs between the EAP peer and server.¶

Traditional manual configuration of PSKs lacks automation and is less efficient. Currently, there are some new manners of configuring PSKs more efficiently. Quantum keys generated by a quantum network can be automatically obtained through a network and configured as PSKs. In the mobile communication scenario, plenty of quantum keys can be offline implanted into mobile terminals. In the post-quantum scenario, each communication peer is typically assumed to have a list of post-quantum PSKs [RFC8784]. If there are ample PSKs, using each PSK only once will provide perfect forward secrecy. Moreover, the attacker cannot impersonate the peer and the server by compromising a used PSK; one PSK's compromise will not influence future sessions.¶

Furthermore, the issue of PSK identity collisions should be considered when managing multiple PSKs. PSKs can be configured in different manners, for example, through traditional manual configuration or obtained through quantum key generators. The PSK identities in different configuration methods usually do not have a unified plan. Thus, it is possible that a PSK identity may clash with another PSK identity configured in a different manner. Even obtained from different quantum key generators, the PSKs' identity may have a collision. Thus, multiple PSKs should be managed by category.¶

This document modifies the EAP-GPSK to support the negotiation of a PSK among multiple PSKs.¶

2. Overview

3. Security Considerations

4. IANA Considerations

Acknowledgements

Contributors

Author's Address