| Internet-Draft | Registering SLAAC Addresses using DHCPv6 | July 2022 |
| Kumari, et al. | Expires 7 January 2023 | [Page] |
This document defines a method to inform a DHCPv6 server that a device has a self-generated or statically configured address.¶
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.¶
The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://wkumari.github.io/draft-wkumari-dhc-addr-notification/draft-wkumari-dhc-addr-notification.html. Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-wkumari-dhc-addr-notification/.¶
Discussion of this document takes place on the Dynamic Host Configuration Working Group mailing list (mailto:dhcwg@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/dhcwg/.¶
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/wkumari/draft-wkumari-dhc-addr-notification.¶
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It is very common operational practice, especially in enterprise networks, to use IPv4 DHCP logs for troubleshooting or security purposes. Examples of this include a helpdesk dealing with a ticket such as "The CEO's laptop cannot connect to the printer"; if the MAC address of the printer is known (for example from an inventory system), the IPv4 address can be retrieved from the DHCP logs and the printer pinged to determine if it is reachable. Another common example is a Security Operations team discovering suspicious events in outbound firewall logs and then consulting DHCP logs to determine which employee's laptop had that IPv4 address at that time so that they can quarantine it and remove the malware.¶
This operational practice relies on the DHCP server knowing the IP address assignments. Therefore, the practice does not work if static IP addresses are manually configured on devices or self-assigned addresses (such as when self-configuring an IPv6 address using SLAAC [RFC4862]) are used.¶
The lack of this parity with IPv4 is one of the reasons that some enterprise networks are unwilling to deploy IPv6.¶
This document provides a mechanism for a device to inform the DHCPv6 server that it has a self-configured IPv6 address (or has a statically configured address), and thus provides parity with IPv4 in this aspect.¶
This document borrows heavily from a previous document, draft-ietf-dhc-addr-registration, which defined "a mechanism to register self-generated and statically configured addresses in DNS through a DHCPv6 server".¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
After successfully assigning a self-generated IPv6 address on one of its interfaces, an end-host implementing this specification SHOULD multicast an ADDR-REG-NOTIFICATION message. After receiving the address registration request, the DHCPv6 server MAY record and log the IPv6 address.¶
+----+ +----------------+ +---------------+ |Host| |First-hop router| |Addr-Reg Server| +----+ +----------------+ +---------------+ | SLAAC | | |<--------->| | | | | | | ADDR-REG-NOTIFICATION | |------------------------------------------------->| | | |Register / log | | |address
The DHCPv6 client sends an ADDR-REG-NOTIFICATION message to inform that an IPv6 address is in use. The format of the ADDR-REG-NOTIFICATION message is described as follows:¶
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| msg-type | transaction-id |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. options .
. (variable) .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
msg-type Identifies the DHCPv6 message type;
Set to ADDR-REG-NOTIFICATION (TBA1).
transaction-id The transaction ID for this message exchange.
options Options carried in this message.
The ADDR-REG-NOTIFICATION message MUST NOT contain server-identifier option and MUST contain the IA Address option. The ADDR-REG-NOTIFICATION message is dedicated for clients to initiate an address registration request toward an address registration server. Consequently, clients MUST NOT put any Option Request Option(s) in the ADDR-REG-NOTIFICATION message. Clients MAY include other options, such as the Client FQDN Option [RFC4704].¶
Clients MUST discard any received ADDR-REG-NOTIFICATION messages.¶
Servers MUST discard any ADDR-REG-NOTIFICATION messages that meet any of the following conditions:¶
The DHCPv6 protocol is used as the address registration protocol when a DHCPv6 server performs the role of an address registration server. The DHCPv6 IA Address option [RFC8415] is adopted in order to fulfill the address registration interactions.¶
The end-host sends a DHCPv6 ADDR-REG-NOTIFICATION message to the address registration server to the All_DHCP_Relay_Agents_and_Servers multicast address (ff02::1:2). The host SHOULD send the packet from the address being registered.¶
The end-host MUST include a Client Identifier option and at least one IA Address option in the ADDR-REG-NOTIFICATION message. The host SHOULD send separate messages for each address (so each message include only one IA Address option) but MAY send a single packet containing multiple options.¶
The host MUST only send the ADDR-REG-NOTIFICATION message for valid ([RFC4862]) addresses of global scope ([RFC4007]).¶
The host MUST NOT send the ADDR-REG-NOTIFICATION message if it has not received any Router Advertisement message with either M or O flags set to 1.¶
{TODO (WK): DHCPv6 uses "DHCP Unique Identifier (DUID)" to identify clients. This doesn't really meet our design goal of "what IP does the printer have?!". One of the DUID types is "DUID Based on Link-layer Address (DUID-LL)", but this is "any one network interface(s)" - this is probably good enough for the inventory use case, but still not ideal}¶
After receiving this ADDR-REG-NOTIFICATION message, the address registration server MUST register the binding between the provided Client Identifier and IPv6 address. If the DHCPv6 server does not support the address registration function, it MUST drop the message (and may log the event).¶
For every successful binding registration, the address registration server MUST record the Client-Identifier-to-IPv6-address bindings and associated valid-lifetimes in its storage, and SHOULD log this information in a manner similar to if it had performed the assignment.¶
If an ADDR-REG-NOTIFICATION message updates the existing Client-Identifier-to-IPv6-address binding the server MUST log the event.¶
The address registration client MUST refresh the registration before it expires (i.e. before the preferred lifetime of the IA address elapses) by sending a new ADDR-REG-NOTIFICATION to the address registration server. If the address registration server does not receive such a refresh after the preferred lifetime has passed, it SHOULD remove the record of the Client-Identifier-to-IPv6-address binding.¶
It is RECOMMENDED that clients initiate a refresh at about 85% of the preferred lifetime. Because RAs may periodically 'reset' the preferred-lifetime, the refresh timer MUST be independently maintained from the address valid-lifetime. Clients SHOULD set a refresh timer to 85% of the preferred lifetime when they complete a registration operation and only update this timer if 85% of any updated preferred lifetime would be sooner than the timer.¶
{TODO: See Issue #3 regarding the appropriate timers, and provide better guidance. We could do some complex "min (4h, max (router_lifetime, preferred_lifetime))" calculation, but that's a bit of a pain and leads to bikeshedding. I suspect that just using a static number would be better.}¶
{TODO: Add some text around "feel free to ignore messages if it looks like a DoS attack" / your leases table is getting full. Note that this is an existing issue for DHCP and spoofed MACs (ask me how I know :-)) }¶
To reduce the effects of packet loss on registration, the client SHOULD retransmit initial registrations. Registrations should be retransmitted according to the Retrans Timer specified by the Router Advertisement on the link. Retries should be jittered to prevent overloading the DHCP infrastructure when a new prefix is announced to the link via Router Advertisement.¶
The client MUST refresh the registration when 1/3 of the Preferred Lifetime of the address has elapsed. Such retransmissions should be jittered.¶
An attacker may attempt to register a large number of addresses in quick succession in order to overwhelm the address registration server and / or fill up log files. These attacks may be mitigated by using generic DHCPv6 protection such as the AUTH option [RFC8415].¶
One of the primary use-cases for the mechanism described in this document is to identify which device is infected with malware (or is otherwise doing bad things) so that it can be blocked from accessing the network. As the device itself is responsible for informing the DHCPv6 server that it is using an address, malware (or a malicious client) can simply not send the ADDR-REG-NOTIFICATION message. This is an informational, optional mechanism, and is designed to aid in debugging. It is not intended to be a strong security access mechanism.¶
This document defines a new DHCPv6 message, the ADDR-REG-NOTIFICATION message (TBA1) described in Section 4, that requires an allocation out of the registry of Message Types defined at http://www.iana.org/assignments/dhcpv6-parameters/¶
TBA1 ADDR-REG-NOTIFICATION this document¶
This document defines a new DHCPv6 Status code, the RegistrationDenied (TBA2) described in Section 5, that requires an allocation out of the registry of Status Codes defined at http://www.iana.org/assignments/dhcpv6-parameters/¶
TBA2 RegistrationDenied this document¶
"We've Been Trying To Reach You About Your Car's Extended Warranty"¶
Much thanks to Jen Linkova for additional text on client behavior. Also, much thanks to Erik Kline and Lorenzo Colitti for significant discussion and feedback.¶