| Internet-Draft | DTLS in SCTP | November 2023 |
| Westerlund, et al. | Expires 26 May 2024 | [Page] |
This document defines a usage of Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) 1.3 to protect the content of Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) packets using the framework provided by the SCTP DTLS chunk which we name DTLS in SCTP. DTLS in SCTP provides encryption, source authentication, integrity and replay protection for the SCTP association with in-band DTLS based key-management and mutual authentication of the peers. The specification is enabling very long-lived sessions of weeks and months and supports mutual re-authentication and rekeying with ephemeral key exchange. This is intended as an alternative to using DTLS/SCTP [RFC6083] and SCTP-AUTH [RFC4895].¶
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.¶
Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-westerlund-tsvwg-sctp-dtls-handshake/.¶
Discussion of this document takes place on the Transport Area Working Group (tsvwg) Working Group mailing list (mailto:tsvwg@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tsvwg/. Subscribe at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tsvwg/.¶
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/gloinul/draft-westerlund-tsvwg-sctp-dtls-handshake.¶
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 26 May 2024.¶
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
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This document describes the usage of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol, as defined in DTLS 1.3 [RFC9147], in the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP), as defined in [RFC9260] with SCTP DTLS chunk [I-D.westerlund-tsvwg-sctp-dtls-chunk]. This specification is intended as an alternative to DTLS/SCTP [RFC6083] and usage of SCTP-AUTH [RFC4895].¶
This specification provides mutual authentication of endpoints, data confidentiality, data origin authentication, data integrity protection, and data replay protection of SCTP packets. Ensuring these security services to the application and its upper layer protocol over SCTP. Thus, it allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed with communications privacy and preventing eavesdropping and detect tampering or message forgery.¶
Applications using DTLS in SCTP can use all currently existing transport features provided by SCTP and its extensions, in some cases with some limitations, as specified in [I-D.westerlund-tsvwg-sctp-dtls-chunk]. DTLS in SCTP supports:¶
preservation of message boundaries.¶
no limitation on number of unidirectional and bidirectional streams.¶
ordered and unordered delivery of SCTP user messages.¶
the dynamic address reconfiguration extension as defined in [RFC5061].¶
User messages of any size.¶
SCTP Packets with a protected set of chunks up to a size of 214 bytes.¶
DTLS in SCTP is a key management specification for the SCTP DTLS 1.3 chunk [I-D.westerlund-tsvwg-sctp-dtls-chunk] that together utilizes all parts of DTLS 1.3 for the security functions like key exchange, authentication, encryption, integrity protection, and replay protection. All key management message exchange happens inband over the SCTP assocation. The basic functionalities and how things are related are described below.¶
In a SCTP association where DTLS 1.3 Chunk usage has been negotiated in the SCTP INIT and INIT-ACK, to initilize and authenticate the peer the DTLS handshake is exchanged as SCTP user messages with a DTLS-SCTP PPID (see section 10.6 of [I-D.westerlund-tsvwg-sctp-dtls-chunk]) until an initial DTLS connection has been established. If the DTLS handshake fails, the SCTP association is aborted. With succesful handshake and authentication of the peer the key material is configured for the DTLS 1.3 chunk. From that point until re-authenticaiton or rekeying needs to occurr the DTLS chunk will protect the SCTP packets. Now that the DTLS connection has been established PVALID chunks are exchanged to verify that no downgrade attack between differnet protection solutions has occurred. To prevent manipulation, the PVALID chunks are sent encapsulated in DTLS chunks.¶
Assuming that the PVALID validation is successful the SCTP association is established and the Upper Layer Protocol (ULP) can start sending data over the SCTP association. From this point all chunks will be protected by encapsulating them in DTLS chunks as defined in [I-D.westerlund-tsvwg-sctp-dtls-chunk]. The DTLS chunk protects all of the SCTP Chunks to be sent in a SCTP packet. Using the selected key-material the DTLS Protection operator protects the plain text producing a DTLS Record that is encapsualted in the DTLS chunk and the transmitted as a SCTP packet with a common header.¶
In the receiving SCTP endpoint each incoming SCTP packet on any of its interfaces and ports are matched to the SCTP association based on ports and VTAG in the common header. In that association context for the DTLS chunk the DTLS Connection Index (DCI) is used to look up the key-material from the one DTLS connection used to authenticate the peer and establish this key-materail. Using the identified key-material and context the content of the DTLS chunk is attempted to be processed, including replay protection, decryption, and integrity checking. And if decryption and integrity verification was successful the produced plain text of one or more SCTP chunks are provided for normal SCTP processing in the identified SCTP association along with associated per-packet meta data such as path received on, original packet size, and ECN bits.¶
When mutual re-authentication or rekeying with ephemeral key exchange is needed or desired by either endpoint a new DTLS connection handshake is performed between the SCTP endpoints. A different DCI than currently used in the DTLS chunk are used to indicate that this is a new handshake. The DCI is sent as pre-amble to any DTLS message sent as SCTP user message. When the handshake has completed the DTLS in SCTP implementation can simply switch to use this DTLS connection's key-material in the DTLS chunk. After a short while (no longer than 2 min) to enable any outstanding packets to drain from the network path between the endpoints the old DTLS connection can be terminated and the key-material deleted from the DTLS chunk's key store.¶
The DTLS connection is free to send any alert, handshake message, or other non-application data to its peer at any point in time. Thus, enabling DTLS 1.3 Key Updates for example. All DTLS message will be sent by means of SCTP user messages with DTLS-SCTP PPID as specified in [I-D.westerlund-tsvwg-sctp-dtls-chunk].¶
DTLS in SCTP (as the combination of the DTLS chunk and the in-band authentication and key-management using DTLS handshakes defined in this document) has a number of properties that are attractive.¶
Provides confidentiality, integrity protection, and source authentication for each SCTP packet.¶
Provides replay protection on SCTP packet level preventing malicious replay attacks on SCTP, both protecting the data as well as the SCTP functions themselves.¶
Provides mutual authentication of the endpoints based on any authentication mechanism supported by DTLS.¶
Uses parallel DTLS connections to enable mutual re-authentication and rekeying with ephemeral key-exchange. Thus, enabling SCTP association lifetimes without known limitations and without needing to drain the SCTP association.¶
Uses core of DTLS as it is and updates and fixes to DTLS security properties can be implemented without further changes to this specification.¶
Secures all SCTP packets exchanged after SCTP association has reached the established state and the initial key-exchange has completed. Making targeted attacks against the SCTP protocol and implementation much harder.¶
DTLS in SCTP results in no limitations on user message transmission or message sizes, those properties are the same as for an unprotected SCTP association.¶
Limited overhead on a per packet basis, with 4 bytes for the DTLS chunk plus the DTLS record overhead. The DTLS overhead is dependent on the DTLS version.¶
Support of SCTP packet plain text payload sizes up to 214 bytes.¶
DTLS/SCTP as defined by [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-dtls-over-sctp-bis] has several important differences most to the benefit of DTLS in SCTP. This section reviews these differences.¶
Replay Protection in DTLS/SCTP has some limitations due to SCTP-AUTH [RFC4895] and its interaction with the SCTP implementation and dependencies on the actual SCTP-AUTH rekeying frequency. DTLS in SCTP relies on DTLS mechanism for replay protection that can prevent both duplicates from being delivered as well as preventing packets from outside the current window to be delivered. Thus, a stronger protection especially for non-DATA chunk are provided and protects the SCTP stack from replayed or duplicated packets.¶
Encryption in DTLS/SCTP is only applied to ULP data. For DTLS in SCTP all chunk types after the association has reached established state and the initial DTLS handshake has compeleted will be encrypted. This, makes protocol attacks harder as a third-party attacker will have less insight into SCTP protocol state. Also, protocol header information likes PPIDs will also be encrypted, which makes targeted attacks harder but also make management and debugging harder.¶
DTLS/SCTP Rekeying is complicated and require advanced API or user message tracking to determine when a key is no longer needed so that it can be discarded. A DTLS/SCTP key that is prematurely discarded can result in loss of parts of a user message and failure of the assumptions on the transport where the sender believes it delivered and the receiver never gets it. This usually will result in the need to terminate the SCTP association to restart the ULP session to avoid any issues due to inconsistencies. DTLS in SCTP is robust to discarding the DTLS key-material after having switched to a new established DTLS connection and its key-material. Any outstanding packets that have not been decoded yet will simply be treated as lost between the SCTP endpoints and SCTP's retransmission will retransmit any user message data that requires it. Also, the algorithm for when to discard a DTLS connection can be much simpler.¶
DTLS/SCTP rekeying can put restrictions on user message sizes unless the right APIs exist to the SCTP implementation to determine the state of user messages. No such restriction exists in DTLS in SCTP.¶
By using the DTLS chunk that is acting on SCTP packet level instead of user messages the consideration for extensions are quite different. Only extensions that would affect the common header or how packets are formed would interact with this mechanism, any extension that just defines new chunks or parameters for existing chunks is expected to just work and be secured by the mechanism. DTLS/SCTP instead interact with extensions that affects how user messages are handled.¶
A known limitation is that DTLS in SCTP does not support more than 214 bytes of chunks per SCTP packet. If the DTLS implementation does not support the maximum DTLS record size the maximum supported packet size might be even lower. However, this value needs to be compared to the supported MTU of IP, and are thus in reality often not an actual limitation. Only for some special deployments or over loopback may this limitation be visible.¶
There are several significant differences in regard to implementation between the two realizations.¶
DTLS in SCTP do requires the DTLS chunk to be implemented in the SCTP stack implementation, and not as an adaptation layer above the SCTP stack which DTLS/SCTP instead requires. This has some extra challenges for operating system level implementations. However, as some updates anyway will be required to support the corrected SCTP-AUTH the implementation burden is likely similar in this regard.¶
DTLS in SCTP implemented in operating system kernels will require that the DTLS implementation is split. Where the protection operations performed to create DTLS records needs to be implemented in the kernel and have an appropriate API for setting keying materia and managed the functions of the protection operation. While the DTLS handshake is residing as an application on top of SCTP interface.¶
DTLS in SCTP can use a DTLS implementation that does not rely on features from outside of the core protocol, where DTLS/SCTP required a number of features as listed below:¶
DTLS Connection Index to identify which DTLS connection that should process the DTLS record.¶
Support for DTLS records of the maximum size of 16 KB.¶
Optional to support negotiation of maximum DTLS record size unless not supporting 16 KB records when it is required. Even if implementing the negotiation, interoperability failure may occur. DTLS in SCTP will only require supporting DTLS record sizes that matches the largest IP packet size that endpoint support or the SCTP implementation.¶
Implementation is required to support turning off the DTLS replay protection.¶
Implementation is required to not use DTLS Key-update functionality. Where DTLS in SCTP is agnostic to its usage, and it provides a useful tool to ensure that the key lifetime is not an issue.¶
The conclusion of these implementation details is that DTLS in SCTP can use existing DTLS implementations, at least for user land SCTP implementation. It is not known if any DTLS 1.3 stack exist that fully support the requirements of DTLS/SCTP. It is expected that a DTLS/SCTP implementation will have to also extend some DTLS implementation.¶
This document uses the following terms:¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
DTLS in SCTP uses the DTLS chunk in the following way. Fields not discussed are used as specified in [I-D.westerlund-tsvwg-sctp-dtls-chunk].¶
DTLS Connection Index is the lower eight bits of an DTLS Connection Index counter. This is a counter implemented in DTLS in SCTP that is used to identify which DTLS connection instance that is capable of processing any received packet or DTLS message over an user message. This counter is recommended to be 64-bit to guarantee no lifetime issues for the SCTP Association.¶
One or more DTLS records. In cases more than one DTLS record is included all DTLS records except the last MUST include a length field. Note that this matches what is specified in DTLS 1.3¶
DTLS messages that are not DTLS records containing protected SCTP chunk payloads will be sent using SCTP user message using format defined below. A DTLS handshake message may be fragmented by DTLS to a set of DTLS records of a maximum configured fragment size. Each DTLS message fragment is sent as a SCTP user message on the same stream where each message is configured for reliable and in-order delivery with the PPID set to DTLS-SCTP [I-D.westerlund-tsvwg-sctp-dtls-chunk]. Each user message DTLS SHALL be prepended with a single byte containing the DTLS connection ID value. These user messages MAY contain one or more DTLS records. The SCTP stream ID used MAY be any stream ID that the ULP alreay uses, and if not know Stream 0. Note that all fragments of a handshake message MUST be sent with the same stream ID to ensure the in-order delivery.¶
DTLS Connection Index is the lower eight bits of an DTLS Connection Index counter. This is a counter implemented in DTLS in SCTP that is used to identify which DTLS connection instance that is capable of processing any received packet or DTLS message over an user message. This counter is recommended to be 64-bit to guarantee no lifetime issues for the SCTP Association.¶
One or more DTLS records. In cases more than one DTLS record is included all DTLS records except the last MUST include a length field. Note that this matches what is specified in DTLS 1.3 [RFC9147] will always include the length field in each record.¶
The [I-D.westerlund-tsvwg-sctp-dtls-chunk] contains a high-level description of the basic DTLS in SCTP architecture, this section deals with details related to the DTLS 1.3 integration with SCTP.¶
DTLS in SCTP uses inband key-establishment, thus the DTLS handshake establishes shared keys with the remote peer. As soon as the SCTP State Machine enters PROTECTION PENDING state, DTLS in SCTP is responsible for progressing to the PROTECTED state when DTLS handshake has completed. The DCI counter is initialized to the value zero that is used for the initial DTLS handshake.¶
When entering PROTECTION PENDING state, DTLS will start the handshake according to Section 6.1.¶
DTLS being initialized for a new SCTP association will set the DCI counter = 0, which implies a DCI field value of 0, for the initial DTLS connection. The DTLS handshake messages are transmitted from this endpoint to the peer using SCTP User message Section 3 with the PPID value set to DTLS-SCTP [I-D.westerlund-tsvwg-sctp-dtls-chunk].¶
When a successful handshake has been completed, DTLS protection operator will inform DTLS chunk Handler that will move SCTP State Machine into PROTECTED state.¶
In the PROTECTED state the currently active DTLS connection is used for protection operation of the payload of SCTP chunks in each packet per below specification. When necessary to meet requirements on periodic re-authentication of the peer and establishment of new forward secrecy keys, the existing DTLS 1.3 connection is being replaced with a new one by first opening a new parallel DTSL connection as further specified in Section 7 and then close the old DTLS connection.¶
When the SCTP association leaves the ESTABLISHED state per [RFC9260] to be shutdown the DTLS connection is kept and continues to protect the SCTP packet payloads through the shutdown process.¶
When the association reaches the CLOSED state as part of the SCTP association closing process all DTLS connections that existed are terminated without further transmissions, i.e. DTLS close_notify is not transmitted.¶
It's up to DTLS key-establishment function to manage the DTLS connections and their related DCI state in the DTLS chunk.¶
Either peer can add a new DTLS connection to the SCTP association at any time, but no more than 2 DTLS connections can exist at the same time. The new DCI value shall be the last active DCI increased by one. What is encoded in the DTLS chunk and DTLS user messages are the DCI value modulo 256. This makes the attempt to create a new DTLS connection to use the same, known, value of DCI from both peers. A new handshake will be initiated by DTLS using the new DCI. Details of the handshake are described in Section 6.1.¶
As either endpoint can initiate a DTLS handshake at the same time, either endpoint may receive a DTLS ClientHello message when it has sent its own ClientHello. In this case the ClientHello from the endpoint that had the DTLS Client role in the establishment of the previous DTLS connection shall be continued to be processed and the other dropped.¶
When the handshake has been completed successfully, the new DTLS connection will be possible to use for traffic, if the handshake is not completed successfully, the new DCI value will not be considered used and a next attempt will reuse that DCI.¶
A DTLS connection is removed when a newer DTLS connection is in use. It is RECOMMENDED to not initiate removal until at least one SCTP packet protected by the new DTLS connection has been received, and any transmitted packets protected using the new DTLS connection has been acknowledge, alternatively one Maximum Segment Lifetime (120 seconds) has passed since the last SCTP packet protected by the old DTLS connection was transmitted.¶
Either peers can initialize the removal of a DTLS connection from the current SCTP association when needed when a new have been established. The closing of the DTLS connection when the SCTP association is in PROTECTED and ESTABLISHED state is done by having the DTLS connection send a DTLS close_notify. When DTLS closure for a DTLS connection is completed, the related DCI information in the DTLS chunk is released.¶
To perform a DTLS Key Update when using the DTLS chunk for protection the following process is performed. Either endpoint can trigger a DTLS key update when needed to update the key used. The DTLS key-update process is detailed in Section 8 of [RFC9147] including a example of the DTLS key update procedure. Note that in line with DTLS, and in contrast to TLS, DTLS in SCTP endpoints MUST NOT start using new epoch keys until the DTLS ACK has been recived. This as the user message tranmission of the KeyUpdate DTLS message occurs using one or more SCTP packets that are protected using epoch N keys. If the sender needs to retransmitt any SCTP packets and have switched to Epoch N+1 the receiver will never receive the KeyUpdate DTLS message.¶
Note: The below role describes the keys in realtion to the endpoint and traffic it will receive or send. This will have to be translated into client or server key depending on the role the endpoint has in the DTLS connection the KeyUpdate happens in.¶
The below assumes that the Intitiator (I) are currentnly using key epoch N. 1. The endpoint Initiates the a key update and generates the new key for Epoch N+1. Epoch N+1 transmission key-materaial is set for the current DCI and epoch N+1 but not yet enabled. DTLS generates DTLS records containing the KeyUpdate DTLS message and update_requested, which is then sent using SCTP user message (Section 3) to the responder.¶
Initiator receives a DTLS user message containing the DTLS ACK message acknowledging the reception of the KeyUpdate message sent in step 1. The Initiator actives the new Epoch N+1 key in the DTLS chunk for protection of future transmissions of SCTP packets. The epoch N send direction key can be removed from the DTLS chunk key store.¶
Initiator receives a DTLS user message with the Responder's KeyUpdate message. The initator generates the recevie keys for epoch N+1 using the received message and installs them in the DTLS chunks key store. Then it generates a DTLS ACK for the KeyUpdate and sends it to the responder as a SCTP user message.¶
When the first SCTP packet protected by epoch N+1 has been received and succesfully decrypted by DTLS chunk the epoch N reception keys can be removed. Although to deal with network reordering, a delay is RECOMMENDED.¶
This completes the key-update procedure.¶
Note that even if both endpoints runs the Initiator process the KeyUpdate will complete. The main difference is that step 3 may occur before step 2 has happened.¶
The process for a responder to a peer initiating KeyUpdate.¶
The responder receives an SCTP DTLS user message containing a KeyUpdate message. The epoch N+1 keys reception keys are generated and installed into the DTLS chunk key store. A DTLS ACK message is generated and transmitted to the peer using a SCTP user message.¶
The responder initiates its own Key Update by generating keys and creating the KeyUpdate message. The send direction keys for epoch N+1 is installed but not enabled for use. The KeyUpdate message is transmitted to the peer using a SCTP user message.¶
The responder receives a DTLS user message containing the DTLS ACK message acknowledging the reception of the KeyUpdate message sent in step 2. The responder actives the new Epoch N+1 key in the DTLS chunk for protection of future transmissions of SCTP packets. The epoch N send direction key can be removed from the DTLS chunk key store.¶
When the first SCTP packet protected by epoch N+1 has been received and succesfully decrypted by DTLS chunk the epoch N reception keys can be removed. Although to deal with network reordering, a delay is RECOMMENDED.¶
As DTLS has its own error reporting mechanism by exchanging DTLS alert messages no new DTLS related cause codes are defined to use the error handling defined in [I-D.westerlund-tsvwg-sctp-dtls-chunk].¶
When DTLS encounters an error it may report that issue using DTLS alert message to its peer by putting the created DTLS record in a SCTP user message (Section 3). This is independent of what to do in relation to the SCTP association. Depending on the severance of the error different paths can be the result:¶
the DTLS connection can continue to protect the SCTP association. In this case the issue may be worth reporting to the peer using a DTLS alert message, but otherwise continue without further action.¶
If the DTLS connection has a critical issue, but can still protect packets then a the endpoint SHOULD attempt to establish a new DTLS connection. If that succeeds then the SCTP association switches over to the new DTLS connection and can terminate the old one including reporting the error. In case the establishment fails, then this critical issue MUST be reported to the SCTP association so that it can send an ABORT chunk with the Error in Protection cause code. This will terminate the SCTP association immediately, provide ULP with notification of the failure and speeding up any higher layer management of the failure.¶
If the DTLS connection fails so that no further data can be protected (i.e. either sent or received) with maintained security then it is not possible to establish a new DTLS connection and DTLS will have to indicate this to the SCTP implementation so it can perform a one sides SCTP association termination. This will lead to an eventual SCTP association timeout in the peer.¶
This document defines the usage of DTLS 1.3 [RFC9147]. Earlier versions of DTLS MUST NOT be used (see [RFC8996]). DTLS 1.3 is RECOMMENDED for security and performance reasons. It is expected that DTLS in SCTP as described in this document will work with future versions of DTLS.¶
Only one version of DTLS MUST be used during the lifetime of an SCTP Association, meaning that the procedure for replacing the DTLS version in use requires the existing SCTP Association to be terminated and a new SCTP Association with the desired DTLS version to be instantiated.¶
The DTLS Connection ID SHALL NOT be included in the DTLS records as it is not needed, the DTLS chunk indicates which DTLS connection the DTLS records are intended for using the DCI bits. Avoiding overhead and addition implementation requirements on DTLS implementation.¶
The DTLS record length field is normally not needed as the DTLS Chunk provides a length field unless multiple records are put in same DTLS chunk payload or user message. If multiple DTLS records are included in one DTLS chunk payload or user message the DTLS record length field MUST be present in all but the last.¶
DTLS record replay detection MUST be used.¶
Sequence number size can be adapted based on how quickly it wraps.¶
Many of the TLS registries have a "Recommended" column. Parameters not marked as "Y" are NOT RECOMMENDED to support in DTLS in SCTP. Non-AEAD cipher suites or cipher suites without confidentiality MUST NOT be supported. Cipher suites and parameters that do not provide ephemeral key-exchange MUST NOT be supported.¶
DTLS in SCTP MUST be mutually authenticated. Authentication is the process of establishing the identity of a user or system and verifying that the identity is valid. DTLS only provides proof of possession of a key. DTLS in SCTP MUST perform identity authentication. It is RECOMMENDED that DTLS in SCTP is used with certificate-based authentication. When certificates are used the application using DTLS in SCTP is responsible for certificate policies, certificate chain validation, and identity authentication (HTTPS does for example match the hostname with a subjectAltName of type dNSName). The application using DTLS in SCTP defines what the identity is and how it is encoded and the client and server MUST use the same identity format. Guidance on server certificate validation can be found in [I-D.ietf-uta-rfc6125bis]. DTLS in SCTP enables periodic transfer of mutual revocation information (OSCP stapling) every time a new parallel connection is set up. All security decisions MUST be based on the peer's authenticated identity, not on its transport layer identity.¶
It is possible to authenticate DTLS endpoints based on IP addresses in certificates. SCTP associations can use multiple IP addresses per SCTP endpoint. Therefore, it is possible that DTLS records will be sent from a different source IP address or to a different destination IP address than that originally authenticated. This is not a problem provided that no security decisions are made based on the source or destination IP addresses.¶
Implementations MUST set up new DTLS connections before any of the certificates expire. It is RECOMMENDED that all negotiated and exchanged parameters are the same except for the timestamps in the certificates. Clients and servers MUST NOT accept a change of identity during the setup of a new connections, but MAY accept negotiation of stronger algorithms and security parameters, which might be motivated by new attacks.¶
Allowing new connections can enable denial-of-service attacks. The endpoints MUST limit the number of simultaneous connections to two.¶
To force attackers to do dynamic key exfiltration and limit the amount of compromised data due to key compromise, implementations MUST have policies for how often to set up new connections with ephemeral key exchange such as ECDHE. Implementations SHOULD set up new connections frequently to force attackers to dynamic key extraction. E.g., at least every hour and every 100 GB of data which is a common policy for IPsec [ANSSI-DAT-NT-003]. See [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis] for a more detailed discussion on key compromise and key exfiltration in (D)TLS.¶
For many DTLS in SCTP deployments the SCTP association is expected to have a very long lifetime of months or even years. For associations with such long lifetimes there is a need to frequently re-authenticate both client and server by setting up new connections. TLS Certificate lifetimes significantly shorter than a year are common which is shorter than many expected SCTP associations protected by DTLS in SCTP.¶
Both SCTP and DTLS contains mechanisms to padd SCTP payloads, and DTLS records respectively. If padding of SCTP packets are desired to hide actual message sizes it RECOMMEDED to use the SCTP Padding Chunck [RFC4820] to generate a consisted SCTP payload size. Support of this chunk is only required on the sender side. However, if the PAD chunk is not supported DTLS padding MAY be used.¶
It needs to be noted that independent if SCTP padding or DTLS padding is used the padding is not taken into account by the SCTP congestion control. Extensive use of padding has potential for worsen congestion situations as the SCTP association will consume more bandwidth than its derived share by the congestion control.¶
The use of SCTP PAD chunk is recommened as it at least can enable future extension or SCTP implementation that account also for the padding. Use of DTLS padding hides this packet expansion from SCTP.¶
DTLS 1.3 is preferred over DTLS 1.2 being a newer protocol that addresses known vulnerabilities and only defines strong algorithms without known major weaknesses at the time of publication.¶
DTLS 1.3 requires rekeying before algorithm specific AEAD limits have been reached. Implementations MAY setup a new DTLS connection instead of using key-update.¶
In DTLS 1.3 any number of tickets can be issued in a connection and the tickets can be used for resumption as long as they are valid, which is up to seven days. The nodes in a resumed connection have the same roles (client or server) as in the connection where the ticket was issued. Resumption can have significant latency benefits for quickly restarting a broken DTLS/SCTP association. If tickets and resumption are used it is enough to issue a single ticket per connection.¶
The PSK key exchange mode psk_ke MUST NOT be used as it does not provide ephemeral key exchange.¶
This section specifies how DTLS in SCTP is established [I-D.westerlund-tsvwg-sctp-dtls-chunk].¶
As soon the SCTP Association has entered the SCTP state PROTECTION PENDING as defined by [I-D.westerlund-tsvwg-sctp-dtls-chunk] the DTLS handshake procedure is initiated by the endpoint that has initiated the SCTP association.¶
The DTLS endpoint will send the DTLS message in one or more SCTP user message depending if the DTLS endpoint fragments the message or not Section 3. The DTLS instance SHOULD NOT use DTLS retransmission to repair any packet losses of handshake message fragment. Note: If the DTLS implementation support configuring a MTU larger than the actual IP MTU it could be used as SCTP provides reliability and fragmentation.¶
If the DTLS handshake is successful in establishing a security context to protect further communication and the peer identity is accepted then the SCTP association is informed that it can move to the PROTECTED state.¶
If the DTLS handshake failed the SCTP association SHALL be aborted and an ERROR chunk with the Error in Protection error cause, with the appropriate extra error causes is generated, the right selection of "Error During Protection Handshake" or "Timeout During Protection Handshake or Validation".¶
When the SCTP Association has entered the ESTABLISHED state, each of the endpoint can initiate an DTLS handshake.¶
The DTLS endpoint will if necessary fragment the handshake into multiple records. Each DTLS handshake message fragment is sent as a SCTP user message Section 3. The DTLS instance SHOULD NOT use DTLS retransmission to repair any packet losses of handshake message fragment. Note: If the DTLS implementation support configuring a MTU larger than the actual IP MTU it could be used as SCTP provides reliability and fragmentation.¶
If the DTLS handshake failed the SCTP association SHALL generate an ERROR chunk with the Error in Protection error cause, with extra error causes "Error During Protection Handshake".¶
Rekeying in this specification is implemented by replacing the DTLS connection getting old with a new one by first creating the new DTLS connection, start using it, then closing the old one.¶
The criteria for rekeying may vary depending on the ULP requirement on security properties, chosen cipher suits etc. Therefore it is assumed that the implementation will be configurable by the ULP to meet its demand.¶
Likely criteria to impact the need for rekeying through the usage of new DTLS connection are:¶
Maximum time since last authentication of the peer¶
Amount of data transferred since last forward secrecy preserving rekeying¶
The cipher suit's maximum key usage being reached. Although for DTLS 1.3 usage of the Key Update mechanism can generate new keys not having the same security properties as opening a new DTLS connection.¶
This specification allows up to 2 DTLS connection to be active at the same time for the current SCTP Association. The following state machine applies.¶
Trigger for rekeying can either be a local AGING event, triggered by the DTLS connection meeting the criteria for rekeying, or a REMOTE AGING event, triggered by receiving a DTLS record on the DCI that would be used for new DTLS connection. In such case a new DTLS connection shall be added according to Section 4.2.1 with a new DCI.¶
As soon as the new DTLS connection completes handshaking, the traffic is moved from the old one, then the procedure for closing the old DTLS connection is initiated, see Section 4.2.2.¶
A race condition may happen when both peer experience local AGING event at the same time and start creation of a new DTLS connection.¶
Since the criteria for calculating a new DCI is known and specified in Section 4.2.1, the peers will use the same DCI for identifying the new DTLS connection. And the race condition is solved as specified in Section 4.2.1.¶
Due to the DTLS record limitation for application data SCTP MUST use 214 as input to determine absolute maximum MTU when running PMTUD and using DTLS in SCTP.¶
The implementor shall take care of DTLS 1.3 record overhead. This so that SCTP PMTUD can take this into consideration and ensure that produced packets that are not PMTUD probes does not become oversized. This may require updating during the SCTP associations lifetime due to future handshakes affecting cipher suit in use, or changes to record layer configurations.¶
Note that this implies that DTLS 1.3 is expected to accept application data payloads of potentially larger sizes than what it configured to use for messages the DTLS implementation generates itself for signaling.¶
The security considerations given in [RFC9147], [RFC6347], and [RFC9260] also apply to this document. BCP 195 [RFC9325] [RFC8996] provides recommendations and requirements for improving the security of deployed services that use DTLS. BCP 195 MUST be followed which implies that DTLS 1.0 SHALL NOT be supported and are therefore not defined.¶
Although DTLS in SCTP provides privacy for the actual user message as well as almost all chunks, some fields are not confidentiality protected. In addition to the DTLS record header, the SCTP common header and the DTLS chunk header are not confidentiality protected. An attacker can correlate DTLS connections over the same SCTP association using the SCTP common header.¶
To provide identity protection it is RECOMMENDED that DTLS in SCTP is used with certificate-based authentication in DTLS 1.3 [RFC9147] and to not reuse tickets. DTLS 1.3 with external PSK authentication does not provide identity protection.¶
By mandating ephemeral key exchange and cipher suites with confidentiality DTLS in SCTP effectively mitigate many forms of passive pervasive monitoring. By recommending implementations to frequently set up new DTLS connections with (EC)DHE force attackers to do dynamic key exfiltration and limits the amount of compromised data due to key compromise.¶
This document has no IANA considerations currently.¶