GEOPRIV | M. Thomson |
Internet-Draft | Commscope |
Intended status: Informational | June 29, 2011 |
Expires: December 31, 2011 |
A Privacy-Preserving Policy Transformation for Location
Obscuring location effectively is difficult. Falsehood offers a simpler, more effective method of location privacy protection. A mechanism is defined whereby a rule maker can request that a location server lie about location.
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Obscuring location has applications for protecting privacy, as described in [I-D.ietf-geopriv-policy].
Effectively protecting privacy through obscuring location information is difficult. Given an obscured location and enough supplementary information, a location recipient can recover a great deal of information about the known location despite obfuscation being used. This supplementary information might include data on geographic features and their characteristics, past behavior of the target or aggregated data.
Solving the difficult obscuring problem might be possible, but the effort required to try is significant. A more expedient solution to the overall problem is to provide a way for a rule maker to select the location that is reported to location recipients.
This privacy solution presents a trade-off. While finer control is thereby given to rule makers over the location information that is shared, it also presents a greater burden on the rule maker developing policy rules.
An extension to the <provide-location> element defined in [I-D.ietf-geopriv-policy] is described.
This policy extension is most useful where an automated system generates location information. In systems where the rule maker already is presented with an opportunity to alter location information, such as where the rule maker role is assumed by the entity generating (e.g. [RFC5985]) or publishing (e.g. [RFC3903]) location, such a mechanism is redundant.
Familiarity with the terminology outlined in [I-D.ietf-geopriv-arch] is helpful.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
The location information absolute replacement (liar) element is a transformation element that is included in the provide-location element of a policy document. When a liar element is included, the profile attribute MUST be set to replacement-transformation.
The liar element can contain any form of location information that is valid for the location-info element in a PIDF-LO [RFC4119] (see also [RFC5491]).
In order to apply the transformation, replace the content of any selected location-info element in the presence document with the content of the liar element in the policy document. Content is copied verbatim.
The common policy [RFC4745] framework permits the application of policy rules in any order. Precedence is used to determine which transformation is finally applied.
When combining multiple provide-location transformations, the location information absolute replacement transformation is assigned the highest available precedence.
<ruleset xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:common-policy" xmlns:gp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geolocation-policy" xmlns:ca="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pidf:geopriv10:civicAddr" xmlns:liar="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pidf:geopriv:liar"> <rule id="drinking"> <conditions> <identity> <one id="sip:wife@example.com"/> </identity> <gp:location-condition> <gp:location profile="civic-condition" label="My Happy Place"> <ca:civicAddress> <ca:NAM>The Pub</ca:NAM> </ca:civicAddress> </gp:location> </gp:location-condition> </conditions> <actions/> <transformations> <gp:provide-location profile="replacement-transformation"> <liar:liar> <ca:civicAddress> <ca:NAM>Work</ca:NAM> </ca:civicAddress> </liar:liar> </gp:provide-location> </transformations> </rule> </ruleset>
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <xs:schema targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:liar" xmlns:liar="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:liar" xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" elementFormDefault="qualified" attributeFormDefault="unqualified"> <xs:element name="liar" type="liar:liarType"/> <xs:complexType name="liarType"> <xs:complexContent> <xs:restriction base="xs:anyType"> <xs:sequence> <!-- The content model is equivalent to that of <location-info> in RFC 4119: very permissive --> <xs:any namespace="##any" processContents="lax" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:restriction> </xs:complexContent> </xs:complexType> </xs:schema>
Richard Barnes provided input on the original idea.
This section registers an XML schema for the location information absolute replacement element, the corresponding namespace and replacement-transformation token.
BEGIN <?xml version="1.0"?> <!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en"> <head> <title>Location Information Absolute Replacement</title> </head> <body> <h1>Namespace</h1> <h2>urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:liar</h2> [[NOTE TO IANA/RFC-EDITOR: Please update RFC URL and replace XXXX with the RFC number for this specification.]] <p>See <a href="[[RFC URL]]">RFCXXXX</a>.</p> </body> </html> END
This section registers a new XML namespace, urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:liar, as per the guidelines in [RFC3688].
This section registers an XML schema as per the guidelines in [RFC3688].
The token replacement-transformation is registered in the Geolocation Policy Location Profile Registry, as defined in [I-D.ietf-geopriv-policy]. This token is used for the provide-location element as described in Section 3.
Policy documents include privacy-sensitive information. The additional capabilities added by this document do not change this fact, but expand the possibilities for embarassment if policy documents are revealed.