DNS Extensions Working Group | S. Rose |
Internet-Draft | NIST |
Updates: 2536, 2539, 3110, 4034, 4398, 5155, 5702, 5933 (if approved) | November 18, 2011 |
Intended status: Best Current Practice | |
Expires: May 21, 2012 |
Applicability Statement: DNS Security (DNSSEC) DNSKEY Algorithm Implementation Status
draft-srose-dnssec-algo-imp-status-00
The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) requires the use of cryptographic algorithm suites for generating digital signatures over DNS data. There is currently an IANA registry for these algorithms that is incomplete in that it lacks the recommended implementation status of each algorithm. This document provides an applicability statement on algorithm implementation compliance status for DNSSEC implementations. This document lists each algorithm's status based on the current reference. In the case that an algorithm is specified without an implementation status, this document assigns one.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on May 21, 2012.
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The Domain Name System (DNS) Security Extensions (DNSSEC) [RFC4033], [RFC4034], [RFC4035], [RFC4509], [RFC5155], and [RFC5702] uses digital signatures over DNS data to provide source authentication and integrity protection. DNSSEC uses an IANA registry to list codes for digital signature algorithms (consisting of a cryptographic algorithm and one-way hash function).
The original list of algorithm status is found in [RFC4034]. Other DNSSEC RFC's have added new algorithms or changed the status of algorithms in the registry. However, implementers must read through all the documents in order to discover which algorithms are considered wise to implement, which are not, and which algorithms may become widely used in the future. This document includes the current compliance status for certain algorithms.
This compliance status indication is only to be considered for implementation, not deployment or operations. Operators are free to deploy any digital signature algorithm available in implementations or algorithms chosen by local security policies. This status is to measure compliance to this RFC only.
This document updates the following: [RFC2536], [RFC2539], [RFC3110], [RFC4034], [RFC4398], [RFC5155], [RFC5702], and [RFC5933].
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
The status of RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 is set to RECOMMENDED TO IMPLEMENT. This is due to the fact that RSA/SHA-1 is a MUST IMPLEMENT. The status of RSA/SHA-256 and RSA/SHA-512 are also set to RECOMMENDED TO IMPLEMENT as it is believed that these algorithms will replace an older algorithm (e.g. RSA/SHA-1) that have a perceived weakness in its hash algorithm (SHA-1).
The DNSSEC algorithm implementation status table is listed below. Only the algorithms already specified for use with DNSSEC (at the time of writing) are listed.
+------------+------------+-----------------+-------------+ | MUST | MUST NOT | RECOMMENDED | OPTIONAL | | IMPLEMENT | IMPLEMENT | TO IMPLEMENT | | +------------+------------+-----------------+-------------+ | | | | | | RSASHA1 | RSAMD5 | RSASHA256 | DSASHA1 | | | | RSASHA1-NSEC3 | DH | | | | -SHA1 | DSA-NSEC3 | | | | RSASHA512 | -SHA1 | | | | | GOST-ECC | | | | | | +------------+------------+-----------------+-------------+
This table does not list the Reserved values in the IANA registry table or the values for INDIRECT (252), PRIVATE (253) and PRIVATEOID (254). These values may relate to more than one algorithm and are therefore up to the implementer's discretion. Their implementation (or lack thereof) therefore cannot be included when judging compliance to this document.
[RFC6014] establishes a parallel procedure for adding a registry entry for a new algorithm other than a standards track document. Algorithms entered into the registry using that procedure are to be considered OPTIONAL for implementation purposes. Specifications that follow this path do not need to obsolete or update this document.
Adding a newly specified algorithm to the registry with a compliance status SHALL entail obsolescing this document and replacing the registry table (with the new algorithm entry). Altering the status column value of any existing algorithm in the registry SHALL entail obsolescing this document and replacing the registry table.
This document cannot be updated, only made obsolete and replaced by a successor document.
This document lists the implementation status of cryptographic algorithms used with DNSSEC. These algorithms are maintained in an IANA registry. There are no changes to the registry in this document. However this document asks to be listed as a reference for the entire registry.
This document replaces the Domain Name System (DNS) Security Algorithm Numbers registry. It is not meant to be a discussion on algorithm superiority. No new security considerations are raised in this document.