TOC |
|
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as “work in progress.”
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 8, 2009.
This document is meant to serve as a repository for test cases assoicated with taking some action upon receipt of unwanted communications.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] (Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” March 1997.).
1.
Introduction
2.
Test Case 1: Use of draft-wing-sipping-spam-score-02
2.1.
Test Architecture
2.2.
Use Cases
2.2.1.
No Spam Score is generated
2.2.2.
’Whitelist’ score from ’trusted’ upstream server
2.2.3.
’Whitelist’ score from ’un-trusted’ upstream server
2.2.4.
’Graylist’ score from upstream server
2.2.5.
’Blacklist’ score from upstream server
2.3.
Test Configurations
2.3.1.
Allow All
2.3.2.
Allow all containing a SPAM header
2.3.3.
Allow with no score header or header with specific score
2.3.4.
Allow only with score header or header with specific score
2.4.
Test Parameters
2.4.1.
Response Code
2.4.2.
’X’ Upper limit of the ’whitelist’ range
2.4.3.
’Y’ Upper limit of the ’graylist’ range
2.4.4.
Primary Route Address
2.4.5.
Secondary Route Address
2.5.
Example Test Messages
2.5.1.
Whitelist Trusted Score
2.5.2.
Whitelist Un-Trusted Score
2.5.3.
Graylist Score
3.
Security Considerations
4.
Acknowledgements
5.
IANA Considerations
6.
Normative References
§
Author's Address
§
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements
TOC |
As part of the ongoing work to qualify the unwanted communication threat there is a need to document potential approaches being tried throughout the industry. This draft is meant to serve as a repository for these approaches and is intended for informative puroposes only.
TOC |
[I‑D.wing‑sipping‑spam‑score] (Wing, D., Niccolini, S., Stiemerling, M., and H. Tschofenig, “Spam Score for SIP,” February 2008.) defines a mechanism for SIP proxies to communicate a spam score to downstream SIP proxies and to SIP user agents. This test case discusses a test setup making use of some parts of this spam score draft. To recap, it is desirable for SIP proxies to insert a spam score so that downstream SIP proxies and downstream SIP user agents can use a high score to decide that special handling is required.
TOC |
The architecture chosen for this test is quite simple and involves an upstream Spam-Score generation server, a downstream receiving SBC and further downstream destinations (both primary and alternate). The idea is to generate the score and have the SBC behave differently depending on both the presence of a score as well as the actual score.
_____________ | | | Primary | | Destination | _________ ________ /| | / \ | | / |_____________| | Spam | | User |/ | Score |----| Agent |\ _____________ | Generator | | Server | \ | | \_________/ |________| \| | | Secondary | | Destination | |_____________|
Figure 1: Test Case 1 Architecture |
TOC |
The test consists of five basic scenarios or use cases. For all cases the assumption is that the variable ’X’ marks the upper limit of a whitelist indication and that the variable ’Y’ marks the upper limit of a graylist indication.
TOC |
This is a baseline of sorts and is there to test one of two possible outcomes; message dropped and message allowed through, nonetheless.
TOC |
This test has the upstream server generate a ’whitelist’ score (0 <= score < X) and the assumption is that there is a trust relationship between the upstream server and the receiving UAS.
TOC |
This test has the upstream server generate a ’whitelist’ score (0 <= score < X) and the assumption is that there is no trust relationship between the upstream server and the receiving UAS.
TOC |
This test has the upstream server generate a ’graylist’ score (X <= score < Y) and the assumption is that there is a trust relationship between the upstream server and the receiving UAS.
TOC |
This test has the upstream server generate a ’blacklist’ score (Y <= score < 100) and the assumption is that there is a trust relationship between the upstream server and the receiving UAS.
TOC |
For each of the use cases listed above we would like to test the following configurations
TOC |
In this configuration all calls are allowed to proceed downstream unhindered regardless of both the presence of a score header or the value therein.
TOC |
In this configuration all calls are allowed to proceed downstream unhindered ONLY if they contain a score header REGARDLESS of the value contained therein.
TOC |
In this configuration all calls are allowed to proceed downstream unhindered with no score header. If a header exists, however, the following behavior is followed:
TOC |
Route to Primary destination.
TOC |
Route to Secondary destination.
TOC |
In this configuration all calls are allowed to proceed downstream unhindered ONLY in presence of score header and than only as per the following behavior:
TOC |
Route to Primary destination.
TOC |
Route to Secondary destination.
TOC |
The following are configurable per realm:
TOC |
This is the response code returned upstream upon blocking of a call due to the suspicion of SPAM.
TOC |
This is the value above which calls are assumed to be ’gray’. By default this value is assumed to be 75.
TOC |
This is the value above which calls are assumed to be ’black’. By default this value is assumed to be 100.
TOC |
Where to route calls not suspected to be SPAM.
TOC |
Where to route calls suspected to be SPAM. This could be a voice mail box for instance.
TOC |
Only the relevant parts of the message are shown:
TOC |
INVITE ... Via: SIP/2.0/TLS trusted.upstream.com;branch=z9hG4bK-14362-1-0 From: white <white@trusted.upstream.com>;tag=1 ... Spam-Score: 0 ;spam-realm=trusted.upstream.com Subject: Spam Score Whitelist Test ...
Figure 2: Whitelist Trusted Score |
TOC |
INVITE ... Via: SIP/2.0/TLS questionable.upstream.com;branch=z9hG4bK-14 From: white <white@questionable.upstream.com>;tag=1 ... Spam-Score: 0 ;spam-realm=questionable.upstream.com Subject: Spam Score Graylist Test ...
Figure 3: Whitelist unTrusted Score |
TOC |
INVITE ... Via: SIP/2.0/TLS trusted.upstream.com;branch=z9hG4bK-14362-1-0 From: white <white@trusted.upstream.com>;tag=1 ... Spam-Score: 75 ;spam-realm=trusted.upstream.com Subject: Spam Score Graylist Test ...
Figure 4: Graylist Score |
TOC |
This draft does not address the inherent security risks associated with communicating SPAM information in the clear as it is assumed that owing to the prior relationship betweent the sending and receiving parties there is a scure infrastructure in place (e.g. TLS) for the message transfer.
TOC |
TBD.
TOC |
None. This document is informational
TOC |
[RFC2119] | Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997 (TXT, HTML, XML). |
[RFC3261] | Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, “SIP: Session Initiation Protocol,” RFC 3261, June 2002 (TXT). |
[I-D.wing-sipping-spam-score] | Wing, D., Niccolini, S., Stiemerling, M., and H. Tschofenig, “Spam Score for SIP,” draft-wing-sipping-spam-score-02 (work in progress), February 2008 (TXT). |
TOC |
David Schwartz | |
XConnect Global Networks | |
Malcha Technology Park | |
Building # 1 | |
Jerusalem 90961 | |
Israel | |
Phone: | +972 52 347 4656 |
Email: | dschwartz@xconnect.net |
URI: | www.xconnect.net |
TOC |
Copyright © The IETF Trust (2008).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an “AS IS” basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-ipr@ietf.org.