TOC 
ECRITH. Schulzrinne
Internet-DraftColumbia University
Intended status: Standards TrackS. McCann
Expires: May 7, 2009Siemens/Roke Manor Research
 G. Bajko
 Nokia
 H. Tschofenig
 Nokia Siemens Networks
 November 03, 2008


Extensions to the Emergency Services Architecture for dealing with Unauthenticated and Unauthorized Devices
draft-schulzrinne-ecrit-unauthenticated-access-04.txt

Status of this Memo

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Abstract

The IETF emergency services architecture assumes that the calling device has acquired rights to use the access network or that no authentication is required for the access network, such as for public wireless access points. Subsequent protocol interactions, such as obtaining location information, learning the address of the Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) and the emergency call itself are largely decoupled from the underlying network access procedures.

In some cases, the device does not have credentials for network access, does not have a VoIP provider, or the credentials have become invalid, e.g., because the user has exhausted their prepaid balance or the account has expired.

This document provides a problem statement, introduces terminology and describes an extension for the base IETF emergency services architecture to address these scenarios.



Table of Contents

1.  Introduction
    1.1.  No Access Authorization (NAA)
    1.2.  No VoIP Service Provider (NVP)
    1.3.  Zero-Balance VoIP Service Provider (ZBP)
2.  A Warning Note
3.  Terminology
4.  Considerations for ISPs to support Unauthenticated Emergency Services without Architecture Extensions
5.  Considerations for ISPs to support Unauthenticated Emergency Services with Architecture Extensions
6.  Profiles
    6.1.  End Host Profile
        6.1.1.  LoST Server Discovery
        6.1.2.  ESRP Discovery
        6.1.3.  Location Determination and Location Configuration
        6.1.4.  Emergency Call Identification
        6.1.5.  SIP Emergency Call Signaling
        6.1.6.  Media
        6.1.7.  Testing
    6.2.  IAP/ISP Profile
        6.2.1.  ESRP Discovery
        6.2.2.  Location Determination and Location Configuration
    6.3.  ESRP Profile
        6.3.1.  Emergency Call Routing
        6.3.2.  Emergency Call Identification
        6.3.3.  SIP Emergency Call Signaling
        6.3.4.  Location Retrieval
7.  Security Considerations
8.  Acknowledgments
9.  IANA Considerations
10.  References
    10.1.  Normative References
    10.2.  Informative References
§  Authors' Addresses
§  Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements




 TOC 

1.  Introduction

Summoning police, the fire department or an ambulance in emergencies is one of the fundamental and most-valued functions of the telephone. As telephone functionality moves from circuit-switched telephony to Internet telephony, its users rightfully expect that this core functionality will continue to work at least as well as it has for the older technology. New devices and services are being made available that could be used to make a request for help, which are not traditional telephones, and users are increasingly expecting them to be used to place emergency calls.

Roughly speaking, the IETF emergency services architecture (see [I‑D.ietf‑ecrit‑phonebcp] (Rosen, B. and J. Polk, “Best Current Practice for Communications Services in support of Emergency Calling,” January 2010.) and [I‑D.ietf‑ecrit‑framework] (Rosen, B., Schulzrinne, H., Polk, J., and A. Newton, “Framework for Emergency Calling using Internet Multimedia,” July 2009.)) divides responsibility for handling emergency calls between the access network (ISP), the VoIP service provider (VSP) and the provider of emergency signaling services, the emergency service network (ESN). The access network may provide location information to end systems, but does not have to provide any VoIP signaling functionality. The emergency caller can reach the ESN either directly or through the VoIP provider's outbound proxy. Any of the three parties can provide the mapping from location to PSAP URI by offering LoST [RFC5222] (Hardie, T., Newton, A., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, “LoST: A Location-to-Service Translation Protocol,” August 2008.) services.

In general, a set of automated configuration mechanisms allows a device to function in a variety of architectures, without the user being aware of the details on who provides location, mapping services or call routing services. However, if emergency calling is to be supported when the calling device lacks access network authorization or does not have a VoIP provider, one or more of the providers may need to provide additional services and functions.

In all cases, the end device MUST be able to perform a LoST lookup and otherwise conduct the emergency call in the same manner as when the three exceptional conditions discussed below do not apply.

We distinguish between three conditions:

No access authorization (NAA):
The current access network requires access authorization and the caller does not have valid user credentials. (This includes the case where the access network allows pay-per-use, as is common for wireless hotspots, but there is insufficient time to pay for access.)
No VoIP provider (NVP):
The caller does not have a VoIP service provider (VSP) at the time of the call.
Zero-balance VoIP provider (ZBP):
The caller has valid credentials with a VSP, but is not allowed to place calls, e.g., because the user has a zero balance in a prepaid account.

A user may well suffer from both NAA and NVP or ZBP at the same time. Depending on local policy and regulations, it may not be possible to place emergency calls in the NAA case. Unless local regulations require user identification, it should always be possible to place calls in the NVP case, with minimal impact on the ISP. Unless the ESN requires that all calls traverse a known set of VSPs, a caller should be able to place an emergency call in the ZBP case. We discuss each case in separate sections below.



 TOC 

1.1.  No Access Authorization (NAA)

In the NAA (No Access Authorization) case, the emergency caller does not posses valid credentials for the access network. If local regulations or policy allows or require, the access network may or needs to cooperate in providing emergency calling services. Generally, the ISP will want to ensure that devices do not pretend to place emergency calls, but then abuse the access for obtaining more general services fraudulently.

In particular, the ISP MUST allow emergency callers to acquire an IP address and to reach a LoST server, either provided by the ISP or some third party. It SHOULD also provide location information via one of the mechanisms specified in [I‑D.ietf‑ecrit‑phonebcp] (Rosen, B. and J. Polk, “Best Current Practice for Communications Services in support of Emergency Calling,” January 2010.) without requiring authorization unless it can safely assume that all nodes in the access network can determine their own location, e.g., via GPS.

The details of how filtering is performed depends on the details of the ISP architecture and are beyond the scope of this document. We illustrate a possible model. If the ISP runs its own LoST server, it would maintain an access control list including all IP addresses contained in responses returned by the LoST server, as well as the LoST server itself. (It may need to translate the domain names returned to IP addresses and hope that the resolution captures all possible DNS responses.) Since the media destination addresses are not predictable, the ISP also has to provide a SIP outbound proxy so that it can determine the media addresses and add those to the filter list.



 TOC 

1.2.  No VoIP Service Provider (NVP)

In the second case, the emergency caller has no current VoIP service provider (VSP). This case poses no particular difficulties unless it is assumed that only VSPs provide LoST server or that ESNs only accept calls that reach it through a set of known VSPs. However, since the calling device cannot obtain configuration information from its VSP, the ISP MUST provide the address of a LoST server via DHCP [RFC5223] (Schulzrinne, H., Polk, J., and H. Tschofenig, “Discovering Location-to-Service Translation (LoST) Servers Using the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP),” August 2008.) if this model is to be supported. The LoST server may be operated either by the ISP or a third party.



 TOC 

1.3.  Zero-Balance VoIP Service Provider (ZBP)

In the case of zero-balance VoIP service provider, the VSP can authenticate the caller, but the caller is not authorized to place regular VoIP calls, e.g., because the contract has expired or the prepaid account for the customer has been depleted. Naturally, a VSP can simply disallow access by such customers, so that all such customers find themselves in the NVP situation described above. If VSPs desire or are required by regulation to provide emergency calling services to such customers, they need to provide LoST services to such customers and may need to provide outbound SIP proxy services. As usual, the calling device looks up the LoST server via SIP configuration.

Unless the emergency call traverses a PSTN gateway or the VSP charges for IP-to-IP calls, there is little potential for fraud. If the VSP also operates the LoST server, the outbound proxy MAY restrict outbound calls to the SIP URIs returned by the LoST server. It is NOT RECOMMENDED to rely on a fixed list of SIP URIs, as that list may change.



 TOC 

2.  A Warning Note

At the time of writing there is no regulation in place that demands the functionality described in this memo. SDOs have started their work on this subject in a proactive fashion in the anticipation that national regulation will demand it for a subset of network environments.

There are also indications that the functionality of unauthenticated emergency calls (called SIM-less calls) in today's cellular system in certain countries leads to a fair amount of hoaks or test calls. This causes overload situations at PSAPs with .

As an example, Federal Office of Communications (OFCOM, Switzerland) provided statistics about 112 calls in Switzerland from Jan. 1997 to Nov. 2001. Switzerland did not offer SIM-less emergency calls except for almost a month in July 2000 where a significant increase in hoaks and test calls was reported. As a consequence, the functionality was disabled again. More details can be found in the panel presentations of the 3rd SDO Emergency Services Workshop [esw07] (, “3rd SDO Emergency Services Workshop, http://www.emergency-services-coordination.info/2007Nov/,” October 30th - November 1st 2007.).



 TOC 

3.  Terminology

In this document, the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] (Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” March 1997.).

This document reuses terminology from [I‑D.ietf‑geopriv‑l7‑lcp‑ps] (Tschofenig, H. and H. Schulzrinne, “GEOPRIV Layer 7 Location Configuration Protocol; Problem Statement and Requirements,” July 2009.) and [RFC5012] (Schulzrinne, H. and R. Marshall, “Requirements for Emergency Context Resolution with Internet Technologies,” January 2008.), namely Internet Access Provider (IAP), Internet Service Provider (ISP), Application Service Provider (ASP), Voice Service Provider (VSP), Emergency Service Routing Proxy (ESRP), Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP), Location Configuration Server (LCS), (emergency) service dial string, and (emergency) service identifier.



 TOC 

4.  Considerations for ISPs to support Unauthenticated Emergency Services without Architecture Extensions

On a very high-level, the steps to be performed by an end host not being attached to the network and the user starting to make an emergency call are the following:

The IAP and the ISP will probably want to make sure that the claimed emergency caller indeed performs an emergency call rather than using the network for other purposes, and thereby acting fraudulent by skipping any authentication, authorization and accounting procedures. By restricting access of the unauthenticated emergency caller to the LoST server and the PSAP URI, traffic can be restricted only to emergency calls.

Using the above procedures, the unauthenticated emergency caller will be successful only if:

Some IAPs/ISPs may not be able to fulfill the above requirements. If those IAPs/ISPs want to support unauthenticated emergency calls, then they can deploy an extended architecture as described in Section 5 (Considerations for ISPs to support Unauthenticated Emergency Services with Architecture Extensions).



 TOC 

5.  Considerations for ISPs to support Unauthenticated Emergency Services with Architecture Extensions

For unauthenticated emergency services support it is insufficient to provide mechanisms only at the link layer in order to bypass authentication for the cases when:

A modification to the emergency services architecture is necessary since the IAP and the ISP need to make sure that the claimed emergency caller indeed performs an emergency call rather than using the network for other purposes, and thereby acting fraudulent by skipping any authentication, authorization and accounting procedures. Hence, without introducing some understanding of the specific application the ISP (and consequently the IAP) will not be able to detect and filter malicious activities. This leads to the architecture described in Figure 1 (Overview) where the IAP needs to implement extensions to link layer procedures for unauthenticated emergency service access and the ISP needs to deploy emergency services related entities used for call routing, such as the Emergency Services Routing Proxy (ESRP), a Location Configuration Server (LCS) and a mapping database.

On a very high-level, the interaction is as follows starting with the end host not being attached to the network and the user starting to make an emergency call.

For editorial reasons the end-to-end SIP and media exchange between the PSAP and SIP UA are not shown in Figure 1 (Overview).

Two important aspects are worth to highlight:

Figure 1 (Overview) shows that the ISP needs to deploy SIP-based emergency services functionality. It is important to note that the ISP itself may outsource the functionality by simply providing access to them (e.g., it puts the IP address of an ESRP or a LoST server into an allow-list). For editorial reasons this outsourcing is not shown.



      +---------------------------+
      |                           |
      | Emergency Network         |
      | Infrastructure            |
      |                           |
      | +----------+ +----------+ |
      | | PSAP     | | ESRP     | |
      | |          | |          | |
      | +----------+ +----------+ |
      +-------------------^-------+
                          |
                          | (7)
 +------------------------+-----------------------+
 | ISP                    |                       |
 |                        |                       |
 |+----------+            v                       |
 || Mapping  |  (6)  +----------+                 |
 || Database |<----->| ESRP /   |                 |
 |+----------+       | SIP Proxy|<-+              |
 |+----------+       +----------+  |  +----------+|
 || LCS-ISP  |          ^          |  | DHCP     ||
 ||          |<---------+          |  | Server   ||
 |+----------+     (4)             |  +----------+|
 +-------^-------------------------+-----------^--+
 +-------|-------------------------+-----------|--+
 | IAP   | (5)                     |           |  |
 |       V                         |           |  |
 |+----------+                     |           |  |
 || LCS-IAP  |       +----------+  |           |  |
 ||          |       | Link     |  |(3)        |  |
 |+----------+       | Layer    |  |           |  |
 |                   | Device   |  |        (2)|  |
 |                   +----------+  |           |  |
 |                        ^        |           |  |
 |                        |        |           |  |
 +------------------------+--------+-----------+--+
                          |        |           |
                       (1)|        |           |
                          |        |           |
                          |   +----+           |
                          v   v                |
                     +----------+              |
                     | End      |<-------------+
                     | Host     |
                     +----------+

 Figure 1: Overview 

It is important to note that a single ESRP may also offer it's service to several ISPs.



 TOC 

6.  Profiles



 TOC 

6.1.  End Host Profile



 TOC 

6.1.1.  LoST Server Discovery

The end host MAY attempt to use [I‑D.ietf‑ecrit‑lost] (Hardie, T., Newton, A., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, “LoST: A Location-to-Service Translation Protocol,” May 2008.) to discover a LoST server. If that attempt fails, the end host SHOULD attempt to discover the address of an ESRP.



 TOC 

6.1.2.  ESRP Discovery

The end host only needs an ESRP when location configuration or LoST server discovery fails. If that is the case, then the end host MUST use the "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP-for-IPv4) Option for Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Servers" [RFC3361] (Schulzrinne, H., “Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP-for-IPv4) Option for Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Servers,” August 2002.) (for IPv6) and / or the "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv6) Options for Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Servers" [RFC3319] (Schulzrinne, H. and B. Volz, “Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv6) Options for Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Servers,” July 2003.) to discover the address of an ESRP. This SIP proxy located in the ISP network will be used as the ESRP for routing emergency calls. There is no need to discovery a separate SIP proxy with specific emergency call functionality since the internal procedure for emergency call processing is subject of ISP internal operation.



 TOC 

6.1.3.  Location Determination and Location Configuration

The end host SHOULD attempt to use the supported LCPs to configure its location. If no LCP is supported in the end host or the location configuration is not successful, then the end host MUST attempt to discover an ESRP, which would assist the end host in providing the location to the PSAP.

The SIP UA in the end host SHOULD attach the location information in a PIDF-LO [RFC4119] (Peterson, J., “A Presence-based GEOPRIV Location Object Format,” December 2005.) when making an emergency call. When constructing the PIDF-LO the guidelines in PIDF-LO profile [I‑D.ietf‑geopriv‑pdif‑lo‑profile] (Winterbottom, J., Thomson, M., and H. Tschofenig, “GEOPRIV PIDF-LO Usage Clarification, Considerations and Recommendations,” November 2008.) MUST be followed. For civic location information the format defined in [RFC5139] (Thomson, M. and J. Winterbottom, “Revised Civic Location Format for Presence Information Data Format Location Object (PIDF-LO),” February 2008.) MUST be supported.



 TOC 

6.1.4.  Emergency Call Identification

To determine which calls are emergency calls, some entity needs to map a user entered dialstring into this URN scheme. A user may "dial" 1-1-2, but the call would be sent to urn:service:sos. This mapping SHOULD be performed at the endpoint device.

End hosts MUST use the Service URN mechanism [RFC5031] (Schulzrinne, H., “A Uniform Resource Name (URN) for Emergency and Other Well-Known Services,” January 2008.) to mark calls as emergency calls for their home emergency dial string (if known). For visited emergency dial string the translation into the Service URN mechanism is not mandatory since the ESRP in the ISPs network knows the visited emergency dial strings.



 TOC 

6.1.5.  SIP Emergency Call Signaling

SIP signaling capabilities [RFC3261] (Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, “SIP: Session Initiation Protocol,” June 2002.) are mandated for end hosts.

The initial SIP signaling method is an INVITE. The SIP INVITE request MUST be constructed according to the requirements in Section 9.2 [I‑D.ietf‑ecrit‑phonebcp] (Rosen, B. and J. Polk, “Best Current Practice for Communications Services in support of Emergency Calling,” January 2010.).

Regarding callback behavior SIP UAs MUST have a globally routable URI in a Contact: header.



 TOC 

6.1.6.  Media

End points MUST comply with the media requirements for end points placing an emergency call found in Section 14 of [I‑D.ietf‑ecrit‑phonebcp] (Rosen, B. and J. Polk, “Best Current Practice for Communications Services in support of Emergency Calling,” January 2010.).



 TOC 

6.1.7.  Testing

The description in Section 15 of [I‑D.ietf‑ecrit‑phonebcp] (Rosen, B. and J. Polk, “Best Current Practice for Communications Services in support of Emergency Calling,” January 2010.) is fully applicable to this document.



 TOC 

6.2.  IAP/ISP Profile



 TOC 

6.2.1.  ESRP Discovery

An ISP hosting an ESRP MUST implement the server side part of "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP-for-IPv4) Option for Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Servers" [RFC3361] (Schulzrinne, H., “Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP-for-IPv4) Option for Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Servers,” August 2002.) (for IPv4) and / or the "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv6) Options for Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Servers" [RFC3319] (Schulzrinne, H. and B. Volz, “Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv6) Options for Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Servers,” July 2003.).



 TOC 

6.2.2.  Location Determination and Location Configuration

The ISP not hosting an ESRP MUST support at least one widely used LCP. The ISP hosting an ESRP MUST perform the neccesary steps to determine the location of the end host. It is not necessary to standardize a specific mechanism.

The role of the ISP is to operate the LIS. The usage of HELD [I‑D.ietf‑geopriv‑http‑location‑delivery] (Barnes, M., Winterbottom, J., Thomson, M., and B. Stark, “HTTP Enabled Location Delivery (HELD),” August 2009.) with the identity extensions [I‑D.winterbottom‑geopriv‑held‑identity‑extensions] (Thomson, M., Tschofenig, H., Barnes, R., and J. Winterbottom, “Use of Target Identity in HTTP-Enabled Location Delivery (HELD),” August 2009.) may be a possible choice. It might be necessary for the ISP to talk to the IAP in order to determine the location of the end host. The work on LIS-to-LIS communication may be relevant, see [I‑D.winterbottom‑geopriv‑lis2lis‑req] (Winterbottom, J. and S. Norreys, “LIS to LIS Protocol Requirements,” November 2007.).



 TOC 

6.3.  ESRP Profile



 TOC 

6.3.1.  Emergency Call Routing

The ESRP must route the emergency call to the PSAP responsible for the physical location of the end host. However, a standardized approach for determining the correct PSAP based on a given location is useful but not mandatory.

For cases where a standardized protocol is used LoST [I‑D.ietf‑ecrit‑lost] (Hardie, T., Newton, A., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, “LoST: A Location-to-Service Translation Protocol,” May 2008.) is a suitable mechanism.



 TOC 

6.3.2.  Emergency Call Identification

The ESRP MUST understand the Service URN mechanism [RFC5031] (Schulzrinne, H., “A Uniform Resource Name (URN) for Emergency and Other Well-Known Services,” January 2008.) (i.e., the 'urn:service:sos' tree) and additionally the national emergency dial strings. The ESRP SHOULD perform a mapping of national emergency dial strings to Service URNs to simplify processing at PSAPs.



 TOC 

6.3.3.  SIP Emergency Call Signaling

SIP signaling capabilities [RFC3261] (Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, “SIP: Session Initiation Protocol,” June 2002.) are mandated for the ESRP. The ESRP MUST process the messages sent by the client, according to Section 6.1.5 (SIP Emergency Call Signaling). Furthermore, the ESRP MUST be able to add a reference to location information, as described in SIP Location Conveyance [I‑D.ietf‑sip‑location‑conveyance] (Polk, J. and B. Rosen, “Location Conveyance for the Session Initiation Protocol,” March 2009.), before forwarding the call to the PSAP. The ISP MUST be prepared to receive incoming dereferencing requests to resolve the reference to the location information.



 TOC 

6.3.4.  Location Retrieval

The ESRP acts a location recipient and the usage of HELD [I‑D.ietf‑geopriv‑http‑location‑delivery] (Barnes, M., Winterbottom, J., Thomson, M., and B. Stark, “HTTP Enabled Location Delivery (HELD),” August 2009.) with the identity extensions [I‑D.winterbottom‑geopriv‑held‑identity‑extensions] (Thomson, M., Tschofenig, H., Barnes, R., and J. Winterbottom, “Use of Target Identity in HTTP-Enabled Location Delivery (HELD),” August 2009.) may be a possible choice. The ESRP would thereby act as a HELD client and the corresponding LIS at the ISP as the HELD server.

The ESRP needs to obtain enough information to route the call. The ESRP itself, however, does not necessarily need to process location information obtained via HELD since it may be used as input to LoST to obtain the PSAP URI.



 TOC 

7.  Security Considerations

The security threats discussed in [RFC5069] (Taylor, T., Tschofenig, H., Schulzrinne, H., and M. Shanmugam, “Security Threats and Requirements for Emergency Call Marking and Mapping,” January 2008.) are applicable to this document. A number of security vulnerabilities discussed in [I‑D.barnes‑geopriv‑lo‑sec] (Barnes, R., Lepinski, M., Cooper, A., Morris, J., Tschofenig, H., and H. Schulzrinne, “An Architecture for Location and Location Privacy in Internet Applications,” March 2009.) around faked location information are less problematic in this case since location information does not need to be provided by the end host itself or it can be verified to fall within a specific geographical area.

There are a couple of new vulnerabilities raised with unauthenticated emergency services since the PSAP operator does is not in possession of any identity information about the emergency call via the signaling path itself. In countries where this functionality is used for GSM networks today this has lead to a significant amount of misuse.

The link layer mechanisms need to provide a special way of handling unauthenticated emergency services. Although this subject is not a topic for the IETF itself but there are at least a few high-level assumptions that may need to be collected. This includes security features that may be desirable.



 TOC 

8.  Acknowledgments

Section 6 of this document is derived from [I‑D.ietf‑ecrit‑phonebcp] (Rosen, B. and J. Polk, “Best Current Practice for Communications Services in support of Emergency Calling,” January 2010.). The WiMax Forum contributed parts of the terminology. Participants of the 2nd and 3rd SDO Emergency Services Workshop provided helpful input.



 TOC 

9.  IANA Considerations

This document does not require actions by IANA.



 TOC 

10.  References



 TOC 

10.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-sip-location-conveyance] Polk, J. and B. Rosen, “Location Conveyance for the Session Initiation Protocol,” draft-ietf-sip-location-conveyance-13 (work in progress), March 2009 (TXT).
[RFC5031] Schulzrinne, H., “A Uniform Resource Name (URN) for Emergency and Other Well-Known Services,” RFC 5031, January 2008 (TXT).
[RFC4119] Peterson, J., “A Presence-based GEOPRIV Location Object Format,” RFC 4119, December 2005 (TXT).
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-pdif-lo-profile] Winterbottom, J., Thomson, M., and H. Tschofenig, “GEOPRIV PIDF-LO Usage Clarification, Considerations and Recommendations,” draft-ietf-geopriv-pdif-lo-profile-14 (work in progress), November 2008 (TXT).
[RFC5139] Thomson, M. and J. Winterbottom, “Revised Civic Location Format for Presence Information Data Format Location Object (PIDF-LO),” RFC 5139, February 2008 (TXT).
[RFC3361] Schulzrinne, H., “Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP-for-IPv4) Option for Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Servers,” RFC 3361, August 2002 (TXT).
[RFC3319] Schulzrinne, H. and B. Volz, “Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv6) Options for Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Servers,” RFC 3319, July 2003 (TXT).
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, “SIP: Session Initiation Protocol,” RFC 3261, June 2002 (TXT).
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997 (TXT, HTML, XML).
[I-D.ietf-ecrit-phonebcp] Rosen, B. and J. Polk, “Best Current Practice for Communications Services in support of Emergency Calling,” draft-ietf-ecrit-phonebcp-14 (work in progress), January 2010 (TXT).
[RFC5222] Hardie, T., Newton, A., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, “LoST: A Location-to-Service Translation Protocol,” RFC 5222, August 2008 (TXT).
[RFC5223] Schulzrinne, H., Polk, J., and H. Tschofenig, “Discovering Location-to-Service Translation (LoST) Servers Using the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP),” RFC 5223, August 2008 (TXT).


 TOC 

10.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-ecrit-lost] Hardie, T., Newton, A., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, “LoST: A Location-to-Service Translation Protocol,” draft-ietf-ecrit-lost-10 (work in progress), May 2008 (TXT).
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-l7-lcp-ps] Tschofenig, H. and H. Schulzrinne, “GEOPRIV Layer 7 Location Configuration Protocol; Problem Statement and Requirements,” draft-ietf-geopriv-l7-lcp-ps-10 (work in progress), July 2009 (TXT).
[I-D.ietf-ecrit-framework] Rosen, B., Schulzrinne, H., Polk, J., and A. Newton, “Framework for Emergency Calling using Internet Multimedia,” draft-ietf-ecrit-framework-10 (work in progress), July 2009 (TXT).
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-http-location-delivery] Barnes, M., Winterbottom, J., Thomson, M., and B. Stark, “HTTP Enabled Location Delivery (HELD),” draft-ietf-geopriv-http-location-delivery-16 (work in progress), August 2009 (TXT).
[RFC5012] Schulzrinne, H. and R. Marshall, “Requirements for Emergency Context Resolution with Internet Technologies,” RFC 5012, January 2008 (TXT).
[I-D.winterbottom-geopriv-held-identity-extensions] Thomson, M., Tschofenig, H., Barnes, R., and J. Winterbottom, “Use of Target Identity in HTTP-Enabled Location Delivery (HELD),” draft-winterbottom-geopriv-held-identity-extensions-10 (work in progress), August 2009 (TXT).
[I-D.winterbottom-geopriv-lis2lis-req] Winterbottom, J. and S. Norreys, “LIS to LIS Protocol Requirements,” draft-winterbottom-geopriv-lis2lis-req-01 (work in progress), November 2007 (TXT).
[RFC5069] Taylor, T., Tschofenig, H., Schulzrinne, H., and M. Shanmugam, “Security Threats and Requirements for Emergency Call Marking and Mapping,” RFC 5069, January 2008 (TXT).
[I-D.barnes-geopriv-lo-sec] Barnes, R., Lepinski, M., Cooper, A., Morris, J., Tschofenig, H., and H. Schulzrinne, “An Architecture for Location and Location Privacy in Internet Applications,” draft-barnes-geopriv-lo-sec-05 (work in progress), March 2009 (TXT).
[esw07] 3rd SDO Emergency Services Workshop, http://www.emergency-services-coordination.info/2007Nov/,” October 30th - November 1st 2007.


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Authors' Addresses

  Henning Schulzrinne
  Columbia University
  Department of Computer Science
  450 Computer Science Building
  New York, NY 10027
  US
Phone:  +1 212 939 7004
Email:  hgs+ecrit@cs.columbia.edu
URI:  http://www.cs.columbia.edu
  
  Stephen McCann
  Siemens/Roke Manor Research
Email:  stephen.mccann@roke.co.uk
  
  Gabor Bajko
  Nokia
Email:  Gabor.Bajko@nokia.com
  
  Hannes Tschofenig
  Nokia Siemens Networks
  Linnoitustie 6
  Espoo 02600
  Finland
Phone:  +358 (50) 4871445
Email:  Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net
URI:  http://www.tschofenig.priv.at


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