Internet-Draft Split-Horizon DNS Configuration November 2021
Reddy, et al. Expires 10 May 2022 [Page]
Workgroup:
ADD
Internet-Draft:
draft-reddy-add-enterprise-split-dns-07
Published:
Intended Status:
Standards Track
Expires:
Authors:
T. Reddy
Akamai
D. Wing
Citrix
K. Smith
Vodafone

Split-Horizon DNS Configuration

Abstract

When split-horizon DNS is deployed by a network, certain domains are only resolvable by querying the network-designated DNS server rather than a public DNS server. DNS clients which use DNS servers not provided by the network need to route those DNS domain queries to the network-designated DNS server. This document informs DNS clients of split-horizon DNS, their DNS domains, and is compatible with encrypted DNS.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 10 May 2022.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Historically, an endpoint would utilize network-designated DNS servers upon joining a network (e.g., DHCP OFFER, IPv6 Router Advertisement). While it has long been possible to configure endpoints to ignore the network's suggestions and use a public DNS server on the Internet, this was seldom used because some networks block UDP/53 in order to enforce their own DNS policies. Also, there has been an increase in the availability of "public resolvers" [RFC8499] which DNS clients may be pre-configured to use instead of the default network resolver for a variety of reasons (e.g., offer a good reachability, support an encrypted transport, provide a claimed privacy policy, (lack of) filtering). With the advent of DoT and DoH, the endpoint is unable to properly resolve split-horizon DNS domains which must query the network-designated DNS server.

This document specifies a mechanism to indicate which DNS zones are used for split-horizon DNS. DNS clients can discover and authenticate DNS servers provided by the network, for example using the techniques proposed in [I-D.ietf-add-dnr] and [I-D.ietf-add-ddr].

The scope of the specification is split-horizon DNS names, which are not domains reserved for special use like ".local". Using these domains are difficult because bookmarks, advertising, and human behavior would need to change so that the special domains only work when connected to the correct network, which is difficult for users to discern on most endpoints. Furthermore, as special domains cannot obtain certificates from a public CA, authenticated TLS connections to those servers are fraught with (Trust on First Use) and certificate warnings, a longstanding problem in the industry.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

This document makes use of the terms defined in [RFC8499]. The terms "Private DNS", "Global DNS" and "Split DNS" are defined in [RFC8499].

'Encrypted DNS' refers to a DNS protocol that provides an encrypted channel between a DNS client and server (e.g., DoT, DoH, or DoQ).

3. Split DNS

[RFC2826] "does not preclude private networks from operating their own private name spaces" but notes that if private networks "wish to make use of names uniquely defined for the global Internet, they have to fetch that information from the global DNS naming hierarchy".

There are various DNS deployments outside of the global DNS, including "split horizon" deployments and DNS usages on private (or virtual private) networks. In a split horizon, an authoritative server gives different responses to queries from the Internet than they do to network-designated DNS servers; while some deployments differentiate internal queries from public queries by the source IP address, the concerns in Section 3.1.1 of [RFC6950] relating to trusting source IP addresses apply to such deployments.

When the internal address space range is private [RFC1918], this makes it both easier for the server to discriminate public from private and harder for public entities to impersonate nodes in the private network. The use cases that motivate split-horizon DNS typically involve restricting access to some network services -- intranet resources such as internal web sites, development servers, or directories, for example -- while preserving the ease of use offered by domain names for internal users.

A typical use case is an Enterprise network that requires one or more DNS domains to be resolved via network-designated DNS servers. This can be a special domain, such as "corp.example.com" for an enterprise that is publicly known to use "example.com". In this case, the endpoint needs to be informed what the private domain names are and what the IP addresses of the network-designated DNS servers are. An Enterprise can also run a different version of its global domain on its internal network. In that case, the client is instructed to send DNS queries for the enterprise public domain (e.g., "example.com") to the network-designated DNS servers. A configuration for this deployment scenario is referred to as a Split DNS configuration. Another use case for split-horizon DNS is Cellular and Fixed-access networks (ISPs) typically offer private domains, including account status/controls, and free education initiatives [INS].

4. Provisioning Domains dnsZones

As discussed in Section 3, internal resources in a network tend to have private DNS names. A network can also run a different version of its global domain on its internal network, and require the use of network-designated DNS servers to get resolved.

Provisioning Domains (PvDs) are defined in [RFC7556] as sets of network configuration information that clients can use to access networks, including rules for DNS resolution and proxy configuration. The PvD Key dnsZones is defined in [RFC8801]. The PvD Key dnsZones adds support for DNS domains for which the network claims authority, and which are intended to be resolved using network-designated DNS servers. The private domains in dnsZones are only reachable by devices attached and authenticated to the network. The global domains specified in the dnsZones key have a different version in the internal network. DNS resolution for other domains remains unchanged.

For each dnsZones entry, the client can use the network-designated DNS servers to resolve the listed domains and its subdomains. Other domain names may be resolved using some other DNS servers that are configured independently. For example, if the dnsZones key specifies "example.test", then "example.test", "www.example.test", and "mail.eng.example.test" can be resolved using the network-designated DNS resolver(s), but "otherexample.test" and "ple.test" can be resolved using the system's public resolver(s).

[RFC8801] defines a mechanism for discovering multiple Explicit PvDs on a single network and their Additional Information by means of an HTTP-over-TLS query using a URI derived from the PvD ID. This set of additional configuration information is referred to as a Web Provisioning Domain (Web PvD). The PvD RA option defined in [RFC8801] SHOULD set the H-flag to indicate that Additional Information is available. This Additional Information JSON object SHOULD include the "dnsZones" key to define the DNS domains for which the network claims authority.

4.1. Authority over the Domains

To comply with [RFC2826] the split-horizon DNS zone must either not exist in the global DNS hierarchy or must be authoritatively delegated to the split-horizon DNS server to answer. The DNS root zone (".") MUST be ignored if it appears in dnsZones. Other generic or global domains, such as Top-Level Domains (TLDs), similarly MUST be ignored if they appear in dnsZones.

The client can use the mechanism described in [I-D.ietf-add-dnr] to discover the network-designated resolvers. To determine if the network-designated encrypted resolvers are authoritative over the domains in dnsZones, the client performs the following steps for each domain in dnsZones:

  1. The client sends an NS query for the domain in dnsZones. This query MUST only be sent over encrypted DNS session to a public resolver that is configured independently. A DNSSEC-validating client SHOULD apply the same validation policy to the NS query as it does to other queries. A client that does not validate DNSSEC SHOULD apply the same policy (if any) to the NS query as it does to other queries.

  2. The client checks that the NS RRset matches any one of the Authentication Domain Names (ADNs) of the discovered network-designated encrypted DNS resolvers.

    1. If the match fails and no ADN of the discovered network-designated encrypted DNS resolvers is a subdomain of NS RRset, the client determines the network is not authoritative for the indicated domain. It might log an error, reject the network entirely (because the network lied about its authority over a domain) or other action.
    2. If the match fails but any one of the ADNs of the discovered network-designated encrypted DNS resolvers is a subdomain of NS RRset, the client can then establish a TLS connection to that network-designated resolver. The client follows the mechanism discussed in Section 8 of [RFC8310] to authenticate the DNS server certificate using the ADN and checks if at least one of the values in subjectAltName matches NS RRset. If the server certificate validation and match succeeds, the client can subsequently resolve the domains in that subtree using the network-designated resolver. If the server certificate does not validate or match fails, the client can proceed as discussed in step 2 (A).

    3. If the match succeeds, the client can then establish a TLS connection to that network-designated resolver. The client follows the mechanism discussed in Section 8 of [RFC8310] to authenticate the DNS server certificate using the ADN.

      • If the server certificate does not validate and a secure connection cannot be established to the network designated resolver, the client can proceed as discussed in step 2 (A).
      • If the server certificate validation is successful and a secure connection is established, the client can subsequently resolve the domains in that subtree using the network-designated resolver.
  3. As an exception to this rule, the client need not perform the above validation for domains reserved for special use [RFC6761] or [RFC6762] such as ".home.arpa" or ".local".
  4. Authenticated denial of existence using NSEC3 or NSEC records can be used by a client to identify that the domain name does not exist in the global DNS.

For example, if in a network the private domain names are defined under "internal.corp1.example.com". The dnsZones PvD Key would indicate that "*.internal.corp1.example.com" are private domain names. The client can trigger a NS query of "internal.corp1.example.com" and the NS RRset returns that the nameserver is "ns1.corp2.example.com". The client would then connect to the network-designated encrypted resolver whose name is "ns1.corp2.example.com", authenticate it using server certificate validation in TLS handshake, and use it for resolving the domains in the subtree of "*.internal.corp1.example.com".

5. An example of Split-Horizon DNS Configuration

In a network the apex domain name is "example.com", which runs a different version of its global domain on its internal network. Today, on the Internet it publishes two NS records, "ns1.example.com" and "ns2.example.com".

To add support for the mechanism described in this document, the network and endpoints first need to support [I-D.ietf-add-dnr] and [RFC8801]. Then, for each site the administrator would add DNS server names which end in "ns1.example.com" or "ns2.example.com" (the names published on the Internet). Also on its internal network, it uses a geographic naming scheme for its internal nameservers with a "service dot location" naming scheme. Assuming its two geographies are "us" and "uk". So the UK site would add "ns1.uk.ns1.example.com" and "ns2.uk.ns2.example.com". Note that these names can be added in addition to more traditional names that might already exist for those DNS servers (e.g., the common "service dot location" such as "ns1.uk.example.com"). All of those names would be advertised to the endpoints as described in [I-D.ietf-add-dnr].

The endpoints compliant with this specification can then determine the network's internal nameservers are owned and managed by the same entity that has published the NS records on the Internet, as described in the following paragraphs:

Continuing with the UK site as the example, the endpoint will join the network, obtain an IPv6 address, and using [I-D.ietf-add-dnr] will discover the resolvers "ns1.uk.ns1.example.com" and "ns2.uk.ns2.example.com" and their IP addresses. Using [RFC8801] (which utilizes IPv6 Router Advertisments), the endpoint will also discover the PvD FQDN is "pvd.uk.example.com".

Continuing with the UK site as the example, the endpoint performs the following steps corresponding with the call flow diagram numbers:

Steps 1-2:
The client joins the network, obtain an IP address, and using [I-D.ietf-add-dnr] will discover the resolvers "ns1.uk.ns1.example.com" and "ns2.uk.ns1.example.com" and their IP addresses. Using [RFC8801], the endpoint will also discover the PvD FQDN is "pvd.uk.example.com".
Steps 3-7:

The client establishes an encrypted DNS connection with "ns1.uk.ns1.example.com", validates its TLS certificate, and queries it for "pvd.uk.example.com" to retrieve the PvD JSON object. Note that [RFC8801] in Section 4.1 mandates the PvD FQDN MUST be resolved using the DNS servers indicated by the associated PvD. The PvD contains:

 {
    "identifier": "pvd.uk.example.com",
    "expires": "2020-05-23T06:00:00Z",
    "prefixes": ["2001:db8:1::/48", "2001:db8:4::/48"],
    "dnsZones:": ["example.com"]
  }

The JSON keys "identifier", "expires", and "prefixes" are defined in [RFC8801].

Steps 8-9:
The client then uses an encrypted DNS connection to a public resolver (e.g., 1.1.1.1) to issue NS queries for the domains in dnsZones. The NS lookup for "example.com" will return "ns1.example.com" and "ns2.example.com".
Step 10:
As the network-provided nameservers are subdomains of those names retrieved from the public resolver and the network-designated resolver's certificate includes at least one of the names retrieved from the public resolver, the client has finished validation that the nameservers signaled in [I-D.ietf-add-dnr] and [RFC8801] are owned and managed by the same entity that published the NS records on the Internet. The endpoint will then use that information from [I-D.ietf-add-dnr] and [RFC8801] to resolve names within dnsZones.

Figure 1 is a simple call flow diagram of the example discussed above.

+---------+                   +-------------------+  +------------+ +---------+ +---------+
| client  |                   | Network           |  | Network    | | Router  | | public  |
|         |                   | encrypted resolvr |  | PvD server | |         | | resolvr |
+---------+                   +-------------------+  +------------+ +---------+ +---------+
     |                                          |         |          |           |
     | Router Solicitation (1)                  |         |          |           |
     |-------------------------------------------------------------->|           |
     |                                          |         |          |           |
     |       Router Advertisement with DNR hostnames & PvD FQDN (2)  |           |
     |<--------------------------------------------------------------|           |
     | -------------------------------------\   |         |          |           |
     |-| now knows DNR hostnames & PvD FQDN |   |         |          |           |
     | |------------------------------------|   |         |          |           |
     |                                          |         |          |           |
     | TLS connection (3)                       |         |          |           |
     |----------------------------------------->|         |          |           |
     | ---------------------------\             |         |          |           |
     |-| validate TLS certificate |             |         |          |           |
     | |--------------------------|             |         |          |           |
     |                                          |         |          |           |
     | resolve pvd.uk.example.com  (4)          |         |          |           |
     |----------------------------------------->|         |          |           |
     |                                          |         |          |           |
     |                         AAAA records (5) |         |          |           |
     |<-----------------------------------------|         |          |           |
     |                                          |         |          |           |
     | https://pvd.uk.example.com/.well-known/pvd (6)     |          |           |
     |--------------------------------------------------->|          |           |
     |                                          |         |          |           |
     |       200 OK (JSON Additional Information) (7)     |          |           |
     |<---------------------------------------------------|          |           |
     | -----------------------\                 |         |          |           |
     |-| dnsZones=example.com |                 |         |          |           |
     | |----------------------|                 |         |          |           |
     |                                          |         |          |           |
     | TLS connection                           |         |          |           |
     |-------------------------------------------------------------------------->|
     | ---------------------------\             |         |          |           |
     |-| validate TLS certificate |             |         |          |           |
     | |--------------------------|             |         |          |           |
     |                                          |         |          |           |
     | NS? example.com  (8)                     |         |          |           |
     |-------------------------------------------------------------------------->|
     |                                          |         |          |           |
     |                               NS=ns1.example.com, ns2.example.com (9)     |
     |<--------------------------------------------------------------------------|
     | -------------------------------\         |         |          |           |
     |-| ns1.uk.ns1.example.com is    |         |         |          |           |
     | | subdomain of ns1.example.com |         |         |          |           |
     | ----------------------\--------|         |         |          |           |
     |-| finished validation |                  |         |          |           |
     | |---------------------|                  |         |          |           |
     |                                          |         |          |           |
     |  use network-designated resolver         |         |          |           |
     |  for example.com (10)                    |         |          |           |
     |----------------------------------------->|         |          |           |
     |                                          |         |          |           |
Figure 1: An Example of Split-Horizon DNS Configuration

6. Split DNS Configuration for IKEv2

The split-tunnel Virtual Private Network (VPN) configuration allows the endpoint to access resources that reside in the VPN [RFC8598] via the tunnel; other traffic not destined to the VPN does not traverse the tunnel. In contrast, a non-split- tunnel VPN configuration causes all traffic to traverse the tunnel into the VPN.

When the VPN tunnel is IPsec, the encrypted DNS resolver hosted by the VPN service provider can be securely discovered by the endpoint using the ENCDNS_IP*_* IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute Types defined in [I-D.btw-add-ipsecme-ike]. For split-tunnel VPN configurations, the endpoint uses the discovered encrypted DNS server to resolve domain names for which the VPN provider claims authority. For non-split-tunnel VPN configurations, the endpoint uses the discovered encrypted DNS server to resolve both global and private domain names. For split-tunnel VPN configurations, the IKE client can use the steps discussed in Section 4.1 to determine if the VPN service provider is authoritative over the INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN domains.

Other VPN tunnel types have similar configuration capabilities, not detailed here.

7. Security Considerations

The content of dnsZones may be passed to another (DNS) program for processing. As with any network input, the content SHOULD be considered untrusted and handled accordingly. The client must perform the steps discussed in Section 4.1 to determine if the network-designated encrypted resolvers are authoritative over the domains in dnsZones. If not, the client can take appropriate action like disconnecting from the network.

In order to deploy DNSSEC operationally for split-horizon domains, the first three schemes described in [I-D.krishnaswamy-dnsop-dnssec-split-view] can be used but not the one discussed in Section 4.1.4. Alternatively, after validating the network authority over the dnsZones domains Section 4.1, a DNSSEC-validating client can reconfigure its stub resolver to disable DNSSEC validation for the domains in dnsZones. The deployment model discussed in this document assumes a hybrid DNS server that acts both as a recursive server and is also authoritative for the domains in dnsZones. It prevents DNS cache-poisoning attacks for the dnsZones domains.

8. IANA Considerations

This document has no IANA actions..

9. Acknowledgements

Thanks to Mohamed Boucadair, Jim Reid, Ben Schwartz, Tommy Pauly, Paul Vixie, Paul Wouters and Vinny Parla for the discussion and comments. The authors would like to give special thanks to Ben Schwartz for his help.

10. References

10.1. Normative References

[RFC1918]
Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G. J., and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1918>.
[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2826]
Internet Architecture Board, "IAB Technical Comment on the Unique DNS Root", RFC 2826, DOI 10.17487/RFC2826, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2826>.
[RFC6761]
Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Special-Use Domain Names", RFC 6761, DOI 10.17487/RFC6761, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6761>.
[RFC6762]
Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Multicast DNS", RFC 6762, DOI 10.17487/RFC6762, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6762>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8310]
Dickinson, S., Gillmor, D., and T. Reddy, "Usage Profiles for DNS over TLS and DNS over DTLS", RFC 8310, DOI 10.17487/RFC8310, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8310>.
[RFC8801]
Pfister, P., Vyncke, É., Pauly, T., Schinazi, D., and W. Shao, "Discovering Provisioning Domain Names and Data", RFC 8801, DOI 10.17487/RFC8801, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8801>.

10.2. Informative References

[I-D.btw-add-ipsecme-ike]
Boucadair, M., Reddy, T., Wing, D., and V. Smyslov, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) Configuration for Encrypted DNS", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike-03, , <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike-03.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-add-ddr]
Pauly, T., Kinnear, E., Wood, C. A., McManus, P., and T. Jensen, "Discovery of Designated Resolvers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-add-ddr-03, , <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-add-ddr-03.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-add-dnr]
Boucadair, M., Reddy, T., Wing, D., Cook, N., and T. Jensen, "DHCP and Router Advertisement Options for the Discovery of Network-designated Resolvers (DNR)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-add-dnr-02, , <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-add-dnr-02.txt>.
[I-D.krishnaswamy-dnsop-dnssec-split-view]
Krishnaswamy, S., "Split-View DNSSEC Operational Practices", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-krishnaswamy-dnsop-dnssec-split-view-04, , <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-krishnaswamy-dnsop-dnssec-split-view-04.txt>.
[INS]
The Unicode Consortium, "Vodafone Foundation Instant Schools for Sub-Saharan Africa", <https://www.vodafone.com/about/vodafone-foundation/focus-areas/instant-schools>.
[RFC6950]
Peterson, J., Kolkman, O., Tschofenig, H., and B. Aboba, "Architectural Considerations on Application Features in the DNS", RFC 6950, DOI 10.17487/RFC6950, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6950>.
[RFC7556]
Anipko, D., Ed., "Multiple Provisioning Domain Architecture", RFC 7556, DOI 10.17487/RFC7556, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7556>.
[RFC8499]
Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS Terminology", BCP 219, RFC 8499, DOI 10.17487/RFC8499, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8499>.
[RFC8598]
Pauly, T. and P. Wouters, "Split DNS Configuration for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC 8598, DOI 10.17487/RFC8598, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8598>.

Authors' Addresses

Tirumaleswar Reddy
Akamai
Embassy Golf Link Business Park
Bangalore 560071
Karnataka
India
Dan Wing
Citrix Systems, Inc.
4988 Great America Pkwy
Santa Clara, CA 95054
United States of America
Kevin Smith
Vodafone Group
One Kingdom Street
London
United Kingdom