| Internet-Draft | RFC 5280 Clarifications | December 2024 |
| Liu, et al. | Expires 4 June 2025 | [Page] |
The updates to RFC 5280 described in this document provide alignment with the 2013 specification for the X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol-OCSP [RFC6960].¶
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For the relying parties of Web PKI, certificate path construction and certificate validation are necessary security review processes. With regard to the implementation of certificate validation process for Internet browsers, the mainstream Internet browser implementation generally follows "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280] standard formulated in 2008. This version of the standard has a long history is not in line with existing practice, and with the development of technology and new features, such as the invention and standardization of certificate transparency system[RFC6962] and online certificate status protocol OCSP [RFC6960], browser manufacturers have not fully followed or enabled them. These new features of check are very helpful for building practical certificate security; In addition, considering the needs of manufacturers, the implementation of Internet browsers inevitably includes various private code implementations, and the certificate validation process in the Internet browser industry is relatively messy and arbitrary. In view of this situation, this document proposes some updates of the latest reference of certificate status information mechanism description for the RFC5280 in line with existing practice, to provide reference for Internet browser manufacturers.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
This section provides updates to several paragraphs of RFC 5280 [RFC5280]. For clarity, if the entire section is not replaced, then the original text and the replacement text are shown.¶
This update provides references for OCSP¶
OLD:¶
* Operational protocols are required to deliver certificates and CRLs (or status information) to certificate-using client systems. Provisions are needed for a variety of different means of certificate and CRL delivery, including distribution procedures based on LDAP, HTTP, FTP, and X.500. Operational protocols supporting these functions are defined in other PKIX specifications. These specifications may include definitions of message formats and procedures for supporting all of the above operational environments, including definitions of or references to appropriate MIME content types.¶
NEW:¶
* Operational protocols are required to deliver certificates and status information (CRLs or OCSP or other out-of-band means etc.,) to certificate-using client systems. Provisions are needed for a variety of different means of certificate and CRL or OCSP or out-of-band status delivery, including distribution procedures based on LDAP, HTTP, FTP, and X.500. Operational protocols supporting these functions are defined in other PKIX specifications. These specifications may include definitions of message formats and procedures for supporting all of the above operational environments, including definitions of or references to appropriate MIME content types.¶
This update provides references for OCSP¶
OLD:¶
* CRL issuers issue CRLs. The CRL issuer is either the CA or an entity that has been authorized by the CA to issue CRLs. CAs publish CRLs to provide status information about the certificates they issued. However, a CA may delegate this responsibility to another trusted authority.¶
NEW:¶
* CRL issuers issue CRLs. The CRL issuer is either the CA or an entity that has been authorized by the CA to issue CRLs. CAs publish CRLs or OCSP to provide status information about the certificates they issued. However, a CA may delegate this responsibility to another trusted authority.¶
This update provides references for OCSP¶
OLD:¶
* (3) At the current time, the certificate is not revoked. This may be determined by obtaining the appropriate CRL (Section 6.3), by status information, or by out-of-band mechanisms.¶
NEW:¶
* At the current time, the certificate is not revoked. This may be determined by obtaining the appropriate CRL (Section 6.3), or by status information from OCSP, or by out-of-band mechanisms, such as Certificate Transparency.¶
This update provides references for OCSP¶
OLD:¶
* Representation of internationalized names in distinguished names is covered in Sections 4.1.2.4, Issuer Name, and 4.1.2.6, Subject Name. Standard naming attributes, such as common name, employ the DirectoryString type, which supports internationalized names through a variety of language encodings. Conforming implementations MUST support UTF8String and PrintableString. RFC 3280 required only binary comparison of attribute values encoded in UTF8String, however, this specification requires a more comprehensive handling of comparison. Implementations may encounter certificates and CRLs with names encoded using TeletexString, BMPString, or UniversalString, but support for these is OPTIONAL.¶
NEW:¶
* Representation of internationalized names in distinguished names is covered in Sections 4.1.2.4, Issuer Name, and 4.1.2.6, Subject Name. Standard naming attributes, such as common name, employ the DirectoryString type, which supports internationalized names through a variety of language encodings. Conforming implementations MUST support UTF8String and PrintableString. RFC 3280 required only binary comparison of attribute values encoded in UTF8String, however, this specification requires a more comprehensive handling of comparison. Implementations may encounter certificates and CRLs or OCSP with names encoded using TeletexString, BMPString, or UniversalString, but support for these is OPTIONAL.¶
This update provides references for OCSP¶
OLD:¶
* Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs) may be included in certificates and CRLs in the subjectAltName and issuerAltName extensions, name constraints extension, authority information access extension, subject information access extension, CRL distribution points extension, and issuing distribution point extension. Each of these extensions uses the GeneralName type; one choice in GeneralName is the dNSName field, which is defined as type IA5String.¶
NEW:¶
* Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs) may be included in certificates and CRLs and OCSP etc,. in the subjectAltName and issuerAltName extensions, name constraints extension, authority information access extension, subject information access extension, CRL distribution points extension, and issuing distribution point extension, TBSRequest field. Each of these extensions uses the GeneralName type; one choice in GeneralName is the dNSName field, which is defined as type IA5String.¶
This update provides references for OCSP¶
OLD:¶
* Electronic Mail addresses may be included in certificates and CRLs in the subjectAltName and issuerAltName extensions, name constraints extension, authority information access extension, subject information access extension, issuing distribution point extension, or CRL distribution points extension. Each of these extensions uses the GeneralName construct; GeneralName includes the rfc822Name choice, which is defined as type IA5String. To accommodate email addresses with internationalized domain names using the current structure, conforming implementations MUST convert the addresses into an ASCII representation.¶
NEW:¶
* Electronic Mail addresses may be included in certificates and CRLs or OCSP in the subjectAltName and issuerAltName extensions, name constraints extension, authority information access extension, subject information access extension, issuing distribution point extension, or CRL distribution points extension, or TBSRequest field. Each of these extensions uses the GeneralName construct; GeneralName includes the rfc822Name choice, which is defined as type IA5String. To accommodate email addresses with internationalized domain names using the current structure, conforming implementations MUST convert the addresses into an ASCII representation.¶
This memo includes no request to IANA.¶
For the relying parties of Web PKI, certificate path construction and certificate validation are necessary security review processes.The quality of implementations that process certificates also affects the degree of assurance provided. The path validation algorithm described in Section 6 relies upon the integrity of the trusted CA information, and especially the integrity of the status information associated with the certificate. By providing multiple checking mechanisms, an attacker cannot trick the user into accepting false certificates.this document proposes some updates of the latest reference of certificate status information mechanism description for the RFC5280 in line with existing practice, to provide security reference for Internet browser manufacturers.¶