| Internet-Draft | e2ee | April 2023 |
| Knodel, et al. | Expires 22 October 2023 | [Page] |
This document provides a definition of end-to-end encryption (E2EE) from both the perspective of a regular internet user as well as from the perspective of required properties for implementers.¶
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End-to-end encryption is an application of cryptography mechanisms and properties in communication systems between endpoints. End-to- end encrypted systems are exceptional in providing both security and privacy properties through confidentiality, integrity and authenticity features for users. Improvements to end-to-end encryption strive to maximize the user's security and privacy while balancing usability and availability. Users of end-to-end encrypted communications expect trustworthy providers of secure implementations to respect and protect them.¶
This document describes that end-to-end encryption MUST provide both security and privacy properties. It provides a definition of which specific security and privacy properties end-to-end encryption should provide.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
End-to-end encryption, irrespective of the content or the specific methods employed, relies on two important and rigorous technical concepts: the end-to-end principle as defined in the IETF; and encryption, an application of cryptographic mechanisms and the primary means employed by the IETF to secure internet protocols and maintain the confidentiality of content delivered via these internet protocols. Where end-to-end encryption is comprised of these necessary constituent parts, a systems approach also defines their interplay. In the field of cryptography it is also possible to achieve a concise definition of end-to-end encrypted security.¶
An "end" either sends messages or receives them, usually both. Other systems on the path are just that: other systems. Other systems MAY be used to facilitate the sending of messages between both "ends", but are not "ends" themselves.¶
It is, however, not trivial to establish the definition of an end point in isolation. [hale] Depending on the context, an "end" may be a user; a device colocated with the user; or a set of devices controlled by a user that want to simultaneously participate in the conversation.¶
The end-to-end principle is a core architectural guideline of the Internet. [RFC3724]¶
The principle has evolved to an understanding that the "network's job is to transmit datagrams as efficiently and flexibly as possible", and the rest should be done at the ends. [RFC1958] This principle can also be extended to the design of applications itself. [saltzer][RFC3724][RFC3238]¶
Encryption is the process of using cryptographic methods to convert plaintext to ciphertext that is decipherable only by authorized parties. Encryption can help extend the end-to-end principle in application design, where now (as before) the function of the network is limited to efficiently transporting messages, but additionally the network cannot access any part of the message itself.¶
Encryption can be applied in an end-to-end context in many ways. For example, applications may use the double-ratchet algorithm (which uses an authenticated encryption scheme) and of an Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE). The usage of these algorithms (or variants of these) is present in many modern messenger applications such as those adopted in the IETF Messaging Layer Security working group, whose charter is to create a document that satisfies the need for several internet applications for group key establishment and message protection protocols [mls]. OpenPGP, mostly used for email, uses a different technique to achieve security and privacy. It is also chartered in the IETF to create a specification that covers object encryption, object signing, and identity certification [openpgp]. Both protocols rely on the use of asymmetric and symmetric encryption, and exchange long-term identity public keys amongst end points.¶
An end-to-end-encryption service provides confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity between ends. Another concise definition already exists for messaging: "End-to-end instant message encryption would conceal communications between one user's instant messaging application through any intermediate devices and servers all the way to the recipient's instant messaging application." [dkg]¶
Confidentiality is broken if content can be decrypted at any intermediate point.¶
As for integrity and authenticity, permission of data manipulation or creation of pseudo-identities for third parties to allow access under the user's identity also violate end-to-end encryption. In other words, the application functions only for the end user and does not perform functions for any other entity coverly, nor overtly, say even if that entity claims to have obtained the consent of the end user. Thus, end point authenticity MUST be established as (sub-)identities of the end user, and end-to-end integrity MUST also be maintained by the system. There is considerable system design flexibility available in the mechanisms for authentication and integrity, specifically data authentication, that still meet this requirement.¶
When looking at implementations of end-to-end encryption from a design perspective, the first consideration is the list of fundamental features that distinguish an end-to-end encrypted system from one that does not employ end-to-end encryption. Secondly, one must consider the development goals for improving the features of end-to-end encryption, in other words, the challenges defined by the designers, developers and implementers of end-to-end encryption.¶
The features and challenges listed below are framed comprehensively rather than from the perspective of their design, development, implementation or use.¶
This section defines the security properties of an end-to-end encrypted system. The properties of end-to-end encryption from an implementation perspective can be split into two categories: 1) the required core properties of confidentiality, integrity and authenticity and 2) recommended additional properties for improved security, such as availability, deniability, forward secrecy, and post-compromise security, which are desirable enhancements.¶
A system provides message confidentiality if only the sender and intended recipient(s) can read the message plaintext, i.e. messages sent between participants can only be read by the agreed upon participants in the group and all participants share the identical group member list.¶
A system provides message integrity when it guarantees that messages have not been modified in transit. If a message has been modified, it must be detected in a reliable way by the recipient.¶
A system provides authentication if the recipient and sender attest to each other's identities in relation to the contents of their communications.¶
There is a set of optional/desirable features that a end-to-end system can provide. These properties can be related to the network, to the user interface or specialized variants of the previous features.¶
A system provides high availability if the user is able to access the contents of the message (decrypt them) when they so desire and potentially from more than one device. For example, a message can arrive to a recipient even after they have been offline for a long time. Note that applications that use this feature often implement a threshold for this property: number or aggregate size of messages; or messages from a month ago can be read by a user that has been offline, but not messages from a year ago.¶
If a message is permanently lost by the network, sender(s) and/or recipient(s) should still be able to communicate.¶
Deniability ensures that anyone able to decrypt a record of the transcript, including message recipients, cannot cryptographically prove to others that a particular participant of a communication authored a specific message. As demonstrated by widely implemented protocols, this optional property must exist in conjunction with the necessary property of authentication, i.e. participants in a communication must be assured that they are communicating with the intended parties but this assurance cannot be transmitted to any other parties.¶
Forward secrecy is a security property that prevents attackers from decrypting encrypted data they have previously captured over a communication channel before the time of compromise, if the attacker compromises one of the endpoints. Forward secrecy is usually achieved by regularly deriving new encryption/decryption keys, and destroying old keys that are no longer required to encrypt or decrypt messages.¶
Post-compromise security is a security property that seeks to guarantee future confidentiality and integrity in the face of a passive end-point compromise (and consequently that communication sent post-compromise is protected with the same security properties that existed before the compromise). It is usually achieved by adding new ephemeral key exchanges (new randomness) to the derivation of encryption/decryption keys every 'x' amount of time or after 'n' messages sent. Note that post-compromise security is not met in the face of active attackers that compromise an end-point. This property can add a level of complexity to a protocol as deriving new key material can be expensive, and, therefore, it has to be carefully evaluated as part of a system's design.¶
Digital communication inevitably generates data other than the content of the communication itself, such as IP addresses, group memberships, and date and time of messages. To enhance the privacy and security of end-to-end encryption, steps should be taken to minimize metadata. Additional steps should be taken to prevent leakage such as hiding users' IP addresses, reducing non-routing metadata, and avoiding extraneous message headers.¶
For confidential conversations, deleting one-by-one sensitive messages typically depends on a level of client-side security that is unsustainable. For example, endusers can still copy text or screenshot images outside the secured client application. A certain level of trust among users of the system is required. That said, features like "delete for me", "delete for everyone" or "disppearing messages" which is time based automated deletion of content do still provide a valuable defense amongst trusted parties in the event of a compromise of a device of one of the participants.¶
Below is a best effort list of the challenges currently faced by protocol designers of end-to-end encrypted systems. Problems that fall outside of this list are likely 1) unnecessary feature requests that negligibly, or do nothing to, achieve the aims of end-to-end encrypted systems, or are 2) in some way antithetical to the goals of end-to-end encrypted systems.¶
While the formal definition and properties of an end-to-end encrypted system relate to communication security and privacy, they do not draw from a comprehensive threat model or speak to what users expect from end-to-end encrypted communication. It is in this context that some designs and architectures of end-to-end encryption may ultimately run contrary to user expectations of end-to-end encrypted systems [GEC-EU]. Although some system designs do not directly violate "the math" of encryption algorithms, they do so by implicating and weakening other important aspects of an end-to-end encrypted system.¶
Users talking to one another in an end-to-end encrypted system should be the only ones that know what they are talking about [RFC7624]. People have the right to data privacy as defined in international human rights law, and within the right to free expression and to hold opinions is inferred the right to whisper, whether or not they are using digital communications or walking through a field.¶
A system is completely trustworthy if and only if it is completely resilient, reliable, accountable, and secure in a way that consistently meets users’ expectations.¶
This definition is complete in its positive and negative aspects: what it is, e.g. "Worthy of confidence" and what it is not, e.g. in RFC 7258: "behavior that subverts the intent of communicating parties without the agreement of those parties" [RFC7258].¶
Therefore, a trustworthy end-to-end encrypted communication system is the provider of the set of functions needed by two or more parties to communicate among each other in a confidential, authenticated and integrity-preserving fashion without any third party having access to the content of that communication where the functions that offer the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity-preservation are providing these services to only the participants whom all know who are in the conversation.¶
No matter the specifics, any methods used to access to the content of the messages by a third party would violate a user's expectations of end-to-end encrypted messaging. "[T]hese access methods scan message contents on the user’s [device]", which are then "scanned for matches against a database of prohibited content before, and sometimes after, the message is sent to the recipient" [GEC-EU]. Third party access also covers cases without scanning -- namely, it should not be possible for any third-party end point, even those under the user's identity as per Section 2.1, to access the data regardless of reason.¶
If a method makes secure and private communication, intended to be sent over an encrypted channel between end points, available to parties other than the sender and intended recipient(s), that method violates the understood expectation of that security property.¶
A way by which users can reduce the risk of their system containing a "backdoor" and confirm their system is performing in accordance to cryptographic protocols' specifications is using systems that are releasing their software as open source. Open source software allows technical users to analyse the system and be assured of its functioning. While most users will not be able to do so, as typical users lack the technological knowledge needed to analyse source code, technilogical communities can do so. It is vital that systems provide public security analyses of their source code enabling reproducible builds and audits and investigations that can be published and peer reviewed.¶
Analyses such as traffic fingerprinting or other (encrypted or unencrypted) data analysis techniques, outside of or as part of end-to-end encrypted system design, allow third parties to draw inferences from communication that was intended to be confidential. "By allowing private user data to be scanned via direct access by servers and their providers," the use of these methods should be considered an affront to "the privacy expectations of users of end-to-end encrypted communication systems" [GEC-EU].¶
Not only should an end-to-end encrypted system value user data privacy by not explicitly enabling pattern inference, it should actively be attempting to solve issues of metadata and traceability (enhanced metadata) through further innovation that stays ahead of advances in these techniques.¶
RFC 3552 talks about the Internet Threat model such as the assumption that the user can expect any communications systems, but perhaps especially end-to-end encrypted systems, to not be intentionally compromised [RFC3552]. Intentional compromises of end-to-end encryption are usually referred to as "backdoors" but are often presented as additional design features under terms like "key escrow" or "exceptional access". Users of end-to-end encryption would not expect a front, back or side door entrance into their confidential conversations and would expect a provider to actively resist -- technically and legally -- compromise through these means.¶
From messaging to video conferencing, there are many competing features in an end-to-end encrypted implementation that is secure, private and usable. The most well designed system cannot meet the expectations of every user, nor does an ideal system exist from any dimension. End-to-end encryption is a technology that is constantly improving to achieve the ideal as defined in this document.¶
Features and functionalities of end-to-end encryption should be developed and improved in service of end user expectations for privacy preserving communications.¶
Fred Baker, Stephen Farrell, Richard Barnes all contributed to the early strategic thinking of this document and whether it would be useful to the IETF community.¶
The folks at Riseup and the LEAP Encryption Access Project have articulated brilliantly the hardest parts of end-to-end encryption systems that serve the end users' right to whisper.¶
Ryan Polk at the Internet Society has energy to spare when it comes to organising meaningful contributions, like this one, for the technical advisors of the Global Encryption Coalition.¶
Adrian Farrel, Eric Rescorla and Paul Wouters are acknowleded for their review, comments, or questions that lead to improvement of this document.¶
Chelsea Komlo and Britta Hale have contributed their deep expertise and consice and rigourous writing to this draft.¶
This document does not specify new protocols and therefore does not bring up technical security considerations.¶
Because some policy decisions may affect the security of the internet, a clear and shared definition of end-to-end encryption is important in policy related discussions. This document aims to provide that clarity.¶
This document has no actions for IANA.¶