TOC 
Network Working GroupA. Kato
Internet-DraftS. Kanno
Intended status: Standards TrackNTT Software Corporation
Expires: March 13, 2010M. Kanda
 NTT
 September 09, 2009


The Use of Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) Modes of Operation for Camellia and Its Use With IPsec
draft-kato-ipsec-camellia-gcm-02

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Abstract

This document describes the use of the Camellia block ciper algorithm in Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) as an IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) mechanism to provide confidentiality and data origin authentication.


Table of Contents

1.  Introduction
    1.1.  Terminology
2.  Camelllia-GCM
3.  IKE Conventions
    3.1.  Keying Material and Salt Values
    3.2.  Phase 1 Identifier
    3.3.  Phase 2 Identifier
    3.4.  Key Length Attribute
4.  Test Vectors
5.  Security Considerations
6.  IANA Considerations
7.  Acknowledgments
8.  References
    8.1.  Normative
    8.2.  Informative
§  Authors' Addresses



 TOC 

1.  Introduction

This document describes the use of the Camellia block cipher algorithm in GCM Mode (Camellia-GCM) , as an IPsec ESP mechanism to provide confidentiality, and data origin authentication. We refer to this method as Camellia-GCM-ESP.

The algorithm specification and object identifiers are described in [5] (Matsui, M., Nakajima, J., and S. Moriai, “A Description of the Camellia Encryption Algorithm,” April 2004.).

GCM mode provides Counter mode (CTR) with data origin authentication. This document does not cover implementation details of GCM. Those details can be found in [1] (Dworkin, M., “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for Confidentiality and Authentication,” April 2006.).


 TOC 

1.1.  Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [3] (Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” March 1997.).


 TOC 

2.  Camelllia-GCM

Camellia-GCM comply with [2] (Viega, J. and D. McGrew, “The Use of Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP),” June 2005.) on following points: 

      - ESP Payload Data
      - Initialization Vector
      - Cipher text
      - Nonce Format
      - AAD Construction
      - Integrity Check Value
      - Packet Expansion


 TOC 

3.  IKE Conventions

This section describes the conventions used to generate keying material and salt values, for use with Camellia-GCM-ESP, using the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) [4] (Kaufman, C., “Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol,” December 2005.) protocol. The identifiers and attributes needed to negotiate a security association using Camellia-GCM-ESP are also defined.


 TOC 

3.1.  Keying Material and Salt Values

IKE makes use of a pseudo-random function (PRF) to derive keying material. The PRF is used iteratively to derive keying material of arbitrary size, called KEYMAT. Keying material is extracted from the output string without regard to boundaries.

The size of the KEYMAT for the Camellia-GCM-ESP MUST be four octets longer than is needed for the associated Camellia key. The keying material is used as follows:

Camellia-GCM-ESP with a 128 bit key
The KEYMAT requested for each Camellia-GCM key is 20 octets. The first 16 octets are the 128-bit Camellia key, and the remaining four octets are used as the salt value in the nonce.
Camellia-GCM-ESP with a 192 bit key
The KEYMAT requested for each Camellia-GCM key is 28 octets. The first 24 octets are the 192-bit Camellia key, and the remaining four octets are used as the salt value in the nonce.
Camellia-GCM-ESP with a 256 bit key
The KEYMAT requested for each Camellia GCM key is 36 octets. The first 32 octets are the 256-bit Camellia key, and the remaining four octets are used as the salt value in the nonce.

 TOC 

3.2.  Phase 1 Identifier

This document does not specify the conventions for using Camellia-GCM for IKE Phase 1 negotiations. For Camellia-GCM to be used in this manner, a separate specification is needed, and an Encryption Algorithm Identifier needs to be assigned. Implementations SHOULD use an IKE Phase 1 cipher that is at least as strong as Camellia-GCM. The use of Camellia CBC [6] (Kato, A., Moriai, S., and M. Kanda, “The Camellia Cipher Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec,” December 2005.) with the same key size used by Camellia-GCM-ESP is RECOMMENDED.


 TOC 

3.3.  Phase 2 Identifier

For IKE Phase 2 negotiations, IANA has assigned three ESP Transform Identifiers for Camellia-GCM with an eight-byte explicit IV: 

      <TBD1> for Camellia-GCM with an 8 octet ICV;
      <TBD2> for Camellia-GCM with a 12 octet ICV; and
      <TBD3> for Camellia-GCM with a 16 octet ICV.

 TOC 

3.4.  Key Length Attribute

Because the Camellia supports three key lengths, the Key Length attribute MUST be specified in the IKE Phase 2 exchange [4] (Kaufman, C., “Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol,” December 2005.). The Key Length attribute MUST have a value of 128, 192, or 256.


 TOC 

4.  Test Vectors

This section contains 18 test vectors(TV), which can be used to confirm that an implementation has correctly implemented Camellia-GCM. 

------ Spec Test Case 1 (Camellia-128) ------
KEY : 00000000000000000000000000000000
IV  : 000000000000000000000000
T   : f5574acc3148dfcb9015200631024df9

------ Spec Test Case 2 (Camellia-128) ------
KEY : 00000000000000000000000000000000
IV  : 000000000000000000000000
P   : 00000000000000000000000000000000
C   : defe3e0b5c54c94b4f2a0f5a46f6210d
T   : f672b94d192266c7c8c8dbb427cc989a

------ Spec Test Case 3 (Camellia-128) ------
KEY : feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308
IV  : cafebabefacedbaddecaf888
P   : d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a72
      1c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b391aafd255
C   : d0d94a13b632f337a0cc9955b94fa020c815f903aab12f1efaf2fe9d90f729a6
      cccbfa986ef2ff2c33de418d9a2529091cf18fe652c1cfde13f8260614bab815
T   : 86e318012dd8329dc9dae6a170f61b24

------ Spec Test Case 4 (Camellia-128) ------
KEY : feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308
IV  : cafebabefacedbaddecaf888
AD  : feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2
P   : d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a72
      1c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39
C   : d0d94a13b632f337a0cc9955b94fa020c815f903aab12f1efaf2fe9d90f729a6
      cccbfa986ef2ff2c33de418d9a2529091cf18fe652c1cfde13f82606
T   : 9f458869431576ea6a095456ec6b8101

------ Spec Test Case 5 (Camellia-128) ------
KEY : feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308
IV  : cafebabefacedbad
AD  : feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2
P   : d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a72
      1c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39
C   : 28fd7434d5cd424a5353818fc21a982460d20cf632eb1e6c4fbfca17d5abcf6a
      52111086162fe9570e7774c7a912aca3dfa10067ddaad40688645bdd
T   : e86f8f2e730c49d536f00fb5225d28b1

------ Spec Test Case 6 (Camellia-128) ------
KEY : feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308
IV  : 9313225df88406e555909c5aff5269aa6a7a9538534f7da1e4c303d2a318a728
      c3c0c95156809539fcf0e2429a6b525416aedbf5a0de6a57a637b39b
AD  : feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2
P   : d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a72
      1c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39
C   : 2e582b8417c93f2ff4f6f7ee3c361e4496e710ee12433baa964987d02f42953e
      402e6f4af407fe08cd2f35123696014c34db19128df4056faebcd647
T   : ceae5569b2af8641572622731aed3e53

------ Spec Test Case 7 (Camellia-192) ------
KEY : 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
IV  : 000000000000000000000000
T   : ba9ae89fddce4b51131e17c4d65ce587

------ Spec Test Case 8 (Camellia-192) ------
KEY : 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
IV  : 000000000000000000000000
P   : 00000000000000000000000000000000
C   : 8f9c0aa2549714c88bb2665e8af86d41
T   : 783cff5c5aca7197320658a74279ab37

------ Spec Test Case 9 (Camellia-192) ------
KEY : feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c
IV  : cafebabefacedbaddecaf888
P   : d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a72
      1c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b391aafd255
C   : 0f009e88410d84ad93c90d55efbe20ffa855492f4dfd0fb485c4f02f536feffb
      b4d967729e5c67f1de0750255cc500716ba483eb3b0a2bf607af28f6a60bb2e9
T   : 8d645a0b0e48d3c3b60a014157cb49b4

------ Spec Test Case 10 (Camellia-192) ------
KEY : feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c
IV  : cafebabefacedbaddecaf888
AD  : feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2
P   : d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a72
      1c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39
C   : 0f009e88410d84ad93c90d55efbe20ffa855492f4dfd0fb485c4f02f536feffb
      b4d967729e5c67f1de0750255cc500716ba483eb3b0a2bf607af28f6
T   : 01b15bb5ab6fac0c422014e91eacbf2b

------ Spec Test Case 11 (Camellia-192) ------
KEY : feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c
IV  : cafebabefacedbad
AD  : feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2
P   : d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a72
      1c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39
C   : 678b3dcb270faa206dc5f6fbb5014996e86d6f3e35cdcdfeb03b37b9b06ff4ff
      2682248823bd3c84124dc76af7bde3dd440c228b5efbc795dd80dfb6
T   : f876143d933214a5035ff0bb96ff650b

------ Spec Test Case 12 (Camellia-192) ------
KEY : feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c
IV  : 9313225df88406e555909c5aff5269aa6a7a9538534f7da1e4c303d2a318a728
      c3c0c95156809539fcf0e2429a6b525416aedbf5a0de6a57a637b39b
AD  : feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2
P   : d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a72
      1c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39
C   : 9733ea567c3bad2259ccd63ef7012f5de709e50b1fdc31f1a16db02ede1b66f1
      1dcc4d953f2d4d4671587b65882afbf9545fdb6deab22413d091b703
T   : 4b72e520b2521e63d240ed5c903216fa

------ Spec Test Case 13 (Camellia-256) ------
KEY : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
IV  : 000000000000000000000000
T   : 9cdb269b5d293bc5db9c55b057d9b591

------ Spec Test Case 14 (Camellia-256) ------
KEY : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
IV  : 000000000000000000000000
P   : 00000000000000000000000000000000
C   : 3d4b2cde666761ba5dfb305178e667fb
T   : 284b63bb143c40ce100fb4dea6bb617b

------ Spec Test Case 15 (Camellia-256) ------
KEY : feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308
IV  : cafebabefacedbaddecaf888
P   : d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a72
      1c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b391aafd255
C   : ad142c11579dd95e41f3c1f324dabc255864d920f1b65759d8f560d4948d4477
      58dfdcf77aa9f62581c7ff572a037f810cb1a9c4b3ca6ed638179b776549e092
T   : c912686270a2b9966415fca3be75c468

------ Spec Test Case 16 (Camellia-256) ------
KEY : feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308
IV  : cafebabefacedbaddecaf888
AD  : feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2
P   : d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a72
      1c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39
C   : ad142c11579dd95e41f3c1f324dabc255864d920f1b65759d8f560d4948d4477
      58dfdcf77aa9f62581c7ff572a037f810cb1a9c4b3ca6ed638179b77
T   : 4e4b178d8fe26fdc95e2e7246dd94bec

------ Spec Test Case 17 (Camellia-256) ------
KEY : feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308
IV  : cafebabefacedbad
AD  : feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2
P   : d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a72
      1c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39
C   : 6ca95fbb7d16577a9ef2fded94dc85b5d40c629f6bef2c649888e3cbb0ededc7
      810c04b12c2983bbbbc482e16e45c9215ae12c15c55f2f4809d06652
T   : e6472b8ebd331bfcc7c0fa63ce094461

------ Spec Test Case 18 (Camellia-256) ------
KEY : feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308
IV  : 9313225df88406e555909c5aff5269aa6a7a9538534f7da1e4c303d2a318a728
      c3c0c95156809539fcf0e2429a6b525416aedbf5a0de6a57a637b39b
AD  : feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2
P   : d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a72
      1c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39
C   : e0cddd7564d09c4dc522dd65949262bbf9dcdb07421cf67f3032becb7253c284
      a16e5bf0f556a308043f53fab9eebb526be7f7ad33d697ac77c67862
T   : 5791883f822013f8bd136fc36fb9946b

 TOC 

5.  Security Considerations

At the time of writing this document there are no known weak keys for Camellia. And no security problem has been found on Camellia [7] (, “The NESSIE project (New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity and Encryption),” .), [8] (Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA), “Cryptography Research and Evaluation Committees,” .)

For other security considerations, please refer to the security considerations of the previous use of GMC mode document described in [2] (Viega, J. and D. McGrew, “The Use of Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP),” June 2005.).


 TOC 

6.  IANA Considerations

IANA has assigned three ESP Transform Identifiers for Camellia-GCM with an eight-byte explicit IV: 

      <TBD1> for Camellia-GCM with an 8 octet ICV;
      <TBD2> for Camellia-GCM with a 12 octet ICV; and
      <TBD3> for Camellia-GCM with a 16 octet ICV.

 TOC 

7.  Acknowledgments

Portions of this text were unabashedly borrowed from [2] (Viega, J. and D. McGrew, “The Use of Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP),” June 2005.).


 TOC 

8.  References


 TOC 

8.1. Normative

[1] Dworkin, M., “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for Confidentiality and Authentication,” April 2006.
[2] Viega, J. and D. McGrew, “The Use of Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP),” RFC 4106, June 2005 (TXT).
[3] Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997 (TXT, HTML, XML).
[4] Kaufman, C., “Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol,” RFC 4306, December 2005 (TXT).
[5] Matsui, M., Nakajima, J., and S. Moriai, “A Description of the Camellia Encryption Algorithm,” RFC 3713, April 2004 (TXT).
[6] Kato, A., Moriai, S., and M. Kanda, “The Camellia Cipher Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec,” RFC 4312, December 2005 (TXT).

 TOC 

8.2. Informative

[7] “The NESSIE project (New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity and Encryption).”
[8] Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA), “Cryptography Research and Evaluation Committees” (HTML).

 TOC 

Authors' Addresses

  Akihiro Kato
  NTT Software Corporation
Phone:  +81-45-212-7614
Fax:  +81-45-212-7528
Email:  kato.akihiro@po.ntts.co.jp
  
  Satoru Kanno
  NTT Software Corporation
Phone:  +81-45-212-7577
Fax:  +81-45-212-9800
Email:  kanno.satoru@po.ntts.co.jp
  
  Masayuki Kanda
  NTT
Phone:  +81-46-859-2437
Fax:  +81-46-859-3365
Email:  kanda@isl.ntt.co.jp