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Network Working GroupS. Kanno
Internet-DraftNTT Software Corporation
Intended status: Standards TrackM. Kanda
Expires: July 31, 2010NTT
 January 27, 2010


Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for Camellia for TLS
draft-kanno-tls-camellia-psk-00

Abstract

This document specifies new Camellia cipher suites for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol to support authentication based on Pre-Shared Key (PSK). This document realizes compatibility with RFC4297, RFC5487, and RFC5489 specified in AES cipher suites.

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on July 31, 2010.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

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Table of Contents

1.  Introduction
    1.1.  Applicability Statement
    1.2.  Terminology
2.  Key Exchange Algorithms
3.  PSK, DHE_PSK, and RSA_PSK with SHA-1/256/384
4.  ECDHE_PSK with SHA-1/256/384
5.  PSK, DHE_PSK, and RSA_PSK with the Camellia-GCM
6.  Security Considerations
7.  IANA Considerations
8.  Acknowledgements
9.  References
    9.1.  Normative References
    9.2.  Informative References
§  Authors' Addresses




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1.  Introduction

This document specifies new Camellia cipher suites for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol to support authentication based on Pre-Shared Key (PSK). These PSK is symmetric key, shared in advance among the communicating parties. This document realizes a compatibility with RFC4297 [3] (Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, “Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS),” December 2005.), RFC5487 [5] (Badra, M., “Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode,” March 2009.), and RFC5489 [4] (Badra, M. and I. Hajjeh, “ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS),” March 2009.) specified in AES cipher suites.

The Camellia algorithm and its properties are described in [2] (Matsui, M., Nakajima, J., and S. Moriai, “A Description of the Camellia Encryption Algorithm,” April 2004.).



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1.1.  Applicability Statement

The cipher suites defined in this document can be negotiated, whatever the negotiated TLS version is.

The cipher suites defined in Section 3 and 4 for SHA-256/384 can be negotiated in TLS version 1.2 or higher.

The applicability statement in RFC4297 [3] (Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, “Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS),” December 2005.) applies to this document as well.



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1.2.  Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [1] (Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” March 1997.).



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2.  Key Exchange Algorithms

The Key Exchange Algorithms for the camellia cipher are defined in Section 2 of RFC4297 [3] (Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, “Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS),” December 2005.) as well.



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3.  PSK, DHE_PSK, and RSA_PSK with SHA-1/256/384

The PSK, DHE_PSK, and RSA_PSK with SHA-1/256/384 for the camellia cipher are defined in Section 3 and 4 of RFC4297 [3] (Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, “Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS),” December 2005.) and Section 3 of RFC5487 [5] (Badra, M., “Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode,” March 2009.) as well.

The following twelve cipher suties are defined for PSK, DHE_PSK, and RSA_PSK with SHA-1/256/384.

      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA           = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA           = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA       = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA       = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA       = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA       = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256        = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384        = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256    = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384    = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256    = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384    = { TBD,TBD };


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4.  ECDHE_PSK with SHA-1/256/384

The ECDHE_PSK with SHA-1/256/384 for the camellia cipher are defined in Section 3 of RFC5489 [4] (Badra, M. and I. Hajjeh, “ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS),” March 2009.) as well.

The following twelve cipher suties are defined for ECDHE_PSK with SHA-1/256/384.

      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA     = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA     = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256  = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384  = { TBD,TBD };


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5.  PSK, DHE_PSK, and RSA_PSK with the Camellia-GCM

The PSK, DHE_PSK, and RSA_PSK with the Camellia-GCM are defined in Section 2 of RFC5487 [5] (Badra, M., “Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode,” March 2009.) as well. Also, GCM mode is defined in SP 800-38D [5] (Badra, M., “Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode,” March 2009.) and Camellia-GCM is defined in XXX [5] (Badra, M., “Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode,” March 2009.)

The following twelve cipher suties are defined for PSK, DHE_PSK, and RSA_PSK with the Camellia-GCM.

      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256        = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384        = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256    = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384    = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256    = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384    = { TBD,TBD };


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6.  Security Considerations

For security considerations of PSK for TLS, this document refers to Section 7 of RFC4297 [3] (Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, “Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS),” December 2005.), Section 4 of RFC5487 [5] (Badra, M., “Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode,” March 2009.), and Section 5 of RFC5489 [4] (Badra, M. and I. Hajjeh, “ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS),” March 2009.).

At the time of writing this document there are no known weak keys for Camellia. And no security problem has been found on Camellia (see [6] (, “The NESSIE project (New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity and Encryption),” .), [7] (Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA), “Cryptography Research and Evaluation Committees,” .), and [8] (Mala, H., Shakiba, M., and M. Dakhil-alian, “New Results on Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced Round Camellia-128,” November 2009.)).



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7.  IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to allocate (has allocated) the following numbers in the TLS Cipher Suite Registry:

      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA           = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA           = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA       = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA       = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA       = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA       = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256        = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384        = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256    = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384    = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256    = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384    = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256        = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384        = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256    = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384    = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256    = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384    = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA     = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA     = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256  = { TBD,TBD };
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384  = { TBD,TBD };


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8.  Acknowledgements

This document unabashedly referred to RFC4297 [3] (Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, “Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS),” December 2005.), RFC5487 [5] (Badra, M., “Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode,” March 2009.), and RFC5489 [4] (Badra, M. and I. Hajjeh, “ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS),” March 2009.).



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9.  References



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9.1. Normative References

[1] Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997 (TXT, HTML, XML).
[2] Matsui, M., Nakajima, J., and S. Moriai, “A Description of the Camellia Encryption Algorithm,” RFC 3713, April 2004 (TXT).
[3] Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, “Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS),” RFC 4279, December 2005 (TXT).
[4] Badra, M. and I. Hajjeh, “ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS),” RFC 5489, March 2009 (TXT).
[5] Badra, M., “Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode,” RFC 5487, March 2009 (TXT).


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9.2. Informative References

[6] The NESSIE project (New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity and Encryption).”
[7] Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA), “Cryptography Research and Evaluation Committees” (HTML).
[8] Mala, H., Shakiba, M., and M. Dakhil-alian, “New Results on Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced Round Camellia-128,” November 2009.


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Authors' Addresses

  Satoru Kanno
  NTT Software Corporation
Phone:  +81-45-212-9803
Fax:  +81-45-212-9800
Email:  kanno.satoru@po.ntts.co.jp
  
  Masayuki Kanda
  NTT
Phone:  +81-422-59-3456
Fax:  +81-422-59-4015
Email:  kanda.masayuki@lab.ntt.co.jp