Addition of Camellia Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-1 and SHA-2
draft-kanno-tls-camellia-ecc-sha-01

Abstract

This document specifies a set of elliptic curve cipher suites for the Transport Security Layer (TLS) protocol to support the Camellia encryption algorithm as a block cipher. This document describes sixteen new cipher suites for TLS that specify HMAC-SHA1 and HMAC-SHA2.

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1.  Introduction

This document specifies a set of elliptic curve cipher suites for the Transport Security Layer (TLS) protocol to support the Camellia encryption algorithm as a block cipher. This document describes sixteen new cipher suites for TLS that specify HMAC-SHA1 and HMAC-SHA2.

The Camellia algorithm and its properties are described in [RFC3713] (Matsui, M., Nakajima, J., and S. Moriai, “A Description of the Camellia Encryption Algorithm,” April 2004.).

1.1.  Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] (Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” March 1997.).

2.  Cipher Suites

This document defines sixteen new cipher suites to be added to TLS. All use Elliptic Curve Cryptography for key exchange and digital signature, as defined in [RFC4492] (Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B. Moeller, “Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS),” May 2006.).

The sixteen cipher suites use Camellia [RFC3713] (Matsui, M., Nakajima, J., and S. Moriai, “A Description of the Camellia Encryption Algorithm,” April 2004.) in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode with HMAC-based MAC.

The cipher suites defined here have the following identifiers:

     CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA    = {TBD,TBD}
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA    = {TBD,TBD}
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA   = {TBD,TBD}
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA   = {TBD,TBD}
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA      = {TBD,TBD}
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA      = {TBD,TBD}
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA     = {TBD,TBD}
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA     = {TBD,TBD}

     CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256  = {TBD,TBD};
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384  = {TBD,TBD};
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256   = {TBD,TBD};
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384   = {TBD,TBD};
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256    = {TBD,TBD};
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384    = {TBD,TBD};
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256     = {TBD,TBD};
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384     = {TBD,TBD};

3.  IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to allocate the following numbers in the TLS Cipher Suite Registry:

     CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA    = {TBD,TBD}
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA    = {TBD,TBD}
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA   = {TBD,TBD}
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA   = {TBD,TBD}
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA      = {TBD,TBD}
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA      = {TBD,TBD}
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA     = {TBD,TBD}
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA     = {TBD,TBD}

     CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256  = {TBD,TBD};
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384  = {TBD,TBD};
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256   = {TBD,TBD};
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384   = {TBD,TBD};
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256    = {TBD,TBD};
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384    = {TBD,TBD};
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256     = {TBD,TBD};
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384     = {TBD,TBD};

4.  Security Considerations

At the time of writing of this document there are no known weak keys for Camellia and no security problems have been found with Camellia (see [NESSIE] (, “The NESSIE project (New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity and Encryption),” .), [CRYPTREC] (Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA), “Cryptography Research and Evaluation Committees,” .), and [Research] (Mala, H., Shakiba, M., and M. Dakhil-alian, “New Results on Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced Round Camellia-128,” November 2009.)).

The security considerations in RFC 5289 [RFC5289] (Rescorla, E., “TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM),” August 2008.) apply to this document as well.

5.  References

5.1. Normative References

5.2. Informative

Authors' Addresses