Network Working Group | M.B. Jones |
Internet-Draft | Microsoft |
Intended status: Standards Track | D. Balfanz |
Expires: May 03, 2012 | |
J. Bradley | |
independent | |
Y.Y. Goland | |
Microsoft | |
J. Panzer | |
N. Sakimura | |
Nomura Research Institute | |
P. Tarjan | |
October 31, 2011 |
JSON Web Token (JWT)
draft-jones-json-web-token-06
JSON Web Token (JWT) is a means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties. The claims in a JWT are encoded as a JSON object that is digitally signed using JSON Web Signature (JWS) and/or encrypted using JSON Web Encryption (JWE).
The suggested pronunciation of JWT is the same as the English word "jot".
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 03, 2012.
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
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JSON Web Token (JWT) is a compact token format intended for space constrained environments such as HTTP Authorization headers and URI query parameters. JWTs encode claims to be transmitted as a JSON object (as defined in RFC 4627 [RFC4627]) that is base64url encoded and digitally signed and/or encrypted. Signing is accomplished using JSON Web Signature (JWS) [JWS]. Encryption is accomplished using JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE].
The suggested pronunciation of JWT is the same as the English word "jot".
JWTs represent a set of claims as a JSON object that is base64url encoded and digitally signed and/or encrypted. This object is the JWT Claims Object. As per RFC 4627 [RFC4627] Section 2.2, the JSON object consists of zero or more name/value pairs (or members), where the names are strings and the values are arbitrary JSON values. These members are the claims represented by the JWT.
The member names within the JWT Claims Object are referred to as Claim Names. These names MUST be unique. The corresponding values are referred to as Claim Values.
The bytes of the UTF-8 representation of the JWT Claims Object are signed in the manner described in JSON Web Signature (JWS) [JWS] and/or encrypted in the manner described in JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE].
The contents of the JWT Header describe the cryptographic operations applied to the JWT Claims Object. If the JWT Header is a JWS Header, the claims are signed. If the JWT Header is a JWE Header, the claims are encrypted.
A JWT is represented as the concatenation of the Encoded JWT Header, the JWT Second Part, and the JWT Third Part, in that order, with the parts being separated by period ('.') characters. When signed, the three parts of the JWT are the three parts of a JWS used to represent the JWT. When encrypted, the three parts of the JWT are the three parts of a JWE used to represent the JWT.
The following example JWT Header declares that the encoded object is a JSON Web Token (JWT) and the JWT is signed using the HMAC SHA-256 algorithm:
{"typ":"JWT", "alg":"HS256"}
Base64url encoding the bytes of the UTF-8 representation of the JWT Header yields this Encoded JWS Header value, which is used as the Encoded JWT Header:
eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLA0KICJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9
The following is an example of a JWT Claims Object:
{"iss":"joe", "exp":1300819380, "http://example.com/is_root":true}
Base64url encoding the bytes of the UTF-8 representation of the JSON Claims Object yields this Encoded JWS Payload, which is used as the JWT Second Part:
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
Signing the Encoded JWS Header and Encoded JWS Payload with the HMAC SHA-256 algorithm and base64url encoding the signature in the manner specified in [JWS], yields this Encoded JWS Signature, which is used as the JWT Third Part:
dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk
Concatenating these parts in the order Header.Second.Third with period characters between the parts yields this complete JWT (with line breaks for display purposes only):
eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLA0KICJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9 . eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ . dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk
This computation is illustrated in more detail in [JWS], Appendix A.1.
A JWT contains a set of claims represented as a base64url encoded JSON object. Note however, that the set of claims a JWT must contain to be considered valid is context-dependent and is outside the scope of this specification. When used in a security-related context, implementations MUST understand and support all of the claims present; otherwise, the JWT MUST be rejected for processing.
There are three classes of JWT Claim Names: Reserved Claim Names, Public Claim Names, and Private Claim Names.
The following claim names are reserved. None of the claims defined in the table below are intended to be mandatory, but rather, provide a starting point for a set of useful, interoperable claims. All the names are short because a core goal of JWTs is for the tokens to be compact.
Claim Name | JSON Value Type | Claim Syntax | Claim Semantics |
---|---|---|---|
exp | number | IntDate | The exp (expiration time) claim identifies the expiration time on or after which the token MUST NOT be accepted for processing. The processing of the exp claim requires that the current date/time MUST be before the expiration date/time listed in the exp claim. Implementers MAY provide for some small leeway, usually no more than a few minutes, to account for clock skew. This claim is OPTIONAL. |
nbf | number | IntDate | The nbf (not before) claim identifies the time before which the token MUST NOT be accepted for processing. The processing of the nbf claim requires that the current date/time MUST be after or equal to the not-before date/time listed in the nbf claim. Implementers MAY provide for some small leeway, usually no more than a few minutes, to account for clock skew. This claim is OPTIONAL. |
iat | number | IntDate | The iat (issued at) claim identifies the time at which the JWT was issued. This claim can be used to determine the age of the token. This claim is OPTIONAL. |
iss | string | StringOrURI | The iss (issuer) claim identifies the principal that issued the JWT. The processing of this claim is generally application specific. The iss value is case sensitive. This claim is OPTIONAL. |
aud | string | StringOrURI | The aud (audience) claim identifies the audience that the JWT is intended for. The principal intended to process the JWT MUST be identified by the value of the audience claim. If the principal processing the claim does not identify itself with the identifier in the aud claim value then the JWT MUST be rejected. The interpretation of the contents of the audience value is generally application specific. The aud value is case sensitive. This claim is OPTIONAL. |
typ | string | String | The typ (type) claim is used to declare a type for the contents of this JWT Claims Object. The typ value is case sensitive. This claim is OPTIONAL. |
Additional reserved claim names MAY be defined via the IANA JSON Web Token Claims registry, as per Section 9. The syntax values used above are defined as follows:
Syntax Name | Syntax Definition |
---|---|
IntDate | The number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as measured in UTC until the desired date/time. See RFC 3339 [RFC3339] for details regarding date/times in general and UTC in particular. |
String | Any string value MAY be used. |
StringOrURI | Any string value MAY be used but a value containing a ":" character MUST be a URI as defined in RFC 3986 [RFC3986]. |
Claim names can be defined at will by those using JWTs. However, in order to prevent collisions, any new claim name SHOULD either be defined in the IANA JSON Web Token Claims registry or be defined as a URI that contains a collision resistant namespace. Examples of collision resistant namespaces include:
In each case, the definer of the name or value MUST take reasonable precautions to make sure they are in control of the part of the namespace they use to define the claim name.
A producer and consumer of a JWT may agree to any claim name that is not a Reserved Name Section 4.1 or a Public Name Section 4.2. Unlike Public Names, these private names are subject to collision and should be used with caution.
The members of the JSON object represented by the JWT Header describe the cryptographic operations applied to the JWT and optionally, additional properties of the JWT.
There are two ways of distinguishing whether the JWT is a JWS or JWE. The first is by examining the alg (algorithm) header value. If the value represents a signature algorithm, the JWT is a JWS; if it represents an encryption algorithm, the JWT is a JWE. A second method is determining whether an enc (encryption method) member exists. If the enc member exists, the JWT is a JWE; otherwise, the JWT is a JWS. Both methods will yield the same result.
Implementations MUST understand the entire contents of the header; otherwise, the JWT MUST be rejected for processing.
JWS Header Parameters are defined by [JWS]. JWE Header Parameters are defined by [JWE]. This specification further specifies the use of the following header parameters in both the cases where the JWT is a JWS and where it is a JWE.
Header Parameter Name | JSON Value Type | Header Parameter Syntax | Header Parameter Semantics |
---|---|---|---|
typ | string | String | The typ (type) header parameter is used to declare structural information about the JWT. In the normal case where nested signing or encryption operations are not employed, the use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL, and if present, it is RECOMMENDED that its value be either "JWT" or "http://openid.net/specs/jwt/1.0". In the case that nested signing or encryption steps are employed, the use of this header parameter is REQUIRED; in this case, the value MUST either be "JWS", to indicate that a nested signed JWT is carried in this JWT or "JWE", to indicate that a nested encrypted JWT is carried in this JWT. |
To support use cases where the JWT content is secured by a means other than a signature and/or encryption contained within the token (such as a signature on a data structure containing the token), JWTs MAY also be created without a signature or encryption. Plaintext JWTs MUST use the alg value none, and are formatted identically to a signed JWT with an empty signature. This means that the base64url encoding of the bytes representing the UTF-8 encoding of the JWT Claims Object is the JWT Second Part, and the empty string is the JWT Third Part.
The following example JWT Header declares that the encoded object is a Plaintext JWT:
{"alg":"none"}
Base64url encoding the bytes of the UTF-8 representation of the JWT Header yields this Encoded JWT Header:
eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0
The following is an example of a JWT Claims Object:
{"iss":"joe", "exp":1300819380, "http://example.com/is_root":true}
Base64url encoding the bytes of the UTF-8 representation of the JSON Claims Object yields this Encoded JWS Payload, which is used as the JWT Second Part:
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
The JWT Third Part is the empty string.
Concatenating these parts in the order Header.Second.Third with period characters between the parts yields this complete JWT (with line breaks for display purposes only):
eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0 . eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ .
To create a JWT, one MUST follow these steps:
When validating a JWT the following steps MUST be taken. If any of the listed steps fails then the token MUST be rejected for processing.
Processing a JWT inevitably requires comparing known strings to values in the token. For example, in checking what the algorithm is, the Unicode string encoding alg will be checked against the member names in the JWT Header to see if there is a matching header parameter name. A similar process occurs when determining if the value of the alg header parameter represents a supported algorithm. Comparing Unicode strings, however, has significant security implications, as per Section 10.
Comparisons between JSON strings and other Unicode strings MUST be performed as specified below:
JWTs use JSON Web Signature (JWS) [JWS] and JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE] to sign and/or encrypt the contents of the JWT.
Of the JWS signing algorithms, only HMAC SHA-256 MUST be implemented by conforming JWT implementations. It is RECOMMENDED that implementations also support the RSA SHA-256 and ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 algorithms. Support for other algorithms and key sizes is OPTIONAL.
If an implementation provides encryption capabilities, of the JWE encryption algorithms, only RSA-PKCS1-1.5 with 2048 bit keys, AES-128-CBC, and AES-256-CBC MUST be implemented by conforming implementations. It is RECOMMENDED that implementations also support ECDH-ES with 256 bit keys, AES-128-GCM, and AES-256-GCM. Support for other algorithms and key sizes is OPTIONAL.
This specification calls for:
TBD: Lots of work to do here. We need to remember to look into any issues relating to security and JSON parsing. One wonders just how secure most JSON parsing libraries are. Were they ever hardened for security scenarios? If not, what kind of holes does that open up? Also, we need to walk through the JSON standard and see what kind of issues we have especially around comparison of names. For instance, comparisons of claim names and other parameters must occur after they are unescaped. Need to also put in text about: Importance of keeping secrets secret. Rotating keys. Strengths and weaknesses of the different algorithms.
TBD: Need to put in text about why strict JSON validation is necessary. Basically, that if malformed JSON is received then the intent of the sender is impossible to reliably discern. One example of malformed JSON that MUST be rejected is an object in which the same member name occurs multiple times. While in non-security contexts it's o.k. to be generous in what one accepts, in security contexts this can lead to serious security holes. For example, malformed JSON might indicate that someone has managed to find a security hole in the issuer's code and is leveraging it to get the issuer to issue "bad" tokens whose content the attacker can control.
TBD: Write about the need to secure the token content if a signature is not contained in the JWT itself.
Claim names in JWTs are Unicode strings. For security reasons, the representations of these names must be compared verbatim after performing any escape processing (as per RFC 4627 [RFC4627], Section 2.5).
This means, for instance, that these JSON strings must compare as being equal ("JWT", "\u004aWT"), whereas these must all compare as being not equal to the first set or to each other ("jwt", "Jwt", "JW\u0074").
JSON strings MAY contain characters outside the Unicode Basic Multilingual Plane. For instance, the G clef character (U+1D11E) may be represented in a JSON string as "\uD834\uDD1E". Ideally, JWT implementations SHOULD ensure that characters outside the Basic Multilingual Plane are preserved and compared correctly; alternatively, if this is not possible due to these characters exercising limitations present in the underlying JSON implementation, then input containing them MUST be rejected.
The following items remain to be done in this draft:
[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] | Cantor, S., Kemp, J., Philpott, R. and E. Maler, "Assertions and Protocol for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-core-2.0-os, March 2005. |
[W3C.CR-xml11-20021015] | Cowan, J, "Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.1", W3C CR CR-xml11-20021015, October 2002. |
[RFC3275] | Eastlake, D., Reagle, J. and D. Solo, "(Extensible Markup Language) XML-Signature Syntax and Processing", RFC 3275, March 2002. |
[RFC4122] | Leach, P., Mealling, M. and R. Salz, "A Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122, July 2005. |
[SWT] | Hardt, D. and Y.Y. Goland, "Simple Web Token (SWT)", Version 0.9.5.1, November 2009. |
[MagicSignatures] | Panzer (editor), J., Laurie, B. and D. Balfanz, "Magic Signatures", August 2010. |
[JSS] | Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura (editor), "JSON Simple Sign", September 2010. |
[CanvasApp] | Facebook, , "Canvas Applications", 2010. |
[JWE] | Jones, M.B., Rescorla, E. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)", October 2011. |
SAML 2.0 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] provides a standard for creating tokens with much greater expressivity and more security options than supported by JWTs. However, the cost of this flexibility and expressiveness is both size and complexity. In addition, SAML's use of XML [W3C.CR-xml11-20021015] and XML DSIG [RFC3275] only contributes to the size of SAML tokens.
JWTs are intended to provide a simple token format that is small enough to fit into HTTP headers and query arguments in URIs. It does this by supporting a much simpler token model than SAML and using the JSON [RFC4627] object encoding syntax. It also supports securing tokens using Hash-based Message Authentication Codes (HMACs) and digital signatures using a smaller (and less flexible) format than XML DSIG.
Therefore, while JWTs can do some of the things SAML tokens do, JWTs are not intended as a full replacement for SAML tokens, but rather as a compromise token format to be used when space is at a premium.
Both JWTs and Simple Web Tokens SWT [SWT], at their core, enable sets of claims to be communicated between applications. For SWTs, both the claim names and claim values are strings. For JWTs, while claim names are strings, claim values can be any JSON type. Both token types offer cryptographic protection of their content: SWTs with HMAC SHA-256 and JWTs with a choice of algorithms, including HMAC SHA-256, RSA SHA-256, and ECDSA P-256 SHA-256.
The authors acknowledge that the design of JWTs was intentionally influenced by the design and simplicity of Simple Web Tokens [SWT] and ideas for JSON tokens that Dick Hardt discussed within the OpenID community.
Solutions for signing JSON content were previously explored by Magic Signatures [MagicSignatures], JSON Simple Sign [JSS], and Canvas Applications [CanvasApp], all of which influenced this draft.
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