| XMPP | P. Saint-Andre |
| Internet-Draft | Cisco |
| Obsoletes: 6122 (if approved) | November 17, 2011 |
| Intended status: Standards Track | |
| Expires: May 20, 2012 |
Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP): Address Format
draft-ietf-xmpp-6122bis-00
This document defines the address format for the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP), including support for code points outside the US-ASCII range. This document obsoletes RFC 6122.
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on May 20, 2012.
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
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The Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol [XMPP] is an application profile of the Extensible Markup Language [XML] for streaming XML data in close to real time between any two or more network-aware entities. The address format for XMPP entities was originally developed in the Jabber open-source community in 1999, first described by [XEP-0029] in 2002, and then defined canonically by [RFC3920] in 2004 and [RFC6122] in 2011.
As specified in RFC 3920 and RFC 6122, the XMPP address format used the "stringprep" technology for preparation of non-ASCII characters [STRINGPREP]. This document defines the XMPP address format in a way that no longer depends on stringprep. Instead, this document depends on the internationalization framework defined by the IETF's PRECIS Working Group [FRAMEWORK].
This document obsoletes RFC 6122.
Many important terms used in this document are defined in [FRAMEWORK], [I18N-TERMS], [IDNA-DEFS], [UNICODE], and [XMPP].
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [KEYWORDS].
An XMPP entity is anything that is network-addressable and that can communicate using XMPP. For historical reasons, the native address of an XMPP entity is called a Jabber Identifier ("JID"). A valid JID is a string of [UNICODE] code points, encoded using [UTF-8], and structured as an ordered sequence of localpart, domainpart, and resourcepart (where the first two parts are demarcated by the '@' character used as a separator, and the last two parts are similarly demarcated by the '/' character).
The syntax for a JID is defined as follows using the Augmented Backus-Naur Form as specified in [ABNF].
jid = [ localpart "@" ] domainpart [ "/" resourcepart ]
localpart = 1*(localpoint)
;
; a "localpoint" is a UTF-8 encoded Unicode
; code point that conforms to the localpart
; subclass of the "NameClass" string class
; defined in draft-blanchet-precis-framework
;
domainpart = IP-literal / IPv4address / ifqdn
;
; the "IPv4address" and "IP-literal" rules are
; defined in RFC 3986, and the first-match-wins
; (a.k.a. "greedy") algorithm described in RFC
; 3986 applies to the matching process
;
; note well that reuse of the IP-literal rule
; from RFC 3986 implies that IPv6 addresses are
; enclosed in square brackets (i.e., beginning
; with '[' and ending with ']')
;
ifqdn = 1*(domainpoint)
;
; a "domainpoint" is a UTF-8 encoded Unicode
; code point that conforms to the "domain name"
; string class effectively defined in RFC 5890
;
resourcepart = 1*(resourcepoint)
;
; a "resourcepoint" is a UTF-8 encoded Unicode
; code point that conforms to the localpart
; subclass of the "FreeClass" string class
; defined in draft-blanchet-precis-framework
;
All JIDs are based on the foregoing structure.
Each allowable portion of a JID (localpart, domainpart, and resourcepart) MUST NOT be zero bytes in length and MUST NOT be more than 1023 bytes in length, resulting in a maximum total size (including the '@' and '/' separators) of 3071 bytes.
For the purposes of communication over an XMPP network (e.g., in the 'to' or 'from' address of an XMPP stanza), an entity's address MUST be represented as a JID, not as a Uniform Resource Identifier [URI] or Internationalized Resource Identifier [IRI]. An XMPP URI or IRI [XMPP-URI] is in essence a JID prepended with 'xmpp:'; however, the native addressing format used in XMPP is that of a mere JID without a URI scheme. [XMPP-URI] is provided only for identification and interaction outside the context of XMPP itself, for example when linking to a JID from a web page. See [XMPP-URI] for information about securely extracting a JID from an XMPP URI or IRI.
The domainpart of a JID is that portion after the '@' character (if any) and before the '/' character (if any); it is the primary identifier and is the only REQUIRED element of a JID (a mere domainpart is a valid JID). Typically a domainpart identifies the "home" server to which clients connect for XML routing and data management functionality. However, it is not necessary for an XMPP domainpart to identify an entity that provides core XMPP server functionality (e.g., a domainpart can identify an entity such as a multi-user chat service [XEP-0045], a publish-subscribe service [XEP-0060], or a user directory).
The domainpart for every XMPP service MUST be a fully qualified domain name (FQDN; see [DNS]), IPv4 address, IPv6 address, or unqualified hostname (i.e., a text label that is resolvable on a local network).
If the domainpart includes a final character considered to be a label separator (dot) by [DNS], this character MUST be stripped from the domainpart before the JID of which it is a part is used for the purpose of routing an XML stanza, comparing against another JID, or constructing an [XMPP-URI]. In particular, the character MUST be stripped before any other canonicalization steps are taken.
A domainpart MUST NOT be zero bytes in length and MUST NOT be more than 1023 bytes in length. This rule is to be enforced after any mapping or normalization of code points. Naturally, the length limits of [DNS] apply, and nothing in this document is to be interpreted as overriding those more fundamental limits.
In the terms of IDNA2008 [IDNA-DEFS], the domainpart of a JID is a "domain name slot".
A domainpart consisting of a fully qualified domain name MUST be an "internationalized domain name" as defined in [IDNA-DEFS] and MUST consist only of Unicode code points that conform to the rules specified in [IDNA-CODE].
For the purposes of communication over XMPP, the domainpart of a JID MUST be treated as follows, where the operations specified MUST be completed in the order shown:
With regard to directionality, the "Bidi Rule" provided in [IDNA-BIDI] applies.
The localpart of a JID is an optional identifier placed before the domainpart and separated from the latter by the '@' character. Typically a localpart uniquely identifies the entity requesting and using network access provided by a server (i.e., a local account), although it can also represent other kinds of entities (e.g., a chat room associated with a multi-user chat service [XEP-0045]). The entity represented by an XMPP localpart is addressed within the context of a specific domain (i.e., <localpart@domainpart>).
A localpart MUST NOT be zero bytes in length and MUST NOT be more than 1023 bytes in length. This rule is to be enforced after any mapping or normalization of code points.
A localpart MUST consist only of Unicode code points that conform to the "NameClass" base string class defined in [FRAMEWORK], with the exception of the following characters that are explicitly disallowed in XMPP localparts:
For the purposes of communication over XMPP, the localpart of a JID MUST be treated as follows, where the operations specified MUST be completed in the order shown:
With regard to directionality, the "Bidi Rule" provided in [IDNA-BIDI] applies.
The resourcepart of a JID is an optional identifier placed after the domainpart and separated from the latter by the '/' character. A resourcepart can modify either a <localpart@domainpart> address or a mere <domainpart> address. Typically a resourcepart uniquely identifies a specific connection (e.g., a device or location) or object (e.g., an occupant in a multi-user chat room [XEP-0045]) belonging to the entity associated with an XMPP localpart at a domain (i.e., <localpart@domainpart/resourcepart>).
A resourcepart MUST NOT be zero bytes in length and MUST NOT be more than 1023 bytes in length. This rule is to be enforced after any mapping or normalization of code points.
A resourcepart MUST consist only of Unicode code points that conform to the "FreeClass" base string class defined in [FRAMEWORK].
For the purposes of communication over XMPP, the localpart of a JID MUST be treated as follows, where the operations specified MUST be completed in the order shown:
With regard to directionality, the "Bidi Rule" provided in [IDNA-BIDI] applies.
XMPP entities SHOULD consider resourceparts to be opaque strings and SHOULD NOT impute meaning to any given resourcepart. In particular:
XMPP applications MUST support IDNA2008 for domainparts, the "NameClass" string class from [FRAMEWORK] for localparts (with the exception of certain ASCII characters specified under Section 2.3), and the "FreeClass" string class from [FRAMEWORK] for resourceparts. This enables XMPP addresses to include a wide variety of characters outside the US-ASCII range. Rules for enforcement of the XMPP address format are provided in [XMPP] and specifications for various XMPP extensions.
For backward compatibility, many XMPP applications support [IDNA2003] for domainparts, and the [STRINGPREP] profiles Nodeprep and Resourceprep [RFC3920] for localparts and resourceparts.
The security considerations described in [FRAMEWORK] apply to the "NameClass" and "FreeClass" base string classes used in this document for XMPP localparts and resourceparts. The security considerations described in [IDNA-DEFS] apply to internationalized domain names, which are used here for XMPP domainparts.
The security considerations described in [UTR39] apply to the use of Unicode characters in XMPP addresses.
There are two forms of address spoofing: forging and mimicking.
In the context of XMPP technologies, address forging occurs when an entity is able to generate an XML stanza whose 'from' address does not correspond to the account credentials with which the entity authenticated onto the network (or an authorization identity provided during negotiation of SASL authentication [SASL] as described in [XMPP]). For example, address forging occurs if an entity that authenticated as "juliet@im.example.com" is able to send XML stanzas from "nurse@im.example.com" or "romeo@example.net".
Address forging is difficult in XMPP systems, given the requirement for sending servers to stamp 'from' addresses and for receiving servers to verify sending domains via server-to-server authentication (see [XMPP]). However, address forging is possible if:
Therefore, an entity outside the security perimeter of a particular server cannot reliably distinguish between JIDs of the form <localpart@domainpart> at that server and thus can authenticate only the domainpart of such JIDs with any level of assurance. This specification does not define methods for discovering or counteracting the kind of poorly implemented or rogue servers just described. However, the end-to-end authentication or signing of XMPP stanzas could help to mitigate this risk, since it would require the rogue server to generate false credentials for signing or encryption of each stanza, in addition to modifying 'from' addresses.
Furthermore, it is possible for an attacker to forge JIDs at other domains by means of a DNS poisoning attack if DNS security extensions [DNSSEC] are not used.
Address mimicking occurs when an entity provides legitimate authentication credentials for and sends XML stanzas from an account whose JID appears to a human user to be the same as another JID. Because many characters are visually similar, it is relatively easy to mimic JIDs in XMPP systems. As one simple example, the localpart "ju1iet" (using the Arabic numeral one as the third character) might appear the same as the localpart "juliet" (using lowercase "L" as the third character).
As explained in [IDNA-DEFS], [FRAMEWORK], [UTR36], and [UTR39], there is no straightforward solution to the problem of visually similar characters. Furthermore, IDNA and PRECIS technologies do not attempt to define such a solution. As a result, XMPP domainparts, localparts, and resourceparts could contain such characters, leading to security vulnerabilities such as the following:
XMPP services and clients are strongly encouraged to define and implement consistent policies regarding the registration, storage, and presentation of visually similar characters in XMPP systems. In particular, service providers and software implementers are strongly encouraged to use the policies recommended in [FRAMEWORK].
The IANA shall add an entry to the PRECIS Usage Registry for reuse of the PRECIS NameClass in XMPP, as follows:
The IANA shall add an entry to the PRECIS Usage Registry for reuse of the PRECIS FreeClass in XMPP, as follows:
This section describes a protocol feature set that summarizes the conformance requirements of this specification. This feature set is appropriate for use in software certification, interoperability testing, and implementation reports. For each feature, this section provides the following information:
The feature set specified here attempts to adhere to the concepts and formats proposed by Larry Masinter within the IETF's NEWTRK Working Group in 2005, as captured in [INTEROP]. Although this feature set is more detailed than called for by [REPORTS], it provides a suitable basis for the generation of implementation reports to be submitted in support of advancing this specification from Proposed Standard to Draft Standard in accordance with [PROCESS].
Based on consensus derived from implementation and deployment experience as well as formal interoperability testing, the following substantive modifications were made from RFC 3920.
Some text in this document was borrowed or adapted from [IDNA-DEFS], [IDNA-PROTO], [IDNA-RATIONALE], and [XEP-0165].