Internet-Draft MultAddrr October 2023
Colitti, et al. Expires 8 April 2024 [Page]
Workgroup:
v6ops Working Group
Internet-Draft:
draft-ietf-v6ops-dhcp-pd-per-device
Published:
Intended Status:
Informational
Expires:
Authors:
L. Colitti
Google, LLC
J. Linkova, Ed.
Google
X. Ma, Ed.
Google

Using DHCPv6-PD to Allocate Unique IPv6 Prefix per Client in Large Broadcast Networks

Abstract

This document discusses an IPv6 deployment scenario when individual clients connected to large broadcast networks (such as enterprise networks or public Wi-Fi networks) are allocated unique prefixes via DHCPv6 Prefix Delegation (DHCPv6-PD).

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 8 April 2024.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Often, large broadcast networks (such as enterprise or public Wi-Fi deployments) place many devices on a shared link with a single on-link prefix. This document describes an alternative deployment model where individual clients obtain prefixes from the network. This provides two important advantages.

First, it offers better scalability. Unlike IPv4, IPv6 allows (and often requires) hosts to have multiple addresses (see Section 16 for more details). However, increasing the number of addresses introduces scalability issues on the network infrastructure. Network devices need to maintain various types of tables/hashes (Neighbor Cache on first-hop routers, Neighbor Discovery Proxy caches on L2 devices etc). On VXLAN [RFC7348] networks each address might be represented as a route so 8 addresses instead of 1 requires the devices to support 8 times more routes, etc. If an infrastructure device resources are exhausted, the device might drop some IPv6 addresses from the corresponding tables, while the address owner might be still using the address to send traffic. This leads to traffic blackholing and degraded customer experience. Providing every host with one prefix allows the network to maintain only one entry per device, while still providing the device the ability to use arbitrary number of addresses.

Second, it provides the ability to extend the network. In IPv4, a device that connects to the network can provide connectivity to subtended devices by using NAT. With DHCPv6 PD, such a device can similarly extend the network, but unlike IPv4 NAT, it can provide its subtended devices with full end-to-end connectivity.

Another method of deploying unique prefixes per device is documented in [RFC8273]. Similarly, the standard deployment model in cellular IPv6 networks [RFC6459] provides a unique prefix to every device. However, providing a unique prefix per device is very uncommon in enterprise-style networks, where nodes are usually connected to broadcast segments/VLANs and each link has a single on-link prefix assigned. This document takes a similar approach to [RFC8273], but allocates the prefix using DHCPv6-PD.

2. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

3. Terminology

Node: a device that implements IPv6, [RFC8200].

Host: any node that is not a router, [RFC8200].

Client: a node which connects to a network and acquires addresses. The node may wish to obtain addresses for its own use, or may be a router that wishes to extend the network to its physical or virtual subsystems, or both. It may be either a host or a router as defined by [RFC8200].

ND: Neighbor Discovery, [RFC4861].

SLAAC: IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration, [RFC4862].

DHCPv6-PD: DHCPv6 ([RFC8415]) mechanism to delegate IPv6 prefixes to clients.

4. Design Principles

Instead of all clients on a given link forming addresses from the same shared prefix assigned to that link:

5. Applicability and Limitations

Delegating a unique prefix per client provides all the benefits of both SLAAC and DHCPv6 address allocation, but at the cost of greater address space usage. This design would substantially benefit some networks (see Section 12), in which the addional cost of an additional service (DHCPv6 prefix delegation) and allocating a larger amount of address space can easily be justified. Examples of such networks include but are not limited to:

In smaller networks, such as home networks, with smaller address space and lower number of clients, SLAAC is a better and simpler option.

6. Routing and Addressing Considerations

6.1. Prefix Pool Allocation

One simple deployment model is to assign a dedicated prefix pool to each link. The prefixes from each link's pool are valid only on the link, and if clients move to another link they will obtain a prefix from the pool associated with the new link (see Section 9). This is very similar to how address pools are allocated when using DHCP to assign individual addresses (e.g., DHCPv4 or DHCPv6 IA_NA), where each link has a dedicated pool of addresses, and clients on the link obtain addresses from the pool.

Other deployment models, such as prefix pools shared over multiple links or routers, are possible, but not described in this document.

6.2. First-Hop Router Requirements

In large networks, DHCPv6 servers are usually centralized, and reached via DHCPv6 relays co-located with the first-hop routers. To delegate IPv6 prefixes to clients, the first hop routers need to implement DHCPv6 relay functions and meet the requirements defined in [RFC8987]. In particular, per Section 4.2 of [RFC8987], the first-hop router must maintain a local routing table that contains all prefixes delegated to clients.

When using a dedicated prefix pool for each link, the network can route the entire pool to the link's first-hop routers, and the routers do not need to advertise individual delegated prefixes into the network's dynamic routing protocol.

With the first-hop routers performing DHCPv6 relay functions, the proposed design neither requires any subsequent relays in the path nor introduce any requirements to such relays, if they are deployed.

To ensure that routes to the delegated prefixes are preserved even if a relay is rebooted or replaced, the operator MUST ensure that all relays in the network infrastructure support DHCPv6 Bulk Leasequery as defined in [RFC5460]. While Section 4.3 of [RFC8987] lists keeping active prefix delegations in persistent storage as an alternative to DHCPv6 Bulk Leasequery, relying on persistent storage has the following drawbacks:

Another mechanism for first-hop routers to obtain information about delegated prefixes is by using Active Leasequery [RFC7653], though this is not yet widely supported.

6.3. Topologies with Multiple First-Hop Routers

In a topology with redundant first-hop routers, all the routers need to relay DHCPv6 traffic, install the delegated prefixes into their routing tables and, if needed, advertise those prefixes to the network.

If the first-hop routers obtain information about delegated prefixes by snooping DHCPv6 Reply messages sent by the server, then all the first-hop routers must be able to snoop these messages. This is possible if the client multicasts the DHCPv6 messages it sends to the server. The server will receive one copy of the client message through each first-hop relay, and will reply unicast to each of them via the relay (or chain of relays) from which it received the message. Thus, all first-hop relays will be able to snoop the replies. Per Section 14 of [RFC8415], clients always use multicast unless the server explicitly allows it using the Server Unicast option ([RFC8415], Section 21.12). Therefore, in topologies with multiple first-hop routers, the DHCPv6 servers MUST be configured not to use the Server Unicast option. It should be noted that [I-D.ietf-dhc-rfc8415bis] deprecates the Server Unicast option precisely because it is not compatible with topologies with multiple first-hop relays.

To recover from crashes or reboots, relays can use Bulk Leasequery or Active Leasequery to issue a QUERY_BY_RELAY_ID with the ID(s) of the other relay(s), as configured by the operator. Additionally, some vendors provide vendor-specific mechanisms to synchronize state between DHCP relays.

For security reasons, some networks do not allow communication between clients on the same link, by dropping device-to-device traffic at layer 2. In this case, delegating a prefix to each client doesn't affect traffic flows, as all traffic is sent to the first-hop router anyway. The router may allow or drop the traffic depending the network security policy.

If the network does allow peer-to-peer communication, the PIO for the on-link prefix is usually advertised with the L-bit set to 1 [RFC4861]. As a result, all addresses from that prefix are considered onlink, and traffic to those destinations is sent directly (not via routers). If such a network delegates prefixes to clients as described in this document, then each client will consider other client's destination addresses to be off-link, because they are no longer within the on-link prefix, but are within the delegated prefixes. When a client sends traffic to another client, packets will initially be sent to the default router. The router will respond with an ICMPv6 redirect message (Section 4.5 of [RFC4861]). If the client receives and accepts the redirect, then traffic can flow directly from device to device. Therefore the administrator deploying the solution described in this document SHOULD ensure that the first-hop routers can send ICMPv6 redirects (the routers are configured to do so and the security policies permit those messages).

7. DHCPv6-PD Server Considerations

Thsi document doesn't introduce any changes to DHCPv6 protocol in general and DHCPv6 server behaviour in particular. However, for the proposed solution to work correctly, the DHCPv6-PD server needs to be configured as follows:

8. Prefix Length Considerations

DHCPv6 prefix delegation supports delegating prefixes of any size. However, at the time of writing the only prefix size that will allow devices to use SLAAC is 64 bits (see also [RFC7421]). Delegating a prefix of sufficient size to use SLAAC allows the client to provide limitless addresses to IPv6 nodes connected to it (e.g., virtual machines, tethered devices), because all IPv6 hosts are required to support SLAAC [RFC8504]. It is also required to extend the network using [RFC7084] (see requirement L-2). Choosing longer prefixes would require the client and any connected system to use some other form of address assignment, which many hosts do not support, and therefore limits the applicability of the proposed solution. Additionally, even clients that support other forms of address assignment require SLAAC for some functions, such as forming dedicates addresses for the use of 464xlat.

Assigning a prefix of sufficient size to support SLAAC is possible on large networks. Section 9.2 of [RFC7934] suggests that even very large networks that require the use of the full RFC1918 range 10.0.0.0/8 to address hosts, an IPv6 /40 is sufficient to provide each client with /64. In multi-site networks the calculations might get more complex, as each site's IPv6 prefix needs to be larger enough to be globally routable and accepted by eBGP peers, for example /48. Let's consider an enterprise network which has 8000 sites (~2^13). Imagine that site has up to 64 (2^6) different network types and each network requires its own /48. So each network can provide /64 to 65K clients (an equivalent of using a /16 IPv4 subnet to address clients). In that case such an enterprise would need /29 (48 - 6 - 13) to provide /64 to each client. Networks of such size usually have multiple allocations from RIRs so /29 sounds reasonable. In real life there are very few networks of that scale and a single /32 would be sufficient for most deployments.

Note that assigning a prefix of sufficient size to support SLAAC does not require that subtended nodes use SLAAC; they can use other address assignment mechanisms as well.

9. Client Mobility

As per Section 18.2.12 of [RFC8415], when the client moves to a new link, it MUST initiate a Rebind/Reply message exchange. Therefore when the client moves between network attachment points it would refresh its delegated prefix the same way it refreshes addresses assigned (via SLAAC or DHCPv6 IA_NA) from the shared onlink prefix:

While allowing the client to keep the same prefix while roaming between links might provide some benefits for the client, it is not feasible without protocol changes: after the client moves to a new link, the DHCPv6-relays would retain the route pointing to the client's link-local address on the old link. Therefore the first-hop routers would have two routes for the same prefix pointing to different link, causing conenctivity issues for the client.

It should be noted that addressing clients from a shared on-link prefix also does not allow clients to keep addresses while roaming between links, so the proposed solution is not different in that regard. In addition to that, quite often different links have different security policies applied (for example, corporate internal network vs guest network), hence clients on different links need to use different prefixes.

10. Antispoofing and SAVI Interaction

Enabling the unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF) on the first-hop router interfaces towards clients provides the first layer of defence agains spoofing. If the malicious client sends a spoofed packet it would be dropped by the router unless the spoofed address belongs to a prefix delegated to another client on the same interface. Therefore the malicious client can only spoof addresses already delegated to another client on the same link or another client link-local address.

Source Address Validation Improvement (SAVI, [RFC7039]) provides more reliable protection against address spoofing. Administrators deploying the proposed solution on the SAVI-enabled infastructure SHOULD ensure that SAVI perimeter devices support DHCPv6-PD snooping to create the correct binding for the delegated prefixes (see [RFC7513]). Using FCFS SAVI ([RFC6620]) for protecting link-local addresses and creating SAVI bindings for DHCPv6-PD assigned prefixes would prevent spoofing.

Some infrastructure devices do not implement SAVI as defined in [RFC7039] but perform other forms of address tracking and snooping for security or performance improvement purposes (e.g. ND proxy). This is very common behaviour for wireless devices (access points and controllers). Administrators SHOULD ensure that such devices are able to snoop DHCPv6-PD packets, so the traffic from the delegated prefixes is not dropped.

It should be noted that using DHCPv6-PD makes it harder for an attacker to select the spoofed source address. When all clients are using the same shared link to form addresses, the attacker might learn addresses used by other clients by listening to multicast Neighbor Solicitations and Neighbour Advertisements. In DHCPv6-PD environments, however, the attacker can only learn about other clients global addresses by listening to multicast DHCPv6 messages, which are not transmitted so often, and may not be received by the client at all because they are sent to multicast groups that are specific to DHCPv6 servers and relays.

11. Migration Strategies and Co-existence with SLAAC Using Prefixes From PIO

It would be beneficial for the network to explicitly indicate its support of DHCPv6-PD for connected clients.

To allow the network to signal DHCPv6-PD support, [I-D.collink-6man-pio-pflag] defines a new PIO flag, indicating that DHCPv6-PD is preferred method of obtaining prefixes.

12. Benefits

The proposed solution provides the following benefits:

13. Privacy Considerations

Eventually, if/when the vast majority of clients support the proposed mechanism, an eavesdropper/information collector might be able to correlate the prefix to the client. To mitigate the threat the client might implement a mechanism similar to SLAAC temporary extensions ([RFC8981]) but for delegated prefixes:

14. IANA Considerations

This memo includes no request to IANA.

15. Security Considerations

A malicious or just misbehaving client might exhaust the DHCP-PD pool by sending a large number of requests with various DUIDs. This is not a new issue as the same attack might be implemented in DHCPv4 or DHCPv6 for IA_NA requests. To prevent a misbehaving client from denying service to other clients, the DHCPv6 server or relay MUST support limiting the number of prefixes delegated to a given client at any given time.

A malicious client might request a prefix and then release it very quickly, causing routing convergence events on the relays. The probability of such attack can be reduced if the network rate limits the amount of broadcast and multicast messages from the client.

Delegating the same prefix for the same client introduces privacy concerns. The proposed mitigation is discussed in Section 13.

Spoofing scenarios and prevention mechanisms are discussed in Section 10.

16. Appendix: Multiple Addresses Considerations

While a typical IPv4 host normally has only one IPv4 address per interface, an IPv6 device almost always has multiple addresses assigned to its interface. At the very least, a host can be expected to have one link-local address, one temporary address and, in most cases, one stable global address. On a network providing NAT64 service, an IPv6-only host running the 464XLAT customer-side translator (CLAT, [RFC6877]) would use a dedicated 464XLAT address, configured via SLAAC (see Section 6.3 of [RFC6877]), which brings the total number of addresses to 4. Other common scenarios where the number of addresses per host's interface might increase significantly, include but are not limited to:

[RFC7934] discusses this aspect and explicitly states that IPv6 deployments SHOULD NOT limit the number of IPv6 addresses a host can have. However it's been observed that networks often do limit the number of on-link addresses per device, likely in an attempt to protect the network resources and prevent DoS attacks.

The most common scenario of network-imposed limitations is Neighbor Discovery (ND) proxy. Many enterprise-scale wireless solutions implement ND proxy to reduce amount of broadcast and multicast downstream (AP to clients) traffic and provide SAVI functions. To perform ND proxy a device usually maintains a table, containing IPv6 and MAC addresses of connected clients. At least some implementations have hardcoded limits on how many IPv6 addresses per a single MAC such a table can contain. When the limit is exceeded the behaviour is implementation-dependent. Some vendors just fail to install N+1 address to the table. Other delete the oldest entry for this MAC and replace it with the new address. In any case the affected addresses lose network connectivity without receiving any implict signal, with traffic being silently dropped.

17. References

17.1. Normative References

[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4193]
Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4193>.
[RFC7084]
Singh, H., Beebee, W., Donley, C., and B. Stark, "Basic Requirements for IPv6 Customer Edge Routers", RFC 7084, DOI 10.17487/RFC7084, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7084>.
[RFC5460]
Stapp, M., "DHCPv6 Bulk Leasequery", RFC 5460, DOI 10.17487/RFC5460, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5460>.
[RFC6620]
Nordmark, E., Bagnulo, M., and E. Levy-Abegnoli, "FCFS SAVI: First-Come, First-Served Source Address Validation Improvement for Locally Assigned IPv6 Addresses", RFC 6620, DOI 10.17487/RFC6620, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6620>.
[RFC6877]
Mawatari, M., Kawashima, M., and C. Byrne, "464XLAT: Combination of Stateful and Stateless Translation", RFC 6877, DOI 10.17487/RFC6877, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6877>.
[RFC8168]
Li, T., Liu, C., and Y. Cui, "DHCPv6 Prefix-Length Hint Issues", RFC 8168, DOI 10.17487/RFC8168, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8168>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8273]
Brzozowski, J. and G. Van de Velde, "Unique IPv6 Prefix per Host", RFC 8273, DOI 10.17487/RFC8273, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8273>.
[RFC8415]
Mrugalski, T., Siodelski, M., Volz, B., Yourtchenko, A., Richardson, M., Jiang, S., Lemon, T., and T. Winters, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 8415, DOI 10.17487/RFC8415, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8415>.
[RFC8981]
Gont, F., Krishnan, S., Narten, T., and R. Draves, "Temporary Address Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6", RFC 8981, DOI 10.17487/RFC8981, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8981>.
[RFC8987]
Farrer, I., Kottapalli, N., Hunek, M., and R. Patterson, "DHCPv6 Prefix Delegating Relay Requirements", RFC 8987, DOI 10.17487/RFC8987, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8987>.

17.2. Informative References

[RFC4861]
Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman, "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861, DOI 10.17487/RFC4861, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4861>.
[RFC4862]
Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862, DOI 10.17487/RFC4862, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4862>.
[RFC6459]
Korhonen, J., Ed., Soininen, J., Patil, B., Savolainen, T., Bajko, G., and K. Iisakkila, "IPv6 in 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Evolved Packet System (EPS)", RFC 6459, DOI 10.17487/RFC6459, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6459>.
[RFC6583]
Gashinsky, I., Jaeggli, J., and W. Kumari, "Operational Neighbor Discovery Problems", RFC 6583, DOI 10.17487/RFC6583, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6583>.
[RFC7039]
Wu, J., Bi, J., Bagnulo, M., Baker, F., and C. Vogt, Ed., "Source Address Validation Improvement (SAVI) Framework", RFC 7039, DOI 10.17487/RFC7039, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7039>.
[RFC7278]
Byrne, C., Drown, D., and A. Vizdal, "Extending an IPv6 /64 Prefix from a Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Mobile Interface to a LAN Link", RFC 7278, DOI 10.17487/RFC7278, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7278>.
[RFC7348]
Mahalingam, M., Dutt, D., Duda, K., Agarwal, P., Kreeger, L., Sridhar, T., Bursell, M., and C. Wright, "Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network (VXLAN): A Framework for Overlaying Virtualized Layer 2 Networks over Layer 3 Networks", RFC 7348, DOI 10.17487/RFC7348, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7348>.
[RFC7421]
Carpenter, B., Ed., Chown, T., Gont, F., Jiang, S., Petrescu, A., and A. Yourtchenko, "Analysis of the 64-bit Boundary in IPv6 Addressing", RFC 7421, DOI 10.17487/RFC7421, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7421>.
[RFC7513]
Bi, J., Wu, J., Yao, G., and F. Baker, "Source Address Validation Improvement (SAVI) Solution for DHCP", RFC 7513, DOI 10.17487/RFC7513, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7513>.
[RFC7653]
Raghuvanshi, D., Kinnear, K., and D. Kukrety, "DHCPv6 Active Leasequery", RFC 7653, DOI 10.17487/RFC7653, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7653>.
[RFC7934]
Colitti, L., Cerf, V., Cheshire, S., and D. Schinazi, "Host Address Availability Recommendations", BCP 204, RFC 7934, DOI 10.17487/RFC7934, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7934>.
[RFC8200]
Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200, DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8200>.
[RFC8504]
Chown, T., Loughney, J., and T. Winters, "IPv6 Node Requirements", BCP 220, RFC 8504, DOI 10.17487/RFC8504, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8504>.
Colitti, L., Linkova, J., Ma, X., and D. Lamparter, "Signalling DHCPv6 Prefix Delegation Availability to Hosts", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-collink-6man-pio-pflag-01, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-collink-6man-pio-pflag-01>.
[I-D.ietf-dhc-rfc8415bis]
Mrugalski, T., Volz, B., Richardson, M., Jiang, S., and T. Winters, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-dhc-rfc8415bis-02, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dhc-rfc8415bis-02>.
[I-D.ietf-opsec-ipv6-addressing]
Gont, F. and G. Gont, "Implications of IPv6 Addressing on Security Operations", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-addressing-00, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-addressing-00>.

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Nick Buraglio, Brian Carpenter, Gert Doering, David Farmer, Fernando Gont, Nick Hilliard, Bob Hinden, Martin Hunek, Erik Kline, David Lamparter, Andrew McGregor, Tomek Mrugalski, Pascal Thubert, Ole Troan, Eduard Vasilenko, Timothy Winters, Chongfeng Xie for the discussions, their input and all contribution.

Contributors

Authors' Addresses

Lorenzo Colitti
Google, LLC
Shibuya 3-21-3,
Japan
Jen Linkova (editor)
Google
1 Darling Island Rd
Pyrmont NSW 2009
Australia
Xiao Ma (editor)
Google
Shibuya 3-21-3,
Japan