Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS)

1.1. Motivation

The visible face of the Internet largely consists of services that employ a client-server architecture in which an interactive or automated client communicates with an application service in order to retrieve or upload information, communicate with other entities, or access a broader network of services. When a client communicates with an application service using Transport Layer Security [TLS] or Datagram Transport Layer Security [DTLS], it references some notion of the server's identity (e.g., "the website at example.com") while attempting to establish secure communication. Likewise, during TLS negotiation, the server presents its notion of the service's identity in the form of a public-key certificate that was issued by a certification authority (CA) in the context of the Internet Public Key Infrastructure using X.509 [PKIX]. Informally, we can think of these identities as the client's "reference identity" and the server's "presented identity" (these rough ideas are defined more precisely later in this document through the concept of particular identifiers). In general, a client needs to verify that the server's presented identity matches its reference identity so it can authenticate the communication.¶

Many application technologies adhere to the pattern just outlined. Such protocols have traditionally specified their own rules for representing and verifying application service identity. Unfortunately, this divergence of approaches has caused some confusion among certification authorities, application developers, and protocol designers.¶

Therefore, to codify secure procedures for the implementation and deployment of PKIX-based authentication, this document specifies recommended procedures for representing and verifying application service identity in certificates intended for use in application protocols employing TLS.¶

1.2. Audience

The primary audience for this document consists of application protocol designers, who can reference this document instead of defining their own rules for the representation and verification of application service identity. Secondarily, the audience consists of certification authorities, service providers, and client developers from technology communities that might reuse the recommendations in this document when defining certificate issuance policies, generating certificate signing requests, or writing software algorithms for identity matching.¶

1.3. How to Read This Document

This document is longer than the authors would have liked because it was necessary to carefully define terminology, explain the underlying concepts, define the scope, and specify recommended behavior for both certification authorities and application software implementations. The following sections are of special interest to various audiences:¶

• Protocol designers might want to first read the checklist in Section 3.¶
• Certification authorities might want to first read the recommendations for representation of server identity in Section 4.¶
• Service providers might want to first read the recommendations for requesting of server certificates in Section 5.¶
• Software implementers might want to first read the recommendations for verification of server identity in Section 6.¶

The sections on terminology (Section 1.7), naming of application services (Section 2), document scope (Section 1.6), and the like provide useful background information regarding the recommendations and guidelines that are contained in the above-referenced sections, but are not absolutely necessary for a first reading of this document.¶

1.4. Applicability

This document does not supersede the rules for certificate issuance or validation provided in [PKIX]. Therefore, [PKIX] is authoritative on any point that might also be discussed in this document. Furthermore, [PKIX] also governs any certificate-related topic on which this document is silent, including but not limited to certificate syntax, certificate extensions such as name constraints and extended key usage, and handling of certification paths.¶

This document addresses only name forms in the leaf "end entity" server certificate, not any name forms in the chain of certificates used to validate the server certificate. Therefore, in order to ensure proper authentication, application clients need to verify the entire certification path per [PKIX].¶

This document also does not supersede the rules for verifying service identity provided in specifications for existing application protocols published prior to this document. However, the procedures described here can be referenced by future specifications, including updates to specifications for existing application protocols if the relevant technology communities agree to do so.¶

1.5. Overview of Recommendations

To orient the reader, this section provides an informational overview of the recommendations contained in this document.¶

The previous version of this specification, [VERIFY], surveyed the current practice from many IETF standards and tried to generalize best practices. This document takes the lessons learned in the past decade and codifies them as best practices.¶

For the primary audience of application protocol designers, this document provides recommended procedures for the representation and verification of application service identity within PKIX certificates used in the context of TLS.¶

For the secondary audiences, in essence this document encourages certification authorities, application service providers, and application client developers to coalesce on the following practices:¶

• Stop including and checking strings that look like domain names in the subject's Common Name.¶
• Check DNS domain names via the subjectAlternativeName extension designed for that purpose: dNSName.¶
• Move toward including and checking even more specific subjectAlternativeName extensions where appropriate for using the protocol (e.g., uniformResourceIdentifier and the otherName form SRVName).¶
• Constrain and simplify the validation of so-called wildcard certificates (e.g., a certificate containing an identifier for *.example.com).¶

1.6. Scope

1.7. Terminology

Because many concepts related to "identity" are often too vague to be actionable in application protocols, we define a set of more concrete terms for use in this specification.¶

application service:

A service on the Internet that enables interactive and automated clients to connect for the purpose of retrieving or uploading information, communicating with other entities, or connecting to a broader network of services.¶

application service provider:

An organization or individual that hosts or deploys an application service.¶

application service type:

A formal identifier for the application protocol used to provide a particular kind of application service at a domain; the application service type typically takes the form of a Uniform Resource Identifier scheme [URI] or a DNS SRV Service [DNS-SRV].¶

attribute-type-and-value pair:

A colloquial name for the ASN.1-based construction comprising a Relative Distinguished Name (RDN), which itself is a building-block component of Distinguished Names. See Section 2 of [LDAP-DN].¶

automated client:

A software agent or device that is not directly controlled by a human user.¶

delegated domain:

A domain name or host name that is explicitly configured for communicating with the source domain, by either (a) the human user controlling an interactive client or (b) a trusted administrator. In case (a), one example of delegation is an account setup that specifies the domain name of a particular host to be used for retrieving information or connecting to a network, which might be different from the server portion of the user's account name (e.g., a server at mailhost.example.com for connecting to an IMAP server hosting an email address of juliet@example.com). In case (b), one example of delegation is an admin-configured host-to-address/address-to-host lookup table.¶

derived domain:

A domain name or host name that a client has derived from the source domain in an automated fashion (e.g., by means of a [DNS-SRV] lookup).¶

identifier:

A particular instance of an identifier type that is either presented by a server in a certificate or referenced by a client for matching purposes.¶

identifier type:

A formally defined category of identifier that can be included in a certificate and therefore that can also be used for matching purposes. For conciseness and convenience, we define the following identifier types of interest, which are based on those found in the PKIX specification [PKIX] and various PKIX extensions.¶

• CN-ID = a Relative Distinguished Name (RDN) in the certificate subject field that contains one and only one attribute-type-and-value pair of type Common Name (CN), where the value matches the overall form of a domain name (informally, dot-separated letter-digit-hyphen labels); see [PKIX] and also [LDAP-SCHEMA]¶
• DNS-ID = a subjectAltName entry of type dNSName; see [PKIX]¶
• SRV-ID = a subjectAltName entry of type otherName whose name form is SRVName; see [SRVNAME]¶
• URI-ID = a subjectAltName entry of type uniformResourceIdentifier whose value includes both (i) a "scheme" and (ii) a "host" component (or its equivalent) that matches the "reg-name" rule (where the quoted terms represent the associated [ABNF] productions from [URI]); see [PKIX] and [URI]¶

interactive client:

A software agent or device that is directly controlled by a human user. (Other specifications related to security and application protocols, such as [WSC-UI], often refer to this entity as a "user agent".)¶

pinning:

The act of establishing a cached name association between the application service's certificate and one of the client's reference identifiers, despite the fact that none of the presented identifiers matches the given reference identifier. Pinning is accomplished by allowing a human user to positively accept the mismatch during an attempt to communicate with the application service. Once a cached name association is established, the certificate is said to be pinned to the reference identifier and in future communication attempts the client simply verifies that the service's presented certificate matches the pinned certificate, as described under Section 6.6.2. (A similar definition of "pinning" is provided in [WSC-UI].)¶

PKIX:

PKIX is a short name for the Internet Public Key Infrastructure using X.509 defined in RFC 5280 [PKIX], which comprises a profile of the X.509v3 certificate specifications and X.509v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) specifications for use in the Internet.¶

PKIX-based system:

A software implementation or deployed service that makes use of X.509v3 certificates and X.509v2 certificate revocation lists (CRLs).¶

PKIX certificate:

An X.509v3 certificate generated and employed in the context of PKIX.¶

presented identifier:

An identifier that is presented by a server to a client within a PKIX certificate when the client attempts to establish secure communication with the server; the certificate can include one or more presented identifiers of different types, and if the server hosts more than one domain then the certificate might present distinct identifiers for each domain.¶

reference identifier:

An identifier, constructed from a source domain and optionally an application service type, used by the client for matching purposes when examining presented identifiers.¶

source domain:

The fully qualified DNS domain name that a client expects an application service to present in the certificate (e.g., www.example.com), typically input by a human user, configured into a client, or provided by reference such as in a hyperlink. The combination of a source domain and, optionally, an application service type enables a client to construct one or more reference identifiers.¶

subjectAltName entry:

An identifier placed in a subjectAltName extension.¶

subjectAltName extension:

A standard PKIX certificate extension [PKIX] enabling identifiers of various types to be bound to the certificate subject -- in addition to, or in place of, identifiers that may be embedded within or provided as a certificate's subject field.¶

subject field:

The subject field of a PKIX certificate identifies the entity associated with the public key stored in the subject public key field (see Section 4.1.2.6 of [PKIX]).¶

subject name:

In an overall sense, a subject's name(s) can be represented by or in the subject field, the subjectAltName extension, or both (see [PKIX] for details). More specifically, the term often refers to the name of a PKIX certificate's subject, encoded as the X.501 type Name and conveyed in a certificate's subject field (see Section 4.1.2.6 of [PKIX]).¶

TLS client:

An entity that assumes the role of a client in a Transport Layer Security [TLS] negotiation. In this specification we generally assume that the TLS client is an (interactive or automated) application client; however, in application protocols that enable server-to-server communication, the TLS client could be a peer application service.¶

TLS server:

An entity that assumes the role of a server in a Transport Layer Security [TLS] negotiation; in this specification we assume that the TLS server is an application service.¶

Most security-related terms in this document are to be understood in the sense defined in [SECTERMS]; such terms include, but are not limited to, "attack," "authentication," "authorization," "certification authority," "certification path," "certificate," "credential," "identity," "self-signed certificate," "trust," "trust anchor," "trust chain," "validate," and "verify".¶

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶

2.1. Naming Application Services

This specification assumes that the name of an application service is based on a DNS domain name (e.g., example.com) -- supplemented in some circumstances by an application service type (e.g., "the IMAP server at example.com").¶

From the perspective of the application client or user, some names are direct because they are provided directly by a human user (e.g., via runtime input, prior configuration, or explicit acceptance of a client communication attempt), whereas other names are indirect because they are automatically resolved by the client based on user input (e.g., a target name resolved from a source name using DNS SRV or NAPTR records). This dimension matters most for certificate consumption, specifically verification as discussed in this document.¶

From the perspective of the application service, some names are unrestricted because they can be used in any type of service (e.g., a certificate might be reused for both the HTTP service and the IMAP service at example.com), whereas other names are restricted because they can be used in only one type of service (e.g., a special-purpose certificate that can be used only for an IMAP service). This dimension matters most for certificate issuance.¶

Therefore, we can categorize the identifier types of interest as follows:¶

• A CN-ID is direct and unrestricted.¶
• A DNS-ID is direct and unrestricted.¶
• An SRV-ID can be either direct or (more typically) indirect, and is restricted.¶
• A URI-ID is direct and restricted.¶

We summarize this taxonomy in the following table.¶

  +-----------+-----------+---------------+
  |           |  Direct   |  Restricted   |
  +-----------+-----------+---------------+
  |  CN-ID    |  Yes      |  No           |
  +-----------+-----------+---------------+
  |  DNS-ID   |  Yes      |  No           |
  +-----------+-----------+---------------+
  |  SRV-ID   |  Either   |  Yes          |
  +-----------+-----------+---------------+
  |  URI-ID   |  Yes      |  Yes          |
  +-----------+-----------+---------------+

When implementing software, deploying services, and issuing certificates for secure PKIX-based authentication, it is important to keep these distinctions in mind. In particular, best practices differ somewhat for application server implementations, application client implementations, application service providers, and certification authorities. Ideally, protocol specifications that reference this document will specify which identifiers are mandatory-to-implement by servers and clients, which identifiers ought to be supported by certificate issuers, and which identifiers ought to be requested by application service providers. Because these requirements differ across applications, it is impossible to categorically stipulate universal rules (e.g., that all software implementations, service providers, and certification authorities for all application protocols need to use or support DNS-IDs as a baseline for the purpose of interoperability).¶

However, it is preferable that each application protocol will at least define a baseline that applies to the community of software developers, application service providers, and CAs actively using or supporting that technology (one such community, the CA/Browser Forum, has codified such a baseline for "Extended Validation Certificates" in [EV-CERTS]).¶

2.2. DNS Domain Names

For the purposes of this specification, the name of an application service is (or is based on) a DNS domain name that conforms to one of the following forms:¶

1. A "traditional domain name," i.e., a fully qualified DNS domain name or "FQDN" (see [DNS-CONCEPTS]) all of whose labels are "LDH labels" as described in [IDNA-DEFS]. Informally, such labels are constrained to [US-ASCII] letters, digits, and the hyphen, with the hyphen prohibited in the first character position. Additional qualifications apply (please refer to the above-referenced specifications for details), but they are not relevant to this specification.¶
2. An "internationalized domain name," i.e., a DNS domain name that conforms to the overall form of a domain name (informally, dot-separated letter-digit-hyphen labels) but includes at least one label containing appropriately encoded Unicode code points outside the traditional US-ASCII range. That is, it contains at least one U-label or A-label, but otherwise may contain any mixture of NR-LDH labels, A-labels, or U-labels, as described in [IDNA-DEFS] and the associated documents.¶

2.3. Subject Naming in PKIX Certificates

In theory, the Internet Public Key Infrastructure using X.509 [PKIX] employs the global directory service model defined in [X.500] and [X.501]. Under that model, information is held in a directory information base (DIB) and entries in the DIB are organized in a hierarchy called the directory information tree (DIT). An object or alias entry in that hierarchy consists of a set of attributes (each of which has a defined type and one or more values) and is uniquely identified by a Distinguished Name (DN). The DN of an entry is constructed by combining the Relative Distinguished Names of its superior entries in the tree (all the way down to the root of the DIT) with one or more specially nominated attributes of the entry itself (which together comprise the Relative Distinguished Name (RDN) of the entry, so-called because it is relative to the Distinguished Names of the superior entries in the tree). The entry closest to the root is sometimes referred to as the "most significant" entry, and the entry farthest from the root is sometimes referred to as the "least significant" entry. An RDN is a set (i.e., an unordered group) of attribute-type-and-value pairs (see also [LDAP-DN]), each of which asserts some attribute about the entry.¶

In practice, the certificates used in [X.509] and [PKIX] borrow key concepts from X.500 and X.501 (e.g., DNs and RDNs) to identify entities, but such certificates are not necessarily part of a global directory information base. Specifically, the subject field of a PKIX certificate is an X.501 type Name that "identifies the entity associated with the public key stored in the subject public key field" (see Section 4.1.2.6 of [PKIX]). However, it is perfectly acceptable for the subject field to be empty, as long as the certificate contains a subject alternative name ("subjectAltName") extension that includes at least one subjectAltName entry, because the subjectAltName extension allows various identities to be bound to the subject (see Section 4.2.1.6 of [PKIX]). The subjectAltName extension itself is a sequence of typed entries, where each type is a distinct kind of identifier.¶

For our purposes, an application service can be identified by a name or names carried in the subject field (i.e., a CN-ID) and/or in one of the following identifier types within subjectAltName entries:¶

• DNS-ID¶
• SRV-ID¶
• URI-ID¶

Existing certificates often use a CN-ID in the subject field to represent a fully qualified DNS domain name; for example, consider the following three subject names, where the attribute of type Common Name contains a string whose form matches that of a fully qualified DNS domain name (im.example.org, mail.example.net, and www.example.com, respectively):¶

     CN=im.example.org,O=Example Org,C=GB

     C=CA,O=Example Internetworking,CN=mail.example.net

     O=Examples-R-Us,CN=www.example.com,C=US

However, the Common Name is not strongly typed because a Common Name might contain a human-friendly string for the service, rather than a string whose form matches that of a fully qualified DNS domain name (a certificate with such a single Common Name will typically have at least one subjectAltName entry containing the fully qualified DNS domain name):¶

     CN=A Free Chat Service,O=Example Org,C=GB

Or, a certificate's subject might contain both a CN-ID as well as another common name attribute containing a human-friendly string:¶

     CN=A Free Chat Service,CN=im.example.org,O=Example Org,C=GB

In general, this specification recommends and prefers use of subjectAltName entries (DNS-ID, SRV-ID, URI-ID, etc.) over use of the subject field (CN-ID) where possible, as more completely described in the following sections. However, specifications that reuse this one can legitimately encourage continued support for the CN-ID identifier type if they have good reasons to do so, such as backward compatibility with deployed infrastructure (see, for example, [EV-CERTS]).¶

4.1. Rules

When a certification authority issues a certificate based on the fully qualified DNS domain name at which the application service provider will provide the relevant application, the following rules apply to the representation of application service identities. The reader needs to be aware that some of these rules are cumulative and can interact in important ways that are illustrated later in this document.¶

1. The certificate SHOULD include a "DNS-ID" if possible as a baseline for interoperability.¶
2. If the service using the certificate deploys a technology for which the relevant specification stipulates that certificates ought to include identifiers of type SRV-ID (e.g., this is true of [XMPP]), then the certificate SHOULD include an SRV-ID.¶
3. If the service using the certificate deploys a technology for which the relevant specification stipulates that certificates ought to include identifiers of type URI-ID (e.g., this is true of [SIP] as specified by [SIP-CERTS], but not true of [HTTP] since [HTTP-TLS] does not describe usage of a URI-ID for HTTP services), then the certificate SHOULD include a URI-ID. The scheme SHALL be that of the protocol associated with the application service type and the "host" component (or its equivalent) SHALL be the fully qualified DNS domain name of the service. A specification that reuses this one MUST specify which URI schemes are to be considered acceptable in URI-IDs contained in PKIX certificates used for the application protocol (e.g., sip but not sips or tel for SIP as described in [SIP-SIPS], or perhaps http and https for HTTP as might be described in a future specification).¶
4. The certificate MAY include other application-specific identifiers for types that were defined before publication of [SRVNAME] (e.g., XmppAddr for [XMPP]) or for which service names or URI schemes do not exist; however, such application-specific identifiers are not applicable to all application technologies and therefore are out of scope for this specification.¶
5. Even though many deployed clients still check for the CN-ID within the certificate subject field, certification authorities are encouraged to migrate away from issuing certificates that represent the server's fully qualified DNS domain name in a CN-ID. Therefore, the certificate SHOULD NOT include a CN-ID unless the certification authority issues the certificate in accordance with a specification that reuses this one and that explicitly encourages continued support for the CN-ID identifier type in the context of a given application technology.¶
6. The certificate MAY contain more than one DNS-ID, SRV-ID, or URI-ID but SHOULD NOT contain more than one CN-ID, as further explained under Section 7.4.¶
7. Unless a specification that reuses this one allows continued support for the wildcard character *, the DNS domain name portion of a presented identifier SHOULD NOT contain the wildcard character, whether as the complete left-most label within the identifier (following the description of labels and domain names in [DNS-CONCEPTS], e.g., *.example.com) or as a fragment thereof (e.g., *oo.example.com, f*o.example.com, or fo*.example.com). A more detailed discussion of so-called "wildcard certificates" is provided under Section 7.2.¶

4.2. Examples

Consider a simple website at www.example.com, which is not discoverable via DNS SRV lookups. Because HTTP does not specify the use of URIs in server certificates, a certificate for this service might include only a DNS-ID of www.example.com. It might also include a CN-ID of www.example.com for backward compatibility with deployed infrastructure.¶

Consider an IMAP-accessible email server at the host mail.example.net servicing email addresses of the form user@example.net and discoverable via DNS SRV lookups on the application service name of example.net. A certificate for this service might include SRV-IDs of _imap.example.net and _imaps.example.net (see [EMAIL-SRV]) along with DNS-IDs of example.net and mail.example.net. It might also include CN-IDs of example.net and mail.example.net for backward compatibility with deployed infrastructure.¶

Consider a SIP-accessible voice-over-IP (VoIP) server at the host voice.example.edu servicing SIP addresses of the form user@voice.example.edu and identified by a URI of <sip:voice.example.edu>. A certificate for this service would include a URI-ID of sip:voice.example.edu (see [SIP-CERTS]) along with a DNS-ID of voice.example.edu. It might also include a CN-ID of voice.example.edu for backward compatibility with deployed infrastructure.¶

Consider an XMPP-compatible instant messaging (IM) server at the host im.example.org servicing IM addresses of the form user@im.example.org and discoverable via DNS SRV lookups on the im.example.org domain. A certificate for this service might include SRV-IDs of _xmpp-client.im.example.org and _xmpp-server.im.example.org (see [XMPP]), a DNS-ID of im.example.org, and an XMPP-specific XmppAddr of im.example.org (see [XMPP]). It might also include a CN-ID of im.example.org for backward compatibility with deployed infrastructure.¶

6.1. Overview

At a high level, the client verifies the application service's identity by performing the actions listed below (which are defined in the following subsections of this document):¶

1. The client constructs a list of acceptable reference identifiers based on the source domain and, optionally, the type of service to which the client is connecting.¶
2. The server provides its identifiers in the form of a PKIX certificate.¶
3. The client checks each of its reference identifiers against the presented identifiers for the purpose of finding a match.¶
4. When checking a reference identifier against a presented identifier, the client matches the source domain of the identifiers and, optionally, their application service type.¶

Naturally, in addition to checking identifiers, a client might complete further checks to ensure that the server is authorized to provide the requested service. However, such checking is not a matter of verifying the application service identity presented in a certificate, and therefore methods for doing so (e.g., consulting local policy information) are out of scope for this document.¶

6.2. Constructing a List of Reference Identifiers

6.3. Preparing to Seek a Match

Once the client has constructed its list of reference identifiers and has received the server's presented identifiers in the form of a PKIX certificate, the client checks its reference identifiers against the presented identifiers for the purpose of finding a match. The search fails if the client exhausts its list of reference identifiers without finding a match. The search succeeds if any presented identifier matches one of the reference identifiers, at which point the client SHOULD stop the search.¶

• Implementation Note: A client might be configured to perform multiple searches, i.e., to match more than one reference identifier. Although such behavior is not forbidden by this specification, rules for matching multiple reference identifiers are a matter for implementation or future specification.¶

• Security Warning: A client MUST NOT seek a match for a reference identifier of CN-ID if the presented identifiers include a DNS-ID, SRV-ID, URI-ID, or any application-specific identifier types supported by the client.¶

Before applying the comparison rules provided in the following sections, the client might need to split the reference identifier into its DNS domain name portion and its application service type portion, as follows:¶

• A reference identifier of type DNS-ID does not include an application service type portion and thus can be used directly as the DNS domain name for comparison purposes. As an example, a DNS-ID of www.example.com would result in a DNS domain name portion of www.example.com.¶
• A reference identifier of type CN-ID also does not include an application service type portion and thus can be used directly as the DNS domain name for comparison purposes. As previously mentioned, this document specifies that a CN-ID always contains a string whose form matches that of a DNS domain name (thus differentiating a CN-ID from a Common Name containing a human-friendly name).¶
• For a reference identifier of type SRV-ID, the DNS domain name portion is the Name and the application service type portion is the Service. As an example, an SRV-ID of _imaps.example.net would be split into a DNS domain name portion of example.net and an application service type portion of imaps (mapping to an application protocol of IMAP as explained in [EMAIL-SRV]).¶
• For a reference identifier of type URI-ID, the DNS domain name portion is the "reg-name" part of the "host" component (or its equivalent) and the application service type portion is the application service type associated with the scheme name matching the [ABNF] "scheme" rule from [URI] (not including the ':' separator). As previously mentioned, this document specifies that a URI-ID always contains a "host" component (or its equivalent) containing a "reg-name". (Matching only the "reg-name" rule from [URI] limits verification to DNS domain names, thereby differentiating a URI-ID from a uniformResourceIdentifier entry that contains an IP address or a mere host name, or that does not contain a "host" component at all.) Furthermore, note that extraction of the "reg-name" might necessitate normalization of the URI (as explained in [URI]). As an example, a URI-ID of sip:voice.example.edu would be split into a DNS domain name portion of voice.example.edu and an application service type of sip (associated with an application protocol of SIP as explained in [SIP-CERTS]).¶

Detailed comparison rules for matching the DNS domain name portion and application service type portion of the reference identifier are provided in the following sections.¶

6.4. Matching the DNS Domain Name Portion

The client MUST match the DNS domain name portion of a reference identifier according to the following rules (and SHOULD also check the application service type as described under Section 6.5). The rules differ depending on whether the domain to be checked is a "traditional domain name" or an "internationalized domain name" (as defined under Section 2.2). Furthermore, to meet the needs of clients that support presented identifiers containing the wildcard character *, we define a supplemental rule for so-called "wildcard certificates". Finally, we also specify the circumstances under which it is acceptable to check the CN-ID identifier type.¶

6.5. Matching the Application Service Type Portion

When a client checks identifiers of type SRV-ID and URI-ID, it MUST check not only the DNS domain name portion of the identifier but also the application service type portion. The client does this by splitting the identifier into the DNS domain name portion and the application service type portion (as described under Section 6.3), then checking both the DNS domain name portion (as described under Section 6.4) and the application service type portion as described in the following subsections.¶

Implementation Note: An identifier of type SRV-ID or URI-ID provides an application service type portion to be checked, but that portion is combined only with the DNS domain name portion of the SRV-ID or URI-ID itself. For example, if a client's list of reference identifiers includes an SRV-ID of _xmpp-client.im.example.org and a DNS-ID of apps.example.net, the client would check (a) the combination of an application service type of xmpp-client and a DNS domain name of im.example.org and (b) a DNS domain name of apps.example.net. However, the client would not check (c) the combination of an application service type of xmpp-client and a DNS domain name of apps.example.net because it does not have an SRV-ID of _xmpp-client.apps.example.net in its list of reference identifiers.¶

6.6. Outcome

The outcome of the matching procedure is one of the following cases.¶

7.1. Pinned Certificates

As defined under Section 1.7, a certificate is said to be "pinned" to a DNS domain name when a user has explicitly chosen to associate a service's certificate with that DNS domain name despite the fact that the certificate contains some other DNS domain name (e.g., the user has explicitly approved apps.example.net as a domain associated with a source domain of example.com). The cached name association MUST take account of both the certificate presented and the context in which it was accepted or configured (where the "context" includes the chain of certificates from the presented certificate to the trust anchor, the source domain, the application service type, the service's derived domain and port number, and any other relevant information provided by the user or associated by the client).¶

7.2. Wildcard Certificates

This document states that the wildcard character * SHOULD NOT be included in presented identifiers but MAY be checked by application clients (mainly for the sake of backward compatibility with deployed infrastructure). As a result, the rules provided in this document are more restrictive than the rules for many existing application technologies. Several security considerations justify tightening the rules:¶

• Wildcard certificates automatically vouch for any and all host names within their domain. This can be convenient for administrators but also poses the risk of vouching for rogue or buggy hosts. See for example [Defeating-SSL] (beginning at slide 91) and [HTTPSbytes] (slides 38-40).¶

• Specifications for existing application technologies are not clear or consistent about the allowable location of the wildcard character, such as whether it can be:¶

  • only the complete left-most label (e.g., *.example.com)¶
  • some fragment of the left-most label (e.g., fo*.example.com, f*o.example.com, or *oo.example.com)¶
  • all or part of a label other than the left-most label (e.g., www.*.example.com or www.foo*.example.com)¶
  • all or part of a label that identifies a so-called "public suffix" (e.g., *.co.uk or *.com)¶
  • included more than once in a given label (e.g., f*b*r.example.com¶
  • included as all or part of more than one label (e.g., *.*.example.com)¶

  These ambiguities might introduce exploitable differences in identity checking behavior among client implementations and necessitate overly complex and inefficient identity checking algorithms.¶

• There is no specification that defines how the wildcard character may be embedded within the A-labels or U-labels [IDNA-DEFS] of an internationalized domain name [IDNA-PROTO]; as a result, implementations are strongly discouraged from including or attempting to check for the wildcard character embedded within the A-labels or U-labels of an internationalized domain name (e.g., xn--kcry6tjko*.example.org). Note, however, that a presented domain name identifier MAY contain the wildcard character as long as that character occupies the entire left-most label position, where all of the remaining labels are valid NR-LDH labels, A-labels, or U-labels (e.g., *.xn--kcry6tjko.example.org).¶

Notwithstanding the foregoing security considerations, specifications that reuse this one can legitimately encourage continued support for the wildcard character if they have good reasons to do so, such as backward compatibility with deployed infrastructure (see, for example, [EV-CERTS]).¶

7.3. Internationalized Domain Names

Allowing internationalized domain names can lead to the inclusion of visually similar (so-called "confusable") characters in certificates; for discussion, see for example [IDNA-DEFS].¶

7.4. Multiple Identifiers

A given application service might be addressed by multiple DNS domain names for a variety of reasons, and a given deployment might service multiple domains (e.g., in so-called "virtual hosting" environments). In the default TLS handshake exchange, the client is not able to indicate the DNS domain name with which it wants to communicate, and the TLS server returns only one certificate for itself. Absent an extension to TLS, a typical workaround used to facilitate mapping an application service to multiple DNS domain names is to embed all of the domain names into a single certificate.¶

A more recent approach, formally specified in [TLS-EXT], is for the client to use the TLS "Server Name Indication" (SNI) extension when sending the client_hello message, stipulating the DNS domain name it desires or expects of the service. The service can then return the appropriate certificate in its Certificate message, and that certificate can represent a single DNS domain name.¶

To accommodate the workaround that was needed before the development of the SNI extension, this specification allows multiple DNS-IDs, SRV-IDs, or URI-IDs in a certificate; however, it explicitly discourages multiple CN-IDs. Although it would be preferable to forbid multiple CN-IDs entirely, there are several reasons at this time why this specification states that they SHOULD NOT (instead of MUST NOT) be included:¶

• At least one significant technology community of interest explicitly allows multiple CN-IDs [EV-CERTS].¶
• At least one significant certification authority is known to issue certificates containing multiple CN-IDs.¶
• Many service providers often deem inclusion of multiple CN-IDs necessary in virtual hosting environments because at least one widely deployed operating system does not yet support the SNI extension.¶

It is hoped that the recommendation regarding multiple CN-IDs can be further tightened in the future.¶