Internet-Draft | Zero Checksum for SCTP | November 2023 |
Tüxen, et al. | Expires 11 May 2024 | [Page] |
The Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) uses a 32-bit checksum in the common header of each packet to provide some level of data integrity. If another method used by SCTP provides already the same or a higher level of data integrity, computing this checksum does not provide any additional protection, but does consume computing resources.¶
This document provides a simple extension to SCTP allowing to save these computing resources by using zero as the checksum in a backwards compatible way. It also defines how this feature can be used when SCTP packets are encapsulated in Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) packets.¶
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SCTP as specified in [RFC9260] uses a CRC32c checksum to provide some level of data integrity. When using, for example, Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) as the lower layer for SCTP as specified in [RFC8261], using the CRC32c checksum does not provide any additional protection over the one already provided by DTLS. However, computing the CRC32c checksum at the sender and receiver side does consume computational resources for no benefit. This is particularly important for end points that are computational-limited and use SCTP encapsulated in DTLS.¶
The extension described in this document allows an SCTP end point to declare that it accepts SCTP packets with a checksum of zero when using a specific alternate error detection method. This declaration happens during the setup of the SCTP association and allows end points supporting this extension to be interoperable with end points not supporting the extension described in this document. To provide this backwards compatibility, end points using this extension still need to implement the CRC32c checksum algorithm.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
SCTP uses a CRC32c checksum to provide some level of data integrity. The CRC32c checksum is computed based on the SCTP common header and the chunks contained in the packet. In particular, the computation of the CRC32c checksum does not involve a pseudo header for IPv4 or IPv6 like the computation of the TCP checksum, as specified in [RFC9293], or the UDP checksum, as specified in [RFC0768].¶
Zero is a valid result of the CRC32c checksum algorithm. For example, the following figure depicts an SCTP packet containing a minimal INIT chunk with a correct CRC32c checksum of zero.¶
Using SCTP in combination with other mechanisms or protocol extensions might provide an equal or better level of data integrity protection than the one provided by using the CRC32c checksum algorithm. When using such alternate error detection methods, the SCTP common header containing the 32-bit checksum field might or might not be visible to middle boxes on the paths between the two end points.¶
Alternate error detection methods have two requirements:¶
An alternate error detection method MUST provide an equal or better level of data integrity than the one provided by using the CRC32c checksum algorithm. This MAY only apply to packets satisfying some method specific constraints.¶
Using an alternate error detection method MUST NOT result in a path failure for more than a couple of round trip times (RTT) due to middle boxes on the path expecting correct CRC32c checksums.¶
To fulfill the second requirement, alternate error detection methods MAY use a heuristic to detect the existence of such middle boxes and use correct CRC32c checksums on these affected paths.¶
One example fulfilling the first requirement is using DTLS as the lower layer of SCTP as specified in [RFC8261]. Another example is using SCTP Authentication as specified in [RFC4895]. Of course, this only applies to all SCTP packets having an AUTH chunk as its first chunk. However, using SCTP Authentication without any heuristic does not fulfill the second requirement. Since using DTLS as the lower layer of SCTP as specified in [RFC8261] also fulfills the second requirement, it can be used as an alternate error detection method (see Section 6).¶
If an alternate error detection method is available, the computation of the CRC32c checksum consumes computational resources without providing any benefit. To avoid this, an SCTP end point could be willing to accept SCTP packets with an incorrect CRC32c checksum value of zero in addition to SCTP packets with correct CRC32c checksum values.¶
Because zero is a valid result of the CRC32c checksum algorithm, a receiver of an SCTP packet containing a checksum value of zero cannot determine whether the sender included an incorrect CRC32c checksum of zero to reduce the CPU cost or the result of the CRC32c checksum computation was actually zero. However, if the receiver is willing to use an alternate error detection method, this ambiguity is irrelevant, since the receiver is fine with not using the CRC32c checksum to protect incoming packets.¶
The Zero Checksum Acceptable Chunk Parameter is defined by the following figure.¶
This field holds the IANA defined parameter type for the "Zero Checksum Acceptable" chunk parameter. IANA is requested to assign the value 32769 (0x8001) (suggested) for this parameter type.¶
This field holds the length in bytes of the chunk parameter; the value MUST be 8.¶
An IANA registered value specifying the alternate error detection method the sender of this parameter is willing to use for received packets.¶
All transported integer numbers are in "network byte order" a.k.a., Big Endian.¶
The Zero Checksum Acceptable Chunk Parameter MAY appear in INIT and INIT ACK chunks and MUST NOT appear in any other chunk. The Parameter MUST NOT appear more than once in any chunk.¶
If an end point not supporting the extension described in this document receives this parameter in an INIT or INIT ACK chunk, it is REQUIRED to skip this parameter and continue to process further parameters in the chunk. This behavior is specified by [RFC9260] because the highest-order two bits of the Type are '10'.¶
An end point willing to accept SCTP packets with an incorrect checksum of zero MUST include the Zero Checksum Acceptable Chunk Parameter indicating the alternate error detection method it is willing to use in the INIT or INIT ACK chunk it sends.¶
An SCTP implementation MAY also require the upper layer to indicate that it is fine to use a specific alternate error detection method for accepting SCTP packets with an incorrect CRC32c checksum value of zero.¶
An SCTP end point cannot just use an incorrect CRC32c checksum value of zero for all SCTP packets it sends. The following restrictions apply:¶
If an end point has not received an INIT or INIT ACK chunk containing a Zero Checksum Acceptable Chunk Parameter indicating an alternate error detection method it supports from its peer during the association setup, it MUST use a correct CRC32c checksum. In particular, when an end point¶
When an end point sends a packet containing a COOKIE ECHO chunk, it MUST include a correct CRC32c checksum in the packet containing the COOKIE ECHO chunk.¶
When an end point supports the dynamic address reconfiguration specified in [RFC5061] and sends a packet containing an ASCONF chunk, it MUST include a correct CRC32c checksum in the packet containing the ASCONF chunk.¶
Alternate error detection methods might have some additional conditions requiring that the sender MUST include a correct CRC32c checksum in the packet.¶
The first restriction allows backwards compatibility and the second and third restriction allow a simpler implementation of the extension defined in this document. The last restriction covers alternate error detection method specific constraints.¶
An SCTP end point MAY only send packets with an incorrect checksum of zero, if the upper layer allowed the use of the alternate error detection method that was announced by the peer.¶
If none of the above restrictions apply, an end point SHOULD use zero as the checksum when sending an SCTP packet.¶
If an end point has sent the Zero Checksum Acceptable Chunk Parameter indicating the support of an alternate error detection method in an INIT or INIT ACK chunk, it MUST accept SCTP packets fulfilling the requirements of the announced alternate error detection method using an incorrect checksum value of zero in addition to SCTP packets containing the correct CRC32c checksum value for this association.¶
In addition to processing OOTB packets with a correct CRC32c checksum as specified in [RFC9260], an SCTP implementation MAY also process OOTB packets having an incorrect zero checksum. Doing so might result in faster SCTP association failure detection.¶
Using SCTP over DTLS as specified in [RFC8261] provides a stronger error detection method than using the CRC32c checksum algorithm. Since middle boxes will not observe the unencrypted SCTP packet, there is no risk in interferring with using zero as an incorrect checksum. There are no additional error detection specific constraints on packets when using DTLS encapsulation.¶
IANA is requested to assign the Error Detection Method Identifier of 1 for this method.¶
This section describes how the socket API defined in [RFC6458] needs to be extended to provide a way for the application to control the acceptance of a zero checksum.¶
A 'Socket API Considerations' section is contained in all SCTP related specifications published after [RFC6458] describing an extension for which implementations using the socket API as specified in [RFC6458] would require some extension of the socket API. Please note that this section is informational only.¶
A socket API implementation based on [RFC6458] is extended by supporting one new write-only IPPROTO_SCTP-level socket option.¶
This IPPROTO_SCTP-level socket option with the name SCTP_ACCEPT_ZERO_CHECKSUM can be used to control the acceptance of a zero checksum. It is a write-only socket option and applies only to future SCTP associations on the socket.¶
This option expects an unsigned integer. Possible values include:¶
Disable the use of alternate error detection method. This means that all SCTP packets being sent have a correct CRC32c checksum value.¶
Use the alternate error detection method described in Section 6.¶
An implementation might only send packets with an incorrect checksum of zero, if the alternate error detection method announced by the peer is also enabled locally via this socket option.¶
The default for this socket option is that the use of alternate error detection methods is disabled.¶
[NOTE to RFC-Editor: "RFCXXXX" is to be replaced by the RFC number you assign this document.]¶
[NOTE to RFC-Editor: The suggested value for the parameter type is tentative and to be confirmed by IANA.]¶
This document (RFCXXXX) is the reference for the registration described in this section.¶
A new chunk parameter type has to be assigned by IANA. This requires an additional line in the "Chunk Parameter Types" registry for SCTP:¶
ID Value | Chunk Parameter Type | Reference |
---|---|---|
32769 (suggested) | Zero Checksum Acceptable (0x8001 (suggested)) | [RFCXXXX] |
Furthermore, IANA is requested to establish a new "Error Detection Method" registry for SCTP. The assignment of new error detection methods is done through the Specification Required policy as defined in [RFC8126]. Documentation for a new error detection method MUST contain the following information:¶
A name of an alternate error detection method.¶
A reference to a specification describing:¶
the alternate error detection method,¶
why the alternate error detection method provides an equal or better level of data integrity protection than the one provided by using the CRC32c checksum,¶
any method specific constraints referred to in the fourth exception in Section 5.2, and¶
why using the alternate error detection method does not result in path failures due to middle boxes expecting correct CRC32c checksums for more than a couple of RTTs. In case the alternate error detection method uses a heuristic for detecting such middle boxes, this heuristic needs to be described.¶
IANA is requested to use the following as the initial contents of the registry:¶
ID Value | Error Detection Method | Reference |
---|---|---|
0 | Reserved | [RFCXXXX] |
1 | SCTP over DTLS | [RFCXXXX] |
2 - 4294967295 | Unassigned |
A Designated Expert (DE) is expected to ascertain the existence of suitable documentation (a specification) as described in [RFC8126] and to verify that the document is permanently and publicly available. Furthermore, the DE is expected to ensure that the above four points have been addressed in an appropriate way.¶
This document does not change the considerations given in [RFC9260].¶
The authors wish to thank Gorry Fairhurst, Mike Heard, Peter Lei, Nils Ohlmeier, Claudio Porfiri, Timo Völker, and Magnus Westerlund for their invaluable comments.¶