| Internet-Draft | TEEP Protocol | March 2022 |
| Tschofenig, et al. | Expires 8 September 2022 | [Page] |
This document specifies a protocol that installs, updates, and deletes Trusted Components in a device with a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). This specification defines an interoperable protocol for managing the lifecycle of Trusted Components.¶
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 8 September 2022.¶
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶
The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) concept has been designed to separate a regular operating system, also referred as a Rich Execution Environment (REE), from security-sensitive applications. In a TEE ecosystem, device vendors may use different operating systems in the REE and may use different types of TEEs. When Trusted Component Developers or Device Administrators use Trusted Application Managers (TAMs) to install, update, and delete Trusted Applications and their dependencies on a wide range of devices with potentially different TEEs then an interoperability need arises.¶
This document specifies the protocol for communicating between a TAM and a TEEP Agent.¶
The Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) architecture document [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture] provides design guidance and introduces the necessary terminology.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
This specification re-uses the terminology defined in [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture].¶
As explained in Section 4.4 of that document, the TEEP protocol treats each Trusted Application (TA), any dependencies the TA has, and personalization data as separate components that are expressed in SUIT manifests, and a SUIT manifest might contain or reference multiple binaries (see [I-D.ietf-suit-manifest] for more details).¶
As such, the term Trusted Component (TC) in this document refers to a set of binaries expressed in a SUIT manifest, to be installed in a TEE. Note that a Trusted Component may include one or more TAs and/or configuration data and keys needed by a TA to operate correctly.¶
Each Trusted Component is uniquely identified by a SUIT Component Identifier (see [I-D.ietf-suit-manifest] Section 8.7.2.2).¶
The TEEP protocol consists of messages exchanged between a TAM and a TEEP Agent. The messages are encoded in CBOR and designed to provide end-to-end security. TEEP protocol messages are signed by the endpoints, i.e., the TAM and the TEEP Agent, but Trusted Applications may also be encrypted and signed by a Trusted Component Developer or Device Administrator. The TEEP protocol not only uses CBOR but also the respective security wrapper, namely COSE [RFC8152]. Furthermore, for software updates the SUIT manifest format [I-D.ietf-suit-manifest] is used, and for attestation the Entity Attestation Token (EAT) [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] format is supported although other attestation formats are also permitted.¶
This specification defines five messages: QueryRequest, QueryResponse, Update, Success, and Error.¶
A TAM queries a device's current state with a QueryRequest message. A TEEP Agent will, after authenticating and authorizing the request, report attestation information, list all Trusted Components, and provide information about supported algorithms and extensions in a QueryResponse message. An error message is returned if the request could not be processed. A TAM will process the QueryResponse message and determine whether to initiate subsequent message exchanges to install, update, or delete Trusted Applications.¶
+------------+ +-------------+
| TAM | |TEEP Agent |
+------------+ +-------------+
QueryRequest ------->
QueryResponse
<------- or
Error
¶
With the Update message a TAM can instruct a TEEP Agent to install and/or delete one or more Trusted Components. The TEEP Agent will process the message, determine whether the TAM is authorized and whether the Trusted Component has been signed by an authorized Trusted Component Signer. A Success message is returned when the operation has been completed successfully, or an Error message otherwise.¶
+------------+ +-------------+
| TAM | |TEEP Agent |
+------------+ +-------------+
Update ---->
Success
<---- or
Error
¶
TEEP messages are protected by the COSE_Sign1 structure. The TEEP protocol messages are described in CDDL format [RFC8610] below.¶
{
teep-message => (query-request /
query-response /
update /
teep-success /
teep-error ),
}
¶
To create a TEEP message, the following steps are performed.¶
When TEEP message is received (see the ProcessTeepMessage conceptual API defined in [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture] section 6.2.1), the following validation steps are performed. If any of the listed steps fail, then the TEEP message MUST be rejected.¶
A QueryRequest message is used by the TAM to learn information from the TEEP Agent, such as the features supported by the TEEP Agent, including ciphersuites and protocol versions. Additionally, the TAM can selectively request data items from the TEEP Agent via the request parameter. Currently, the following features are supported:¶
Like other TEEP messages, the QueryRequest message is signed, and the relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL structure is shown in Appendix C.¶
query-request = [
type: TEEP-TYPE-query-request,
options: {
? token => bstr .size (8..64),
? supported-cipher-suites => [ + suite ],
? supported-freshness-mechanisms => [ + freshness-mechanism ],
? challenge => bstr .size (8..512),
? versions => [ + version ],
* $$query-request-extensions
* $$teep-option-extensions
},
data-item-requested: data-item-requested
]
¶
The message has the following fields:¶
The data-item-requested parameter indicates what information the TAM requests from the TEEP Agent in the form of a bitmap. Each value in the bitmap corresponds to an IANA registered information element. This specification defines the following initial set of information elements:¶
Further values may be added in the future via IANA registration.¶
The QueryResponse message is the successful response by the TEEP Agent after receiving a QueryRequest message. As discussed in Section 7.2, it can also be sent unsolicited if the contents of the QueryRequest are already known and do not vary per message.¶
Like other TEEP messages, the QueryResponse message is signed, and the relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL structure is shown in Appendix C.¶
query-response = [
type: TEEP-TYPE-query-response,
options: {
? token => bstr .size (8..64),
? selected-cipher-suite => suite,
? selected-version => version,
? evidence-format => text,
? evidence => bstr,
? tc-list => [ + tc-info ],
? requested-tc-list => [ + requested-tc-info ],
? unneeded-tc-list => [ + SUIT_Component_Identifier ],
? ext-list => [ + ext-info ],
* $$query-response-extensions,
* $$teep-option-extensions
}
]
tc-info = {
component-id => SUIT_Component_Identifier,
? tc-manifest-sequence-number => .within uint .size 8
}
requested-tc-info = {
component-id => SUIT_Component_Identifier,
? tc-manifest-sequence-number => .within uint .size 8
? have-binary => bool
}
¶
The QueryResponse message has the following fields:¶
The tc-info object has the following fields:¶
The requested-tc-info message has the following fields:¶
Section 7 of [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture] lists information that may appear in evidence depending on the circumstance. However, the evidence is opaque to the TEEP protocol and there are no formal requirements on the contents of evidence.¶
TAMs however consume Attestation Results and do need enough information therein to make decisions on how to remediate a TEE that is out of compliance, or update a TEE that is requesting an authorized change. To do so, the information in Section 7 of [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture] is often required depending on the policy. When an Entity Attestation Token is used, the following claims can be used to meet those requirements:¶
| Requirement | Claim | Reference |
|---|---|---|
| Device unique identifier | ueid | [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] section 3.4 |
| Vendor of the device | oemid | [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] section 3.6 |
| Class of the device | class-identifier | [I-D.birkholz-rats-suit-claims] section 3.1.2 |
| TEE hardware type | chip-version | [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] section 3.7 |
| TEE hardware version | chip-version | [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] section 3.7 |
| TEE firmware type | sw-name | [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] section 3.9 |
| TEE firmware version | sw-version | [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] section 3.10 |
| Freshness proof | nonce | [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] section 3.3 |
The Update message is used by the TAM to install and/or delete one or more Trusted Components via the TEEP Agent.¶
Like other TEEP messages, the Update message is signed, and the relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL structure is shown in Appendix C.¶
update = [
type: TEEP-TYPE-update,
options: {
? token => bstr .size (8..64),
? manifest-list => [ + bstr .cbor SUIT_Envelope ],
* $$update-extensions,
* $$teep-option-extensions
}
]
¶
The Update message has the following fields:¶
Note that an Update message carrying one or more SUIT manifests will inherently involve multiple signatures, one by the TAM in the TEEP message and one from a Trusted Component Signer inside each manifest. This is intentional as they are for different purposes.¶
The TAM is what authorizes apps to be installed, updated, and deleted on a given TEE and so the TEEP signature is checked by the TEEP Agent at protocol message processing time. (This same TEEP security wrapper is also used on messages like QueryRequest so that Agents only send potentially sensitive data such as evidence to trusted TAMs.)¶
The Trusted Component signer on the other hand is what authorizes the Trusted Component to actually run, so the manifest signature could be checked at install time or load (or run) time or both, and this checking is done by the TEE independent of whether TEEP is used or some other update mechanism. See section 5 of [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture] for further discussion.¶
The Update Message has a SUIT_Envelope containing SUIT manifests. Following are some examples of using SUIT manifests in the Update Message.¶
In this example, a SUIT Manifest has a URI pointing to a Trusted Component Binary.¶
A Trusted Component Developer creates a new Trusted Component Binary and hosts it at a Trusted Component Developer's URI. Then the Trusted Component Developer generates an associated SUIT manifest with the filename "tc-uuid.suit" that contains the URI. The filename "tc-uuid.suit" is used in Example 3 later.¶
The TAM receives the latest SUIT manifest from the Trusted Component Developer, and the URI it contains will not be changeable by the TAM since the SUIT manifest is signed by the Trusted Component Developer.¶
Pros:¶
Cons:¶
+------------+ +-------------+
| TAM | | TEEP Agent |
+------------+ +-------------+
Update ---->
+=================== teep-protocol(TAM) ==================+
| TEEP_Message([ |
| TEEP-TYPE-update, |
| options: { |
| manifest-list: [ |
| += suit-manifest "tc-uuid.suit" (TC Developer) =+ |
| | SUIT_Envelope({ | |
| | manifest: { | |
| | install: { | |
| | set-parameter: { | |
| | uri: "https://example.org/tc-uuid.ta" | |
| | }, | |
| | fetch | |
| | } | |
| | } | |
| | }) | |
| +===============================================+ |
| ] |
| } |
| ]) |
+=========================================================+
and then,
+-------------+ +--------------+
| TEEP Agent | | TC Developer |
+-------------+ +--------------+
<----
fetch "https://example.org/tc-uuid.ta"
+======= tc-uuid.ta =======+
| 48 65 6C 6C 6F 2C 20 ... |
+==========================+
Figure 1: URI of the Trusted Component Binary
¶
For the full SUIT Manifest example binary, see Appendix "Example 1: SUIT Manifest pointing to URI of the Trusted Component Binary".¶
In this example, the SUIT manifest contains the entire Trusted Component Binary using the integrated-payload (see [I-D.ietf-suit-manifest] Section 7.6).¶
A Trusted Component Developer delegates to the TAM the task of delivering the Trusted Component Binary in the SUIT manifest. The Trusted Component Developer creates a SUIT manifest and embeds the Trusted Component Binary, which is referenced in the URI parameter with identifier "#tc". The Trusted Component Developer provides the SUIT manifest to the TAM.¶
The TAM serves the SUIT manifest containing the Trusted Component Binary to the device in an Update message.¶
Pros:¶
Cons:¶
+------------+ +-------------+
| TAM | | TEEP Agent |
+------------+ +-------------+
Update ---->
+=========== teep-protocol(TAM) ============+
| TEEP_Message([ |
| TEEP-TYPE-update, |
| options: { |
| manifest-list: [ |
| +== suit-manifest(TC Developer) ==+ |
| | SUIT_Envelope({ | |
| | "#tc": h'48 65 6C 6C ...', | |
| | manifest: { | |
| | install: { | |
| | set-parameter: { | |
| | uri: "#tc" | |
| | }, | |
| | fetch | |
| | } | |
| | } | |
| | }) | |
| +=================================+ |
| ] |
| } |
| ]) |
+===========================================+
Figure 2: Integrated Payload with Trusted Component Binary
¶
For the full SUIT Manifest example binary, see Appendix "Example 2: SUIT Manifest including the Trusted Component Binary".¶
In this example, Personalization Data is associated with the Trusted Component Binary "tc-uuid.suit" from Example 1.¶
The Trusted Component Developer places Personalization Data in a file named "config.json" and hosts it on an HTTPS server. The Trusted Component Developer then creates a SUIT manifest with the URI, specifying which Trusted Component Binary it correlates to in the parameter 'dependency-resolution', and signs the SUIT manifest.¶
The TAM delivers the SUIT manifest of the Personalization Data which depends on the Trusted Component Binary from Example 1.¶
+------------+ +-------------+
| TAM | | TEEP Agent |
+------------+ +-------------+
Update ---->
+================= teep-protocol(TAM) ======================+
| TEEP_Message([ |
| TEEP-TYPE-update, |
| options: { |
| manifest-list: [ |
| +======== suit-manifest(TC Developer) ============+ |
| | SUIT_Envelope({ | |
| | manifest: { | |
| | common: { | |
| | dependencies: [ | |
| | {{digest-of-tc.suit}} | |
| | ] | |
| | } | |
| | dependency-resolution: { | |
| | set-parameter: { | |
| | uri: "https://example.org/tc-uuid.suit" | |
| | } | |
| | fetch | |
| | } | |
| | install: { | |
| | set-parameter: { | |
| | uri: "https://example.org/config.json" | |
| | }, | |
| | fetch | |
| | set-dependency-index | |
| | process-dependency | |
| | } | |
| | } | |
| | }) | |
| +=================================================+ |
| ] |
| } |
| ]) |
+===========================================================+
and then,
+-------------+ +--------------+
| TEEP Agent | | TC Developer |
+-------------+ +--------------+
<----
fetch "https://example.org/config.json"
+=======config.json========+
| 7B 22 75 73 65 72 22 ... |
+==========================+
Figure 3: Personalization Data
¶
For the full SUIT Manifest example binary, see Appendix "Example 3: Supplying Personalization Data for Trusted Component Binary".¶
This subsection shows an example deleting the Trusted Component Binary in the TEEP Device.¶
A Trusted Component Developer can also generate SUIT Manifest which unlinks the installed Trusted Component. The TAM deliver it when the TAM want to uninstall the component.¶
The directive-unlink (see [I-D.moran-suit-trust-domains] Section-6.5.4) is located in the manifest to delete the Trusted Component. Note that in case other Trusted Components depend on it, i.e. the reference count is not zero, the TEEP Device SHOULD NOT delete it immediately.¶
+------------+ +-------------+
| TAM | | TEEP Agent |
+------------+ +-------------+
Update ---->
+=========== teep-protocol(TAM) ============+
| TEEP_Message([ |
| TEEP-TYPE-update, |
| options: { |
| manifest-list: [ |
| +== suit-manifest(TC Developer) ==+ |
| | SUIT_Envelope({ | |
| | manifest: { | |
| | install: [ | |
| | unlink | |
| | ] | |
| | } | |
| | }) | |
| +=================================+ |
| ] |
| } |
| ]) |
+===========================================+
Figure 4: Unlink Trusted Component example (summary)
¶
For the full SUIT Manifest example binary, see Appendix E. SUIT Example 4 (Appendix "E.4. Example 4: Unlink a Trusted Component")¶
The Success message is used by the TEEP Agent to return a success in response to an Update message.¶
Like other TEEP messages, the Success message is signed, and the relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL structure is shown in Appendix C.¶
teep-success = [
type: TEEP-TYPE-teep-success,
options: {
? token => bstr .size (8..64),
? msg => text .size (1..128),
? suit-reports => [ + suit-report ],
* $$teep-success-extensions,
* $$teep-option-extensions
}
]
¶
The Success message has the following fields:¶
The Error message is used by the TEEP Agent to return an error in response to an Update message.¶
Like other TEEP messages, the Error message is signed, and the relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL structure is shown in Appendix C.¶
teep-error = [
type: TEEP-TYPE-teep-error,
options: {
? token => bstr .size (8..64),
? err-msg => text .size (1..128),
? supported-cipher-suites => [ + suite ],
? supported-freshness-mechanisms => [ + freshness-mechanism ],
? versions => [ + version ],
? suit-reports => [ + suit-report ],
* $$teep-error-extensions,
* $$teep-option-extensions
},
err-code: uint (0..23)
]
¶
The Error message has the following fields:¶
This specification defines the following initial error messages:¶
New error codes should be added sparingly, not for every implementation error. That is the intent of the err-msg field, which can be used to provide details meaningful to humans. New error codes should only be added if the TAM is expected to do something behaviorally different upon receipt of the error message, rather than just logging the event. Hence, each error code is responsible for saying what the behavioral difference is expected to be.¶
The TEEP protocol operates between a TEEP Agent and a TAM. While the TEEP protocol does not require use of EAT, use of EAT is encouraged and Section 4.3 explicitly defines a way to carry an Entity Attestation Token evidence in a QueryResponse.¶
As discussed in Section 4.3.1, the content of attestation evidence is opaque to the TEEP architecture, but the content of Attestation Results is not, where Attestation Results flow between a Verifier and a TAM (as the Relying Party). Although Attestation Results required by a TAM are separable from the TEEP protocol per se, this section is included as part of the requirements for building a compliant TAM that uses EATs for Attestation Results.¶
Section 7 of [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] defines the requirement for Entity Attestation Token profiles. This section defines an EAT profile for use with TEEP.¶
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-teep-protocol-08. (RFC-editor: upon RFC publication, replace string with "https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX" where XXXX is the RFC number of this document.)¶
Behavior is specified in terms of the conceptual APIs defined in section 6.2.1 of [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture].¶
When the ProcessConnect API is invoked, the TAM sends a QueryRequest message.¶
When the ProcessTeepMessage API is invoked, the TAM first does validation as specified in Section 4.1.2, and drops the message if it is not valid. Otherwise, it proceeds as follows.¶
If the message includes a token, it can be used to match the response to a request previously sent by the TAM. The TAM MUST expire the token value after receiving the first response from the device that has a valid signature and ignore any subsequent messages that have the same token value. The token value MUST NOT be used for other purposes, such as a TAM to identify the devices and/or a device to identify TAMs or Trusted Components.¶
If a QueryResponse message is received that contains evidence, the evidence is passed to an attestation Verifier (see [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture]) to determine whether the Agent is in a trustworthy state. Based on the results of attestation, and the lists of installed, requested, and unneeded Trusted Components reported in the QueryResponse, the TAM determines, in any implementation specific manner, which Trusted Components need to be installed, updated, or deleted, if any. If any Trusted Components need to be installed, updated, or deleted, the TAM sends an Update message containing SUIT Manifests with command sequences to do the relevant installs, updates, or deletes. It is important to note that the TEEP Agent's Update Procedure requires resolving and installing any dependencies indicated in the manifest, which may take some time, and the resulting Success or Error message is generated only after completing the Update Procedure. Hence, depending on the freshness mechanism in use, the TAM may need to store data (e.g., a nonce) for some time.¶
If a Success or Error message is received containing one or more SUIT Reports, the TAM also validates that the nonce in any SUIT Report matches the token sent in the Update message, and drops the message if it does not match. Otherwise, the TAM handles the update in any implementation specific way, such as updating any locally cached information about the state of the TEEP Agent, or logging the results.¶
If any other Error message is received, the TAM can handle it in any implementation specific way, but Section 4.6 provides recommendations for such handling.¶
When the RequestTA API is invoked, the TEEP Agent first checks whether the requested TA is already installed. If it is already installed, the TEEP Agent passes no data back to the caller. Otherwise, if the TEEP Agent chooses to initiate the process of requesting the indicated TA, it determines (in any implementation specific way) the TAM URI based on any TAM URI provided by the RequestTA caller and any local configuration, and passes back the TAM URI to connect to. It MAY also pass back a QueryResponse message if all of the following conditions are true:¶
When the RequestPolicyCheck API is invoked, the TEEP Agent decides whether to initiate communication with any trusted TAMs (e.g., it might choose to do so for a given TAM unless it detects that it has already communicated with that TAM recently). If so, it passes back a TAM URI to connect to. If the TEEP Agent has multiple TAMs it needs to connect with, it just passes back one, with the expectation that RequestPolicyCheck API will be invoked to retrieve each one successively until there are no more and it can pass back no data at that time. Thus, once a TAM URI is returned, the TEEP Agent can remember that it has already initiated communication with that TAM.¶
When the ProcessError API is invoked, the TEEP Agent can handle it in any implementation specific way, such as logging the error or using the information in future choices of TAM URI.¶
When the ProcessTeepMessage API is invoked, the Agent first does validation as specified in Section 4.1.2, and drops the message if it is not valid. Otherwise, processing continues as follows based on the type of message.¶
When a QueryRequest message is received, the Agent responds with a QueryResponse message if all fields were understood, or an Error message if any error was encountered.¶
When an Update message is received, the Agent attempts to update the Trusted Components specified in the SUIT manifests by following the Update Procedure specified in [I-D.ietf-suit-manifest], and responds with a Success message if all SUIT manifests were successfully installed, or an Error message if any error was encountered. It is important to note that the Update Procedure requires resolving and installing any dependencies indicated in the manifest, which may take some time, and the Success or Error message is generated only after completing the Update Procedure.¶
The TEEP protocol uses COSE for protection of TEEP messages. After a QueryResponse is received, the selected cryptographic algorithm is used in subsequent TEEP messages (Install, Success, and Error). To negotiate cryptographic mechanisms and algorithms, the TEEP protocol defines the following ciphersuite structure.¶
ciphersuite = [
teep-cose-sign-algs / nil,
teep-cose-encrypt-algs / nil ,
teep-cose-mac-algs / nil
]
¶
The ciphersuite structure is used to present the combination of mechanisms and cryptographic algorithms. Each suite value corresponds with a COSE-type defined in Section 2 of [RFC8152].¶
supported-cipher-suites = [ + suite ]¶
Cryptographic algorithm values are defined in the COSE Algorithms registry [COSE.Algorithm]. A TAM MUST support both of the following ciphersuites. A TEEP Agent MUST support at least one of the two but can choose which one. For example, a TEEP Agent might choose a given ciphersuite if it has hardware support for it.¶
teep-cose-sign-algs /= cose-alg-es256, teep-cose-sign-algs /= cose-alg-eddsa¶
A TAM or TEEP Agent MUST also support the following algorithms:¶
teep-cose-encrypt-algs /= cose-alg-accm-16-64-128 teep-cose-mac-algs /= cose-alg-hmac-256¶
A TAM or TEEP Agent MAY also support one or more of the following algorithms:¶
teep-cose-sign-algs /= cose-alg-ps256, teep-cose-sign-algs /= cose-alg-ps384, teep-cose-sign-algs /= cose-alg-ps512, teep-cose-sign-algs /= cose-alg-rsa-oaep-256, teep-cose-sign-algs /= cose-alg-rsa-oaep-512¶
Any ciphersuites without confidentiality protection can only be added if the associated specification includes a discussion of security considerations and applicability, since manifests may carry sensitive information. For example, Section 6 of [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture] permits implementations that terminate transport security inside the TEE and if the transport security provides confidentiality then additional encryption might not be needed in the manifest for some use cases. For most use cases, however, manifest confidentiality will be needed to protect sensitive fields from the TAM as discussed in Section 9.8 of [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture].¶
A freshness mechanism determines how a TAM can tell whether evidence provided in a Query Response is fresh. There are multiple ways this can be done as discussed in Section 10 of [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture].¶
Each freshness mechanism is identified with an integer value, which corresponds to an IANA registered freshness mechanism (see Section 11.2. This document defines the following freshness mechanisms:¶
| Value | Freshness mechanism |
|---|---|
| 1 | Nonce |
| 2 | Timestamp |
| 3 | Epoch ID |
In the Nonce mechanism, the evidence MUST include a nonce provided in the QueryRequest challenge. In other mechanisms, a timestamp or epoch ID determined via mechanisms outside the TEEP protocol is used, and the challenge is only needed in the QueryRequest message if a challenge is needed in generating evidence for reasons other than freshness.¶
If a TAM supports multiple freshness mechanisms that require different challenge formats, the QueryRequest message can currently only send one such challenge. This situation is expected to be rare, but should it occur, the TAM can choose to prioritize one of them and exclude the other from the supported-freshness-mechanisms in the QueryRequest, and resend the QueryRequest with the other mechanism if an ERR_UNSUPPORTED_FRESHNESS_MECHANISMS Error is received that indicates the TEEP Agent supports the other mechanism.¶
This section summarizes the security considerations discussed in this specification:¶
A TAM is responsible for vetting a Trusted Component and before distributing them to TEEP Agents.¶
It is RECOMMENDED to provide a way to update the trust anchor store used by the TEE, for example using a firmware update mechanism. Thus, if a Trusted Component Signer is later compromised, the TAM can update the trust anchor store used by the TEE, for example using a firmware update mechanism.¶
IANA is requested to assign a media type for application/teep+cbor.¶
IANA is also requested to create a new registry for freshness mechanisms.¶
Name of registry: TEEP Freshness Mechanisms¶
Policy: Specification Required [RFC8126]¶
Additional requirements: The specification must document relevant security considerations.¶
Initial values:¶
| Value | Freshness mechanism | Specification |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Nonce | RFC TBD Section 9 |
| 2 | Timestamp | RFC TBD Section 9 |
| 3 | Epoch ID | RFC TBD Section 9 |
(RFC Editor: please replace TBD above with the number assigned to this document.)¶
We would like to thank Brian Witten (Symantec), Tyler Kim (Solacia), Nick Cook (Arm), and Minho Yoo (IoTrust) for their contributions to the Open Trust Protocol (OTrP), which influenced the design of this specification.¶
We would like to thank Eve Schooler for the suggestion of the protocol name.¶
We would like to thank Kohei Isobe (TRASIO/SECOM), Ken Takayama (SECOM) Kuniyasu Suzaki (TRASIO/AIST), Tsukasa Oi (TRASIO), and Yuichi Takita (SECOM) for their valuable implementation feedback.¶
We would also like to thank Carsten Bormann and Henk Birkholz for their help with the CDDL.¶
Valid TEEP messages MUST adhere to the following CDDL data definitions,
except that SUIT_Envelope and SUIT_Component_Identifier are
specified in [I-D.ietf-suit-manifest].¶
teep-message = $teep-message-type .within teep-message-framework
SUIT_Envelope = any
teep-message-framework = [
type: uint (0..23) / $teep-type-extension,
options: { * teep-option },
* uint; further integers, e.g., for data-item-requested
]
teep-option = (uint => any)
; messages defined below:
$teep-message-type /= query-request
$teep-message-type /= query-response
$teep-message-type /= update
$teep-message-type /= teep-success
$teep-message-type /= teep-error
; message type numbers, uint (0..23)
TEEP-TYPE-query-request = 1
TEEP-TYPE-query-response = 2
TEEP-TYPE-update = 3
TEEP-TYPE-teep-success = 5
TEEP-TYPE-teep-error = 6
version = .within uint .size 4
ext-info = .within uint .size 4
; data items as bitmaps
data-item-requested = $data-item-requested .within uint .size 8
attestation = 1
$data-item-requested /= attestation
trusted-components = 2
$data-item-requested /= trusted-components
extensions = 4
$data-item-requested /= extensions
query-request = [
type: TEEP-TYPE-query-request,
options: {
? token => bstr .size (8..64),
? supported-cipher-suites => [ + suite ],
? supported-freshness-mechanisms => [ + freshness-mechanism ],
? challenge => bstr .size (8..512),
? versions => [ + version ],
* $$query-request-extensions
* $$teep-option-extensions
},
data-item-requested: data-item-requested
]
; ciphersuites
suite = [
teep-cose-sign-algs / nil,
teep-cose-encrypt-algs / nil,
teep-cose-mac-algs / nil
]
teep-cose-sign-algs /= cose-alg-es256,
teep-cose-sign-algs /= cose-alg-eddsa
teep-cose-sign-algs /= cose-alg-ps256,
teep-cose-sign-algs /= cose-alg-ps384,
teep-cose-sign-algs /= cose-alg-ps512,
teep-cose-sign-algs /= cose-alg-rsa-oaep-256,
teep-cose-sign-algs /= cose-alg-rsa-oaep-512
teep-cose-encrypt-algs /= cose-alg-accm-16-64-128
teep-cose-mac-algs /= cose-alg-hmac-256
; algorithm identifiers defined in the IANA COSE Algorithms Registry
cose-alg-es256 = -7
cose-alg-eddsa = -8
cose-alg-ps256 = -37
cose-alg-ps384 = -38
cose-alg-ps512 = -39
cose-alg-rsa-oaep-256 = -41
cose-alg-rsa-oaep-512 = -42
cose-alg-accm-16-64-128 = 10
cose-alg-hmac-256 = 5
; freshness-mechanisms
freshness-mechanism = $TEEP-freshness-mechanism .within uint .size 4
FRESHNESS_NONCE = 0
FRESHNESS_TIMESTAMP = 1
FRESHNESS_EPOCH_ID = 2
$TEEP-freshness-mechanism /= FRESHNESS_NONCE
$TEEP-freshness-mechanism /= FRESHNESS_TIMESTAMP
$TEEP-freshness-mechanism /= FRESHNESS_EPOCH_ID
query-response = [
type: TEEP-TYPE-query-response,
options: {
? token => bstr .size (8..64),
? selected-cipher-suite => suite,
? selected-version => version,
? evidence-format => text,
? evidence => bstr,
? tc-list => [ + tc-info ],
? requested-tc-list => [ + requested-tc-info ],
? unneeded-tc-list => [ + SUIT_Component_Identifier ],
? ext-list => [ + ext-info ],
* $$query-response-extensions,
* $$teep-option-extensions
}
]
tc-info = {
component-id => SUIT_Component_Identifier,
? tc-manifest-sequence-number => .within uint .size 8
}
requested-tc-info = {
component-id => SUIT_Component_Identifier,
? tc-manifest-sequence-number => .within uint .size 8
? have-binary => bool
}
update = [
type: TEEP-TYPE-update,
options: {
? token => bstr .size (8..64),
? manifest-list => [ + bstr .cbor SUIT_Envelope ],
* $$update-extensions,
* $$teep-option-extensions
}
]
teep-success = [
type: TEEP-TYPE-teep-success,
options: {
? token => bstr .size (8..64),
? msg => text .size (1..128),
? suit-reports => [ + suit-report ],
* $$teep-success-extensions,
* $$teep-option-extensions
}
]
teep-error = [
type: TEEP-TYPE-teep-error,
options: {
? token => bstr .size (8..64),
? err-msg => text .size (1..128),
? supported-cipher-suites => [ + suite ],
? supported-freshness-mechanisms => [ + freshness-mechanism ],
? versions => [ + version ],
? suit-reports => [ + suit-report ],
* $$teep-error-extensions,
* $$teep-option-extensions
},
err-code: uint (0..23)
]
; The err-code parameter, uint (0..23)
ERR_PERMANENT_ERROR = 1
ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION = 2
ERR_UNSUPPORTED_FRESHNESS_MECHANISMS = 3
ERR_UNSUPPORTED_MSG_VERSION = 4
ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER_SUITES = 5
ERR_BAD_CERTIFICATE = 6
ERR_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED = 9
ERR_TEMPORARY_ERROR = 10
ERR_MANIFEST_PROCESSING_FAILED = 17
; labels of mapkey for teep message parameters, uint (0..23)
supported-cipher-suites = 1
challenge = 2
versions = 3
selected-cipher-suite = 5
selected-version = 6
evidence = 7
tc-list = 8
ext-list = 9
manifest-list = 10
msg = 11
err-msg = 12
evidence-format = 13
requested-tc-list = 14
unneeded-tc-list = 15
component-id = 16
tc-manifest-sequence-number = 17
have-binary = 18
suit-reports = 19
token = 20
supported-freshness-mechanisms = 21
¶
This section includes some examples with the following assumptions:¶
The device will have two TCs with the following SUIT Component Identifiers:¶
/ query-request = /
[
1, / type : TEEP-TYPE-query-request = 1 (uint (0..23)) /
/ options : /
{
20 : 0xa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf,
/ token = 20 (mapkey) :
h'a0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf' (bstr .size (8..64)),
generated by TAM /
1 : [ 1 ], / supported-cipher-suites = 1 (mapkey) :
TEEP-AES-CCM-16-64-128-HMAC256--256-X25519-EdDSA =
[ 1 ] (array of .within uint .size 4) /
3 : [ 0 ] / version = 3 (mapkey) :
[ 0 ] (array of .within uint .size 4) /
},
3 / data-item-requested :
attestation | trusted-components = 3 (.within uint .size 8) /
]
¶
83 # array(3)
01 # unsigned(1) uint (0..23)
A4 # map(4)
14 # unsigned(20) uint (0..23)
4F # bytes(16) (8..64)
A0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAF
01 # unsigned(1) uint (0..23)
81 # array(1)
01 # unsigned(1) within uint .size 4
03 # unsigned(3) uint (0..23)
81 # array(1)
00 # unsigned(0) within uint .size 4
04 # unsigned(4) uint (0..23)
43 # bytes(3)
010203 # "\x01\x02\x03"
03 # unsigned(3) .within uint .size 8
¶
This is shown below in CBOR diagnostic form. Only the payload signed by COSE is shown.¶
/ eat-claim-set = /
{
/ issuer / 1: "joe",
/ timestamp (iat) / 6: 1(1526542894)
/ nonce / 10: h'948f8860d13a463e8e',
/ secure-boot / 15: true,
/ debug-status / 16: 3, / disabled-permanently /
/ security-level / 14: 3, / secure-restricted /
/ device-identifier / <TBD>: h'e99600dd921649798b013e9752dcf0c5',
/ vendor-identifier / <TBD>: h'2b03879b33434a7ca682b8af84c19fd4',
/ class-identifier / <TBD>: h'9714a5796bd245a3a4ab4f977cb8487f',
/ chip-version / 26: [ "MyTEE", 1 ],
/ component-identifier / <TBD>: h'60822887d35e43d5b603d18bcaa3f08d',
/ version / <TBD>: "v0.1"
}
¶
/ query-response = /
[
2, / type : TEEP-TYPE-query-response = 2 (uint (0..23)) /
/ options : /
{
20 : 0xa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf,
/ token = 20 (mapkey) :
h'a0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf' (bstr .size (8..64)),
given from TAM's QueryRequest message /
5 : 1, / selected-cipher-suite = 5 (mapkey) :
TEEP-AES-CCM-16-64-128-HMAC256--256-X25519-EdDSA =
1 (.within uint .size 4) /
6 : 0, / selected-version = 6 (mapkey) :
0 (.within uint .size 4) /
7 : ... / evidence = 7 (mapkey) :
Entity Attestation Token /
8 : [ / tc-list = 8 (mapkey) : (array of tc-info) /
{
16 : [ 0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f ] / component-id =
16 (mapkey) : [ h'000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f' ]
(SUIT_Component_Identifier = [* bstr]) /
},
{
16 : [ 0x100102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f ] / component-id =
16 (mapkey) : [ h'100102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f' ]
(SUIT_Component_Identifier = [* bstr]) /
}
]
}
]
¶
82 # array(2)
02 # unsigned(2) uint (0..23)
A5 # map(5)
14 # unsigned(20) uint (0..23)
4F # bytes(16) (8..64)
A0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAF
05 # unsigned(5) uint (0..23)
01 # unsigned(1) .within uint .size 4
06 # unsigned(6) uint (0..23)
00 # unsigned(0) .within uint .size 4
07 # unsigned(7) uint (0..23)
... # Entity Attestation Token
08 # unsigned(8) uint (0..23)
82 # array(2)
81 # array(1)
4F # bytes(16)
000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
81 # array(1)
4F # bytes(16)
100102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
¶
/ update = /
[
3, / type : TEEP-TYPE-update = 3 (uint (0..23)) /
/ options : /
{
20 : 0xa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf,
/ token = 20 (mapkey) :
h'a0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf' (bstr .size (8..64)),
generated by TAM /
10 : [ ] / manifest-list = 10 (mapkey) :
[ ] (array of bstr wrapped SUIT_Envelope(any)) /
/ empty, example purpose only /
}
]
¶
82 # array(2)
03 # unsigned(3) uint (0..23)
A3 # map(3)
14 # unsigned(20) uint (0..23)
4F # bytes(16) (8..64)
A0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAF
0A # unsigned(10) uint (0..23)
80 # array(0)
¶
/ teep-success = /
[
5, / type : TEEP-TYPE-teep-success = 5 (uint (0..23)) /
/ options : /
{
20 : 0xa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf,
/ token = 20 (mapkey) :
h'a0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf' (bstr .size (8..64)),
given from TAM's Update message /
}
]
¶
82 # array(2)
05 # unsigned(5) uint (0..23)
A1 # map(1)
14 # unsigned(20) uint (0..23)
4F # bytes(16) (8..64)
A0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAF
¶
/ teep-error = /
[
6, / type : TEEP-TYPE-teep-error = 6 (uint (0..23)) /
/ options : /
{
20 : 0xa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf,
/ token = 20 (mapkey) :
h'a0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf' (bstr .size (8..64)),
given from TAM's Update message /
12 : "disk-full" / err-msg = 12 (mapkey) :
"disk-full" (text .size (1..128)) /
},
17, / err-code : ERR_MANIFEST_PROCESSING_FAILED = 17 (uint (0..23)) /
]
¶
83 # array(3)
06 # unsigned(6) uint (0..23)
A2 # map(2)
14 # unsigned(20) uint (0..23)
4F # bytes(16) (8..64)
A0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAF
0C # unsigned(12) uint (0..23)
69 # text(9) (1..128)
6469736B2D66756C6C # "disk-full"
11 # unsigned(17) uint (0..23)
¶
This section shows some examples of SUIT manifests described in Section 4.4.¶
The examples are signed using the following ECDSA secp256r1 key with SHA256 as the digest function.¶
COSE_Sign1 Cryptographic Key:¶
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgApZYjZCUGLM50VBC CjYStX+09jGmnyJPrpDLTz/hiXOhRANCAASEloEarguqq9JhVxie7NomvqqL8Rtv P+bitWWchdvArTsfKktsCYExwKNtrNHXi9OB3N+wnAUtszmR23M4tKiW -----END PRIVATE KEY-----¶
The corresponding public key can be used to verify these examples:¶
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEhJaBGq4LqqvSYVcYnuzaJr6qi/Eb bz/m4rVlnIXbwK07HypLbAmBMcCjbazR14vTgdzfsJwFLbM5kdtzOLSolg== -----END PUBLIC KEY-----¶
/ SUIT_Envelope_Tagged / 107( {
/ suit-authentication-wrapper / 2: << [
<< [
/ suit-digest-algorithm-id: / -16 / suit-cose-alg-sha256 /,
/ suit-digest-bytes: / h'DB601ADE73092B58532CA03FBB663DE49532435336F1558B49BB622726A2FEDD'
] >>,
<< / COSE_Sign1_Tagged / 18( [
/ protected: / << {
/ algorithm-id / 1: -7 / ES256 /
} >>,
/ unprotected: / {},
/ payload: / null,
/ signature: / h'5B2D535A2B6D5E3C585C1074F414DA9E10BD285C99A33916DADE3ED38812504817AC48B62B8E984EC622785BD1C411888BE531B1B594507816B201F6F28579A4'
] ) >>
] >>,
/ suit-manifest / 3: << {
/ suit-manifest-version / 1: 1,
/ suit-manifest-sequence-number / 2: 3,
/ suit-common / 3: << {
/ suit-components / 2: [
[
h'544545502D446576696365', / "TEEP-Device" /
h'5365637572654653', / "SecureFS" /
h'8D82573A926D4754935332DC29997F74', / tc-uuid /
h'7461' / "ta" /
]
],
/ suit-common-sequence / 4: << [
/ suit-directive-override-parameters / 20, {
/ suit-parameter-vendor-identifier / 1: h'C0DDD5F15243566087DB4F5B0AA26C2F',
/ suit-parameter-class-identifier / 2: h'DB42F7093D8C55BAA8C5265FC5820F4E',
/ suit-parameter-image-digest / 3: << [
/ suit-digest-algorithm-id: / -16 / suit-cose-alg-sha256 /,
/ suit-digest-bytes: / h'8CF71AC86AF31BE184EC7A05A411A8C3A14FD9B77A30D046397481469468ECE8'
] >>,
/ suit-parameter-image-size / 14: 20
},
/ suit-condition-vendor-identifier / 1, 15,
/ suit-condition-class-identifier / 2, 15
] >>
} >>,
/ suit-install / 9: << [
/ suit-directive-override-parameters / 20, {
/ suit-parameter-uri / 21: "https://example.org/8d82573a-926d-4754-9353-32dc29997f74.ta"
},
/ suit-directive-fetch / 21, 15,
/ suit-condition-image-match / 3, 15
] >>
} >>
} )
¶
D8 6B # tag(107) / SUIT_Envelope_Tagged /
A2 # map(2)
02 # unsigned(2) / suit-authentication-wrapper /
58 73 # bytes(115)
82 # array(2)
58 24 # bytes(36)
82 # array(2)
2F # negative(15) / -16 = suit-cose-alg-sha256 /
58 20 # bytes(32)
DB601ADE73092B58532CA03FBB663DE49532435336F1558B49BB622726A2FEDD
58 4A # bytes(74)
D2 # tag(18) / COSE_Sign1_Tagged /
84 # array(4)
43 # bytes(3)
A1 # map(1)
01 # unsigned(1) / algorithm-id /
26 # negative(6) / -7 = ES256 /
A0 # map(0)
F6 # primitive(22) / null /
58 40 # bytes(64)
5B2D535A2B6D5E3C585C1074F414DA9E10BD285C99A33916DADE3ED38812504817AC48B62B8E984EC622785BD1C411888BE531B1B594507816B201F6F28579A4
03 # unsigned(3) / suit-manifest: /
58 D4 # bytes(212)
A4 # map(4)
01 # unsigned(1) / suit-manifest-version: /
01 # unsigned(1)
02 # unsigned(2) / suit-manifest-sequence-number: /
03 # unsigned(3)
03 # unsigned(3) / suit-common: /
58 84 # bytes(132)
A2 # map(2)
02 # unsigned(2) / suit-components: /
81 # array(1)
84 # array(4)
4B # bytes(11)
544545502D446576696365 # "TEEP-Device"
48 # bytes(8)
5365637572654653 # "SecureFS"
50 # bytes(16)
8D82573A926D4754935332DC29997F74 # tc-uuid
42 # bytes(2)
7461 # "ta"
04 # unsigned(4) / suit-common-sequence: /
58 54 # bytes(84)
86 # array(6)
14 # unsigned(20) / suit-directive-override-parameters: /
A4 # map(4)
01 # unsigned(1) / suit-parameter-vendor-identifier: /
50 # bytes(16)
C0DDD5F15243566087DB4F5B0AA26C2F
02 # unsigned(2) / suit-parameter-class-identifier: /
50 # bytes(16)
DB42F7093D8C55BAA8C5265FC5820F4E
03 # unsigned(3) / suit-parameter-image-digest: /
58 24 # bytes(36)
82 # array(2)
2F # negative(15) / -16 = suit-cose-alg-sha256 /
58 20 # bytes(32)
8CF71AC86AF31BE184EC7A05A411A8C3A14FD9B77A30D046397481469468ECE8
0E # unsigned(14) / suit-parameter-image-size: /
14 # unsigned(20)
01 # unsigned(1) / suit-condition-vendor-identifier: /
0F # unsigned(15)
02 # unsigned(2) / suit-condition-class-identifier: /
0F # unsigned(15)
09 # unsigned(9) / suit-install: /
58 45 # bytes(69)
86 # array(6)
14 # unsigned(20) / suit-directive-override-parameters: /
A1 # map(1)
15 # unsigned(21) / suit-parameter-uri: /
78 3B # text(59)
68747470733A2F2F6578616D706C652E6F72672F38643832353733612D393236642D343735342D393335332D3332646332393939376637342E7461 # "https://example.org/8d82573a-926d-4754-9353-32dc29997f74.ta"
15 # unsigned(21) / suit-directive-fetch: /
0F # unsigned(15)
03 # unsigned(3) / suit-condition-image-match: /
0F # unsigned(15)
¶
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¶
/ SUIT_Envelope_Tagged / 107( {
/ suit-authentication-wrapper / 2: << [
<< [
/ suit-digest-algorithm-id: / -16 / suit-cose-alg-sha256 /,
/ suit-digest-bytes: / h'14A98BE957DE38FAE37376EA491FD6CAD9BFBD3C90051C8F5B017D7A496C3B05'
] >>,
<< / COSE_Sign1_Tagged / 18( [
/ protected: / << {
/ algorithm-id / 1: -7 / ES256 /
} >>,
/ unprotected: / {},
/ payload: / null,
/ signature: / h'4093B323953785981EB607C8BA61B21E5C4F85726A2AF48C1CB05BD4401B1B1565070728FDA38E6496D631E1D23F966CFF7805EDE721D48507D9192993DA8722'
] ) >>
] >>,
/ suit-integrated-payload / "#tc": h'48656C6C6F2C2053656375726520576F726C6421', / "Hello, Secure World!" /
/ suit-manifest / 3: << {
/ suit-manifest-version / 1: 1,
/ suit-manifest-sequence-number / 2: 3,
/ suit-common / 3: << {
/ suit-components / 2: [
[
h'544545502D446576696365', / "TEEP-Device" /
h'5365637572654653', / "SecureFS" /
h'8D82573A926D4754935332DC29997F74', / tc-uuid /
h'7461' / "ta" /
]
],
/ suit-common-sequence / 4: << [
/ suit-directive-override-parameters / 20, {
/ suit-parameter-vendor-identifier / 1: h'C0DDD5F15243566087DB4F5B0AA26C2F',
/ suit-parameter-class-identifier / 2: h'DB42F7093D8C55BAA8C5265FC5820F4E',
/ suit-parameter-image-digest / 3: << [
/ suit-digest-algorithm-id: / -16 / suit-cose-alg-sha256 /,
/ suit-digest-bytes: / h'8CF71AC86AF31BE184EC7A05A411A8C3A14FD9B77A30D046397481469468ECE8'
] >>,
/ suit-parameter-image-size / 14: 20
},
/ suit-condition-vendor-identifier / 1, 15,
/ suit-condition-class-identifier / 2, 15
] >>
} >>,
/ suit-install / 9: << [
/ suit-directive-override-parameters / 20, {
/ suit-parameter-uri / 21: "#tc"
},
/ suit-directive-fetch / 21, 15,
/ suit-condition-image-match / 3, 15
] >>
} >>
} )
¶
D8 6B # tag(107) / SUIT_Envelope_Tagged /
A3 # map(3)
02 # unsigned(2) / suit-authentication-wrapper /
58 73 # bytes(115)
82 # array(2)
58 24 # bytes(36)
82 # array(2)
2F # negative(15) / -16 = suit-cose-alg-sha256 /
58 20 # bytes(32)
14A98BE957DE38FAE37376EA491FD6CAD9BFBD3C90051C8F5B017D7A496C3B05
58 4A # bytes(74)
D2 # tag(18) / COSE_Sign1_Tagged /
84 # array(4)
43 # bytes(3)
A1 # map(1)
01 # unsigned(1) / algorithm-id /
26 # negative(6) / -7 = ES256 /
A0 # map(0)
F6 # primitive(22) / null /
58 40 # bytes(64)
4093B323953785981EB607C8BA61B21E5C4F85726A2AF48C1CB05BD4401B1B1565070728FDA38E6496D631E1D23F966CFF7805EDE721D48507D9192993DA8722
63 # text(3) / suit-integrated-payload /
237463 # "#tc"
54 # bytes(20)
48656C6C6F2C2053656375726520576F726C6421 # "Hello, Secure World!"
03 # unsigned(3) / suit-manifest: /
58 9A # bytes(154)
A4 # map(4)
01 # unsigned(1) / suit-manifest-version: /
01 # unsigned(1)
02 # unsigned(2) / suit-manifest-sequence-number: /
03 # unsigned(3)
03 # unsigned(3) / suit-common: /
58 84 # bytes(132)
A2 # map(2)
02 # unsigned(2) / suit-components: /
81 # array(1)
84 # array(4)
4B # bytes(11)
544545502D446576696365 # "TEEP-Device"
48 # bytes(8)
5365637572654653 # "SecureFS"
50 # bytes(16)
8D82573A926D4754935332DC29997F74 # tc-uuid
42 # bytes(2)
7461 # "ta"
04 # unsigned(4) / suit-common-sequence: /
58 54 # bytes(84)
86 # array(6)
14 # unsigned(20) / suit-directive-override-parameters: /
A4 # map(4)
01 # unsigned(1) / suit-parameter-vendor-identifier: /
50 # bytes(16)
C0DDD5F15243566087DB4F5B0AA26C2F
02 # unsigned(2) / suit-parameter-class-identifier: /
50 # bytes(16)
DB42F7093D8C55BAA8C5265FC5820F4E
03 # unsigned(3) / suit-parameter-image-digest: /
58 24 # bytes(36)
82 # array(2)
2F # negative(15) / -16 = suit-cose-alg-sha256 /
58 20 # bytes(32)
8CF71AC86AF31BE184EC7A05A411A8C3A14FD9B77A30D046397481469468ECE8
0E # unsigned(14) / suit-parameter-image-size: /
14 # unsigned(20)
01 # unsigned(1) / suit-condition-vendor-identifier: /
0F # unsigned(15)
02 # unsigned(2) / suit-condition-class-identifier: /
0F # unsigned(15)
09 # unsigned(9) / suit-install: /
4C # bytes(12)
86 # array(6)
14 # unsigned(20) / suit-directive-override-parameters: /
A1 # map(1)
15 # unsigned(21) / suit-parameter-uri: /
63 # text(3)
237463 # "#tc"
15 # unsigned(21) / suit-directive-fetch: /
0F # unsigned(15)
03 # unsigned(3) / suit-condition-image-match: /
0F # unsigned(15)
¶
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¶
/ SUIT_Envelope_Tagged / 107( {
/ suit-authentication-wrapper / 2: << [
<< [
/ suit-digest-algorithm-id: / -16 / suit-cose-alg-sha256 /,
/ suit-digest-bytes: / h'CE596D785169B72712560B3A246AA98F814498EA3625EEBB72CED9AF273E7FFD'
] >>,
<< / COSE_Sign1_Tagged / 18( [
/ protected: / << {
/ algorithm-id / 1: -7 / ES256 /
} >>,
/ unprotected: / {},
/ payload: / null,
/ signature: / h'E9083AA71D2BFCE48253037B9C3116A5EDF23BE0F4B4357A8A835F724660DA7482C64345B4C73DE95F05513BD09FC2E58BD2CC865CC851AD797513A9A951A3CA'
] ) >>
] >>,
/ suit-manifest / 3: << {
/ suit-manifest-version / 1: 1,
/ suit-manifest-sequence-number / 2: 3,
/ suit-common / 3: << {
/ suit-dependencies / 1: [
{
/ suit-dependency-digest / 1: [
/ suit-digest-algorithm-id: / -16 / suit-cose-alg-sha256 /,
/ suit-digest-bytes: / h'F8690E5A86D010BF2B5348ABB99F2254DB7B608D0D626B98DB51AB3ECFC51907'
]
}
],
/ suit-components / 2: [
[
h'544545502D446576696365', / "TEEP-Device" /
h'5365637572654653', / "SecureFS" /
h'636F6E6669672E6A736F6E' / "config.json" /
]
],
/ suit-common-sequence / 4: << [
/ suit-directive-set-component-index / 12, 0,
/ suit-directive-override-parameters / 20, {
/ suit-parameter-vendor-identifier / 1: h'C0DDD5F15243566087DB4F5B0AA26C2F',
/ suit-parameter-class-identifier / 2: h'DB42F7093D8C55BAA8C5265FC5820F4E',
/ suit-parameter-image-digest / 3: << [
/ suit-digest-algorithm-id: / -16 / suit-cose-alg-sha256 /,
/ suit-digest-bytes: / h'AAABCCCDEEEF00012223444566678889ABBBCDDDEFFF01112333455567778999'
] >>,
/ suit-parameter-image-size / 14: 64
},
/ suit-condition-vendor-idnetifier / 1, 15,
/ suit-condition-class-identifier / 2, 15
] >>
} >>,
/ suit-dependency-resolution / 7: << [
/ suit-directive-set-dependency-index / 13, 0,
/ suit-directive-override-parameters / 20, {
/ suit-parameter-uri / 21: "https://example.org/8d82573a-926d-4754-9353-32dc29997f74.suit"
},
/ suit-directive-fetch / 21, 2,
/ suit-condition-image-match / 3, 15
] >>,
/ suit-install / 9: << [
/ suit-directive-set-dependency-index / 13, 0,
/ suit-directive-process-dependency / 18, 0,
/ suit-directive-set-component-index / 12, 0,
/ suit-directive-override-parameters / 20, {
/ suit-parameter-uri / 21: "https://example.org/config.json"
},
/ suit-directive-fetch / 21, 2,
/ suit-condition-image-match / 3, 15
] >>,
/ suit-validate / 10: << [
/ suit-directive-set-component-index / 12, 0,
/ suit-condition-image-match/ 3, 15
] >>
} >>
} )
¶
D8 6B # tag(107) / SUIT_Envelope_Tagged /
A2 # map(2)
02 # unsigned(2) / suit-authentication-wrapper: /
58 73 # bytes(115)
82 # array(2)
58 24 # bytes(36)
82 # array(2)
2F # negative(15) / -16 = suit-cose-alg-sha256 /
58 20 # bytes(32)
CE596D785169B72712560B3A246AA98F814498EA3625EEBB72CED9AF273E7FFD
58 4A # bytes(74)
D2 # tag(18) / COSE_Sign1_Tagged /
84 # array(4)
43 # bytes(3)
A1 # map(1)
01 # unsigned(1) / algorithm-id /
26 # negative(6) / -7 = ES256 /
A0 # map(0)
F6 # primitive(22) / null /
58 40 # bytes(64)
E9083AA71D2BFCE48253037B9C3116A5EDF23BE0F4B4357A8A835F724660DA7482C64345B4C73DE95F05513BD09FC2E58BD2CC865CC851AD797513A9A951A3CA
03 # unsigned(3) / suit-manifest: /
59 0134 # bytes(308)
A6 # map(6)
01 # unsigned(1) / suit-manifest-version: /
01 # unsigned(1)
02 # unsigned(2) / suit-manifest-sequence-number: /
03 # unsigned(3)
03 # unsigned(3) / suit-common: /
58 A7 # bytes(167)
A3 # map(3)
01 # unsigned(1) / suit-dependencies: /
81 # array(1)
A1 # map(1)
01 # unsigned(1) suit-dependency-digest: /
82 # array(2)
2F # negative(15) / -16 = suit-cose-alg-sha256 /
58 20 # bytes(32)
F8690E5A86D010BF2B5348ABB99F2254DB7B608D0D626B98DB51AB3ECFC51907
02 # unsigned(2) / suit-components: /
81 # array(1)
83 # array(3)
4B # bytes(11)
544545502D446576696365 # "TEEP-Device"
48 # bytes(8)
5365637572654653 # "SecureFS"
4B # bytes(11)
636F6E6669672E6A736F6E # "config.json"
04 # unsigned(4) / suit-common-sequence: /
58 57 # bytes(87)
88 # array(8)
0C # unsigned(12) / suit-directive-set-component-index: /
00 # unsigned(0)
14 # unsigned(20) / suit-directive-override-parameters: /
A4 # map(4)
01 # unsigned(1) / suit-parameter-vendor-identifier: /
50 # bytes(16)
C0DDD5F15243566087DB4F5B0AA26C2F
02 # unsigned(2) / suit-parameter-class-identifier: /
50 # bytes(16)
DB42F7093D8C55BAA8C5265FC5820F4E
03 # unsigned(3) / suit-parameter-image-digest: /
58 24 # bytes(36)
82 # array(2)
2F # negative(15) / -16 = suit-cose-alg-sha256 /
58 20 # bytes(32)
AAABCCCDEEEF00012223444566678889ABBBCDDDEFFF01112333455567778999
0E # unsigned(14) / suit-parameter-image-size: /
18 40 # unsigned(64)
01 # unsigned(1) / suit-condition-vendor-identifier: /
0F # unsigned(15)
02 # unsigned(2) / suit-condition-class-identifier: /
0F # unsigned(15)
07 # unsigned(7) / suit-dependency-resolution: /
58 49 # bytes(73)
88 # array(8)
0D # unsigned(13) / suit-directive-set-dependency-index: /
00 # unsigned(0)
14 # unsigned(20) / suit-directive-override-parameters: /
A1 # map(1)
15 # unsigned(21) / suit-parameter-uri: /
78 3D # text(61)
68747470733A2F2F6578616D706C652E6F72672F38643832353733612D393236642D343735342D393335332D3332646332393939376637342E73756974 # "https://example.org/8d82573a-926d-4754-9353-32dc29997f74.suit"
15 # unsigned(21) / suit-directive-fetch: /
02 # unsigned(2)
03 # unsigned(3) / suit-condition-image-match: /
0F # unsigned(15)
09 # unsigned(9) / suit-install: /
58 2F # bytes(47)
8C # array(12)
0D # unsigned(13) / suit-directive-set-dependency-index: /
00 # unsigned(0)
12 # unsigned(18) / suit-directive-process-dependency: /
00 # unsigned(0)
0C # unsigned(12) / suit-directive-set-component-index: /
00 # unsigned(0)
14 # unsigned(20) / suit-directive-override-parameters: /
A1 # map(1)
15 # unsigned(21) / suit-parameter-uri: /
78 1F # text(31)
68747470733A2F2F6578616D706C652E6F72672F636F6E6669672E6A736F6E # "https://example.org/config.json"
15 # unsigned(21) / suit-directive-fetch: /
02 # unsigned(2)
03 # unsigned(3) / suit-condition-image-match: /
0F # unsigned(15)
0A # unsigned(10) / suit-validate: /
45 # bytes(5)
84 # array(4)
0C # unsigned(12) / suit-directive-set-component-index: /
00
03 # unsigned(3) / suit-condition-image-match: /
0F # unsigned(15)
¶
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¶
/ SUIT_Envelope_Tagged / 107( {
/ suit-authentication-wrapper / 2: << [
<< [
/ suit-digest-algorithm-id: / -16 / suit-cose-alg-sha256 /,
/ suit-digest-bytes: / h'632454F19A9440A5B83493628A7EF8704C8A0205A62C34E425BAA34C71341F42'
] >>,
<< / COSE_Sign1_Tagged / 18( [
/ protected / << {
/ algorithm-id / 1: -7 / ES256 /
} >>,
/ unprotected: / {},
/ payload: / null,
/ signature: / h'A32CDB7C1D089C27408CED3C79087220EB0D77F105BB5330912875F4D94AD108D7658C650463AEB7E1CCA5084F22B2F3993176E8B3529A3202ED735E4D39BBBF'
] ) >>
] >>,
/ suit-manifest / 3: << {
/ suit-manifest-version / 1: 1,
/ suit-manifest-sequence-number / 2: 18446744073709551615 / UINT64_MAX /,
/ suit-common / 3: << {
/ suit-components / 2: [
[
h'544545502D446576696365', / "TEEP-Device" /
h'5365637572654653', / "SecureFS" /
h'8D82573A926D4754935332DC29997F74', / tc-uuid /
h'7461' / "ta" /
]
],
/ suit-common-sequence / 4: << [
/ suit-directive-override-parameters / 20, {
/ suit-parameter-vendor-identifier / 1: h'C0DDD5F15243566087DB4F5B0AA26C2F',
/ suit-parameter-class-identifier / 2: h'DB42F7093D8C55BAA8C5265FC5820F4E'
},
/ suit-condition-vendor-identifier / 1, 15,
/ suit-condition-class-identifier / 2, 15
] >>
} >>,
/ suit-install / 9: << [
/ suit-directive-set-component-index: / 12, 0,
/ suit-directive-unlink: / 33, 0
] >>
} >>
} )
¶
D8 6B # tag(107) / SUIT_Envelope_Tagged /
A2 # map(2)
02 # unsigned(2) / suit-authentication-wrapper /
58 73 # bytes(115)
82 # array(2)
58 24 # bytes(36)
82 # array(2)
2F # negative(15) / -16 = suit-cose-alg-sha256 /
58 20 # bytes(32)
632454F19A9440A5B83493628A7EF8704C8A0205A62C34E425BAA34C71341F42
58 4A # bytes(74)
D2 # tag(18) / COSE_Sign1_Tagged /
84 # array(4)
43 # bytes(3)
A1 # map(1)
01 # unsigned(1) / algorithm-id /
26 # negative(6) / -7 = ES256 /
A0 # map(0)
F6 # primitive(22) / null /
58 40 # bytes(64)
A32CDB7C1D089C27408CED3C79087220EB0D77F105BB5330912875F4D94AD108D7658C650463AEB7E1CCA5084F22B2F3993176E8B3529A3202ED735E4D39BBBF
03 # unsigned(3) / suit-manifest: /
58 73 # bytes(115)
A4 # map(4)
01 # unsigned(1) / suit-manifest-version: /
01 # unsigned(1)
02 # unsigned(2) / suit-manifest-sequence-number: /
1B FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF # unsigned(18446744073709551615)
03 # unsigned(3) / suit-common: /
58 5B # bytes(91)
A2 # map(2)
02 # unsigned(2) / suit-components: /
81 # array(1)
84 # array(4)
4B # bytes(11)
544545502D446576696365 # "TEEP-Device"
48 # bytes(8)
5365637572654653 # "SecureFS"
50 # bytes(16)
8D82573A926D4754935332DC29997F74 # tc-uuid
42 # bytes(2)
7461 # "ta"
04 # unsigned(4) / suit-common-sequence: /
58 2B # bytes(84)
86 # array(6)
14 # unsigned(20) / suit-directive-override-parameters: /
A2 # map(2)
01 # unsigned(1) / suit-parameter-vendor-identifier: /
50 # bytes(16)
C0DDD5F15243566087DB4F5B0AA26C2F
02 # unsigned(2) / suit-parameter-class-identifier: /
50 # bytes(16)
DB42F7093D8C55BAA8C5265FC5820F4E
01 # unsigned(1) / suit-condition-vendor-identifier: /
0F # unsigned(15)
02 # unsigned(2) / suit-condition-class-identifier: /
0F # unsigned(15)
09 # unsigned(9) / suit-install: /
46 # bytes(6)
84 # array(4)
0C # unsigned(12) / suit-directive-set-component-index: /
00 # unsigned(0)
18 21 # unsigned(33) / suit-directive-unlink: /
00 # unsigned(0)
¶
D86BA2025873825824822F5820632454F19A9440A5B83493628A7EF8704C 8A0205A62C34E425BAA34C71341F42584AD28443A10126A0F65840A32CDB 7C1D089C27408CED3C79087220EB0D77F105BB5330912875F4D94AD108D7 658C650463AEB7E1CCA5084F22B2F3993176E8B3529A3202ED735E4D39BB BF035873A40101021BFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF03585BA20281844B544545502D 446576696365485365637572654653508D82573A926D4754935332DC2999 7F7442746104582B8614A20150C0DDD5F15243566087DB4F5B0AA26C2F02 50DB42F7093D8C55BAA8C5265FC5820F4E010F020F0946840C00182100¶
This section shows some examples of SUIT reports.¶
SUIT Reports have no records if no conditions have failed. The URI in this example is the reference URI provided in the SUIT manifest.¶
{
/ suit-report-manifest-digest / 1:<<[
/ algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /,
/ digest-bytes / h'a7fd6593eac32eb4be578278e6540c5c'
h'09cfd7d4d234973054833b2b93030609'
]>>,
/ suit-report-manifest-uri / 2: "tam.teep.example/personalisation.suit",
/ suit-report-records / 4: []
}
¶
{
/ suit-report-manifest-digest / 1:<<[
/ algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /,
/ digest-bytes / h'a7fd6593eac32eb4be578278e6540c5c09cfd7d4d234973054833b2b93030609'
]>>,
/ suit-report-manifest-uri / 2: "tam.teep.example/personalisation.suit",
/ suit-report-records / 4: [
{
/ suit-record-manifest-id / 1:[],
/ suit-record-manifest-section / 2: 7 / dependency-resolution /,
/ suit-record-section-offset / 3: 66,
/ suit-record-dependency-index / 5: 0,
/ suit-record-failure-reason / 6: 404
}
]
}
¶
where the dependency-resolution refers to:¶
107({
authentication-wrapper,
/ manifest / 3:<<{
/ manifest-version / 1:1,
/ manifest-sequence-number / 2:3,
common,
dependency-resolution,
install,
validate,
run,
text
}>>,
})
¶
and the suit-record-section-offset refers to:¶
<<[
/ directive-set-dependency-index / 13,0 ,
/ directive-set-parameters / 19,{
/ uri / 21:'tam.teep.example/'
'edd94cd8-9d9c-4cc8-9216-b3ad5a2d5b8a.suit',
} ,
/ directive-fetch / 21,2 ,
/ condition-image-match / 3,15
]>>,
¶