A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is to improve routing security. (See [RFC6480] for more information.) As part of this system, a mechanism is needed to allow entities to verify that an AS has been given permission by an IP address block holder to advertise routes to one or more prefixes within that block. A ROA provides this function.¶

The ROA makes use of the template for RPKI digitally signed objects [RFC6488], which defines a Crytopgraphic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] wrapper for the ROA content as well as a generic validation procedure for RPKI signed objects. Therefore, to complete the specification of the ROA (see Section 4 of [RFC6488]), this document defines:¶

• The OID that identifies the signed object as being a ROA. (This OID appears within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo object as well as the content-type signed attribute in the signerInfo object).¶
• The ASN.1 syntax for the ROA eContent. (This is the payload that specifies the AS being authorized to originate routes as well as the prefixes to which the AS may originate routes.) The ROA eContent is ASN.1 encoded using the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X.690].¶
• Additional steps required to validate ROAs (in addition to the validation steps specified in [RFC6488]).¶

2. Related Work

It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280] and "X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779].¶

Additionally, this document makes use of the RPKI signed object profile [RFC6488]; thus, familiarity with that document is assumed. Note that the RPKI signed object profile makes use of certificates adhering to the RPKI Resource Certificate Profile [RFC6487]; thus, familiarly with that profile is also assumed.¶

3. The ROA ContentType

The content-type for a ROA is defined as routeOriginAuthz and has the numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24.¶

This OID MUST appear both within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo object as well as the ContentType signed attribute in the signerInfo object (see [RFC6488]).¶

4. The ROA eContent

The content of a ROA identifies a single AS that has been authorized by the address space holder to originate routes and a list of one or more IP address prefixes that will be advertised. If the address space holder needs to authorize multiple ASes to advertise the same set of address prefixes, the holder issues multiple ROAs, one per AS number. A ROA is formally defined as:¶

RPKI-ROA-2023 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
  pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) mod(0) id-mod-rpkiROA-2023(TBD) }

DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN

IMPORTS
  CONTENT-TYPE
  FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- in [RFC6268]
    { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
      pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) } ;

ct-routeOriginAttestation CONTENT-TYPE ::=
  { TYPE RouteOriginAttestation
    IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-routeOriginAuthz }

id-ct-routeOriginAuthz OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
  { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
    pkcs-9(9) id-smime(16) id-ct(1) routeOriginAuthz(24) }

RouteOriginAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
  version [0]   INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
  asID          ASID,
  ipAddrBlocks  SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..2)) OF ROAIPAddressFamily }

ASID ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295)

ROAIPAddressFamily ::= SEQUENCE {
  addressFamily AFI.&afi ({AddressFamilySet}),
  addresses     AFI.&Addresses ({AddressFamilySet}{@addressFamily}) }

AFI ::= CLASS {
  &afi          OCTET STRING (SIZE(2)) UNIQUE,
  &Addresses
} WITH SYNTAX { AFI &afi ADDRESSES-TYPE &Addresses }

AddressFamilySet AFI ::= { addressFamilyIPv4 | addressFamilyIPv6 }

addressFamilyIPv4 AFI ::= { AFI ipv4 ADDRESSES-TYPE ROAIPv4Addresses }
addressFamilyIPv6 AFI ::= { AFI ipv6 ADDRESSES-TYPE ROAIPv6Addresses }

ipv4 OCTET STRING ::= '0001'H
ipv6 OCTET STRING ::= '0002'H

ROAIPv4Addresses ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddress{32}
ROAIPv6Addresses ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddress{128}

ROAIPAddress {INTEGER: len} ::= SEQUENCE {
  address       BIT STRING (SIZE(0..len)),
  maxLength     INTEGER (0..len) OPTIONAL }

END

6. Security Considerations

There is no assumption of confidentiality for the data in a ROA; it is anticipated that ROAs will be stored in repositories that are accessible to all ISPs, and perhaps to all Internet users. There is no explicit authentication associated with a ROA, since the PKI used for ROA validation provides authorization but not authentication. Although the ROA is a signed, application-layer object, there is no intent to convey non-repudiation via a ROA.¶

The purpose of a ROA is to convey authorization for an AS to originate a route to the prefix(es) in the ROA. Thus, the integrity of a ROA MUST be established. The ROA specification makes use of the RPKI signed object format; thus, all security considerations in [RFC6488] also apply to ROAs. Additionally, the signed object profile uses the CMS signed message format for integrity; thus, ROAs inherit all security considerations associated with that data structure.¶

The right of the ROA signer to authorize the target AS to originate routes to the prefix(es) is established through use of the address space and AS number PKI described in [RFC6480]. Specifically, one MUST verify the signature on the ROA using an X.509 certificate issued under this PKI, and check that the prefix(es) in the ROA are contained within those in the certificate's IP Address Delegation Extension.¶

7. IANA Considerations

Decimal   Description             References
---------------------------------------------------------------
  24      id-ct-routeOriginAuthz  [RFC-to-be]

Name                             OID                         Specification
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Route Origination Authorization  1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24  [RFC-to-be]

Filename Extension  RPKI Object                     Reference
------------------------------------------------------------------------
       .roa         Route Origination Authorization [RFC-to-be]

Decimal  Description             Reference
--------------------------------------------
    TBD  id-mod-rpkiROA-2022     [RFC-to-be]

   Type name: application
   Subtype name: rpki-roa
   Required parameters: N/A
   Optional parameters: N/A
   Encoding considerations: binary
   Security considerations: Carries an RPKI ROA [RFC-to-be].
       This media type contains no active content. See
       Section 6 of [RFC-to-be] for further information.
   Interoperability considerations: None
   Published specification: [RFC-to-be]
   Applications that use this media type: RPKI operators
   Additional information:
     Content: This media type is a signed object, as defined
         in [RFC6488], which contains a payload of a list of
         prefixes and an AS identifer as defined in [RFC-to-be].
     Magic number(s): None
     File extension(s): .roa
     Macintosh file type code(s):
   Person & email address to contact for further information:
     Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
   Intended usage: COMMON
   Restrictions on usage: None
   Change controller: IETF

Appendix A. Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank Theo Buehler, Ties de Kock, Charles Gardiner, Russ Housley, Jeffrey Haas, and Bob Beck for their help and contributions. Additionally, the authors thank Rob Austein, Roque Gagliano, Danny McPherson, and Sam Weiler for their careful reviews and helpful comments.¶

Appendix B. Example ROA eContent Payload

Below an example of a DER encoded ROA eContent is provided with annotation following the '#' character.¶

$ echo 302402023CCA301E301C04020002301630090307002001067C208C30090307002A0EB2400000 \
  | xxd -r -ps \
  | openssl asn1parse -i -dump -inform DER
    0:d=0  hl=2 l=  36 cons: SEQUENCE                   # RouteOriginAttestation
    2:d=1  hl=2 l=   2 prim:  INTEGER           :3CCA   # asID 15562
    6:d=1  hl=2 l=  30 cons:  SEQUENCE                  # ipAddrBlocks
    8:d=2  hl=2 l=  28 cons:   SEQUENCE                 #  ROAIPAddressFamily
   10:d=3  hl=2 l=   2 prim:    OCTET STRING            #   addressFamily
      0000 - 00 02                              ..      #    IPv6
   14:d=3  hl=2 l=  22 cons:    SEQUENCE                #   addresses
   16:d=4  hl=2 l=   9 cons:     SEQUENCE               #    ROAIPAddress
   18:d=5  hl=2 l=   7 prim:      BIT STRING            #     address
      0000 - 00 20 01 06 7c 20 8c               . ..| . #      2001:67c:208c::/48
   27:d=4  hl=2 l=   9 cons:     SEQUENCE               #    ROAIPAddress
   29:d=5  hl=2 l=   7 prim:      BIT STRING            #     address
      0000 - 00 2a 0e b2 40                     .*..@   #      2a0e:b240::/48
      0007 - <SPACES/NULS>

Below is a complete Base64 [RFC4648] encoded RPKI ROA Signed Object.¶
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The object in Appendix B has the following properties:¶

Object
SHA256 hash:            13afbad09ed59b315efd8722d38b09fd02962e376e4def32247f9de905649b47
Size:                   1807 octets

CMS signing time:       Fri 17 Jun 2022 00:24:22 +0000

X.509 end-entity certificate
Subject key id:         A3D964245749BB6DD5AB1F2E830E33A6C5146E8F
Authority key id:       38E14F92FDC7CCFBFC182361523AE27D697E952F
Issuer:                 /CN=38e14f92fdc7ccfbfc182361523ae27d697e952f
Serial:                 86F9
Not before:             Fri 17 Jun 2022 00:24:22 +0000
Not after:              Sat 01 Jul 2023 00:00:00 +0000
IP address delegation:  2001:67c:208c::/48, 2a0e:b240::/48

eContent
asID:                   15562
addresses:              2001:67c:208c::/48, 2a0e:b240::/48

Appendix C. Canonical form for ROA eContent

As the data structure described by the ROA ASN.1 module allows for many different ways to represent the same set of IP address information, a canonical form is defined such that every set of IP address information has a unique representation. In order to produce and verify this canonical form, the process described in this section SHOULD be used to ensure information elements are unique with respect to one another and sorted in ascending order. This canonicalization procedure builds upon the canonicalization procedure specified in section 2.2.3.6 of [RFC3779].¶

In order to semantically compare, sort, and deduplicate the contents of the ipAddrBlocks field, each ROAIPAddress element is mapped to an abstract data element composed of four integer values:¶

afi

The AFI value appearing in the addressFamily field of the containing ROAIPAddressFamily as an integer.¶

addr

The first IP address of the IP prefix appearing in the ROAIPAddress address field, as 32-bit (IPv4) or 128-bit (IPv6) integer value.¶

plen

The prefix length of the IP prefix appearing in the ROAIPAddress address field as an integer value.¶

mlen

The value appearing in the maxLength field of the ROAIPAddress, if present, otherwise the above prefix length value.¶

Thus, the equality or relative order of two ROAIPAddress elements can be tested by comparing their abstract representations.¶

Authors' Addresses