| Internet-Draft | A Profile for Route Origin Authorization | April 2023 |
| Snijders, et al. | Expires 22 October 2023 | [Page] |
This document defines a standard profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs). A ROA is a digitally signed object that provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has authorized an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes to one or more prefixes within the address block. This document obsoletes RFC 6482.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 22 October 2023.¶
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶
The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is to improve routing security. (See [RFC6480] for more information.) As part of this system, a mechanism is needed to allow entities to verify that an AS has been given permission by an IP address block holder to advertise routes to one or more prefixes within that block. A ROA provides this function.¶
The ROA makes use of the template for RPKI digitally signed objects [RFC6488], which defines a Crytopgraphic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] wrapper for the ROA content as well as a generic validation procedure for RPKI signed objects. Therefore, to complete the specification of the ROA (see Section 4 of [RFC6488]), this document defines:¶
This section summarizes the significant changes between [RFC6482] and the profile described in this document.¶
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280] and "X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779].¶
Additionally, this document makes use of the RPKI signed object profile [RFC6488]; thus, familiarity with that document is assumed. Note that the RPKI signed object profile makes use of certificates adhering to the RPKI Resource Certificate Profile [RFC6487]; thus, familiarly with that profile is also assumed.¶
The content-type for a ROA is defined as routeOriginAuthz and has the numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24.¶
This OID MUST appear both within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo object as well as the ContentType signed attribute in the signerInfo object (see [RFC6488]).¶
The content of a ROA identifies a single AS that has been authorized by the address space holder to originate routes and a list of one or more IP address prefixes that will be advertised. If the address space holder needs to authorize multiple ASes to advertise the same set of address prefixes, the holder issues multiple ROAs, one per AS number. A ROA is formally defined as:¶
RPKI-ROA-2022 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) mod(0) id-mod-rpkiROA-2022(TBD) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
CONTENT-TYPE
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- in [RFC6268]
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) } ;
ct-routeOriginAttestation CONTENT-TYPE ::=
{ TYPE RouteOriginAttestation
IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-routeOriginAuthz }
id-ct-routeOriginAuthz OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) id-smime(16) id-ct(1) routeOriginAuthz(24) }
RouteOriginAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
asID ASID,
ipAddrBlocks SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..2)) OF ROAIPAddressFamily }
ASID ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295)
-- Note: addressFamily can only be '0001'H (IPv4) or '0002'H (IPv6). --
ROAIPAddressFamily ::= SEQUENCE {
addressFamily OCTET STRING (SIZE(2)),
addresses SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddress }
-- Note: maxLength must be equal or larger than size of IPAddress, --
-- and equal or smaller to what the AFI context permits. --
ROAIPAddress ::= SEQUENCE {
address IPAddress,
maxLength INTEGER (0..128) OPTIONAL }
-- Note: if the ROAIPAddressFamily's addressFamily is IPv4, the --
-- IPAddress' size cannot exceed 32; conversely if addressFamily --
-- is IPv6, size can't exceed 128. --
IPAddress ::= BIT STRING (SIZE(0..128))
END
¶
The version number of the RouteOriginAttestation MUST be 0.¶
The asID field contains the AS number that is authorized to originate routes to the given IP address prefixes.¶
The ipAddrBlocks field encodes the set of IP address prefixes to which the AS is authorized to originate routes. Note that the syntax here is more restrictive than that used in the IP Address Delegation extension defined in [RFC3779]. That extension can represent arbitrary address ranges, whereas ROAs need to represent only prefixes.¶
Within the ROAIPAddressFamily structure, the addressFamily field contains the Address Family Identifier (AFI) of an IP address family. This specification only supports IPv4 and IPv6, therefore addressFamily MUST be either 0001 or 0002.¶
There MUST be only one instance of ROAIPAddressFamily per unique AFI in the ROA. Thus, the ROAIPAddressFamily structure MUST NOT appear more than twice.¶
The addresses field represents prefixes as a sequence of type ROAIPAddress.¶
A ROAIPAddress structure is a sequence containing an address field of type IPAddress and an optional maxLength field of type INTEGER.¶
The address field represents a single IP address prefix. See section 2.2.3.8 of [RFC3779] for more details on type IPAddress.¶
When present, the maxLength specifies the maximum length of the IP address prefix that the AS is authorized to advertise.¶
If present, the maxLength MUST be:¶
For example, if the IP address prefix is 203.0.113.0/24 and the maxLength is 26, the AS is authorized to advertise any more-specific prefix with a maximum length of 26. In this example, the AS would be authorized to advertise 203.0.113.0/24, 203.0.113.128/25, or 203.0.113.192/26; but not 203.0.113.0/27. See [RFC9319] for more information on the use of maxLength.¶
When the maxLength is not present, the AS is only authorized to advertise the exact prefix specified in the ROAIPAddress' address field.¶
Note that a valid ROA may contain an IP address prefix (within a ROAIPAddress element) that is encompassed by another IP address prefix (within a separate ROAIPAddress element). For example, a ROA may contain the prefix 203.0.113.0/24 with maxLength 26, as well as the prefix 203.0.113.0/28 with maxLength 28. This ROA would authorize the indicated AS to advertise any prefix beginning with 203.0.113 with a minimum length of 24 and a maximum length of 26, as well as the specific prefix 203.0.113.0/28.¶
Additionally, a ROA MAY contain two ROAIPAddress elements, where the IP address prefix is identical in both cases. However, this is NOT RECOMMENDED as, in such a case, the ROAIPAddress with the shorter maxLength grants no additional privileges to the indicated AS and thus can be omitted without changing the meaning of the ROA.¶
Before a relying party can use a ROA to validate a routing announcement, the relying party MUST first validate the ROA. To validate a ROA, the relying party MUST perform all the validation checks specified in [RFC6488] as well as the following additional ROA-specific validation steps.¶
There is no assumption of confidentiality for the data in a ROA; it is anticipated that ROAs will be stored in repositories that are accessible to all ISPs, and perhaps to all Internet users. There is no explicit authentication associated with a ROA, since the PKI used for ROA validation provides authorization but not authentication. Although the ROA is a signed, application-layer object, there is no intent to convey non-repudiation via a ROA.¶
The purpose of a ROA is to convey authorization for an AS to originate a route to the prefix(es) in the ROA. Thus, the integrity of a ROA MUST be established. The ROA specification makes use of the RPKI signed object format; thus, all security considerations in [RFC6488] also apply to ROAs. Additionally, the signed object profile uses the CMS signed message format for integrity; thus, ROAs inherit all security considerations associated with that data structure.¶
The right of the ROA signer to authorize the target AS to originate routes to the prefix(es) is established through use of the address space and AS number PKI described in [RFC6480]. Specifically, one MUST verify the signature on the ROA using an X.509 certificate issued under this PKI, and check that the prefix(es) in the ROA are contained within those in the certificate's IP Address Delegation Extension.¶
The IANA has allocated for this document in the "SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)" registry:¶
Decimal Description References --------------------------------------------------------------- 24 id-ct-routeOriginAuthz [RFC6482][RFC-to-be]¶
Upon publication of this document, IANA is requested to reference the RFC publication instead of this draft.¶
The IANA has registered the OID for the RPKI Signed Checklist in the "RPKI Signed Objects" registry created by [RFC6488] as follows:¶
Name OID Specification ------------------------------------------------------------- ROA 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24 [RFC6482][RFC-TBD]¶
The IANA has added an item for the ROA file extension to the "RPKI Repository Name Schemes" registry created by [RFC6481] as follows:¶
Filename Extension RPKI Object Reference
------------------------------------------------------------------------
.roa Route Origination Authorization [RFC6481][RFC-to-be]
¶
Upon publication of this document, IANA is requested to make this addition permanent and to reference the RFC publication instead of this draft.¶
The IANA is requested to allocate for this document in the "SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)" registry:¶
Decimal Description References
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
TBD id-mod-rpkiROA-2022 [RFC-to-be]
¶
The IANA is requested to update the media type application/rpki-roa in the "Media Type" registry as follows:¶
Type name: application
Subtype name: rpki-roa
Required parameters: N/A
Optional parameters: N/A
Encoding considerations: binary
Security considerations: Carries an RPKI ROA [RFC-to-be].
This media type contains no active content. See
Section 6 of [RFC-to-be] for further information.
Interoperability considerations: None
Published specification: [RFC-to-be]
Applications that use this media type: RPKI operators
Additional information:
Content: This media type is a signed object, as defined
in [RFC6488], which contains a payload of a list of
prefixes and an AS identifer as defined in [RFC-to-be].
Magic number(s): None
File extension(s): .roa
Macintosh file type code(s):
Person & email address to contact for further information:
Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: None
Change controller: IETF
¶
The authors wish to thank Charles Gardiner and Russ Housley for their help and contributions. Additionally, the authors thank Rob Austein, Roque Gagliano, Danny McPherson, and Sam Weiler for their careful reviews and helpful comments.¶
Below an example of a DER encoded ROA eContent is provided with annotation following the '#' character.¶
$ echo 302402023CCA301E301C04020002301630090307002001067C208C30090307002A0EB2400000 \
| xxd -r -ps \
| openssl asn1parse -i -dump -inform DER
0:d=0 hl=2 l= 36 cons: SEQUENCE # RouteOriginAttestation
2:d=1 hl=2 l= 2 prim: INTEGER :3CCA # asID 15562
6:d=1 hl=2 l= 30 cons: SEQUENCE # ipAddrBlocks
8:d=2 hl=2 l= 28 cons: SEQUENCE # ROAIPAddressFamily
10:d=3 hl=2 l= 2 prim: OCTET STRING # addressFamily
0000 - 00 02 .. # IPv6
14:d=3 hl=2 l= 22 cons: SEQUENCE # addresses
16:d=4 hl=2 l= 9 cons: SEQUENCE # ROAIPAddress
18:d=5 hl=2 l= 7 prim: BIT STRING # address
0000 - 00 20 01 06 7c 20 8c . ..| . # 2001:67c:208c::/48
27:d=4 hl=2 l= 9 cons: SEQUENCE # ROAIPAddress
29:d=5 hl=2 l= 7 prim: BIT STRING # address
0000 - 00 2a 0e b2 40 .*..@ # 2a0e:b240::/48
0007 - <SPACES/NULS>
¶
Below is a complete Base64 [RFC4648] encoded RPKI ROA Signed Object.¶
MIIHCwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIG/DCCBvgCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwNwYLKoZIhvcNAQkQ ARigKAQmMCQCAjzKMB4wHAQCAAIwFjAJAwcAIAEGfCCMMAkDBwAqDrJAAACgggT7MIIE9zCC A9+gAwIBAgIDAIb5MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDM4ZTE0ZjkyZmRjN2Nj ZmJmYzE4MjM2MTUyM2FlMjdkNjk3ZTk1MmYwHhcNMjIwNjE3MDAyNDIyWhcNMjMwNzAxMDAw MDAwWjAzMTEwLwYDVQQDEyhBM0Q5NjQyNDU3NDlCQjZERDVBQjFGMkU4MzBFMzNBNkM1MTQ2 RThGMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA4CRG1t04YFLq3fctx2ThNfr6 Vxsd2wZzcZhQJgUdlvUyfUPISWMwuPfpGjviqtCEzh5aNePGpLopkIES08egzTmJ78Is6+kW LXwy9CcwT7gmP9qOTSEi8h4qcyajxHbAwDEjROVNSujhLGeB74S9IQTn2Ertp2Et2xPq/kXw +eiBHtOL2h2I7/UOZxHOHuNuHby+VbhFaxgPA7rVfdlUAf9yYxQvyZtB7kHT/EwAR4c9SYWu 0rvbWNJwWehzlT74V1XaknRXQjkKYHe34Fyyx9FY86uX4uN8rPuIzkd7n6g81pUZRIuk/3tc /DjbHNAD3qWVQ+0aqNdkunoJhQccZwIDAQABo4ICEjCCAg4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFKPZZCRXSbtt 1asfLoMOM6bFFG6PMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFDjhT5L9x8z7/BgjYVI64n1pfpUvMBgGA1UdIAEB /wQOMAwwCgYIKwYBBQUHDgIwZAYDVR0fBF0wWzBZoFegVYZTcnN5bmM6Ly9jaGxvZS5zb2Jv cm5vc3QubmV0L3Jwa2kvUklQRS1ubGpvYnNuaWpkZXJzL09PRlBrdjNIelB2OEdDTmhVanJp ZldsLWxTOC5jcmwwZAYIKwYBBQUHAQEEWDBWMFQGCCsGAQUFBzAChkhyc3luYzovL3Jwa2ku cmlwZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS9ERUZBVUxUL09PRlBrdjNIelB2OEdDTmhVanJpZldsLWxT OC5jZXIwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgeAMIGoBggrBgEFBQcBCwSBmzCBmDBfBggrBgEFBQcwC4ZT cnN5bmM6Ly9jaGxvZS5zb2Jvcm5vc3QubmV0L3Jwa2kvUklQRS1ubGpvYnNuaWpkZXJzL285 bGtKRmRKdTIzVnF4OHVndzR6cHNVVWJvOC5yb2EwNQYIKwYBBQUHMA2GKWh0dHBzOi8vY2hs b2Uuc29ib3Jub3N0Lm5ldC9ycGtpL25ld3MueG1sMCsGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBwwGjAYBAIA AjASAwcAIAEGfCCMAwcAKg6yQAAAMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQAY4bd+Y1Os1MbxGWLU d7rNVG0c3e0FOwtUOE/Qprt5gkCHO2L19/R1jnXlAaJPID5VhUNl2y/AiwmP47vhk+fvtEdB wniszL8wCk5b6wwufn1z5/stQ85GRmsqJw5nkOYCyWpTP8k+TUa4w32xNj1dX78FwadDVeSP yMgJ0860mkXbV1/82/D60zrWQsVAZiYebhni1QAqmpsxZwdZceFRRVY48YDPOZ73ZBZvf0g6 Boy1+djlcAkugA92OKLzqjHWfY2iWZkcxXmFDthoeVCGQePkHMOigOyjZPcM8EXumo1rwI7N 4CPs0VkmCVCZABYVQ0HJvU08i/Wf6X1VRbNcMYIBqjCCAaYCAQOAFKPZZCRXSbtt1asfLoMO M6bFFG6PMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAaBrMBoGCSqGSIb3DQEJAzENBgsqhkiG9w0BCRABGDAcBgkq hkiG9w0BCQUxDxcNMjIwNjE3MDAyNDIyWjAvBgkqhkiG9w0BCQQxIgQgyCDmNy5kR2T3NpBX fNhzFLNQv4PmI8kFb6VIt1kqeRswDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAEggEAWu1sxXCO/X8voU1zfvL+ My6KXb5va2CIuKD4dn/cllClWp8YizygIb+tPWfsT6DvaLOp1jE0raQyc8nUexLXSlIBGF7j GVWYCy4Oo8mXki+YB3AP1eXiBpx8E4Aa3Rq6/FO80fqrVmUTuywGnv9m6zSIrzEPFujpRIDa QQfDEOktRcLvNPXHfipTBzR4VSLkbZbyJBdigEPFUJVIRcAoI4tZAUVcbwANrHpZElFMBgr6 Rpn9l5nu7kUlZqXbV39Mfv8WCzctaUyc+Ag311sfWu5s6XaX3PtT9V4TnQhbSWcvR9NgM+As NqelVbdJ/iA2SeNHU/65xf6dDE2zdHDfsw==¶