Internet-Draft RATS CMW October 2024
Birkholz, et al. Expires 23 April 2025 [Page]
Workgroup:
Remote ATtestation ProcedureS
Internet-Draft:
draft-ietf-rats-msg-wrap-09
Published:
Intended Status:
Standards Track
Expires:
Authors:
H. Birkholz
Fraunhofer SIT
N. Smith
Intel
T. Fossati
Linaro
H. Tschofenig
H-BRS

RATS Conceptual Messages Wrapper (CMW)

Abstract

This document defines the RATS conceptual message wrapper (CMW) format, a type of encapsulation format that can be used for any RATS messages, such as Evidence, Attestation Results, Endorsements, and Reference Values. Additionally, the document describes a collection type that enables the aggregation of one or more CMWs into a single message.

This document also defines corresponding CBOR tag, JSON Web Tokens (JWT) and CBOR Web Tokens (CWT) claims, as well as an X.509 extension. These allow embedding the wrapped conceptual messages into CBOR-based protocols, web APIs, and PKIX protocols. In addition, a Media Type and a CoAP Content-Format are defined for transporting CMWs in HTTP, MIME, CoAP and other Internet protocols.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 April 2025.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

The RATS architecture defines a handful of conceptual messages (see Section 8 of [RFC9334]), such as Evidence and Attestation Results. Each conceptual message can have multiple claims encoding and serialization formats (Section 9 of [RFC9334]). Throughout their lifetime, RATS conceptual messages are typically transported over different protocols. For example,

It is desirable to reuse any typing information associated with the messages across such protocol boundaries to minimize the cost associated with type registrations and maximize interoperability. With the CMW format described in this document, protocol designers do not need to update protocol specifications to support different conceptual messages. This approach reduces the implementation effort for developers to support different attestation technologies. For example, an implementer of a Relying Party application does not need to parse attestation-related conceptual messages, such as different Evidence formats, but can instead utilize the CMW format to be agnostic to the attestation technology.

This document defines two encapsulation formats for RATS conceptual messages that aim to achieve the goals stated above.

These encapsulation formats have been specifically designed to possess the following characteristics:

A protocol designer could use these formats, for example, to convey Evidence, Endorsements and Reference Values in certificates and CRLs extensions ([DICE-arch]), to embed Attestation Results or Evidence as first-class authentication credentials in TLS handshake messages [I-D.fossati-tls-attestation], to transport attestation-related payloads in RESTful APIs, or for stable storage of Attestation Results in the form of file system objects.

This document also defines corresponding CBOR tag, JSON Web Tokens (JWT) and CBOR Web Tokens (CWT) claims, as well as an X.509 extension. These allow embedding the wrapped conceptual messages into CBOR-based protocols, web APIs, and PKIX protocols. In addition, a Media Type and a CoAP Content-Format are defined for transporting CMWs in HTTP, MIME, CoAP and other Internet protocols.

2. Conventions and Definitions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

In this document, CDDL [RFC8610] [RFC9165] is used to describe the data formats.

The reader is assumed to be familiar with the vocabulary and concepts defined in [RFC9334].

This document reuses the terms defined in Section 2 of [RFC9193] (e.g., "Content-Type").

3. Conceptual Message Wrapper Encodings

Two types of RATS Conceptual Message Wrapper (CMW) are specified in this document:

  1. A CMW using a CBOR or JSON record (Section 3.1);

  2. A CMW based on CBOR tags (Section 3.2).

A further CMW "collection" type that holds together multiple CMW items is defined in Section 3.3.

A CMW "tunnel" type is also defined in Section 3.3.3 to allow transporting CBOR CMWs in JSON collections and vice-versa.

The collected CDDL is in Appendix A.

This document only defines an encapsulation, not a security format. It is the responsibility of the Attester to ensure that the CMW contents have the necessary security protection. Security considerations are discussed in Section 9.

3.1. CMW Record

The format of the CMW record is shown in Figure 1. The JSON [STD90] and CBOR [STD94] representations are provided separately. Both the json-record and cbor-record have the same fields except for slight differences in the types discussed below.

json-record = [
  type: media-type
  value: base64url-string
  ? ind: uint .bits cm-type
]

cbor-record = [
  type: coap-content-format-type / media-type
  value: bytes
  ? ind: uint .bits cm-type
]
Figure 1: CDDL definition of the Record format

Each contains two or three members:

type:

Either a text string representing a Content-Type (e.g., an EAT media type [I-D.ietf-rats-eat-media-type]) or an unsigned integer corresponding to a CoAP Content-Format number (Section 12.3 of [RFC7252]). The latter MUST NOT be used in the JSON serialization.

value:

The RATS conceptual message serialized according to the value defined in the type member. When using JSON, the value field MUST be encoded as Base64 using the URL and filename safe alphabet (Section 5 of [RFC4648]) without padding. This always applies, even if the conceptual message format is already textual (e.g., a JWT EAT). When using CBOR, the value field MUST be encoded as a CBOR byte string.

ind:

An optional bitmap that indicates which conceptual message types are carried in the value field. Any combination (i.e., any value between 1 and 15, included) is allowed. This is useful only if the type is potentially ambiguous and there is no further context available to the CMW consumer to decide. For example, this might be the case if the base media type is not profiled (e.g., application/eat+cwt), if the value field contains multiple conceptual messages with different types (e.g., both Reference Values and Endorsements within the same application/signed-corim+cbor), or if the same profile identifier is shared by different conceptual messages. Future specifications may add new values to the ind field; see Section 10.4.

3.2. CMW CBOR Tags

CBOR Tags used as CMW may be derived from CoAP Content-Format numbers. If a CoAP content format exists for a RATS conceptual message, the TN() transform defined in Appendix B of [RFC9277] can be used to derive a corresponding CBOR tag in range [1668546817, 1668612095].

The RATS conceptual message is first serialized according to the Content-Format number associated with the CBOR tag and then encoded as a CBOR byte string, to which the tag is prepended.

The CMW CBOR Tag is defined in Figure 2 as a macro with two parameters:

  • tn, the CBOR tag number

  • $fmt, the definition of the associated conceptual message

cbor-tag<tn, $fmt> = #6.<tn>(bytes .cbor $fmt)
Figure 2: CDDL definition of the CBOR Tag format macro

To add a new CMW, the $cbor-tag type socket is extended with a new instance of the CMW CBOR Tag macro. For example, to associate conceptual messages of type my-evidence with CBOR Tag 1668576819, one would extend $cbor-tag as follows:

$cbor-tag /= cbor-tag<1668576819, my-evidence>

my-evidence = {
  &(eat_nonce: 10) => bstr .size (8..64)
}

3.2.1. Use of Pre-existing CBOR Tags

If a CBOR tag has been registered in association with a certain RATS conceptual message independently of a CoAP content format (i.e., it is not obtained by applying the TN() transform), it can be readily used as an encapsulation without the extra processing described in Section 3.2.

A consumer can always distinguish tags that have been derived via TN(), which all fall in the [1668546817, 1668612095] range, from tags that are not, and therefore apply the right decapsulation on receive.

3.3. CMW Collections

Layered Attesters and composite devices (Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of [RFC9334]) generate Evidence that consists of multiple parts. For example, in data center servers, it is not uncommon for separate attesting environments (AE) to serve a subsection of the entire machine. One AE might measure and attest to what was booted on the main CPU, while another AE might measure and attest to what was booted on a SmartNIC plugged into a PCIe slot, and a third AE might measure and attest to what was booted on the machine's GPU. To allow aggregation of multiple, potentially non-homogeneous evidence formats collected from different AEs, this document defines a CMW "collection" as a container that holds several CMW items, each with a label that is unique within the scope of the collection.

Although originally designed to support layered Attester and composite device use cases, the CMW collection can be adapted for other scenarios that require the aggregation of RATS conceptual messages. For instance, collections may be used to group Endorsements, Reference Values, Attestation Results, and more. A single CMW collection can contain a mix of different message types, and it can also be used to carry messages related to multiple devices simultaneously.

The CMW collection (Figure 3) is defined as a CBOR map or JSON object with CMW values, either native or "tunnelled" (Section 3.3.3). The position of a cmw entry in the cmw-collection is not significant. Labels can be strings (or integers in the CBOR serialization) that serve as a mnemonic for different conceptual messages in the collection.

The "__cmwc_t" key is reserved for associating an optional type to the overall collection and MUST NOT be used for a label. The collection type is either a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) or an object identifier (OID). The OID is always absolute and never relative.

Since the collection type is recursive, implementations may limit the allowed depth of nesting.

json-collection = {
  ? "__cmwc_t": ~uri / oid
  + &(label: text) => json-CMW / c2j-tunnel
}

cbor-collection = {
  ? "__cmwc_t": ~uri / oid
  + &(label: (int / text)) => cbor-CMW / j2c-tunnel
}
Figure 3: CDDL definition of the CMW collection format

CMW itself provides no facilities for authenticity, integrity protection, or confidentiality. It is the responsibility of the designer for each use case to determine the necessary security properties and implement them accordingly. A secure channel (e.g., via TLS) or object-level security (e.g., using JWT) may suffice in some scenarios, but not in all.

When a CMW is used to carry the Evidence for composite or layered attestation for a single device, the security properties needed are that of attestation. In particular, all the members in a CMW must be bound together so that an attacker can not replace one Evidence message showing compromise with that from a non-compromised device. The authenticity and integrity protection MUST be attestation-oriented. For further security considerations about collections, see Section 9.2.

3.3.1. Relation to EAT submods

EAT submods (Section 4.2.18 of [I-D.ietf-rats-eat]) provide a facility for aggregating attestation that has built-in security and will be suitable for some of the same attestation Evidence use cases covered by CMW collections. However, compared to CMW collections, EAT submods are limited in two ways:

  1. EAT [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] allows carrying non-EAT-formatted types by augmenting the $EAT-CBOR-Tagged-Token socket or the $JSON-Selector socket. However, these need to be specified in subsequent standard documents updating the EAT specification,

  2. Their top-down structure does not align well with the bottom-up approach layered attesters use to build the chain of trust, making them not ideal for modelling layered attestation.

3.3.2. CMW Collections' role in composite Attester topology

A CMW Collection's tree structure is not required to be a spanning tree of the system's composite Attester topology. If the labels carry semantic content for a Verifier (e.g. to improve Verifier performance or aid human comprehension), the collection SHOULD be integrity protected. For example, the collection can be integrity protected by including it in a signed token such as a CWT or JWT.

3.3.3. CMW Tunnel

The CMW tunnel type (Figure 4) allows for moving a CMW in one serialization format, either JSON or CBOR, into a collection that uses the opposite serialization format.

Both tunnel types are arrays with two elements. The first element, a fixed text string starting with a #, acts as a sentinel value. The #, which is not an acceptable start symbol for the Content-Type production (Appendix A), makes it possible to disambiguate a CMW tunnel from a CMW record.

c2j-tunnel = [ "#cmw-c2j-tunnel", base64url-string ]
j2c-tunnel = [ "#cmw-j2c-tunnel", bytes ]
Figure 4: CDDL definition of the CMW tunnel format

The conversion algorithms are described in the following subsections.

3.3.3.1. CBOR-to-JSON

The CBOR byte string of the serialised CBOR CMW is encoded as Base64 using the URL and filename safe alphabet (Section 5 of [RFC4648]) without padding. The obtained string is added as the second element of the c2j-tunnel array. The c2j-tunnel array is serialized as JSON.

3.3.3.2. JSON-to-CBOR

The UTF-8 string of the serialized JSON CMW is encoded as a CBOR byte string (Major type 2). The byte string is added as the second element of the j2c-tunnel array. The j2c-tunnel array is serialized as CBOR.

3.4. Decapsulation Algorithm

Once any external framing is removed (for example, if the CMW is carried in a certificate extension), the CMW decoder performs a 1-byte lookahead to determine how to decode the remaining byte buffer. The following pseudo-code illustrates this process:

func CMWTypeDemux(b []byte) (CMW, error) {
  if len(b) == 0 {
    return Unknown
  }

  if b[0] == 0x82 || b[0] == 0x83 {
    return CBORRecord
  } else if b[0] >= 0xc0 && b[0] <= 0xdb {
    return CBORTag
  } else if b[0] == 0x5b {
    return JSONRecord
  } else if b[0] == 0x7b {
    return JSONCollection
  } else if (b[0] >= 0xa0 && b[0] <= 0xbb) || b[0] == 0xbf {
    return CBORCollection
  }

  return Unknown
}

4. Transporting CMW in COSE and JOSE Web Tokens

To facilitate the embedding of CMWs and CMW collections in CBOR-based protocols and web APIs, this document defines two "cmw" claims for use with JSON Web Tokens (JWT) and CBOR Web Tokens (CWT).

The definitions for these claims can be found in Section 10.2 and Section 10.1, respectively.

4.1. Encoding Requirements

A CMW collection carried in a "cmw" JWT claim MUST be a json-collection. A CMW collection carried in a "cmw" CWT claim MUST be a cbor-collection.

A CMW record carried in a "cmw" JWT claim MUST be a json-record. A CMW record carried in a "cmw" CWT claim MUST be a cbor-record.

5. Transporting CMW in X.509 Messages

CMW may need to be transported in PKIX messages, such as Certificate Signing Requests (CSRs) or in X.509 Certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs).

The use of CMW in CSRs is documented in [I-D.ietf-lamps-csr-attestation], while its application in X.509 Certificates and CRLs is detailed in Section 6.1 of [DICE-arch].

This section outlines the CMW extension designed to carry CMW objects.

The CMW extension MAY be included in X.509 Certificates, CRLs [RFC5280], and CSRs.

The CMW extension MUST be identified by the following object identifier:

id-pe-cmw  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
        { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
          security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-pe(1) TBD }

This extension SHOULD NOT be marked critical. It MAY be marked critical in cases where the attestation-related information is essential for granting resource access, and there is a risk that legacy relying parties would bypass such controls.

The CMW extension MUST have the following syntax:

CMW ::= CHOICE {
    json UTF8String,
    cbor OCTET STRING
}

The CMW MUST include the serialized CMW object in either JSON or CBOR format, utilizing the appropriate CHOICE entry.

The DER-encoded CMW is the value of the OCTET STRING for the extnValue field of the extension.

5.1. ASN.1 Module

This section provides an ASN.1 module [X.680] for the CMW extension, following the conventions established in [RFC5912] and [RFC6268].

CMWExtn
  { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
    security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
    id-mod-cmw-collection-extn(TBD) }

DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN

IMPORTS
  EXTENSION
  FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009  -- RFC 5912
    { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
      security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
      id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) } ;

-- CMW Extension

ext-CMW EXTENSION ::= {
  SYNTAX CMW
  IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-cmw }

-- CMW Extension OID

id-pe-cmw  OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=
   { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
     security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-pe(1) TBD }

-- CMW Extension Syntax

CMW ::= CHOICE {
    json UTF8String,
    cbor OCTET STRING
}

END

5.2. Compatibility with DICE ConceptualMessageWrapper

Section 6.1.8 of [DICE-arch] specifies the ConceptualMessageWrapper (CMW) format and its corresponding object identifier. The CMW format outlined in [DICE-arch] permits only a subset of the CMW grammar defined in this document. In particular, the tunnel and collection formats cannot be encoded using DICE CMWs.

6. Transporting CMW in EAT submods

Section 4.2.18 of [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] allows carrying non-EAT-formatted types in EAT submods by augmenting the $EAT-CBOR-Tagged-Token socket or the $JSON-Selector socket.

The following CDDL adds cbor-CMW and json-CMW to EAT using such extension points:

$EAT-CBOR-Tagged-Token /= #6.CPA765(cbor-CMW)

$JSON-Selector /= [ type: "CMW", nested-token: json-CMW ]

Where:

RFC Editor: This document uses the CPA (code point allocation) convention described in [I-D.bormann-cbor-draft-numbers]. For each usage of the term "CPA", please remove the prefix "CPA" from the indicated value and replace the residue with the value assigned by IANA; perform an analogous substitution for all other occurrences of the prefix "CPA" in the document. Finally, please remove this note.

7. Examples

The (equivalent) examples in Section 7.1, Section 7.2, and Section 7.3 assume that the Media-Type-Name application/vnd.example.rats-conceptual-msg has been registered alongside a corresponding CoAP Content-Format number 30001. The CBOR tag 1668576818 is derived applying the TN() transform as described in Section 3.2.

The example in Section 7.4 is a signed CoRIM (Concise Reference Integrity Manifest) [I-D.ietf-rats-corim] payload with an explicit CM indicator 0b0000_0011 (3), meaning that the wrapped message contains both Reference Values and Endorsements.

7.1. JSON Record

[
  "application/vnd.example.rats-conceptual-msg",
  "q82rzQ"
]

Note that a CoAP Content-Format number can also be used with the JSON record form. That may be the case when it is known that the receiver can handle CoAP Content-Formats and it is crucial to save bytes.

7.2. CBOR Record

[
  30001,
  h'2347da55'
]

with the following wire representation:

82             # array(2)
   19 7531     # unsigned(30001)
   44          # bytes(4)
      2347da55 # "#G\xDAU"

Note that a Media-Type-Name can also be used with the CBOR record form, for example if it is known that the receiver cannot handle CoAP Content-Formats, or (unlike the case in point) if a CoAP Content-Format number has not been registrered.

[
  "application/vnd.example.rats-conceptual-msg",
  h'2347da55'
]

7.3. CBOR Tag

1668576818(h'2347da55')

with the following wire representation:

da 63747632    # tag(1668576818)
   44          # bytes(4)
      2347da55 # "#G\xDAU"

7.4. CBOR Record with explicit CM indicator

[
  "application/signed-corim+cbor",
  h'd28443a10126a1',
  3
]

with the following wire representation:

83                                    # array(3)
   78 1d                              # text(29)
      6170706c69636174696f6e2f7369676e65642d636f72696d2b63626f72
                                      # "application/signed-corim+cbor"
   47                                 # bytes(7)
      d28443a10126a1                  # "҄C\xA1\u0001&\xA1"
   03                                 # unsigned(3)

7.5. CBOR Collection

The following example is a CBOR collection that assembles conceptual messages from three attesters: Evidence for attesters A and B and Attestation Results for attester C. It is given an explicit collection type using the URI form.

{
  "attester A": [
    30001,
    h'2347da55',
    4
  ],
  "attester B": 1668576818(h'2347da55'),
  "attester C": [
    "application/eat+jwt",
    h'4c693475',
    8
  ]
}

with the following wire representation:

a3                                      # map(3)
   6a                                   # text(10)
      61747465737465722041              # "attester A"
   83                                   # array(3)
      19 7531                           # unsigned(30001)
      44                                # bytes(4)
         2347da55                       # "#G\xDAU"
      04                                # unsigned(4)
   6a                                   # text(10)
      61747465737465722042              # "attester B"
   da 63747632                          # tag(1668576818)
      44                                # bytes(4)
         2347da55                       # "#G\xDAU"
   6a                                   # text(10)
      61747465737465722043              # "attester C"
   83                                   # array(3)
      73                                # text(19)
         6170706c69636174696f6e2f6561742b6a7774 # "application/eat+jwt"
      44                                # bytes(4)
         4c693475                       # "Li4u"
      08                                # unsigned(8)

The following example shows the use of a tunnelled type to move a JSON record to a CBOR collection:

{
  "__cmwc_t": "tag:example.com,2024:composite-attester",
  0: [
    30001,
    h'2347da55',
    4
  ],
  1: 1668576818(h'2347da55'),
  2: [
    "#cmw-j2c-tunnel",
    '[ "application/eat+jwt", "Li4u", 8 ]'
  ]
}

7.6. JSON Collection

The following example is a JSON collection that assembles Evidence from two attesters.

{
  "attester A": [
    "application/eat-ucs+json",
    "e30K",
    4
  ],
  "attester B": [
    "application/eat-ucs+cbor",
    "oA",
    4
  ]
}

The following example shows the use of a tunnelled type to move a CBOR record to a JSON collection:

{
  "attester A": [
    "application/eat-ucs+json",
    "e30K",
    4
  ],
  "attester B (tunnelled)": [
    "#cmw-c2j-tunnel",
    "g3gYYXBwbGljYXRpb24vZWF0LXVjcytjYm9yQaAE"
  ]
}

7.7. Use in JWT

The following example shows the use of the "cmw" JWT claim to transport a CMW collection in a JWT [RFC7519]:

{
  "cmw": {
    "attester A": [
      "application/eat-ucs+json",
      "e30K",
      4
    ],
    "attester B (tunnelled)": [
      "#cmw-c2j-tunnel",
      "g3gYYXBwbGljYXRpb24vZWF0LXVjcytjYm9yQaAE"
    ]
  },
  "iss": "evidence collection daemon",
  "exp": 1300819380
}

8. Implementation Status

This section records the status of known implementations of the protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942]. The description of implementations in this section is intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the information presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may exist.

According to [RFC7942], "this will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature. It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as they see fit".

8.1. Project Veraison

The organization responsible for this implementation is Project Veraison, a Linux Foundation project hosted at the Confidential Computing Consortium.

The software, hosted at https://github.com/veraison/cmw, provides a Golang package that allows encoding and decoding of CMW payloads. The implementation covers all the features presented in this draft. The maturity level is alpha. The license is Apache 2.0. The developers can be contacted on the Zulip channel: https://veraison.zulipchat.com/#narrow/stream/383526-CMW/.

9. Security Considerations

9.1. Records and CBOR Tags

RATS conceptual messages are typically secured using cryptography. If the messages are already protected, then there are no additional security requirements imposed by the introduction of this encapsulation. If an adversary tries to modify the payload encapsulation, it will result in incorrect processing of the encapsulated message and lead to an error. If the messages are not protected, additional security must be added at a different layer. As an example, a cbor-record containing an UCCS (Unprotected CWT Claims Sets) [I-D.ietf-rats-uccs] can be signed using COSE Sign1 [STD96].

9.2. Collections

If the collection is not protected from tampering by external security measures (such as object security primitives) or internal mechanisms (such as intra-item binding), an attacker could easily manipulate the collection's contents. It is the responsibility of the Attester who creates the CMW collection to ensure that the contents of the collection are integrity-protected. The designer of the attestation technology is typically in charge of ensuring that the security properties are met, not the user of the conceptual message wrapper. In particular, when a CMW is used to carry multiple Evidence messages for a composite device or layered attestation, there should be strong binding between the Evidence messages within the collection. This binding is needed to prevent attacks where Evidence from a subverted part of the device is replaced by Evidence from a separate non-subverted device. The binding of Evidence messages should be some form of attestation. For example, key material used to sign/bind an entire CMW collection should be an attestation key, handled as described in Section 12.1 of [RFC9334]. The binding does not necessarily have to be a signature over the CMW collection, it might also be achieved through identifiers, cross-linking, signing or hashing between the members of the collection. Client-authenticated TLS may be used to bind a CMW collection of Evidence messages. However, the client key used with TLS should not be that of the end-user or owner of the device. Instead, it should be attestation-oriented key material from the device or the attester manufacturer.

10. IANA Considerations

RFC Editor: replace "RFCthis" with the RFC number assigned to this document.

10.1. CWT cmw Claim Registration

IANA is requested to add a new cmw claim to the "CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims" registry [IANA.cwt] as follows:

  • Claim Name: cmw

  • Claim Description: A RATS Conceptual Message Wrapper

  • Claim Key: TBD

  • Claim Value Type(s): CBOR Map, CBOR Array, or CBOR Tag

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Specification Document(s): Section 3.1, Section 3.3 and Section 3.2 of RFCthis

The suggested value for the Claim Key is 299.

10.2. JWT cmw Claim Registration

IANA is requested to add a new cmw claim to the "JSON Web Token Claims" sub-registry of the "JSON Web Token (JWT)" registry [IANA.jwt] as follows:

  • Claim Name: cmw

  • Claim Description: A RATS Conceptual Message Wrapper

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 and Section 3.3 of RFCthis

10.3. CBOR Tag Registration

IANA is requested to add the following tag to the "CBOR Tags" [IANA.cbor-tags] registry.

Table 1
CBOR Tag Data Item Semantics Reference
CPA765 CBOR map, CBOR array, CBOR tag RATS Conceptual Message Wrapper Section 3.1, Section 3.2 and Section 3.3 of RFCthis

10.4. RATS Conceptual Message Wrapper (CMW) Indicators Registry

This specification defines a new "RATS Conceptual Message Wrapper (CMW) Indicators" registry, with the policy "Expert Review" (Section 4.5 of [BCP26]).

The objective is to have CMW Indicators values registered for all RATS Conceptual Messages (Section 8 of [RFC9334]).

10.4.1. Instructions for the Designated Expert

The expert is instructed to add the values incrementally.

Acceptable values are those corresponding to RATS Conceptual Messages defined by the RATS architecture [RFC9334] and any of its updates.

10.4.2. Structure of Entries

Each entry in the registry must include:

Indicator value:

A number corresponding to the bit position in the ind bitmap (Section 3.1).

Conceptual Message name:

A text string describing the RATS conceptual message this indicator corresponds to.

Reference:

A reference to a document, if available, or the registrant.

The initial registrations for the registry are detailed in Table 2.

Table 2: CMW Indicators Registry Initial Contents
Indicator value Conceptual Message name Reference
0 Reference Values RFCthis
1 Endorsements RFCthis
2 Evidence RFCthis
3 Attestation Results RFCthis
4-31 Unassigned RFCthis

10.4.3. Provisional Registration

Before the creation of the registry by IANA, new codepoints can be added to the provisional CMW Indicators registry by following the documented procedure.

Table 2 will be regularly updated to match the contents of the provisional registry.

The provisional registry will be discontinued once IANA establishes the permanent registry, which is expected to coincide with the publication of the current document.

10.5. Media Types

IANA is requested to add the following media types to the "Media Types" registry [IANA.media-types].

Table 3: CMW Media Types
Name Template Reference
cmw+cbor application/cmw+cbor Section 3.1, Section 3.2 and Section 3.3 of RFCthis
cmw+json application/cmw+json Section 3.1 and Section 3.3 of RFCthis

10.5.1. application/cmw+cbor

Type name:

application

Subtype name:

cmw+cbor

Required parameters:

n/a

Optional parameters:

cmwc_t (CMW collection type in string format. The parameter value is case-insensitive. It MUST NOT be used for CMW that are not collections.)

Encoding considerations:

binary (CBOR)

Security considerations:

Section 9 of RFCthis

Interoperability considerations:

n/a

Published specification:

RFCthis

Applications that use this media type:

Attesters, Verifiers, Endorsers and Reference-Value providers, Relying Parties that need to transfer CMW payloads over HTTP(S), CoAP(S), and other transports.

Fragment identifier considerations:

The syntax and semantics of fragment identifiers are as specified for "application/cbor". (No fragment identification syntax is currently defined for "application/cbor".)

Person & email address to contact for further information:

RATS WG mailing list (rats@ietf.org)

Intended usage:

COMMON

Restrictions on usage:

none

Author/Change controller:

IETF

Provisional registration:

no

10.5.2. application/cmw+json

Type name:

application

Subtype name:

cmw+json

Required parameters:

n/a

Optional parameters:

cmwc_t (CMW collection type in string format. The parameter value is case-insensitive. It MUST NOT be used for CMW that are not collections.)

Encoding considerations:

binary (JSON is UTF-8-encoded text)

Security considerations:

Section 9 of RFCthis

Interoperability considerations:

n/a

Published specification:

RFCthis

Applications that use this media type:

Attesters, Verifiers, Endorsers and Reference-Value providers, Relying Parties that need to transfer CMW payloads over HTTP(S), CoAP(S), and other transports.

Fragment identifier considerations:

The syntax and semantics of fragment identifiers are as specified for "application/json". (No fragment identification syntax is currently defined for "application/json".)

Person & email address to contact for further information:

RATS WG mailing list (rats@ietf.org)

Intended usage:

COMMON

Restrictions on usage:

none

Author/Change controller:

IETF

Provisional registration:

no

10.6. CoAP Content Formats

IANA is requested to register the following Content-Format numbers in the "CoAP Content-Formats" sub-registry, within the "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Parameters" Registry [IANA.core-parameters]:

Table 4: New CoAP Content Formats
Content-Type Content Coding ID Reference
application/cmw+cbor - TBD1 Section 3.1, Section 3.2 and Section 3.3 of RFCthis
application/cmw+json - TBD2 Section 3.1 and Section 3.3 of RFCthis

If possible, TBD1 and TBD2 should be assigned in the 256..999 range.

10.7. New SMI Numbers Registrations

IANA is requested to assign an object identifier (OID) for the CMW extension defined in Section 5 in the "Certificate Extension" sub-registry of the "SMI Numbers" [IANA.smi-numbers] registry.

IANA is requested to assign an object identifier (OID) for the ASN.1 Module defined in Section 5.1 in the "Module Identifier" sub-registry of the "SMI Numbers" [IANA.smi-numbers] registry.

11. References

11.1. Normative References

[BCP26]
Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8126>.
[IANA.cbor-tags]
IANA, "Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) Tags", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/cbor-tags>.
[IANA.core-parameters]
IANA, "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Parameters", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/core-parameters>.
[IANA.cwt]
IANA, "CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt>.
[IANA.jwt]
IANA, "JSON Web Token (JWT)", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>.
[IANA.media-types]
IANA, "Media Types", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types>.
[IANA.smi-numbers]
IANA, "Structure of Management Information (SMI) Numbers (MIB Module Registrations)", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers>.
[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC4648]
Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4648>.
[RFC5280]
Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280>.
[RFC5912]
Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912, DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5912>.
[RFC6268]
Schaad, J. and S. Turner, "Additional New ASN.1 Modules for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 6268, DOI 10.17487/RFC6268, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6268>.
[RFC6838]
Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13, RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6838>.
[RFC7252]
Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252, DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7252>.
[RFC7519]
Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7519>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8610]
Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8610>.
[RFC9165]
Bormann, C., "Additional Control Operators for the Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL)", RFC 9165, DOI 10.17487/RFC9165, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9165>.
[RFC9277]
Richardson, M. and C. Bormann, "On Stable Storage for Items in Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)", RFC 9277, DOI 10.17487/RFC9277, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9277>.
[STD90]
Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259, DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8259>.
[STD94]
Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949, DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8949>.
[X.680]
International Telephone and Telegraph Consultative Committee, "Specification of Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of Basic Notation", CCITT Recommendation X.680, .

11.2. Informative References

[DICE-arch]
Trusted Computing Group, "DICE Attestation Architecture", , <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/DICE-Attestation-Architecture-Version-1.1-Revision-18_pub.pdf>.
[I-D.bormann-cbor-draft-numbers]
Bormann, C., "Managing CBOR codepoints in Internet-Drafts", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-bormann-cbor-draft-numbers-04, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-bormann-cbor-draft-numbers-04>.
[I-D.fossati-tls-attestation]
Tschofenig, H., Sheffer, Y., Howard, P., Mihalcea, I., Deshpande, Y., Niemi, A., and T. Fossati, "Using Attestation in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-fossati-tls-attestation-07, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-fossati-tls-attestation-07>.
[I-D.ietf-lamps-csr-attestation]
Ounsworth, M., Tschofenig, H., Birkholz, H., Wiseman, M., and N. Smith, "Use of Remote Attestation with Certification Signing Requests", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-csr-attestation-12, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-csr-attestation-12>.
[I-D.ietf-rats-ar4si]
Voit, E., Birkholz, H., Hardjono, T., Fossati, T., and V. Scarlata, "Attestation Results for Secure Interactions", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-ar4si-07, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-ar4si-07>.
[I-D.ietf-rats-corim]
Birkholz, H., Fossati, T., Deshpande, Y., Smith, N., and W. Pan, "Concise Reference Integrity Manifest", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-corim-06, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-corim-06>.
[I-D.ietf-rats-eat]
Lundblade, L., Mandyam, G., O'Donoghue, J., and C. Wallace, "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-eat-31, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-eat-31>.
[I-D.ietf-rats-eat-media-type]
Lundblade, L., Birkholz, H., and T. Fossati, "EAT Media Types", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-eat-media-type-11, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-eat-media-type-11>.
[I-D.ietf-rats-uccs]
Birkholz, H., O'Donoghue, J., Cam-Winget, N., and C. Bormann, "A CBOR Tag for Unprotected CWT Claims Sets", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-uccs-10, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-uccs-10>.
[RFC7942]
Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205, RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7942>.
[RFC9193]
Keränen, A. and C. Bormann, "Sensor Measurement Lists (SenML) Fields for Indicating Data Value Content-Format", RFC 9193, DOI 10.17487/RFC9193, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9193>.
[RFC9334]
Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and W. Pan, "Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Architecture", RFC 9334, DOI 10.17487/RFC9334, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9334>.
[STD96]
Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process", STD 96, RFC 9052, DOI 10.17487/RFC9052, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9052>.

Appendix A. Collected CDDL

start = cmw

cmw = json-CMW / cbor-CMW

json-CMW = json-record / json-collection
cbor-CMW = cbor-record / cbor-collection / $cbor-tag

json-record = [
  type: media-type
  value: base64url-string
  ? ind: uint .bits cm-type
]

cbor-record = [
  type: coap-content-format-type / media-type
  value: bytes
  ? ind: uint .bits cm-type
]

cbor-tag<tn, $fmt> = #6.<tn>(bytes .cbor $fmt)

json-collection = {
  ? "__cmwc_t": ~uri / oid
  + &(label: text) => json-CMW / c2j-tunnel
}

cbor-collection = {
  ? "__cmwc_t": ~uri / oid
  + &(label: (int / text)) => cbor-CMW / j2c-tunnel
}

c2j-tunnel = [ "#cmw-c2j-tunnel", base64url-string ]
j2c-tunnel = [ "#cmw-j2c-tunnel", bytes ]

media-type = text .abnf ("Content-Type" .cat Content-Type-ABNF)
base64url-string = text .regexp "[A-Za-z0-9_-]+"

cm-type = &(
  reference-values: 0
  endorsements: 1
  evidence: 2
  attestation-results: 3
)

coap-content-format-type = uint .size 2

oid = text .regexp "([0-2])((\\.0)|(\\.[1-9][0-9]*))*"

Content-Type-ABNF = '

Content-Type   = Media-Type-Name *( *SP ";" *SP parameter )
parameter      = token "=" ( token / quoted-string )

token          = 1*tchar
tchar          = "!" / "#" / "$" / "%" / "&" / "\'" / "*"
               / "+" / "-" / "." / "^" / "_" / "`" / "|" / "~"
               / DIGIT / ALPHA
quoted-string  = %x22 *( qdtext / quoted-pair ) %x22
qdtext         = SP / %x21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E
quoted-pair    = "\" ( SP / VCHAR )

Media-Type-Name = type-name "/" subtype-name

type-name = restricted-name
subtype-name = restricted-name

restricted-name = restricted-name-first *126restricted-name-chars
restricted-name-first  = ALPHA / DIGIT
restricted-name-chars  = ALPHA / DIGIT / "!" / "#" /
                         "$" / "&" / "-" / "^" / "_"
restricted-name-chars =/ "." ; Characters before first dot always
                             ; specify a facet name
restricted-name-chars =/ "+" ; Characters after last plus always
                             ; specify a structured syntax suffix

DIGIT     =  %x30-39           ; 0 - 9
POS-DIGIT =  %x31-39           ; 1 - 9
ALPHA     =  %x41-5A / %x61-7A ; A - Z / a - z
SP        =  %x20
VCHAR     =  %x21-7E           ; printable ASCII (no SP)
'

Appendix B. Registering and Using CMWs

Figure 5 describes the registration preconditions for using CMWs in either CMW record or CBOR tag forms. When using CMW collection, the preconditions apply for each entry in the collection.

Reuse EAT/CoRIM Register media type(s) new media + profile type Register new CoAP Content-Format Automatically Existing derive CBOR CBOR tag [RFC9277] tag CBOR tag CMW CMW
Figure 5: How To Create a CMW

Appendix C. Open Issues

The list of currently open issues for this documents can be found at https://github.com/thomas-fossati/draft-ftbs-rats-msg-wrap/issues.

RFC Editor: please remove before publication.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Brian Campbell, Carl Wallace, Carsten Bormann, Dionna Glaze, Ionuț Mihalcea, Michael B. Jones, Mohit Sethi, Russ Housley, and Tom Jones for their reviews and suggestions.

The definition of a CMW collection has been modelled on a proposal originally made by Simon Frost for an EAT-based Evidence collection type. The CMW collection intentionally attains binary compatibility with Simon's design and aims at superseding it by also generalizing on the allowed Evidence formats.

Contributors

Laurence Lundblade
Security Theory LLC

Laurence made significant contributions to enhancing the security requirements and considerations for CMW collections.

Authors' Addresses

Henk Birkholz
Fraunhofer SIT
Ned Smith
Intel
Thomas Fossati
Linaro
Hannes Tschofenig
University of Applied Sciences Bonn-Rhein-Sieg