Internet-Draft | Alternative NTP port | October 2021 |
Lichvar | Expires 21 April 2022 | [Page] |
This document updates RFC 5905 to specify an alternative port for the Network Time Protocol (NTP) which is restricted to NTP messages that do not allow traffic amplification.¶
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There are several modes specified for NTP. NTP packets in versions 2, 3, and 4 have a 3-bit field for the mode. Modes 1 (active), 2 (passive), 3 (client), 4 (server), and 5 (broadcast) are used for synchronization of clocks. They are specified in RFC 5905 [RFC5905]. Modes 6 and 7 are used for other purposes, like monitoring and remote management of NTP servers and clients. The mode 6 is specified in Control Messages Protocol for Use with Network Time Protocol Version 4 [I-D.ietf-ntp-mode-6-cmds].¶
The first group of modes typically does not allow any traffic amplification, i.e. the response is not larger than the request. An exception is Autokey [RFC5906], which allows an NTP response to be longer than the request, e.g. packets containing the Certificate Message or Cookie Message extension field. Autokey is rarely used. If it is enabled on a publicly accessible server, the access needs to be tightly controlled to limit denial-of-service (DoS) attacks exploiting the amplification.¶
The modes 6 and 7 of NTP allow significant traffic amplification, which has been exploited in large-scale DoS attacks on the Internet. Publicly accessible servers that support these modes need to be configured to not respond to requests using the modes, as recommended in BCP 233 [RFC8633], but the number of servers that still do that is significant enough to require specific mitigations.¶
Network operators have implemented different mitigations. They are not documented and may change over time. Some of the mitigations that have been observed are:¶
From those, only the 3rd approach does not have an impact on synchronization of clocks with NTP. However, this mitigation can be implemented only on devices which can inspect the UDP payload.¶
The number of public servers in the pool.ntp.org project has dropped since 2013, when the large-scale attacks started.¶
The length-specific filtering and rate limiting has an impact on the Network Time Security [RFC8915] authentication, which uses extension fields in NTPv4 packets.¶
This document specifies an alternative port for NTP which is restricted to a subset of the NTP protocol which does not allow amplification in order to enable safe synchronization of clocks in networks where the port 123 is blocked or rate limited.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
The table in "Figure 6: Global Parameters" in Section 7.2 of [RFC5905] is extended with:¶
Name | Value | Description |
---|---|---|
ALTPORT | TBD | Alternative NTP port |
The following text from Section 9.1 of [RFC5905]:¶
is replaced with:¶
The following text is added to the Section 9.1:¶
IANA is requested to allocate the following port in the Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry [RFC6335]:¶
A Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacker can selectively block requests sent to the alternative port to force a client to select the original port and get a degraded NTP service with a significant packet loss. The client needs to periodically try the alternative port to recover from the degraded service when the attack stops.¶
The author would like to thank Daniel Franke, Dhruv Dhody, Ragnar Sundblad, and Steven Sommars for their useful comments.¶