| Internet-Draft | Groupings for TLS Clients and Servers | July 2020 |
| Watsen & Wu | Expires 11 January 2021 | [Page] |
This document defines three YANG modules: the first defines groupings for a generic TLS client, the second defines groupings for a generic TLS server, and the third defines common identities and groupings used by both the client and the server. It is intended that these groupings will be used by applications using the TLS protocol.¶
This draft contains placeholder values that need to be replaced with finalized values at the time of publication. This note summarizes all of the substitutions that are needed. No other RFC Editor instructions are specified elsewhere in this document.¶
Artwork in this document contains shorthand references to drafts in progress. Please apply the following replacements:¶
AAAA --> the assigned RFC value for draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types¶
BBBB --> the assigned RFC value for draft-ietf-netconf-trust-anchors¶
CCCC --> the assigned RFC value for draft-ietf-netconf-keystore¶
DDDD --> the assigned RFC value for draft-ietf-netconf-tcp-client-server¶
FFFF --> the assigned RFC value for this draft¶
Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for the date of publication of this draft. Please apply the following replacement:¶
2020-07-10 --> the publication date of this draft¶
The following Appendix section is to be removed prior to publication:¶
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Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.¶
This document defines three YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] modules: the first defines a grouping for a generic TLS client, the second defines a grouping for a generic TLS server, and the third defines identities and groupings common to both the client and the server (TLS is defined in [RFC5246]). It is intended that these groupings will be used by applications using the TLS protocol. For instance, these groupings could be used to help define the data model for an HTTPS [RFC2818] server or a NETCONF over TLS [RFC7589] based server.¶
The client and server YANG modules in this document each define one grouping, which is focused on just TLS-specific configuration, and specifically avoids any transport-level configuration, such as what ports to listen-on or connect-to. This affords applications the opportunity to define their own strategy for how the underlying TCP connection is established. For instance, applications supporting NETCONF Call Home [RFC8071] could use the "ssh-server-grouping" grouping for the TLS parts it provides, while adding data nodes for the TCP-level call-home configuration.¶
This document presents one or more YANG modules [RFC7950] that are part of a collection of RFCs that work together to define configuration modules for clients and servers of both the NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040] protocols.¶
The modules have been defined in a modular fashion to enable their use by other efforts, some of which are known to be in progress at the time of this writing, with many more expected to be defined in time.¶
The relationship between the various RFCs in the collection is presented in the below diagram. The labels in the diagram represent the primary purpose provided by each RFC. Links the each RFC are provided below the diagram.¶
crypto-types
^ ^
/ \
/ \
truststore keystore
^ ^ ^ ^
| +---------+ | |
| | | |
| +------------+ |
tcp-client-server | / | |
^ ^ ssh-client-server | |
| | ^ tls-client-server
| | | ^ ^ http-client-server
| | | | | ^
| | | +-----+ +---------+ |
| | | | | |
| +-----------|--------|--------------+ | |
| | | | | |
+-----------+ | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
netconf-client-server restconf-client-server
¶
| Label in Diagram | Originating RFC |
|---|---|
| crypto-types | [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types] |
| truststore | [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors] |
| keystore | [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore] |
| tcp-client-server | [I-D.ietf-netconf-tcp-client-server] |
| ssh-client-server | [I-D.ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server] |
| tls-client-server | [I-D.ietf-netconf-tls-client-server] |
| http-client-server | [I-D.ietf-netconf-http-client-server] |
| netconf-client-server | [I-D.ietf-netconf-netconf-client-server] |
| restconf-client-server | [I-D.ietf-netconf-restconf-client-server] |
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
This document in compliant with the Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA) [RFC8342]. For instance, as described in [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors] and [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore], trust anchors and keys installed during manufacturing are expected to appear in <operational>.¶
The TLS common model presented in this section contains identities and groupings common to both TLS clients and TLS servers. The "hello-params-grouping" grouping can be used to configure the list of TLS algorithms permitted by the TLS client or TLS server. The lists of algorithms are ordered such that, if multiple algorithms are permitted by the client, the algorithm that appears first in its list that is also permitted by the server is used for the TLS transport layer connection. The ability to restrict the algorithms allowed is provided in this grouping for TLS clients and TLS servers that are capable of doing so and may serve to make TLS clients and TLS servers compliant with local security policies. This model supports both TLS1.2 [RFC5246] and TLS 1.3 [RFC8446].¶
TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 have different ways defining their own supported cryptographic algorithms, see TLS and DTLS IANA registries page (https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml):¶
Thus, in order to support both TLS1.2 and TLS1.3, the cipher-suites part of the "hello-params-grouping" grouping should include three parameters for configuring its permitted TLS algorithms, which are: TLS Cipher Suites, TLS SignatureScheme, TLS Supported Groups. Note that TLS1.2 only uses TLS Cipher Suites.¶
Features are defined for algorithms that are OPTIONAL or are not widely supported by popular implementations. Note that the list of algorithms is not exhaustive.¶
The following diagram lists all the "feature" statements defined in the "ietf-tls-common" module:¶
Features: +-- tls-1_0 +-- tls-1_1 +-- tls-1_2 +-- tls-1_3 +-- tls-ecc +-- tls-dhe +-- tls-3des +-- tls-gcm +-- tls-sha2¶
The following diagram illustrates the relationship amongst the "identity" statements defined in the "ietf-tls-common" module:¶
Identities:
+-- tls-version-base
| +-- tls-1.0
| +-- tls-1.1
| +-- tls-1.2
+-- cipher-suite-base
+-- rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha
+-- rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha
+-- rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha256
+-- rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha256
+-- dhe-rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha
+-- dhe-rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha
+-- dhe-rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha256
+-- dhe-rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha256
+-- ecdhe-ecdsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha256
+-- ecdhe-ecdsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha384
+-- ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha256
+-- ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha384
+-- ecdhe-ecdsa-with-aes-128-gcm-sha256
+-- ecdhe-ecdsa-with-aes-256-gcm-sha384
+-- ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-128-gcm-sha256
+-- ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-256-gcm-sha384
+-- rsa-with-3des-ede-cbc-sha
+-- ecdhe-rsa-with-3des-ede-cbc-sha
+-- ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha
+-- ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha
¶
Comments:¶
The following diagram lists all the "grouping" statements defined in the "ietf-tls-common" module:¶
Groupings: +-- hello-params-grouping¶
Each of these groupings are presented in the following subsections.¶
The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "hello-params-grouping" grouping:¶
grouping hello-params-grouping
+-- tls-versions
| +-- tls-version* identityref
+-- cipher-suites
+-- cipher-suite* identityref
¶
Comments:¶
The "ietf-tls-common" module does not contain any protocol-accessible nodes, but the module needs to be "implemented", as described in Section 5.6.5 of [RFC7950], in order for the identities in Section 2.1.2 to be defined.¶
This section shows how it would appear if the "hello-params-grouping" grouping were populated with some data.¶
<hello-params
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-common"
xmlns:tlscmn="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-common">
<tls-versions>
<tls-version>tlscmn:tls-1.1</tls-version>
<tls-version>tlscmn:tls-1.2</tls-version>
</tls-versions>
<cipher-suites>
<cipher-suite>tlscmn:dhe-rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha</cipher-suite>
<cipher-suite>tlscmn:rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha</cipher-suite>
<cipher-suite>tlscmn:rsa-with-3des-ede-cbc-sha</cipher-suite>
</cipher-suites>
</hello-params>
¶
This YANG module has a normative references to [RFC4346], [RFC5246], [RFC5288], [RFC5289], and [RFC8422].¶
This YANG module has a informative references to [RFC2246], [RFC4346], [RFC5246], and [RFC8446].¶
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-tls-common@2020-07-10.yang"¶
module ietf-tls-common {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-common";
prefix tlscmn;
organization
"IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
Author: Kent Watsen <mailto:kent+ietf@watsen.net>
Author: Gary Wu <mailto:garywu@cisco.com>";
description
"This module defines a common features, identities, and
groupings for Transport Layer Security (TLS).
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified
as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with
or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and
subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified
BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC FFFF
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcFFFF); see the RFC
itself for full legal notices.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document
are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119)
(RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.";
revision 2020-07-10 {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC FFFF: YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS Servers";
}
// Features
feature tls-1_0 {
description
"TLS Protocol Version 1.0 is supported.";
reference
"RFC 2246: The TLS Protocol Version 1.0";
}
feature tls-1_1 {
description
"TLS Protocol Version 1.1 is supported.";
reference
"RFC 4346: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.1";
}
feature tls-1_2 {
description
"TLS Protocol Version 1.2 is supported.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
feature tls-1_3 {
description
"TLS Protocol Version 1.2 is supported.";
reference
"RFC 8446: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3";
}
feature tls-ecc {
description
"Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is supported for TLS.";
reference
"RFC 8422: Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)";
}
feature tls-dhe {
description
"Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange is supported for TLS.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
feature tls-3des {
description
"The Triple-DES block cipher is supported for TLS.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
feature tls-gcm {
description
"The Galois/Counter Mode authenticated encryption mode is
supported for TLS.";
reference
"RFC 5288: AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for
TLS";
}
feature tls-sha2 {
description
"The SHA2 family of cryptographic hash functions is supported
for TLS.";
reference
"FIPS PUB 180-4: Secure Hash Standard (SHS)";
}
// Identities
identity tls-version-base {
description
"Base identity used to identify TLS protocol versions.";
}
identity tls-1.0 {
if-feature "tls-1_0";
base tls-version-base;
description
"TLS Protocol Version 1.0.";
reference
"RFC 2246: The TLS Protocol Version 1.0";
}
identity tls-1.1 {
if-feature "tls-1_1";
base tls-version-base;
description
"TLS Protocol Version 1.1.";
reference
"RFC 4346: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.1";
}
identity tls-1.2 {
if-feature "tls-1_2";
base tls-version-base;
description
"TLS Protocol Version 1.2.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity cipher-suite-base {
description
"Base identity used to identify TLS cipher suites.";
}
identity rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha {
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha {
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha256 {
if-feature "tls-sha2";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha256 {
if-feature "tls-sha2";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity dhe-rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha {
if-feature "tls-dhe";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity dhe-rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha {
if-feature "tls-dhe";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity dhe-rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha256 {
if-feature "tls-dhe and tls-sha2";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity dhe-rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha256 {
if-feature "tls-dhe and tls-sha2";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity ecdhe-ecdsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha256 {
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-sha2";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256.";
reference
"RFC 5289: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)";
}
identity ecdhe-ecdsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha384 {
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-sha2";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384.";
reference
"RFC 5289: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)";
}
identity ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha256 {
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-sha2";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256.";
reference
"RFC 5289: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)";
}
identity ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha384 {
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-sha2";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384.";
reference
"RFC 5289: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)";
}
identity ecdhe-ecdsa-with-aes-128-gcm-sha256 {
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-gcm and tls-sha2";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256.";
reference
"RFC 5289: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)";
}
identity ecdhe-ecdsa-with-aes-256-gcm-sha384 {
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-gcm and tls-sha2";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384.";
reference
"RFC 5289: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)";
}
identity ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-128-gcm-sha256 {
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-gcm and tls-sha2";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256.";
reference
"RFC 5289: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)";
}
identity ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-256-gcm-sha384 {
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-gcm and tls-sha2";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384.";
reference
"RFC 5289: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)";
}
identity rsa-with-3des-ede-cbc-sha {
if-feature "tls-3des";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity ecdhe-rsa-with-3des-ede-cbc-sha {
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-3des";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA.";
reference
"RFC 8422: Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)";
}
identity ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha {
if-feature "tls-ecc";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA.";
reference
"RFC 8422: Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)";
}
identity ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha {
if-feature "tls-ecc";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA.";
reference
"RFC 8422: Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)";
}
// Groupings
grouping hello-params-grouping {
description
"A reusable grouping for TLS hello message parameters.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
container tls-versions {
description
"Parameters regarding TLS versions.";
leaf-list tls-version {
type identityref {
base tls-version-base;
}
description
"Acceptable TLS protocol versions.
If this leaf-list is not configured (has zero elements)
the acceptable TLS protocol versions are implementation-
defined.";
}
}
container cipher-suites {
description
"Parameters regarding cipher suites.";
leaf-list cipher-suite {
type identityref {
base cipher-suite-base;
}
ordered-by user;
description
"Acceptable cipher suites in order of descending
preference. The configured host key algorithms should
be compatible with the algorithm used by the configured
private key. Please see Section 5 of RFC FFFF for
valid combinations.
If this leaf-list is not configured (has zero elements)
the acceptable cipher suites are implementation-
defined.";
reference
"RFC FFFF: YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS Servers";
}
}
}
}
¶
<CODE ENDS>¶
The following diagram lists all the "feature" statements defined in the "ietf-tls-client" module:¶
Features: +-- tls-client-hello-params-config +-- tls-client-keepalives +-- x509-certificate-auth +-- raw-public-key-auth +-- psk-auth¶
The following diagram lists all the "grouping" statements defined in the "ietf-tls-client" module:¶
Groupings: +-- tls-client-grouping¶
Each of these groupings are presented in the following subsections.¶
The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "tls-client-grouping" grouping:¶
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
grouping tls-client-grouping
+-- client-identity!
| +-- (auth-type)
| +--:(certificate) {x509-certificate-auth}?
| | +-- certificate
| | +---u ks:local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-\
grouping
| +--:(raw-public-key) {raw-public-key-auth}?
| | +-- raw-private-key
| | +---u ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping
| +--:(psk) {psk-auth}?
| +-- psk
| +---u ks:local-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping
+-- server-authentication
| +-- ca-certs! {x509-certificate-auth}?
| | +---u ts:local-or-truststore-certs-grouping
| +-- ee-certs! {x509-certificate-auth}?
| | +---u ts:local-or-truststore-certs-grouping
| +-- raw-public-keys! {raw-public-key-auth}?
| | +---u ts:local-or-truststore-public-keys-grouping
| +-- psks! {psk-auth}?
+-- hello-params {tls-client-hello-params-config}?
| +---u tlscmn:hello-params-grouping
+-- keepalives {tls-client-keepalives}?
+-- peer-allowed-to-send? empty
+-- test-peer-aliveness!
+-- max-wait? uint16
+-- max-attempts? uint8
¶
Comments:¶
For the referenced grouping statement(s):¶
The "ietf-tls-client" module does not contain any protocol-accessible nodes.¶
This section presents two examples showing the "tls-client-grouping" grouping populated with some data. These examples are effectively the same except the first configures the client identity using a local key while the second uses a key configured in a keystore. Both examples are consistent with the examples presented in Section 2 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors] and Section 3.2 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore].¶
The following configuration example uses local-definitions for the client identity and server authentication:¶
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
<tls-client
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-client"
xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types">
<!-- how this client will authenticate itself to the server -->
<client-identity>
<certificate>
<local-definition>
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public\
-key-format>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-f\
ormat>
<cleartext-private-key>base64encodedvalue==</cleartext-priva\
te-key>
<cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</local-definition>
</certificate>
<!-- TESTED, BUT COMMENTED OUT DUE TO ONLY ONE ALLOWED AT A TIME
<raw-private-key>
<local-definition>
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public\
-key-format>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-f\
ormat>
<cleartext-private-key>base64encodedvalue==</cleartext-priva\
te-key>
</local-definition>
</raw-private-key>
<psk>
<local-definition>
<key-format>ct:octet-string-key-format</key-format>
<cleartext-key>base64encodedvalue==</cleartext-key>
</local-definition>
</psk>
-->
</client-identity>
<!-- which certificates will this client trust -->
<server-authentication>
<ca-certs>
<local-definition>
<certificate>
<name>Server Cert Issuer #1</name>
<cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</certificate>
<certificate>
<name>Server Cert Issuer #2</name>
<cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</certificate>
</local-definition>
</ca-certs>
<ee-certs>
<local-definition>
<certificate>
<name>My Application #1</name>
<cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</certificate>
<certificate>
<name>My Application #2</name>
<cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</certificate>
</local-definition>
</ee-certs>
<raw-public-keys>
<local-definition>
<public-key>
<name>corp-fw1</name>
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</publ\
ic-key-format>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
</public-key>
<public-key>
<name>corp-fw1</name>
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</publ\
ic-key-format>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
</public-key>
</local-definition>
</raw-public-keys>
<psks/>
</server-authentication>
<keepalives>
<test-peer-aliveness>
<max-wait>30</max-wait>
<max-attempts>3</max-attempts>
</test-peer-aliveness>
</keepalives>
</tls-client>
¶
The following configuration example uses keystore-references for the client identity and truststore-references for server authentication: from the keystore:¶
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
<tls-client xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-client">
<!-- how this client will authenticate itself to the server -->
<client-identity>
<certificate>
<keystore-reference>
<asymmetric-key>rsa-asymmetric-key</asymmetric-key>
<certificate>ex-rsa-cert</certificate>
</keystore-reference>
</certificate>
<!-- TESTED, BUT COMMENTED OUT DUE TO ONLY ONE ALLOWED AT A TIME
<raw-private-key>
<keystore-reference>raw-private-key</keystore-reference>
</raw-private-key>
<psk>
<keystore-reference>encrypted-symmetric-key</keystore-referenc\
e>
</psk>
-->
</client-identity>
<!-- which certificates will this client trust -->
<server-authentication>
<ca-certs>
<truststore-reference>trusted-server-ca-certs</truststore-refe\
rence>
</ca-certs>
<ee-certs>
<truststore-reference>trusted-server-ee-certs</truststore-refe\
rence>
</ee-certs>
<raw-public-keys>
<truststore-reference>Raw Public Keys for TLS Servers</trustst\
ore-reference>
</raw-public-keys>
<psks/>
</server-authentication>
<keepalives>
<test-peer-aliveness>
<max-wait>30</max-wait>
<max-attempts>3</max-attempts>
</test-peer-aliveness>
</keepalives>
</tls-client>
¶
This YANG module has normative references to [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors] and [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore].¶
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-tls-client@2020-07-10.yang"¶
module ietf-tls-client {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-client";
prefix tlsc;
import ietf-netconf-acm {
prefix nacm;
reference
"RFC 8341: Network Configuration Access Control Model";
}
import ietf-crypto-types {
prefix ct;
reference
"RFC AAAA: YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography";
}
import ietf-truststore {
prefix ts;
reference
"RFC BBBB: A YANG Data Model for a Truststore";
}
import ietf-keystore {
prefix ks;
reference
"RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore";
}
import ietf-tls-common {
prefix tlscmn;
revision-date 2020-07-10; // stable grouping definitions
reference
"RFC FFFF: YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS Servers";
}
organization
"IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
Author: Kent Watsen <mailto:kent+ietf@watsen.net>
Author: Gary Wu <mailto:garywu@cisco.com>";
description
"This module defines reusable groupings for TLS clients that
can be used as a basis for specific TLS client instances.
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified
as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with
or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and
subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified
BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC FFFF
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcFFFF); see the RFC
itself for full legal notices.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document
are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119)
(RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.";
revision 2020-07-10 {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC FFFF: YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS Servers";
}
// Features
feature tls-client-hello-params-config {
description
"TLS hello message parameters are configurable on a TLS
client.";
}
feature tls-client-keepalives {
description
"Per socket TLS keepalive parameters are configurable for
TLS clients on the server implementing this feature.";
}
feature x509-certificate-auth {
description
"Indicates that the client supports authenticating servers
using X.509 certificates.";
}
feature raw-public-key-auth {
description
"Indicates that the client supports authenticating servers
using ray public keys.";
}
feature psk-auth {
description
"Indicates that the client supports authenticating servers
using PSKs (pre-shared or pairwise-symmetric keys).";
}
// Groupings
grouping tls-client-grouping {
description
"A reusable grouping for configuring a TLS client without
any consideration for how an underlying TCP session is
established.
Note that this grouping uses fairly typical descendent
node names such that a stack of 'uses' statements will
have name conflicts. It is intended that the consuming
data model will resolve the issue (e.g., by wrapping
the 'uses' statement in a container called
'tls-client-parameters'). This model purposely does
not do this itself so as to provide maximum flexibility
to consuming models.";
container client-identity {
nacm:default-deny-write;
presence
"Indicates that TLS-level client authentication
is sent. Present so that the 'choice' node's
mandatory true doesn't imply that a client
identity must be configured.";
description
"Identity credentials the TLS client MAY present when
establishing a connection to a TLS server. If not
configured, then client authentication is presumed to
occur a protocol layer above TLS. When configured,
and requested by the TLS server when establishing a
TLS session, these credentials are passed in the
Certificate message defined in Section 7.4.2 of
RFC 5246.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2
RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore";
choice auth-type {
mandatory true;
description
"A choice amongst available authentication types.";
/* FIXME: delete now?
Not mandatory as client identity MAY be provided
by another layer in the protocol stack (e.g., an
HTTP authentication mechanism).";*/
case certificate {
if-feature x509-certificate-auth;
container certificate {
description
"Specifies the client identity using a certificate.";
uses
ks:local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping{
refine "local-or-keystore/local/local-definition" {
must 'public-key-format'
+ ' = "ct:subject-public-key-info-format"';
}
refine "local-or-keystore/keystore/keystore-reference"
+ "/asymmetric-key" {
must 'deref(.)/../ks:public-key-format'
+ ' = "ct:subject-public-key-info-format"';
}
}
}
}
case raw-public-key {
if-feature raw-public-key-auth;
container raw-private-key {
description
"Specifies the client identity using a raw
private key.";
uses ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping {
refine "local-or-keystore/local/local-definition" {
must 'public-key-format'
+ ' = "ct:subject-public-key-info-format"';
}
refine "local-or-keystore/keystore"
+ "/keystore-reference" {
must 'deref(.)/../ks:public-key-format'
+ ' = "ct:subject-public-key-info-format"';
}
}
}
}
case psk {
if-feature psk-auth;
container psk {
description
"Specifies the client identity using a PSK (pre-shared
or pairwise-symmetric key). Note that, when the PSK is
configured as a Keystore reference, the key's 'name'
node MAY be used as the PSK's ID when used by the TLS
protocol.";
uses ks:local-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping {
augment "local-or-keystore/local/local-definition" {
if-feature "ks:local-definitions-supported";
description
"Adds an 'id' value when the PSK is used by TLS.";
leaf id {
type string; // FIXME: is this the right type?
description
"The key id used in the TLS protocol for PSKs.";
}
}
}
}
}
}
} // container client-identity
container server-authentication {
nacm:default-deny-write;
must 'ca-certs or ee-certs or raw-public-keys or psks';
description
"Specifies how the TLS client can authenticate TLS servers.
Any combination of credentials is additive and unordered.
Note that no configuration is required for PSK (pre-shared
or pairwise-symmetric key) based authentication as the key
is necessarily the same as configured in the '../client-
identity' node.";
container ca-certs {
if-feature "x509-certificate-auth";
presence
"Indicates that the TLS client can authenticate TLS servers
using configured certificate authority certificates.";
description
"A set of certificate authority (CA) certificates used by
the TLS client to authenticate TLS server certificates.
A server certificate is authenticated if it has a valid
chain of trust to a configured CA certificate.";
reference
"RFC BBBB: A YANG Data Model for a Truststore";
uses ts:local-or-truststore-certs-grouping;
}
container ee-certs { // FIXME: plural too much?
if-feature "x509-certificate-auth";
presence
"Indicates that the TLS client can authenticate TLS
servers using configured server certificates.";
description
"A set of server certificates (i.e., end entity
certificates) used by the TLS client to authenticate
certificates presented by TLS servers. A server
certificate is authenticated if it is an exact
match to a configured server certificate.";
reference
"RFC BBBB: A YANG Data Model for a Truststore";
uses ts:local-or-truststore-certs-grouping;
}
container raw-public-keys {
if-feature "raw-public-key-auth";
presence
"Indicates that the TLS client can authenticate TLS
servers using configured server certificates.";
description
"A set of raw public keys used by the TLS client to
authenticate raw public keys presented by the TLS
server. A raw public key is authenticated if it
is an exact match to a configured raw public key.";
reference
"RFC BBBB: A YANG Data Model for a Truststore";
uses ts:local-or-truststore-public-keys-grouping {
refine "local-or-truststore/local/local-definition"
+ "/public-key" {
must 'public-key-format'
+ ' = "ct:subject-public-key-info-format"';
}
refine "local-or-truststore/truststore"
+ "/truststore-reference" {
must 'deref(.)/../*/ts:public-key-format'
+ ' = "ct:subject-public-key-info-format"';
}
}
}
container psks {
if-feature "psk-auth";
presence
"Indicates that the TLS client can authenticate TLS servers
using a configure PSK (pre-shared or pairwise-symmetric
key).";
description
"No configuration is required since the PSK value is the
same as PSK value configured in the 'client-identity'
node.";
}
} // container server-authentication
container hello-params {
nacm:default-deny-write;
if-feature "tls-client-hello-params-config";
uses tlscmn:hello-params-grouping;
description
"Configurable parameters for the TLS hello message.";
} // container hello-params
container keepalives {
nacm:default-deny-write;
if-feature "tls-client-keepalives";
description
"Configures the keepalive policy for the TLS client.";
leaf peer-allowed-to-send {
type empty;
description
"Indicates that the remote TLS server is allowed to send
HeartbeatRequest messages, as defined by RFC 6520
to this TLS client.";
reference
"RFC 6520: Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram
Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Heartbeat Extension";
}
container test-peer-aliveness {
presence
"Indicates that the TLS client proactively tests the
aliveness of the remote TLS server.";
description
"Configures the keep-alive policy to proactively test
the aliveness of the TLS server. An unresponsive
TLS server is dropped after approximately max-wait
* max-attempts seconds. The TLS client MUST send
HeartbeatRequest messages, as defined by RFC 6520.";
reference
"RFC 6520: Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram
Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Heartbeat Extension";
leaf max-wait {
type uint16 {
range "1..max";
}
units "seconds";
default "30";
description
"Sets the amount of time in seconds after which if
no data has been received from the TLS server, a
TLS-level message will be sent to test the
aliveness of the TLS server.";
}
leaf max-attempts {
type uint8;
default "3";
description
"Sets the maximum number of sequential keep-alive
messages that can fail to obtain a response from
the TLS server before assuming the TLS server is
no longer alive.";
}
}
}
} // grouping tls-client-grouping
} // module ietf-tls-client
¶
<CODE ENDS>¶
The following diagram lists all the "feature" statements defined in the "ietf-tls-server" module:¶
Features: +-- tls-server-hello-params-config +-- tls-server-keepalives +-- client-auth-config-supported +-- x509-certificate-auth +-- raw-public-key-auth +-- psk-auth¶
The following diagram lists all the "grouping" statements defined in the "ietf-tls-server" module:¶
Groupings: +-- tls-server-grouping¶
Each of these groupings are presented in the following subsections.¶
The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "tls-server-grouping" grouping:¶
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
grouping tls-server-grouping
+-- server-identity
| +-- (auth-type)
| +--:(certificate) {x509-certificate-auth}?
| | +-- certificate
| | +---u ks:local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-\
grouping
| +--:(raw-private-key) {raw-public-key-auth}?
| | +-- raw-private-key
| | +---u ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping
| +--:(psk) {psk-auth}?
| +-- psk
| +---u ks:local-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping
+-- client-authentication! {client-auth-config-supported}?
| +-- ca-certs! {x509-certificate-auth}?
| | +---u ts:local-or-truststore-certs-grouping
| +-- ee-certs! {x509-certificate-auth}?
| | +---u ts:local-or-truststore-certs-grouping
| +-- raw-public-keys! {raw-public-key-auth}?
| | +---u ts:local-or-truststore-public-keys-grouping
| +-- psks! {psk-auth}?
+-- hello-params {tls-server-hello-params-config}?
| +---u tlscmn:hello-params-grouping
+-- keepalives {tls-server-keepalives}?
+-- peer-allowed-to-send? empty
+-- test-peer-aliveness!
+-- max-wait? uint16
+-- max-attempts? uint8
¶
Comments:¶
For the referenced grouping statement(s):¶
The "ietf-tls-server" module does not contain any protocol-accessible nodes.¶
This section presents two examples showing the "tls-server-grouping" grouping populated with some data. These examples are effectively the same except the first configures the server identity using a local key while the second uses a key configured in a keystore. Both examples are consistent with the examples presented in Section 2 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors] and Section 3.2 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore].¶
The following configuration example uses local-definitions for the server identity and client authentication:¶
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
<tls-server
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-server"
xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types">
<!-- how this server will authenticate itself to the client -->
<server-identity>
<certificate>
<local-definition>
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public\
-key-format>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-f\
ormat>
<cleartext-private-key>base64encodedvalue==</cleartext-priva\
te-key>
<cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</local-definition>
</certificate>
<!-- TESTED, BUT COMMENTED OUT DUE TO ONLY ONE ALLOWED AT A TIME
<raw-private-key>
<local-definition>
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public\
-key-format>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-f\
ormat>
<cleartext-private-key>base64encodedvalue==</cleartext-priva\
te-key>
</local-definition>
</raw-private-key>
<psk>
<local-definition>
<key-format>ct:octet-string-key-format</key-format>
<cleartext-key>base64encodedvalue==</cleartext-key>
</local-definition>
</psk>
-->
</server-identity>
<!-- which certificates will this server trust -->
<client-authentication>
<ca-certs>
<local-definition>
<certificate>
<name>Identity Cert Issuer #1</name>
<cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</certificate>
<certificate>
<name>Identity Cert Issuer #2</name>
<cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</certificate>
</local-definition>
</ca-certs>
<ee-certs>
<local-definition>
<certificate>
<name>Application #1</name>
<cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</certificate>
<certificate>
<name>Application #2</name>
<cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</certificate>
</local-definition>
</ee-certs>
<raw-public-keys>
<local-definition>
<public-key>
<name>User A</name>
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</publ\
ic-key-format>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
</public-key>
<public-key>
<name>User B</name>
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</publ\
ic-key-format>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
</public-key>
</local-definition>
</raw-public-keys>
<psks/>
</client-authentication>
<keepalives>
<peer-allowed-to-send/>
</keepalives>
</tls-server>
¶
The following configuration example uses keystore-references for the server identity and truststore-references for client authentication: from the keystore:¶
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
<tls-server xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-server">
<!-- how this server will authenticate itself to the client -->
<server-identity>
<certificate>
<keystore-reference>
<asymmetric-key>rsa-asymmetric-key</asymmetric-key>
<certificate>ex-rsa-cert</certificate>
</keystore-reference>
</certificate>
<!-- TESTED, BUT COMMENTED OUT DUE TO ONLY ONE ALLOWED AT A TIME
<raw-private-key>
<keystore-reference>raw-private-key</keystore-reference>
</raw-private-key>
<psk>
<keystore-reference>encrypted-symmetric-key</keystore-referenc\
e>
</psk>
-->
</server-identity>
<!-- which certificates will this server trust -->
<client-authentication>
<ca-certs>
<truststore-reference>trusted-client-ca-certs</truststore-refe\
rence>
</ca-certs>
<ee-certs>
<truststore-reference>trusted-client-ee-certs</truststore-refe\
rence>
</ee-certs>
<raw-public-keys>
<truststore-reference>Raw Public Keys for TLS Clients</trustst\
ore-reference>
</raw-public-keys>
<psks/>
</client-authentication>
<keepalives>
<peer-allowed-to-send/>
</keepalives>
</tls-server>
¶
This YANG module has a normative references to [RFC5246], [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors] and [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore].¶
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-tls-server@2020-07-10.yang"¶
module ietf-tls-server {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-server";
prefix tlss;
import ietf-netconf-acm {
prefix nacm;
reference
"RFC 8341: Network Configuration Access Control Model";
}
import ietf-crypto-types {
prefix ct;
reference
"RFC AAAA: YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography";
}
import ietf-truststore {
prefix ts;
reference
"RFC BBBB: A YANG Data Model for a Truststore";
}
import ietf-keystore {
prefix ks;
reference
"RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore";
}
import ietf-tls-common {
prefix tlscmn;
revision-date 2020-07-10; // stable grouping definitions
reference
"RFC FFFF: YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS Servers";
}
organization
"IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
Author: Kent Watsen <mailto:kent+ietf@watsen.net>
Author: Gary Wu <mailto:garywu@cisco.com>";
description
"This module defines reusable groupings for TLS servers that
can be used as a basis for specific TLS server instances.
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified
as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with
or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and
subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified
BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC FFFF
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcFFFF); see the RFC
itself for full legal notices.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document
are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119)
(RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.";
revision 2020-07-10 {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC FFFF: YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS Servers";
}
// Features
feature tls-server-hello-params-config {
description
"TLS hello message parameters are configurable on a TLS
server.";
}
feature tls-server-keepalives {
description
"Per socket TLS keepalive parameters are configurable for
TLS servers on the server implementing this feature.";
}
feature client-auth-config-supported {
description
"Indicates that the configuration for how to authenticate
clients can be configured herein, as opposed to in an
application specific location. That is, to support the
consuming data models that prefer to place client
authentication with client definitions, rather then
in a data model principally concerned with configuring
the transport.";
}
feature x509-certificate-auth {
description
"Indicates that the server supports authenticating clients
using X.509 certificates.";
}
feature raw-public-key-auth {
description
"Indicates that the server supports authenticating clients
using ray public keys.";
}
feature psk-auth {
description
"Indicates that the server supports authenticating clients
using PSKs (pre-shared or pairwise-symmetric keys).";
}
// Groupings
grouping tls-server-grouping {
description
"A reusable grouping for configuring a TLS server without
any consideration for how underlying TCP sessions are
established.
Note that this grouping uses fairly typical descendent
node names such that a stack of 'uses' statements will
have name conflicts. It is intended that the consuming
data model will resolve the issue (e.g., by wrapping
the 'uses' statement in a container called
'tls-server-parameters'). This model purposely does
not do this itself so as to provide maximum flexibility
to consuming models.";
container server-identity {
nacm:default-deny-write;
description
"A locally-defined or referenced end-entity certificate,
including any configured intermediate certificates, the
TLS server will present when establishing a TLS connection
in its Certificate message, as defined in Section 7.4.2
in RFC 5246.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2
RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore";
choice auth-type {
mandatory true;
description
"A choice amongst authentication types.";
case certificate {
if-feature x509-certificate-auth;
container certificate {
description
"Specifies the server identity using a certificate.";
uses
ks:local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping{
refine "local-or-keystore/local/local-definition" {
must 'public-key-format'
+ ' = "ct:subject-public-key-info-format"';
}
refine "local-or-keystore/keystore/keystore-reference"
+ "/asymmetric-key" {
must 'deref(.)/../ks:public-key-format'
+ ' = "ct:subject-public-key-info-format"';
}
}
}
}
case raw-private-key {
if-feature raw-public-key-auth;
container raw-private-key {
description
"Specifies the server identity using a raw
private key.";
uses ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping {
refine "local-or-keystore/local/local-definition" {
must 'public-key-format'
+ ' = "ct:subject-public-key-info-format"';
}
refine "local-or-keystore/keystore/keystore-reference"{
must 'deref(.)/../ks:public-key-format'
+ ' = "ct:subject-public-key-info-format"';
}
}
}
}
case psk {
if-feature psk-auth;
container psk {
description
"Specifies the server identity using a PSK (pre-shared
or pairwise-symmetric key). Note that, when the PSK is
configured as a Keystore reference, the key's 'name'
node MAY be used as the PSK's ID when used by the TLS
protocol.";
uses ks:local-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping {
augment "local-or-keystore/local/local-definition" {
if-feature "ks:local-definitions-supported";
description
"An 'id' value for when the PSK is used by TLS.";
leaf id {
type string; // FIXME: is this the right type?
description
"The key id used in the TLS protocol for PSKs.";
}
}
}
}
}
}
} // container server-identity
container client-authentication {
if-feature "client-auth-config-supported";
nacm:default-deny-write;
must 'ca-certs or ee-certs or raw-public-keys or psks';
presence
"Indicates that client authentication is supported (i.e.,
that the server will request clients send certificates).
If not configured, the TLS server SHOULD NOT request the
TLS clients provide authentication credentials.";
description
"Specifies how the TLS server can authenticate TLS clients.
Any combination of credentials is additive and unordered.
Note that no configuration is required for PSK (pre-shared
or pairwise-symmetric key) based authentication as the key
is necessarily the same as configured in the '../server-
identity' node.";
container ca-certs {
if-feature "x509-certificate-auth";
presence
"Indicates that the TLS server can authenticate TLS clients
using configured certificate authority certificates.";
description
"A set of certificate authority (CA) certificates used by
the TLS server to authenticate TLS client certificates. A
client certificate is authenticated if it has a valid
chain of trust to a configured CA certificate.";
reference
"RFC BBBB: A YANG Data Model for a Truststore";
uses ts:local-or-truststore-certs-grouping;
}
container ee-certs { // FIXME: plural too much?
if-feature "x509-certificate-auth";
presence
"Indicates that the TLS server can authenticate TLS
clients using configured client certificates.";
description
"A set of client certificates (i.e., end entity
certificates) used by the TLS server to authenticate
certificates presented by TLS clients. A client
certificate is authenticated if it is an exact
match to a configured client certificate.";
reference
"RFC BBBB: A YANG Data Model for a Truststore";
uses ts:local-or-truststore-certs-grouping;
}
container raw-public-keys {
if-feature "raw-public-key-auth";
presence
"Indicates that the TLS server can authenticate TLS
clients using raw public keys.";
description
"A set of raw public keys used by the TLS server to
authenticate raw public keys presented by the TLS
client. A raw public key is authenticated if it
is an exact match to a configured raw public key.";
reference
"RFC BBBB: A YANG Data Model for a Truststore";
uses ts:local-or-truststore-public-keys-grouping {
refine "local-or-truststore/local/local-definition"
+ "/public-key" {
must 'public-key-format'
+ ' = "ct:subject-public-key-info-format"';
}
refine "local-or-truststore/truststore"
+ "/truststore-reference" {
must 'deref(.)/../*/ts:public-key-format'
+ ' = "ct:subject-public-key-info-format"';
}
}
}
container psks {
if-feature "psk-auth";
presence
"Indicates that the TLS server can authenticate the TLS
client using its PSK (pre-shared or pairwise-symmetric
key).";
description
"No configuration is required since the PSK value is the
same as PSK value configured in the 'client-identity'
node.";
}
} // container client-authentication
container hello-params {
nacm:default-deny-write;
if-feature "tls-server-hello-params-config";
uses tlscmn:hello-params-grouping;
description
"Configurable parameters for the TLS hello message.";
} // container hello-params
container keepalives {
nacm:default-deny-write;
if-feature "tls-server-keepalives";
description
"Configures the keepalive policy for the TLS server.";
leaf peer-allowed-to-send {
type empty;
description
"Indicates that the remote TLS client is allowed to send
HeartbeatRequest messages, as defined by RFC 6520
to this TLS server.";
reference
"RFC 6520: Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram
Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Heartbeat Extension";
}
container test-peer-aliveness {
presence
"Indicates that the TLS server proactively tests the
aliveness of the remote TLS client.";
description
"Configures the keep-alive policy to proactively test
the aliveness of the TLS client. An unresponsive
TLS client is dropped after approximately max-wait
* max-attempts seconds.";
leaf max-wait {
type uint16 {
range "1..max";
}
units "seconds";
default "30";
description
"Sets the amount of time in seconds after which if
no data has been received from the TLS client, a
TLS-level message will be sent to test the
aliveness of the TLS client.";
}
leaf max-attempts {
type uint8;
default "3";
description
"Sets the maximum number of sequential keep-alive
messages that can fail to obtain a response from
the TLS client before assuming the TLS client is
no longer alive.";
}
}
} // container keepalives
} // grouping tls-server-grouping
} // module ietf-tls-server
¶
<CODE ENDS>¶
The "ietf-tls-common" YANG module defines "grouping" statements that are designed to be accessed via YANG based management protocols, such as NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Both of these protocols have mandatory-to-implement secure transport layers (e.g., SSH, TLS) with mutual authentication.¶
The NETCONF access control model (NACM) [RFC8341] provides the means to restrict access for particular users to a pre-configured subset of all available protocol operations and content.¶
Since the module in this document only define groupings, these considerations are primarily for the designers of other modules that use these groupings.¶
None of the readable data nodes defined in this YANG module are considered sensitive or vulnerable in network environments. The NACM "default-deny-all" extension has not been set for any data nodes defined in this module.¶
None of the writable data nodes defined in this YANG module are considered sensitive or vulnerable in network environments. The NACM "default-deny-write" extension has not been set for any data nodes defined in this module.¶
This module does not define any RPCs, actions, or notifications, and thus the security consideration for such is not provided here.¶
The "ietf-tls-client" YANG module defines "grouping" statements that are designed to be accessed via YANG based management protocols, such as NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Both of these protocols have mandatory-to-implement secure transport layers (e.g., SSH, TLS) with mutual authentication.¶
The NETCONF access control model (NACM) [RFC8341] provides the means to restrict access for particular users to a pre-configured subset of all available protocol operations and content.¶
Since the module in this document only define groupings, these considerations are primarily for the designers of other modules that use these groupings.¶
None of the readable data nodes defined in this YANG module are considered sensitive or vulnerable in network environments. The NACM "default-deny-all" extension has not been set for any data nodes defined in this module.¶
All of the writable data nodes defined by this module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. For instance, any modification to a key or reference to a key may dramatically alter the implemented security policy. For this reason, the NACM extension "default-deny-write" has been set for all data nodes defined in this module.¶
This module does not define any RPCs, actions, or notifications, and thus the security consideration for such is not provided here.¶
The "ietf-tls-server" YANG module defines "grouping" statements that are designed to be accessed via YANG based management protocols, such as NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Both of these protocols have mandatory-to-implement secure transport layers (e.g., SSH, TLS) with mutual authentication.¶
The NETCONF access control model (NACM) [RFC8341] provides the means to restrict access for particular users to a pre-configured subset of all available protocol operations and content.¶
Since the module in this document only define groupings, these considerations are primarily for the designers of other modules that use these groupings.¶
None of the readable data nodes defined in this YANG module are considered sensitive or vulnerable in network environments. The NACM "default-deny-all" extension has not been set for any data nodes defined in this module.¶
All of the writable data nodes defined by this module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. For instance, any modification to a key or reference to a key may dramatically alter the implemented security policy. For this reason, the NACM extension "default-deny-write" has been set for all data nodes defined in this module.¶
This module does not define any RPCs, actions, or notifications, and thus the security consideration for such is not provided here.¶
This document registers three URIs in the "ns" subregistry of the IETF XML Registry [RFC3688]. Following the format in [RFC3688], the following registrations are requested:¶
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-common Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF. XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace. URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-client Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF. XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace. URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-server Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF. XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.¶
This document registers three YANG modules in the YANG Module Names registry [RFC6020]. Following the format in [RFC6020], the following registrations are requested:¶
name: ietf-tls-common namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-common prefix: tlscmn reference: RFC FFFF name: ietf-tls-client namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-client prefix: tlsc reference: RFC FFFF name: ietf-tls-server namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-server prefix: tlss reference: RFC FFFF¶
This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.¶
The authors would like to thank for following for lively discussions on list and in the halls (ordered by last name): Andy Bierman, Martin Bjorklund, Benoit Claise, Mehmet Ersue, Balazs Kovacs, Radek Krejci, David Lamparter, Ladislav Lhotka, Alan Luchuk, Tom Petch, Juergen Schoenwaelder, Phil Shafer, Sean Turner, Michal Vasko, Bert Wijnen, and Liang Xia.¶