LAMPS - Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME K. Bashiri Internet-Draft BSI Intended status: Standards Track S. Fluhrer Expires: 5 January 2025 Cisco Systems S. Gazdag genua GmbH D. Van Geest CryptoNext Security S. Kousidis BSI 4 July 2024 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Algorithm Identifiers for HSS and XMSS draft-ietf-lamps-x509-shbs-02 Abstract This document specifies algorithm identifiers and ASN.1 encoding formats for the Stateful Hash-Based Signature Schemes (S-HBS) Hierarchical Signature System (HSS), eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS), and XMSS^MT, a multi-tree variant of XMSS. This specification applies to the Internet X.509 Public Key infrastructure (PKI) when those digital signatures are used in Internet X.509 certificates and certificate revocation lists. About This Document This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC. Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lamps-x509-shbs/. Discussion of this document takes place on the LAMPS Working Group mailing list (mailto:spasm@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/spasm/. Subscribe at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm/. Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/x509-hbs/draft-x509-shbs. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Bashiri, et al. Expires 5 January 2025 [Page 1] Internet-Draft HSS and XMSS for X.509 July 2024 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 5 January 2025. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Use Cases of S-HBS in X.509 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Algorithm Identifiers and Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.1. HSS Algorithm Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.2. XMSS Algorithm Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.3. XMSS^MT Algorithm Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Public Key Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5.1. HSS Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.2. XMSS Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.3. XMSS^MT Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6. Key Usage Bits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7. Signature Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7.1. HSS Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7.2. XMSS Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7.3. XMSS^MT Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8. Key Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 11. Backup and Restore Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Bashiri, et al. Expires 5 January 2025 [Page 2] Internet-Draft HSS and XMSS for X.509 July 2024 12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Appendix A. HSS X.509 v3 Certificate Example . . . . . . . . . . 15 Appendix B. XMSS X.509 v3 Certificate Example . . . . . . . . . 18 Appendix C. XMSS^MT X.509 v3 Certificate Example . . . . . . . . 18 Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 1. Introduction Stateful Hash-Based Signature Schemes (S-HBS) such as HSS, XMSS and XMSS^MT combine Merkle trees with One Time Signatures (OTS) in order to provide digital signature schemes that remain secure even when quantum computers become available. Their theoretic security is well understood and depends only on the security of the underlying hash function. As such they can serve as an important building block for quantum computer resistant information and communication technology. The private key of S-HBS is a finite collection of OTS keys, hence only a limited number of messages can be signed and the private key's state must be updated and persisted after signing to prevent reuse of OTS keys. While the right selection of algorithm parameters would allow a private key to sign a virtually unbounded number of messages (e.g. 2^60), this is at the cost of a larger signature size and longer signing time. Due to the statefulness of the private key and the limited number of signatures that can be created, S-HBS might not be appropriate for use in interactive protocols. However, in some use cases the deployment of S-HBS may be appropriate. Such use cases are described and discussed later in Section 3. 2. Conventions and Definitions The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 3. Use Cases of S-HBS in X.509 As many cryptographic algorithms that are considered to be quantum- resistant, S-HBS have several pros and cons regarding their practical usage. On the positive side they are considered to be secure against a classical as well as a quantum adversary, and a secure instantiation of S-HBS may always be built as long as a cryptographically secure hash function exists. Moreover, S-HBS offer Bashiri, et al. Expires 5 January 2025 [Page 3] Internet-Draft HSS and XMSS for X.509 July 2024 small public key sizes, and, in comparison to other post-quantum signature schemes, the S-HBS can offer relatively small signature sizes (for certain parameter sets). While key generation and signature generation may take longer than classical alternatives, fast and minimal verification routines can be built. The major negative aspect is the statefulness. Private keys always have to be handled in a secure manner, S-HBS necessitate a special treatment of the private key in order to avoid security incidents like signature forgery [MCGREW], [SP800208]. Therefore, for S-HBS, a secure environment MUST be used for key generation and key management. Note that, in general, root CAs offer such a secure environment and the number of issued signatures (including signed certificates and CRLs) is often moderate due to the fact that many root CAs delegate OCSP services or the signing of end-entity certificates to other entities (such as subordinate CAs) that use stateless signature schemes. Therefore, many root CAs should be able to handle the required state management, and S-HBS offer a viable solution. As the above reasoning for root CAs usually does not apply for subordinate CAs, it is NOT RECOMMENDED for subordinate CAs to use S-HBS for issuing end-entity certificates. Moreover, S-HBS MUST NOT be used for end-entity certificates. However, S-HBS MAY be used for code signing certificates, since they are suitable and recommended in such non-interactive contexts. For example, see the recommendations for software and firmware signing in [CNSA2.0]. Some manufactures use common and well-established key formats like X.509 for their code signing and update mechanisms. Also there are multi-party IoT ecosystems where publicly trusted code signing certificates are useful. 4. Algorithm Identifiers and Parameters In this document, we define new OIDs for identifying the different stateful hash-based signature algorithms. An additional OID is defined in [I-D.draft-ietf-lamps-rfc8708bis] and repeated here for convenience. For all of the OIDs, the parameters MUST be absent. 4.1. HSS Algorithm Identifier The object identifier and public key algorithm identifier for HSS is defined in [I-D.draft-ietf-lamps-rfc8708bis]. The definitions are repeated here for reference. The object identifier for an HSS public key is id-alg-hss-lms- hashsig: Bashiri, et al. Expires 5 January 2025 [Page 4] Internet-Draft HSS and XMSS for X.509 July 2024 id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) alg(3) 17 } Note that the id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig algorithm identifier is also referred to as id-alg-mts-hashsig. This synonym is based on the terminology used in an early draft of the document that became [RFC8554]. The public key and signature values identify the hash function and the height used in the HSS/LMS tree. [RFC8554] and [SP800208] define these values, but an IANA registry [IANA-LMS] permits the registration of additional identifiers in the future. 4.2. XMSS Algorithm Identifier The object identifier for an XMSS public key is id-alg-xmss-hashsig: id-alg-xmss-hashsig OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) TBD1 } The public key and signature values identify the hash function and the height used in the XMSS tree. [RFC8391] and [SP800208] define these values, but an IANA registry [IANA-XMSS] permits the registration of additional identifiers in the future. 4.3. XMSS^MT Algorithm Identifier The object identifier for an XMSS^MT public key is id-alg-xmssmt- hashsig: id-alg-xmssmt-hashsig OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) TBD2 } The public key and signature values identify the hash function and the height used in the XMSS^MT tree. [RFC8391] and [SP800208] define these values, but an IANA registry [IANA-XMSS] permits the registration of additional identifiers in the future. 5. Public Key Identifiers Certificates conforming to [RFC5280] can convey a public key for any public key algorithm. The certificate indicates the algorithm through an algorithm identifier. An algorithm identifier consists of an OID and optional parameters. Bashiri, et al. Expires 5 January 2025 [Page 5] Internet-Draft HSS and XMSS for X.509 July 2024 [RFC8554] and [RFC8391] define the raw octet string encodings of the public keys used in this document. When used in a SubjectPublicKeyInfo type, the subjectPublicKey BIT STRING contains the raw octet string encodings of the public keys. This document defines ASN.1 OCTET STRING types for encoding the public keys when not used in a SubjectPublicKeyInfo. The OCTET STRING is mapped to a subjectPublicKey (a value of type BIT STRING) as follows: the most significant bit of the OCTET STRING value becomes the most significant bit of the BIT STRING value, and so on; the least significant bit of the OCTET STRING becomes the least significant bit of the BIT STRING. 5.1. HSS Public Keys The HSS public key identifier is as follows: pk-HSS-LMS-HashSig PUBLIC-KEY ::= { IDENTIFIER id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig -- KEY no ASN.1 wrapping -- PARAMS ARE absent CERT-KEY-USAGE { digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign } } The HSS public key is defined as follows: HSS-LMS-HashSig-PublicKey ::= OCTET STRING [RFC8554] defines the raw octet string encoding of an HSS public key using the hss_public_key structure. See [SP800208] and [RFC8554] for more information on the contents and format of an HSS public key. Note that the single-tree signature scheme LMS is instantiated as HSS with number of levels being equal to 1. 5.2. XMSS Public Keys The XMSS public key identifier is as follows: pk-XMSS-HashSig PUBLIC-KEY ::= { IDENTIFIER id-alg-xmss-hashsig -- KEY no ASN.1 wrapping -- PARAMS ARE absent CERT-KEY-USAGE { digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign } } The XMSS public key is defined as follows: XMSS-HashSig-PublicKey ::= OCTET STRING Bashiri, et al. Expires 5 January 2025 [Page 6] Internet-Draft HSS and XMSS for X.509 July 2024 [RFC8391] defines the raw octet string encoding of an HSS public key using the xmss_public_key structure. See [SP800208] and [RFC8391] for more information on the contents and format of an XMSS public key. 5.3. XMSS^MT Public Keys The XMSS^MT public key identifier is as follows: pk-XMSSMT-HashSig PUBLIC-KEY ::= { IDENTIFIER id-alg-xmssmt-hashsig -- KEY no ASN.1 wrapping -- PARAMS ARE absent CERT-KEY-USAGE { digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign } } The XMSS^MT public key is defined as follows: XMSSMT-HashSig-PublicKey ::= OCTET STRING [RFC8391] defines the raw octet string encoding of an HSS public key using the xmssmt_public_key structure. See [SP800208] and [RFC8391] for more information on the contents and format of an XMSS^MT public key. 6. Key Usage Bits The intended application for the key is indicated in the keyUsage certificate extension [RFC5280]. When one of the AlgorithmIdentifiers specified in this document appears in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo field of a certification authority (CA) X.509 certificate [RFC5280], the certificate key usage extension MUST contain at least one of the following values: digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, or cRLSign. However, it MUST NOT contain other values. When one of these AlgorithmIdentifiers appears in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo field of an end entity X.509 certificate [RFC5280], the certificate key usage extension MUST contain at least one of the following values: digitalSignature or nonRepudiation. However, it MUST NOT contain other values. Note that for certificates that indicate id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig the above definitions are more restrictive than the requirement defined in Section 4 of [I-D.draft-ietf-lamps-rfc8708bis]. Bashiri, et al. Expires 5 January 2025 [Page 7] Internet-Draft HSS and XMSS for X.509 July 2024 7. Signature Algorithms This section identifies OIDs for signing using HSS, XMSS, and XMSS^MT. When these algorithm identifiers appear in the algorithm field as an AlgorithmIdentifier, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, one of the OIDs defined in the following subsections. When the signature algorithm identifiers described in this document are used to create a signature on a message, no digest algorithm is applied to the message before signing. That is, the full data to be signed is signed rather than a digest of the data. For HSS, the signature value is described in section 6.4 of [RFC8554]. For XMSS and XMSS^MT the signature values are described in sections B.2 and C.2 of [RFC8391], respectively. The octet string representing the signature is encoded directly in the OCTET STRING without adding any additional ASN.1 wrapping. For the Certificate and CertificateList structures, the signature value is wrapped in the "signatureValue" OCTET STRING field. 7.1. HSS Signature Algorithm The HSS public key OID is also used to specify that an HSS signature was generated on the full message, i.e. the message was not hashed before being processed by the HSS signature algorithm. id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) alg(3) 17 } The HSS signature is defined as follows: HSS-LMS-HashSig-Signature ::= OCTET STRING See [SP800208] and [RFC8554] for more information on the contents and format of an HSS signature. 7.2. XMSS Signature Algorithm The XMSS public key OID is also used to specify that an XMSS signature was generated on the full message, i.e. the message was not hashed before being processed by the XMSS signature algorithm. id-alg-xmss-hashsig OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD } Bashiri, et al. Expires 5 January 2025 [Page 8] Internet-Draft HSS and XMSS for X.509 July 2024 The XMSS signature is defined as follows: XMSS-HashSig-Signature ::= OCTET STRING See [SP800208] and [RFC8391] for more information on the contents and format of an XMSS signature. The signature generation MUST be performed according to 7.2 of [SP800208]. 7.3. XMSS^MT Signature Algorithm The XMSS^MT public key OID is also used to specify that an XMSS^MT signature was generated on the full message, i.e. the message was not hashed before being processed by the XMSS^MT signature algorithm. id-alg-xmssmt-hashsig OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD } The XMSS^MT signature is defined as follows: XMSSMT-HashSig-Signature ::= OCTET STRING See [SP800208] and [RFC8391] for more information on the contents and format of an XMSS^MT signature. The signature generation MUST be performed according to 7.2 of [SP800208]. 8. Key Generation The key generation for XMSS and XMSS^MT MUST be performed according to 7.2 of [SP800208] 9. ASN.1 Module For reference purposes, the ASN.1 syntax is presented as an ASN.1 module here. This ASN.1 Module builds upon the conventions established in [RFC5911]. X509-SHBS-2024 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-shbs-2024(TBD) } DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN EXPORTS ALL; Bashiri, et al. Expires 5 January 2025 [Page 9] Internet-Draft HSS and XMSS for X.509 July 2024 IMPORTS PUBLIC-KEY, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 -- RFC 5911 [CMSASN1] { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) } sa-HSS-LMS-HashSig, pk-HSS-LMS-HashSig FROM MTS-HashSig-2013 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) id-smime(16) id-mod(0) id-mod-mts-hashsig-2013(64) }; -- -- Object Identifiers -- -- id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig is defined in [RFC8708] id-alg-xmss-hashsig OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) TBD1 } id-alg-xmssmt-hashsig OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) TBD2 } -- -- Signature Algorithms and Public Keys -- -- sa-HSS-LMS-HashSig is defined in [RFC8708] sa-XMSS-HashSig SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { IDENTIFIER id-alg-xmss-hashsig PARAMS ARE absent PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-XMSS-HashSig } SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-alg-xmss-hashsig } } sa-XMSSMT-HashSig SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { IDENTIFIER id-alg-xmssmt-hashsig PARAMS ARE absent PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-XMSSMT-HashSig } SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-alg-xmssmt-hashsig } } -- pk-HSS-LMS-HashSig is defined in [RFC8708] pk-XMSS-HashSig PUBLIC-KEY ::= { IDENTIFIER id-alg-xmss-hashsig Bashiri, et al. Expires 5 January 2025 [Page 10] Internet-Draft HSS and XMSS for X.509 July 2024 -- KEY no ASN.1 wrapping -- PARAMS ARE absent CERT-KEY-USAGE { digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign } } pk-XMSSMT-HashSig PUBLIC-KEY ::= { IDENTIFIER id-alg-xmssmt-hashsig -- KEY no ASN.1 wrapping -- PARAMS ARE absent CERT-KEY-USAGE { digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign } } -- -- Public Key (pk-) Algorithms -- PublicKeys PUBLIC-KEY ::= { -- This expands PublicKeys from RFC 5912 pk-HSS-LMS-HashSig | pk-XMSS-HashSig | pk-XMSSMT-HashSig, ... } -- -- Signature Algorithms (sa-) -- SignatureAlgs SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { -- This expands SignatureAlgorithms from RFC 5912 sa-HSS-LMS-HashSig | sa-XMSS-HashSig | sa-XMSSMT-HashSig, ... } END 10. Security Considerations The security requirements of [SP800208] MUST be taken into account. For S-HBS it is crucial to stress the importance of a correct state management. If an attacker were able to obtain signatures for two different messages created using the same OTS key, then it would become computationally feasible for that attacker to create forgeries [BH16]. As noted in [MCGREW] and [ETSI-TR-103-692], extreme care needs to be taken in order to avoid the risk that an OTS key will be reused accidentally. This is a new requirement that most developers will not be familiar with and requires careful handling. Bashiri, et al. Expires 5 January 2025 [Page 11] Internet-Draft HSS and XMSS for X.509 July 2024 Various strategies for a correct state management can be applied: * Implement a track record of all signatures generated by a key pair associated to a S-HBS instance. This track record may be stored outside the device which is used to generate the signature. Check the track record to prevent OTS key reuse before a new signature is released. Drop the new signature and hit your PANIC button if you spot OTS key reuse. * Use a S-HBS instance only for a moderate number of signatures such that it is always practical to keep a consistent track record and be able to unambiguously trace back all generated signatures. * Apply the state reservation strategy described in Section 5 of [MCGREW], where upcoming states are reserved in advance by the signer. In this way the number of state synchronisations between nonvolatile and volatile memory is reduced. 11. Backup and Restore Management Certificate Authorities have high demands in order to ensure the availability of signature generation throughout the validity period of signing key pairs. Usual backup and restore strategies when using a stateless signature scheme (e.g. SLH-DSA) are to duplicate private keying material and to operate redundant signing devices or to store and safeguard a copy of the private keying material such that it can be used to set up a new signing device in case of technical difficulties. For S-HBS such straightforward backup and restore strategies will lead to OTS reuse with high probability as a correct state management is not guaranteed. Strategies for maintaining availability and keeping a correct state are described in Section 7 of [SP800208]. 12. IANA Considerations IANA is requested to assign a module OID from the "SMI for PKIX Module Identifier" registry for the ASN.1 module in Section 9. One object identifier for the ASN.1 module in Appendix A is requested for the SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifiers (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0) registry: Bashiri, et al. Expires 5 January 2025 [Page 12] Internet-Draft HSS and XMSS for X.509 July 2024 +=========+========================+====================+ | Decimal | Description | References | +=========+========================+====================+ | TBD | id-mod-pkix1-shbs-2024 | [EDNOTE: THIS RFC] | +---------+------------------------+--------------------+ Table 1 IANA is requested to update the SMI Security for PKIX Algorithms [SMI-PKIX] (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6) registry with four additional entries: +=========+=======================+====================+ | Decimal | Description | References | +=========+=======================+====================+ | TBD1 | id-alg-xmss-hashsig | [EDNOTE: THIS RFC] | +---------+-----------------------+--------------------+ | TBD2 | id-alg-xmssmt-hashsig | [EDNOTE: THIS RFC] | +---------+-----------------------+--------------------+ Table 2 13. References 13.1. Normative References [I-D.draft-ietf-lamps-rfc8708bis] Housley, R., "Use of the HSS/LMS Hash-Based Signature Algorithm in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 8708, DOI 10.17487/RFC8708, February 2020, . [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, . [RFC5911] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and S/MIME", RFC 5911, DOI 10.17487/RFC5911, June 2010, . Bashiri, et al. Expires 5 January 2025 [Page 13] Internet-Draft HSS and XMSS for X.509 July 2024 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . [RFC8391] Huelsing, A., Butin, D., Gazdag, S., Rijneveld, J., and A. Mohaisen, "XMSS: eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme", RFC 8391, DOI 10.17487/RFC8391, May 2018, . [RFC8554] McGrew, D., Curcio, M., and S. Fluhrer, "Leighton-Micali Hash-Based Signatures", RFC 8554, DOI 10.17487/RFC8554, April 2019, . [SP800208] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), "Recommendation for Stateful Hash-Based Signature Schemes", 29 October 2020, . 13.2. Informative References [BH16] Bruinderink, L. and S. Hülsing, "Oops, I did it again – Security of One-Time Signatures under Two-Message Attacks.", 2016, . [CNSA2.0] National Security Agency (NSA), "Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0 (CNSA 2.0) Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA)", 7 September 2022, . [ETSI-TR-103-692] European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), "State management for stateful authentication mechanisms", November 2021, . [IANA-LMS] IANA, "Leighton-Micali Signatures (LMS)", n.d., . [IANA-XMSS] IANA, "XMSS: Extended Hash-Based Signatures", n.d., . Bashiri, et al. Expires 5 January 2025 [Page 14] Internet-Draft HSS and XMSS for X.509 July 2024 [MCGREW] McGrew, D., Kampanakis, P., Fluhrer, S., Gazdag, S., Butin, D., and J. Buchmann, "State Management for Hash- Based Signatures", 2 November 2016, . [RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April 2002, . [RFC8410] Josefsson, S. and J. Schaad, "Algorithm Identifiers for Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, and X448 for Use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure", RFC 8410, DOI 10.17487/RFC8410, August 2018, . [RFC8411] Schaad, J. and R. Andrews, "IANA Registration for the Cryptographic Algorithm Object Identifier Range", RFC 8411, DOI 10.17487/RFC8411, August 2018, . [SMI-PKIX] IANA, "SMI Security for PKIX Algorithms", n.d., . Appendix A. HSS X.509 v3 Certificate Example This section shows a self-signed X.509 v3 certificate using HSS. Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: e8:91:d6:06:91:4f:ce:f3 Signature Algorithm: HSS Issuer: C=US, ST=VA, L=Herndon, O=Bogus CA Validity Not Before: May 14 08:58:11 2024 GMT Not After : May 14 08:58:11 2034 GMT Subject: C=US, ST=VA, L=Herndon, O=Bogus CA Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: HSS HSS public key: PQ key material: 00:00:00:01:00:00:00:05:00:00:00:04:74:e4:73: a8:23:a6:6a:7e:9f:a5:45:a8:fa:63:c6:fb:17:8f: af:fe:28:d1:82:d3:95:92:3e:f9:e2:5f:92:20:56: Bashiri, et al. Expires 5 January 2025 [Page 15] Internet-Draft HSS and XMSS for X.509 July 2024 00:09:e4:36:f9:39:a8:ea:8d:e7:79:02:61:a8:42 X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: D6:FD:27:12:44:AD:D2:76:19:C0:FC:6D:52:95:6B:19: 1B:F8:4C:9D:37:9E:6E:F0:7A:98:F0:6C:6E:C5:A2:14 X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: D6:FD:27:12:44:AD:D2:76:19:C0:FC:6D:52:95:6B:19: 1B:F8:4C:9D:37:9E:6E:F0:7A:98:F0:6C:6E:C5:A2:14 X509v3 Basic Constraints: CA:TRUE X509v3 Key Usage: Certificate Sign, CRL Sign Signature Algorithm: HSS Signature Value: 00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:04:b8:20:60:54:98:f9: ca:6b:fb:d4:91:a0:24:0c:19:f6:e2:4c:94:5d:b1:52:41:93: 85:8f:dd:97:2a:e4:76:8a:cd:36:7f:05:d6:35:ed:c4:8e:ff: 72:fe:16:41:54:e4:0b:2a:aa:e6:52:8c:03:25:5e:bd:79:b0: 48:c8:71:65:8c:31:bf:d0:8e:1a:59:88:37:c6:74:8d:62:4d: 7d:f2:e0:29:6e:46:58:43:a5:cd:6c:6e:65:19:66:50:59:f4: 94:51:ca:e0:f9:91:ac:92:c4:c0:04:78:cf:5b:9e:36:35:14: 0e:8b:84:3d:77:af:ef:58:2b:34:2e:c5:01:c5:45:09:ac:28: 8c:e1:db:c5:bf:19:d1:a8:0e:02:72:21:82:e5:f2:fc:9f:bd: 1f:72:31:23:62:f7:2b:60:80:49:21:7e:46:b5:cb:80:b2:4d: 6c:9a:68:8a:2e:84:ec:06:47:80:1b:da:c4:40:07:2f:c2:57: 02:39:cb:8c:06:9f:38:55:2f:18:80:2a:7d:08:e4:10:d0:f7: 41:7f:26:0e:4c:6a:73:78:a4:f7:1b:db:2d:b1:6c:16:b8:64: f1:9c:69:2e:d7:b4:a8:d9:49:c0:c8:df:33:de:ac:ad:89:1a: f1:14:42:b4:39:3c:cb:2d:1a:93:96:61:d8:ba:70:0c:b4:64: 23:80:ac:17:34:f5:e4:67:36:d1:2c:dc:b1:7c:ec:1a:41:3f: be:28:f8:7a:c4:b9:f2:a0:8c:cf:8b:68:c3:98:02:09:5c:72: 4f:f5:4e:c7:22:37:8f:2d:67:f0:86:75:fc:ab:34:07:a7:bc: 9c:0c:b8:d6:90:93:a2:92:4c:a0:eb:7b:83:10:ed:ea:73:a2: 93:ac:8e:d3:e5:6a:93:ac:5f:17:5a:6a:67:84:9e:84:4b:64: 35:8b:2d:d0:47:8c:9d:9d:8c:d3:d5:99:a2:ed:e4:84:5e:bc: 5e:9a:f4:07:51:9d:08:94:19:95:46:c5:94:b1:e3:8a:9a:e3: 0f:80:9e:b7:9a:eb:a2:33:83:40:9f:47:e7:a4:9e:26:01:cf: 57:60:cf:ae:78:a2:0d:1b:a2:4d:41:aa:45:08:15:4c:ee:ad: 87:3b:74:58:f1:60:19:67:62:45:2b:da:c8:74:dc:a3:02:d3: 29:26:2c:b0:55:67:0b:a5:b8:a2:c2:1b:16:6a:9e:5f:23:02: 9d:b8:4a:61:8a:ab:3e:91:ef:0b:ab:be:ff:46:9d:c3:1f:2a: b0:93:1d:86:64:42:d4:d9:31:ec:b1:5b:2c:8e:78:e6:41:4c: 5d:0a:f7:ec:d7:51:c8:5d:7f:de:df:ef:87:2a:2e:d6:3d:e7: 23:3b:1e:e1:86:ca:96:95:50:45:60:10:3d:95:f1:47:cf:d2: d7:de:5e:db:65:a7:15:9e:bd:dc:f6:96:0e:f8:90:26:1a:8b: cb:6a:7b:d2:32:fc:e5:99:4b:82:82:48:ee:56:f4:dc:a9:7c: 61:7f:60:94:c7:53:53:31:71:fe:5e:31:42:07:4d:9b:d3:4e: 48:39:75:56:33:67:6a:d6:b5:2c:36:9a:41:fd:a7:c7:fa:10: Bashiri, et al. Expires 5 January 2025 [Page 16] Internet-Draft HSS and XMSS for X.509 July 2024 2d:3d:50:a6:d5:c3:f6:2a:ab:ba:31:40:c7:2d:ec:d4:74:43: c2:6e:2e:9b:a9:0d:36:9d:b7:c5:55:8e:08:09:8e:54:a2:a1: 9c:af:61:8d:b3:a3:4a:51:67:2d:60:7a:1c:f0:72:9b:90:5e: 42:a5:1a:af:74:e8:82:64:e4:78:d9:e9:4d:74:04:35:e3:71: fd:0a:c8:f8:3a:fa:e4:a2:fe:08:eb:e1:69:84:ee:d0:ba:60: f4:7d:80:8a:06:e6:df:32:68:da:07:4f:15:2e:82:75:92:6c: e2:bf:ac:e7:ab:a4:e0:a3:ab:2c:71:1b:81:e5:8d:1d:d8:44: c7:fd:a1:46:51:84:7b:e3:8a:b8:9b:04:28:63:26:0d:44:16: 1d:7f:b0:e2:76:c5:0e:c3:0a:d3:5a:da:ed:b7:28:f7:e9:55: e6:d1:1f:0d:46:b9:1d:4a:79:7e:bd:4b:60:d3:bc:54:ef:95: e3:e9:1c:57:1e:3a:48:b5:98:89:e4:92:cb:48:aa:db:ab:08: 31:7f:08:3f:d9:a8:3b:2d:81:40:cf:60:90:08:ba:a2:ca:0a: 0b:a7:76:2a:98:40:3c:03:e6:a2:a1:ce:8a:a4:bd:ab:04:87: 35:cc:b5:ef:da:92:d2:be:98:08:74:89:b2:e4:cd:78:75:7f: 8f:b8:fe:9c:02:07:a2:07:cb:34:e1:0d:e1:9b:4a:74:69:97: f1:1c:5e:5f:28:2c:82:97:b8:08:c7:4f:97:33:90:83:df:d1: c7:db:7a:28:1d:98:4e:ef:d5:c2:30:4f:a1:b8:ed:c6:c5:15: 11:d6:ee:f3:97:f4:22:95:48:12:f8:5f:ba:15:71:e5:5f:19: 44:50:c1:e1:70:bd:3e:48:a8:f3:2c:62:ad:8f:8a:9f:64:c7: 92:a7:ec:77:8c:5a:78:99:73:7e:77:12:61:28:90:92:a7:e0: 46:9a:39:29:1d:06:a1:5e:5c:f2:d6:bb:49:73:e2:88:da:ef: 3f:93:2e:98:b6:7d:01:b5:56:bc:30:08:2a:0a:22:4b:45:92: b3:72:94:ff:07:e1:fe:f3:4e:58:38:cf:0e:e1:45:15:e1:93: 5a:21:52:77:5e:e6:98:17:16:71:b9:e7:8a:a2:2c:5a:d9:d7: 0b:15:86:70:69:6f:47:80:7e:87:c7:d0:3d:4b:f6:8f:ca:7d: 8b:6a:45:27:ee:10:72:b7:df:6c:43:1d:75:e3:ae:64:1d:b3: 30:85:32:32:2a:c2:8f:21:67:58:25:dc:51:6d:a3:6a:06:d1: 5d:77:b1:dc:33:6c:ba:0c:be:fa:c2:61:8f:30:18:c3:c1:c7: 6e:6b:d8:17:1d:bf:67:be:ca:af:94:cc:5b:f2:49:a7:00:00: 00:05:16:46:55:cf:04:6f:4f:43:be:87:22:e6:11:92:45:5d: 17:31:92:6f:17:15:2c:b5:f6:37:d1:fb:a5:8f:83:1c:ac:7c: 54:ce:2d:95:ef:b0:d4:44:c8:d5:d8:a3:e5:0a:b4:ba:f0:d0: c5:ab:6a:34:88:72:d7:32:22:27:54:13:1b:60:0f:cd:32:e7: cc:33:06:47:68:46:80:06:72:11:f7:74:ab:eb:38:23:30:68: ad:48:01:e4:77:5e:34:e4:b1:c3:e9:46:a4:96:da:71:12:19: b1:c2:7f:53:0f:f6:cd:4a:cf:12:e8:ea:25:1b:89:f6:35:54: e9:9b:e1:02:d5:f8:d4:8b:92:56:43:fd:05:3b:4b:0b:dd:8a: 20:05:2e:18:7e:a1:a8:e8:55:18:3d:40:ff:5e:35:a3:c3:fb Bashiri, et al. Expires 5 January 2025 [Page 17] Internet-Draft HSS and XMSS for X.509 July 2024 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIGsDCCAYigAwIBAgIJAOiR1gaRT87zMA0GCyqGSIb3DQEJEAMRMD8xCzAJBgNV BAYTAlVTMQswCQYDVQQIDAJWQTEQMA4GA1UEBwwHSGVybmRvbjERMA8GA1UECgwI Qm9ndXMgQ0EwHhcNMjQwNTE0MDg1ODExWhcNMzQwNTE0MDg1ODExWjA/MQswCQYD VQQGEwJVUzELMAkGA1UECAwCVkExEDAOBgNVBAcMB0hlcm5kb24xETAPBgNVBAoM CEJvZ3VzIENBME4wDQYLKoZIhvcNAQkQAxEDPQAAAAABAAAABQAAAAR05HOoI6Zq fp+lRaj6Y8b7F4+v/ijRgtOVkj754l+SIFYACeQ2+Tmo6o3neQJhqEKjdTBzMCkG A1UdDgQiBCDW/ScSRK3SdhnA/G1SlWsZG/hMnTeebvB6mPBsbsWiFDArBgNVHSME JDAigCDW/ScSRK3SdhnA/G1SlWsZG/hMnTeebvB6mPBsbsWiFDAMBgNVHRMEBTAD AQH/MAsGA1UdDwQEAwIBBjANBgsqhkiG9w0BCRADEQOCBREAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAE uCBgVJj5ymv71JGgJAwZ9uJMlF2xUkGThY/dlyrkdorNNn8F1jXtxI7/cv4WQVTk Cyqq5lKMAyVevXmwSMhxZYwxv9COGlmIN8Z0jWJNffLgKW5GWEOlzWxuZRlmUFn0 lFHK4PmRrJLEwAR4z1ueNjUUDouEPXev71grNC7FAcVFCawojOHbxb8Z0agOAnIh guXy/J+9H3IxI2L3K2CASSF+RrXLgLJNbJpoii6E7AZHgBvaxEAHL8JXAjnLjAaf OFUvGIAqfQjkEND3QX8mDkxqc3ik9xvbLbFsFrhk8ZxpLte0qNlJwMjfM96srYka 8RRCtDk8yy0ak5Zh2LpwDLRkI4CsFzT15Gc20SzcsXzsGkE/vij4esS58qCMz4to w5gCCVxyT/VOxyI3jy1n8IZ1/Ks0B6e8nAy41pCTopJMoOt7gxDt6nOik6yO0+Vq k6xfF1pqZ4SehEtkNYst0EeMnZ2M09WZou3khF68Xpr0B1GdCJQZlUbFlLHjiprj D4Cet5rrojODQJ9H56SeJgHPV2DPrniiDRuiTUGqRQgVTO6thzt0WPFgGWdiRSva yHTcowLTKSYssFVnC6W4osIbFmqeXyMCnbhKYYqrPpHvC6u+/0adwx8qsJMdhmRC 1Nkx7LFbLI545kFMXQr37NdRyF1/3t/vhyou1j3nIzse4YbKlpVQRWAQPZXxR8/S 195e22WnFZ693PaWDviQJhqLy2p70jL85ZlLgoJI7lb03Kl8YX9glMdTUzFx/l4x QgdNm9NOSDl1VjNnata1LDaaQf2nx/oQLT1QptXD9iqrujFAxy3s1HRDwm4um6kN Np23xVWOCAmOVKKhnK9hjbOjSlFnLWB6HPBym5BeQqUar3TogmTkeNnpTXQENeNx /QrI+Dr65KL+COvhaYTu0Lpg9H2Aigbm3zJo2gdPFS6CdZJs4r+s56uk4KOrLHEb geWNHdhEx/2hRlGEe+OKuJsEKGMmDUQWHX+w4nbFDsMK01ra7bco9+lV5tEfDUa5 HUp5fr1LYNO8VO+V4+kcVx46SLWYieSSy0iq26sIMX8IP9moOy2BQM9gkAi6osoK C6d2KphAPAPmoqHOiqS9qwSHNcy179qS0r6YCHSJsuTNeHV/j7j+nAIHogfLNOEN 4ZtKdGmX8RxeXygsgpe4CMdPlzOQg9/Rx9t6KB2YTu/VwjBPobjtxsUVEdbu85f0 IpVIEvhfuhVx5V8ZRFDB4XC9Pkio8yxirY+Kn2THkqfsd4xaeJlzfncSYSiQkqfg Rpo5KR0GoV5c8ta7SXPiiNrvP5MumLZ9AbVWvDAIKgoiS0WSs3KU/wfh/vNOWDjP DuFFFeGTWiFSd17mmBcWcbnniqIsWtnXCxWGcGlvR4B+h8fQPUv2j8p9i2pFJ+4Q crffbEMddeOuZB2zMIUyMirCjyFnWCXcUW2jagbRXXex3DNsugy++sJhjzAYw8HH bmvYFx2/Z77Kr5TMW/JJpwAAAAUWRlXPBG9PQ76HIuYRkkVdFzGSbxcVLLX2N9H7 pY+DHKx8VM4tle+w1ETI1dij5Qq0uvDQxatqNIhy1zIiJ1QTG2APzTLnzDMGR2hG gAZyEfd0q+s4IzBorUgB5HdeNOSxw+lGpJbacRIZscJ/Uw/2zUrPEujqJRuJ9jVU 6ZvhAtX41IuSVkP9BTtLC92KIAUuGH6hqOhVGD1A/141o8P7 -----END CERTIFICATE----- Appendix B. XMSS X.509 v3 Certificate Example [EDNOTE: To be provided once id-alg-xmss-hashsig is assigned] Appendix C. XMSS^MT X.509 v3 Certificate Example [EDNOTE: To be provided once id-alg-xmssmt-hashsig is assigned] Bashiri, et al. Expires 5 January 2025 [Page 18] Internet-Draft HSS and XMSS for X.509 July 2024 Acknowledgments Thanks for Russ Housley and Panos Kampanakis for helpful suggestions. This document uses a lot of text from similar documents [SP800208], ([RFC3279] and [RFC8410]) as well as [I-D.draft-ietf-lamps-rfc8708bis]. Thanks go to the authors of those documents. "Copying always makes things easier and less error prone" - [RFC8411]. Authors' Addresses Kaveh Bashiri BSI Email: kaveh.bashiri.ietf@gmail.com Scott Fluhrer Cisco Systems Email: sfluhrer@cisco.com Stefan Gazdag genua GmbH Email: ietf@gazdag.de Daniel Van Geest CryptoNext Security Email: daniel.vangeest@cryptonext-security.com Stavros Kousidis BSI Email: kousidis.ietf@gmail.com Bashiri, et al. Expires 5 January 2025 [Page 19]