Internet-Draft draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-05 April 2024
Sharma Expires 4 October 2024 [Page]
Workgroup:
Internet Engineering Task Force
Internet-Draft:
draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-05
Obsoletes:
8954 (if approved)
Updates:
6960 (if approved)
Published:
Intended Status:
Standards Track
Expires:
Author:
H. Sharma, Ed.
Netskope Inc

Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Nonce Extension

Abstract

RFC 8954 imposed the size constraints on the optional Nonce extension for the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP). OCSP is used for checking the status of a certificate, and the Nonce extension is used to cryptographically bind an OCSP response message to a particular OCSP request message.

Some environments use cryptographic algorithms that generate a Nonce value that is longer than 32 octets. This document updates the maximum allowed length of Nonce to 128 octets. This document also modifies Nonce section to clearly define the encoding format and values distinctively for an easier implementation and understanding. This document obsoletes RFC 8954 and provides updated ASN.1 modules for OCSP, updates RFC 6960.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 4 October 2024.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Nonce extension was previously defined in Section 4.4.1 of [RFC6960] and updated in [RFC8954]. [RFC8954] limits the maximum Nonce length to 32 octets. To support cryptographic algorithms that generate a Nonce that is longer than 32 octets, this document updates the maximum allowed size of the Nonce to 128 octets. In addition, this document recommends that the OCSP client and responder use a Nonce with a minimum length of 32 octets.

1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

2. OCSP Extensions

The message formats for OCSP requests and responses are defined in [RFC6960] and Nonce extension was updated in [RFC8954]. [RFC6960] also defines the standard extensions for OCSP messages based on the extension model employed in X.509 version 3 certificates (see [RFC5280]). [RFC8954] replaces this section to limit the minimum and maximum length for the Nonce value. This document extends the maximum allowed nonce length to 128 octets and does not change the specifications of any of the other standard extensions defined in [RFC6960].

2.1. Nonce Extension

The Nonce cryptographically binds a request and a response to prevent replay attacks. The Nonce is included as one of the requestExtensions in requests; in responses, it would be included as one of the responseExtensions. In both the request and the response, the Nonce will be identified by the object identifier id-pkix-ocsp-nonce, while the extnValue is the encoded value of Nonce octets. If the Nonce extension is present, then the length of the Nonce octets MUST be at least 1 octet and can be up to 128 octets.

An OCSP client that implements this document MUST use a minimum length of 32 octets for Nonce octets in the Nonce extension. [RFC8954] compliant implementations will be unable to process nonces generated per the new specification with sizes in excess of the limit of 32 octets that was specified in [RFC8954].

An OCSP responder that implements this document MUST reject any OCSP request that has a Nonce octets with a length of either 0 octets or more than 128 octets, with the malformedRequest OCSPResponseStatus as described in Section 4.2.1 of [RFC6960]. Responders, supporting the Nonce extension, MUST accept Nonce lengths of at least 16 octets and MAY choose to ignore the Nonce extension for requests where the length of the Nonce octets is less than 16 octets or more than 32 octets.

The value of the Nonce octets MUST be generated using a cryptographically strong pseudorandom number generator (see [RFC4086]). The minimum Nonce length of 1 octet is defined to provide backward compatibility with older clients that follow [RFC6960].

id-pkix-ocsp           OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad-ocsp }
id-pkix-ocsp-nonce     OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 }
Nonce ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(1..128))


   Example of an encoded OCSP Nonce extension with 32 Nonce octets in
   hexadecimal format.

   30 2f 06 09 2b 06 01 05 05 07 30 01 02 04 22 04
   20 dd 49 d4 07 2c 44 9d a1 c3 17 bd 1c 1b df fe
   db e1 50 31 2e c4 cd 0a dd 18 e5 bd 6f 84 bf 14
   c8

   Here is the decoded version of the above example.
   Offset, Length and Object Identifier are in decimal.

   Offset  Length
   0       47    : SEQUENCE {
   2       9     :   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ocspNonce (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 2)
   13      34    :   OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
   15      32    :     OCTET STRING
                 :       DD 49 D4 07 2C 44 9D A1 C3 17 BD 1C 1B DF FE DB
                 :       E1 50 31 2E C4 CD 0A DD 18 E5 BD 6F 84 BF 14 C8
                 :     }
                 :  }

3. Security Considerations

The security considerations of OCSP, in general, are described in [RFC6960]. During the interval in which the previous OCSP response for a certificate is not expired but the responder has a changed status for that certificate, a copy of that OCSP response can be used to indicate that the status of the certificate is still valid. Including a client's nonce value in the OCSP response makes sure that the response is the latest response from the server and not an old copy.

3.1. Replay Attack

The Nonce extension is used to avoid replay attacks. Since the OCSP responder may choose not to send the Nonce extension in the OCSP response even if the client has sent the Nonce extension in the request [RFC5019], an on-path attacker can intercept the OCSP request and respond with an earlier response from the server without the Nonce extension. This can be mitigated by configuring the server to use a short time interval between the thisUpdate and nextUpdate fields in the OCSP response.

4. IANA Considerations

For the ASN.1 Module in Appendix A.1, IANA is requested to assign an object identifier (OID) for the module identifier to replace TBD1. The OID for the module should be allocated in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0), and the Description for the new OID should be set to "id-mod-ocsp-2024-88".

For the ASN.1 Module in Appendix A.2, IANA is requested to assign an object identifier (OID) for the module identifier to replace TBD2. The OID for the module should be allocated in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0), and the Description for the new OID should be set to "id-mod-ocsp-2024-08".

Acknowledgements

The authors of this document wish to thank Mohit Sahni for his work to produce [RFC8954].

The authors wish to thank Russ Housley, Corey Bonnell, Michael StJohns and Carl Wallace for the feedback and suggestions.

References

Normative References

[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4086]
Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
[RFC5019]
Deacon, A. and R. Hurst, "The Lightweight Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Profile for High-Volume Environments", RFC 5019, DOI 10.17487/RFC5019, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5019>.
[RFC5280]
Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC6960]
Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8954]
Sahni, M., Ed., "Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Nonce Extension", RFC 8954, DOI 10.17487/RFC8954, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8954>.

Informative References

[RFC5912]
Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912, DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.
[Errata5891]
RFC Errata, Erratum ID 5891, RFC 6960, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5891>.

Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules

This section includes the ASN.1 modules for OCSP and replaces the entirity of Section 5 of [RFC8954]. It addresses Errata id 5891 [Errata5891] as well.

Appendix A.1 includes an ASN.1 module that conforms to the 1998 version of ASN.1 for all syntax elements of OCSP. This module replaces the modules Appendix B.1 of [RFC6960].

Appendix A.2 includes an ASN.1 module, corresponding to the module present in A.1, that conforms to the 2008 version of ASN.1. This module replaces the modules in Section 4 of [RFC5912] and Appendix B.2 of [RFC6960]. Although a 2008 ASN.1 module is provided, the module in Appendix A.1 remains the normative module as per the policy of the PKIX working group.

A.1. OCSP in ASN.1 - 1998 Syntax 

OCSP-2024-88
      {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
      security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
      id-mod-ocsp-2024-88(TBD1)}

DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=

BEGIN

IMPORTS

   -- PKIX Certificate Extensions
      AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax, CRLReason, GeneralName
      FROM PKIX1Implicit88 { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
           dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
           id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit(19) }

      Name, CertificateSerialNumber, Extensions,
      id-kp, id-ad-ocsp, Certificate, AlgorithmIdentifier
      FROM PKIX1Explicit88 { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
           dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
           id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit(18) };

OCSPRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
   tbsRequest              TBSRequest,
   optionalSignature   [0] EXPLICIT Signature OPTIONAL }

TBSRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
   version             [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
   requestorName       [1] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL,
   requestList             SEQUENCE OF Request,
   requestExtensions   [2] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }

Signature ::= SEQUENCE {
   signatureAlgorithm      AlgorithmIdentifier,
   signature               BIT STRING,
   certs               [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }

Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0) }

Nonce ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(1..128))

Request ::= SEQUENCE {
   reqCert                     CertID,
   singleRequestExtensions [0] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }

CertID ::= SEQUENCE {
   hashAlgorithm           AlgorithmIdentifier,
   issuerNameHash          OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's DN
   issuerKeyHash           OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's public key
   serialNumber            CertificateSerialNumber }

OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
   responseStatus          OCSPResponseStatus,
   responseBytes       [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL }

OCSPResponseStatus ::= ENUMERATED {
   successful          (0),  -- Response has valid confirmations
   malformedRequest    (1),  -- Illegal confirmation request
   internalError       (2),  -- Internal error in issuer
   tryLater            (3),  -- Try again later
                             -- (4) is not used
   sigRequired         (5),  -- Must sign the request
   unauthorized        (6)   -- Request unauthorized
}

ResponseBytes ::= SEQUENCE {
   responseType            OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
   response                OCTET STRING }

BasicOCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
  tbsResponseData          ResponseData,
  signatureAlgorithm       AlgorithmIdentifier,
  signature                BIT STRING,
  certs                [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }

ResponseData ::= SEQUENCE {
   version             [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
   responderID             ResponderID,
   producedAt              GeneralizedTime,
   responses               SEQUENCE OF SingleResponse,
   responseExtensions  [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }

ResponderID ::= CHOICE {
   byName              [1] Name,
   byKey               [2] KeyHash }

KeyHash ::= OCTET STRING -- SHA-1 hash of responder's public key
                         -- (i.e., the SHA-1 hash of the value of the
                         -- BIT STRING subjectPublicKey [excluding
                         -- the tag, length, and number of unused
                         -- bits] in the responder's certificate)

SingleResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
   certID                  CertID,
   certStatus              CertStatus,
   thisUpdate              GeneralizedTime,
   nextUpdate          [0] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
   singleExtensions    [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }

CertStatus ::= CHOICE {
   good                [0] IMPLICIT NULL,
   revoked             [1] IMPLICIT RevokedInfo,
   unknown             [2] IMPLICIT UnknownInfo }

RevokedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
   revocationTime          GeneralizedTime,
   revocationReason    [0] EXPLICIT CRLReason OPTIONAL }

UnknownInfo ::= NULL

ArchiveCutoff ::= GeneralizedTime

AcceptableResponses ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER

ServiceLocator ::= SEQUENCE {
   issuer                  Name,
   locator                 AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax }

CrlID ::= SEQUENCE {
    crlUrl               [0]     EXPLICIT IA5String OPTIONAL,
    crlNum               [1]     EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
    crlTime              [2]     EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL }

PreferredSignatureAlgorithms ::= SEQUENCE OF PreferredSignatureAlgorithm

PreferredSignatureAlgorithm ::= SEQUENCE {
   sigIdentifier   AlgorithmIdentifier,
   certIdentifier  AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL }



-- Object Identifiers

id-kp-OCSPSigning            OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 }
id-pkix-ocsp                 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad-ocsp }
id-pkix-ocsp-basic           OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 1 }
id-pkix-ocsp-nonce           OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 }
id-pkix-ocsp-crl             OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 3 }
id-pkix-ocsp-response        OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 4 }
id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck         OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 5 }
id-pkix-ocsp-archive-cutoff  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 6 }
id-pkix-ocsp-service-locator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 7 }
id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 8 }
id-pkix-ocsp-extended-revoke OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 9 }

END

A.2. OCSP in ASN.1 - 2008 Syntax 

OCSP-2024-08
     {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
     security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
     id-mod-ocsp-2024-08(TBD2)}

DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=

BEGIN

IMPORTS

Extensions{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
   {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
   mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)}

AlgorithmIdentifier{}, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, PUBLIC-KEY
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
   {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
   mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
   id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)}

AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax, GeneralName, CrlEntryExtensions, CRLReason
FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
   {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
   mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)}

Name, CertificateSerialNumber, id-kp, id-ad-ocsp, Certificate
FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
   {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
   mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)}

sa-dsaWithSHA1, sa-rsaWithMD2, sa-rsaWithMD5, sa-rsaWithSHA1
FROM PKIXAlgs-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
   {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
   mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
   id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56)};

OCSPRequest     ::=     SEQUENCE {
   tbsRequest                  TBSRequest,
   optionalSignature   [0]     EXPLICIT Signature OPTIONAL }

TBSRequest      ::=     SEQUENCE {
   version             [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
   requestorName       [1] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL,
   requestList             SEQUENCE OF Request,
   requestExtensions   [2] EXPLICIT Extensions {{re-ocsp-nonce |
                    re-ocsp-response, ...,
                    re-ocsp-preferred-signature-algorithms}} OPTIONAL }

Signature       ::=     SEQUENCE {
   signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier
                            { SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {...}},
   signature            BIT STRING,
   certs            [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }

Version  ::=  INTEGER  {  v1(0) }

Nonce ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(1..128))

Request ::=     SEQUENCE {
   reqCert                    CertID,
   singleRequestExtensions    [0] EXPLICIT Extensions
                                      { {re-ocsp-service-locator,
                                             ...}} OPTIONAL }

CertID ::= SEQUENCE {
   hashAlgorithm            AlgorithmIdentifier
                                {DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}},
   issuerNameHash     OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's DN
   issuerKeyHash      OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's public key
   serialNumber       CertificateSerialNumber }

OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
  responseStatus         OCSPResponseStatus,
  responseBytes          [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL }



OCSPResponseStatus ::= ENUMERATED {
   successful            (0), -- Response has valid confirmations
   malformedRequest      (1), -- Illegal confirmation request
   internalError         (2), -- Internal error in issuer
   tryLater              (3), -- Try again later
                              -- (4) is not used
   sigRequired           (5), -- Must sign the request
   unauthorized          (6)  -- Request unauthorized
}

RESPONSE ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER

ResponseSet RESPONSE ::= {basicResponse, ...}

ResponseBytes ::=       SEQUENCE {
   responseType        RESPONSE.
                           &amp;id ({ResponseSet}),
   response            OCTET STRING (CONTAINING RESPONSE.
                           &amp;Type({ResponseSet}{@responseType}))}

basicResponse RESPONSE ::=
   { BasicOCSPResponse IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-basic }

BasicOCSPResponse       ::= SEQUENCE {
  tbsResponseData      ResponseData,
  signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier{SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM,
                           {sa-dsaWithSHA1 | sa-rsaWithSHA1 |
                                sa-rsaWithMD5 | sa-rsaWithMD2, ...}},
  signature            BIT STRING,
  certs            [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }

ResponseData ::= SEQUENCE {
  version              [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
  responderID              ResponderID,
  producedAt               GeneralizedTime,
  responses                SEQUENCE OF SingleResponse,
  responseExtensions   [1] EXPLICIT Extensions
                              {{re-ocsp-nonce, ...,
                                re-ocsp-extended-revoke}} OPTIONAL }

ResponderID ::= CHOICE {
  byName   [1] Name,
  byKey    [2] KeyHash }

KeyHash ::= OCTET STRING -- SHA-1 hash of responder's public key
                        -- (excluding the tag and length fields)

SingleResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
  certID                       CertID,
  certStatus                   CertStatus,
  thisUpdate                   GeneralizedTime,
  nextUpdate           [0]     EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
  singleExtensions     [1]     EXPLICIT Extensions{{re-ocsp-crl |
                                            re-ocsp-archive-cutoff |
                                            CrlEntryExtensions, ...}
                                            } OPTIONAL }

CertStatus ::= CHOICE {
   good                [0]     IMPLICIT NULL,
   revoked             [1]     IMPLICIT RevokedInfo,
   unknown             [2]     IMPLICIT UnknownInfo }

RevokedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
   revocationTime              GeneralizedTime,
   revocationReason    [0]     EXPLICIT CRLReason OPTIONAL }

UnknownInfo ::= NULL

ArchiveCutoff ::= GeneralizedTime

AcceptableResponses ::= SEQUENCE OF RESPONSE.&amp;id({ResponseSet})

ServiceLocator ::= SEQUENCE {
   issuer    Name,
   locator   AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax }

CrlID ::= SEQUENCE {
   crlUrl               [0]     EXPLICIT IA5String OPTIONAL,
   crlNum               [1]     EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
   crlTime              [2]     EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL }

PreferredSignatureAlgorithms ::= SEQUENCE OF PreferredSignatureAlgorithm

PreferredSignatureAlgorithm ::= SEQUENCE {
  sigIdentifier  AlgorithmIdentifier{SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {...}},
  certIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier{PUBLIC-KEY, {...}} OPTIONAL
}

-- Certificate Extensions

ext-ocsp-nocheck EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX NULL IDENTIFIED
                                BY id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck }

-- Request Extensions

re-ocsp-nonce EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX Nonce
                             IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-nonce }

re-ocsp-response EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX AcceptableResponses IDENTIFIED
                                BY id-pkix-ocsp-response }

re-ocsp-service-locator EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX ServiceLocator
                                       IDENTIFIED BY
                                       id-pkix-ocsp-service-locator }

re-ocsp-preferred-signature-algorithms EXTENSION ::= {
  SYNTAX PreferredSignatureAlgorithms
  IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs  }

-- Response Extensions

re-ocsp-crl EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX CrlID IDENTIFIED BY
                               id-pkix-ocsp-crl }

re-ocsp-archive-cutoff EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX ArchiveCutoff
                                      IDENTIFIED BY
                                      id-pkix-ocsp-archive-cutoff }

re-ocsp-extended-revoke EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX NULL IDENTIFIED BY
                                       id-pkix-ocsp-extended-revoke }

-- Object Identifiers

id-kp-OCSPSigning            OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 }
id-pkix-ocsp                 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-ad-ocsp
id-pkix-ocsp-basic           OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 1 }
id-pkix-ocsp-nonce           OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 }
id-pkix-ocsp-crl             OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 3 }
id-pkix-ocsp-response        OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 4 }
id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck         OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 5 }
id-pkix-ocsp-archive-cutoff  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 6 }
id-pkix-ocsp-service-locator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 7 }
id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 8 }
id-pkix-ocsp-extended-revoke OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 9 }

END

Author's Address

Himanshu Sharma (editor)
Netskope Inc
2445 Augustine Dr 3rd floor
Santa Clara, California 95054
United States of America
URI: www.netskope.com