X.509 Certificate Extension for 5G Network Function Types

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) has specified several Network Functions (NFs) as part of the service-based architecture within the 5G System. The 49 NF types that are defined for 3GPP Release 17 listed in Table 6.1.6.3.3-1 of [TS29.510], and each NF type is identified by a short ASCII string.¶

Operators of 5G systems make use of an internal PKI to identify interface instances in the NFs in a 5G system. X.509v3 public key certificates [RFC5280] are used, and the primary function of a certificate is to bind a public key to the identity of an entity that holds the corresponding private key, known as the certificate subject. The certificate subject and the subjectAltName certificate extension can be used to support identity-based access control decisions.¶

This document specifies the NFTypes certificate extension, which provides a list of NF Types associated with the certificate subject. The NFTypes certificate extension can be used to support role-based access control decisions. The NFTypes certificate extension can be used by operators of 5G systems or later.¶

The certificate extension supports many different forms of role-based access control in support of the diversity of activities that NFs are trusted to perform in the overall system. An NF activity might include the implementation of filtering policies. Another NF activity might provide an access controlled resource. Different levels of confidence that the NFTypes are proper assigned are needed in these two examples, yet both contribute to the overall security of the 5G system.¶

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶

3. Certificate Subject Identification

Several patterns for certificate subject names are provided in Section 6.1.1 of [TS33.310] for the Network Domain Security (NDS) Authentication Framework (AF) for 3GPP Release 17. For example, the certificate subject name for an NF instance follows one of these patterns:¶

  (c=<country>), o=<Organization Name>, cn=<Some distinguishing name>

  cn=<hostname>, (ou=<servers>), dc=<domain>, dc=<domain>

When either pattern is used, the cn= portion is a DirectoryString; however, Section 4.1.2.6 of [RFC5280], limits the character set to either PrintableString or UTF8String. Note that the PrintableString has a much more limited set of characters that can be represented, and as a result, Section 6.1.1 of [TS33.310] requires the o= and cn= portions of the subject name to use UTF8String.¶

When the first pattern is used, the o= portion of the name contains the home domain as specified in Section 28.2 of [TS23.003] to identify the public land mobile network, and it takes the following form:¶

  5gc.mnc<MNC>.mcc<MCC>.3gppnetwork.org

where MNC designates the Mobile Network Code, and MCC designates the Mobile Country Code.¶

The certificates are expected to include the SubjectAltName certificate extension that contains a fully qualified domain name (FQDN), where the FQDN designates the NF as defined in Section 28.3.2.5 of [TS23.003]. For example, the SubjectAltName certificate extension for an NF instance implementing the AMF might include these FQDNs:¶

  amf1.cluster1.net2.amf.5gc.mnc012.mcc345.3gppnetwork.org

  amf1.callback.cluster1.net2.amf.5gc.mnc012.mcc345.3gppnetwork.org

The certificates for entities that can act as TLS clients or servers are also expected to include a uniformResourceIdentifier in the SubjectAltName certificate extension that contains the NF Instance ID as specified in Clause 5.3.2 of [TS29.571]. For example, the SubjectAltName certificate extension for an NF Instance ID might be:¶

  urn:uuid:f81d4fae-7dec-11d0-a765-00a0c91e6bf6

Following these patterns facilitates the use of the certificate subject and the subjectAltName certificate extension to support identity-based access control decisions.¶

When the second pattern is used, the dc= portion of the name contains a single domain component. For example, hostname.example.net would appear in the certificate subject as:¶

  cn=hostname, dc=example, dc=net

4. Network Functions Certificate Extension

This section specifies the NFTypes certificate extension, which provides a list of NF Types associated with the certificate subject.¶

The NFTypes certificate extension MAY be included in public key certificates [RFC5280]. The NFTypes extension MUST be identified by the following object identifier:¶

  id-pe-nftypes  OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=
     { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
       security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-pe(1) TBD1 }

This extension MUST NOT be marked critical.¶

The NFTypes extension MUST have the following syntax:¶

  NFTypes ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF NFType

  NFType ::= IA5String (SIZE (1..32))

The NFTypes MUST contain only the ASCII strings.¶

The NFTypes MUST contain at least one NFType.¶

The NFTypes MUST NOT contain the same NFType more than once.¶

Each NFType MUST contain at least one ASCII character, and each NFType MUST NOT contain more than 32 ASCII characters.¶

The NFType is of type IA5String to permit inclusion of the character underscore character ('_'), which is not part of the PrintableString character set.¶

5. ASN.1 Module

This section provides an ASN.1 module [X.680] for the NFTypes certificate extension, and it follows the conventions established in [RFC5912] and [RFC6268].¶

<CODE BEGINS>
  NFTypeCertExtn
    { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
      security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
      id-mod-nftype(TBD2) }

  DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
  BEGIN

  IMPORTS
    EXTENSION
    FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009  -- RFC 5912
      { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
        security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
        id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) } ;


  -- NFTypes Certificate Extension

  ext-NFType EXTENSION ::= {
    SYNTAX NFTypes
    IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-nftype }

  -- NFTypes Certificate Extension OID

  id-pe-nftype  OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=
     { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
       security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-pe(1) TBD1 }

  -- NFTypes Certificate Extension Syntax

  NFTypes ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF NFType

  NFType ::= IA5String (SIZE (1..32))

  END

<CODE ENDS>

6. Security Considerations

The Security Considerations of [RFC5280] are applicable to this document.¶

The ASCII strings that specify the NF Types are not standard; an operator MAY build its own NF Type. Since the NF Type is used for role-based access control decisions, the operator that specifies their own ASCII string for an NF Type MUST ensure that the new NF Type does not match an existing one. Use of the same ASCII string by two different operators for different roles could lead to confusion or incorrect access control decisions.¶

The certificate extension supports many different forms of role-based access control in support of the diversity of activities that NFs are trusted to perform in the overall system. An NF activity might include the implementation of filtering policies. Another NF activity might provide an access controlled resource. Different levels of confidence that the NFTypes are proper assigned are needed in these two examples, yet both contribute to the overall security of the 5G system. As a result, different operators might have different trust models for NFTypes certificate extension.¶

7. Privacy Considerations

In some security protocols, such as TLS 1.2 [RFC5246], certificates are exchanged in the clear. In other security protocols, such as TLS 1.3 [RFC8446], the certificates are encrypted. The inclusion of NFType certificate extension can help an observer determine which systems are of most interest based on the plaintext certificate transmission.¶

8. IANA Considerations

For the NFType certificate extension in Section 4, IANA is requested to assign an object identifier (OID) for the certificate extension. The OID for the certificate extension should be allocated in the "SMI Security for PKIX Certificate Extension" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1).¶

For the ASN.1 Module in Section 5, IANA is requested to assign an object identifier (OID) for the module identifier. The OID for the module should be allocated in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0).¶

9. Acknowledgements

Many thanks to Ben Smeets and Michael Li for their review and comments.¶

Appendix A. Appendix A. NFType Strings

Table 6.1.6.3.3-1 of [TS29.510] defines the ASCII strings for the NF Types specified in 3GPP documents, which are listed below in alphabetical order. This list is not exhaustive.¶

    "5G_DDNMF"        "ICSCF"           "SCEF"
    "5G_EIR"          "IMS_AS"          "SCP"
    "AANF"            "LMF"             "SCSAS"
    "ADRF"            "MB-SMF"          "SCSCF"
    "AF"              "MB-UPF"          "SEPP"
    "AMF"             "MFAF"            "SMF"
    "AUSF"            "MME"             "SMSF"
    "BSF"             "N3IWF"           "SOR_AF"
    "CBCF"            "NEF"             "SPAF"
    "CEF"             "NRF"             "TSCTSF"
    "CHF"             "NSACF"           "UCMF"
    "DCCF"            "NSSAAF"          "UDM"
    "DRA"             "NSSF"            "UDR"
    "EASDF"           "NSWOF"           "UDSF"
    "GBA_BSF"         "NWDAF"           "UPF"
    "GMLC"            "PCF"
    "HSS"             "PCSCF"

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