Simple Provisioning of Public Names for Residential Networks

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Home network owners may have devices or services hosted on this home network that they wish to access from the Internet (i.e., from a network outside of the home network). To enable this access, the names and IP addresses of these devices and services needs to be made available in the public DNS.¶

The names and IP address of the home network are present in the Public Homenet Zone by the Homenet Naming Authority (HNA), which in turn instructs the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure (DOI) to publish the zone on the behalf of the HNA. This document describes how an HNA can instruct a DOI to publish a Public Homenet Zone on its behalf.¶

The document introduces the Synchronization Channel and the Control Channel between the HNA and the Distribution Manager (DM) that belongs to the DOI.¶

The Synchronization Channel (see Section 7) is used to synchronize the Public Homenet Zone. The HNA is configured as a primary, while the DM is configured as a secondary.¶

The Control Channel (see Section 6) is used to set the Synchronization Channel. For example, to build the Public Homenet Zone, the HNA needs the authoritative servers (and associated IP addresses) of the servers of the DOI actually serving the zone. Similarly, the DOI needs to know the IP address of the primary (HNA) as well as potentially the hash of the Key SIgning Key (KSK) in the DS RRset to secure the DNSSEC delegation with the parent zone.¶

The remainder of the document is as follows. Section 2 defines the terminology, Section 3 presents the general problem of publishing names and IP addresses, Section 4 presents an alternative solution to the current mechanism described in this document and Section 5 presents some deployment scenarios. Section 5 provides an architectural view of the HNA, DM and DOI as well as their different communication channels (Control Channel, Synchronization Channel, DM Distribution Channel) respectively described in Section 6, Section 7 and Section 8. Section 9 and Section 11 respectively detail HNA security policies as well as DNSSEC compliance within the home network. Section 12 discusses how renumbering should be handled. Finally, Section 13 and Section 14 respectively discuss privacy and security considerations when outsourcing the Public Homenet Zone.¶

The appendices discuss several management (see Section 10) provisioning (see Section 10), configurations (see Appendix B) and deployment (see Section 4 and Appendix C) aspects.¶

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶

Customer Premises Equipment:

(CPE) is a router providing connectivity to the home network.¶

Homenet Zone:

is the DNS zone for use within the boundaries of the home network: 'home.arpa' (see [RFC8375]). This zone is not considered public and is out of scope for this document.¶

Registered Homenet Domain:

is the domain name that is associated with the home network. A given home network may have multiple Registered Homenet Domain.¶

Public Homenet Zone:

contains the names in the home network that are expected to be publicly resolvable on the Internet. A home network can have multiple Public Homenet Zones.¶

Homenet Naming Authority(HNA): is a function responsible for managing the Public Homenet Zone. This includes populating the Public Homenet Zone, signing the zone for DNSSEC, as well as managing the distribution of that Homenet Zone to the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure (DOI).¶

DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure (DOI):

is the infrastructure responsible for receiving the Public Homenet Zone and publishing it on the Internet. It is mainly composed of a Distribution Manager and Public Authoritative Servers.¶

Public Authoritative Servers:

are the authoritative name servers for the Public Homenet Zone. Name resolution requests for the Registered Homenet Domain are sent to these servers.¶

Homenet Authoritative Servers:

are authoritative name servers for the Homenet Zone within the Homenet network.¶

Distribution Manager (DM):

is the (set of) server(s) to which the HNA synchronizes the Public Homenet Zone, and which then distributes the relevant information to the Public Authoritative Servers.¶

Public Homenet Reverse Zone:

The reverse zone file associated with the Public Homenet Zone.¶

Reverse Public Authoritative Servers:

equivalent to Public Authoritative Servers specifically for reverse resolution.¶

Reverse Distribution Manager:

equivalent to Distribution Manager specifically for reverse resolution.¶

Homenet DNSSEC Resolver:

a resolver that performs a DNSSEC resolution on the home network for the Public Homenet Zone. The resolution is performed requesting the Homenet Authoritative Servers.¶

DNSSEC Resolver:

a resolver that performs a DNSSEC resolution on the Internet for the Public Homenet Zone. The resolution is performed requesting the Public Authoritative Servers.¶

3. Selecting Names and Addresses to Publish

While this document does not create any normative mechanism to select the names to publish, this document anticipates that the home network administrator (a human being), will be presented with a list of current names and addresses either directly on the HNA or via another device such as a phone.¶

The administrator would mark which devices and services (by name), are to be published. The HNA would then collect the IP address(es) associated with that device or service, and put the name into the Public Homenet Zone. The address of the device or service can be collected from a number of places: mDNS [RFC6762], DHCP [RFC8415], UPnP, PCP [RFC6887], or manual configuration.¶

A device or service may have Global Unicast Addresses (GUA) (IPv6 [RFC3787] or IPv4), Unique Local IPv6 Addresses (ULA) [RFC4193], as well IPv6-Link-Local addresses[RFC4291][RFC7404], IPv4-Link-Local Addresses [RFC3927] (LLA), and private IPv4 addresses [RFC1918]. Of these the link-local are almost never useful for the Public Zone, and should be omitted. The IPv6 ULA and the private IPv4 addresses may be useful to publish, if the home network environment features a VPN that would allow the home owner to reach the network.¶

The IPv6 ULA addresses are safer to publish with a significantly lower probability of collision than RFC1918 addresses.¶

In general, one expects the GUA to be the default address to be published. However, publishing the ULA and private IPv4 addresses may enable local communications within the home network. A direct advantage of enabling local communication is to enable communications even in case of Internet disruption. Since communications are established with names which remain a global identifier, the communication can be protected by TLS the same way it is protected on the global Internet - using certificates.¶

4. Envisioned deployment scenarios

A number of deployment scenarios have been envisioned, this section aims at providing a brief description. The use cases are not limitations and this section is not normative.¶

5. Architecture Description

This section provides an overview of the architecture for outsourcing the authoritative naming service from the HNA to the DOI. As a consequence, this prevents HNA to handle the DNS traffic from the Internet associated with the resolution of the Homenet Zone as depicted in Figure 1. More specifically, DNS resolution for the Public Homenet Zone (here myhome.example) from Internet DNSSEC resolvers is handled by the DOI as opposed to the HNA. The DOI benefits from a cloud infrastructure while the HNA is dimensioned for home network and as such likely enable to support any load. In the case the HNA is a CPE, outsourcing to the DOI protects the home network against DDoS for example. Of course the DOI needs to be informed dynamically about the content of myhome.example. The description of such a synchronization mechanism is the purpose of this document.¶

       Home network                 |         Internet
+----------------------+            | +----------------------+
|           HNA        |            | |          DOI         |
|+--------------------+|            | |+--------------------+|
|| Public Homenet Zone||<------------>|| Public Homenet Zone||
||   (myhome.example) ||            | ||   (myhome.example) ||
|+--------------------+|  DNS Zone  | |+--------------------+|
+----------------------+  Synchron- | +----------------------+
      (primary)           ization   |       ^  |   (secondary)
                                    |       |  | (DNS resolution)
                                    |       |  v
                                    | +-----------------------+
                                    | |       Internet        |
                                    | |    DNSSEC Resolver    |
                                    | +-----------------------+

Note that Appendix B shows necessary parameters to configure the HNA.¶

       Home network                 |         Internet
                                    |
                                    | +----------------------------+
                                    | |          DOI               |
       (primary)          Control   | |        (secondary)         |
+-----------------------+ Channel   | |  +-----------------------+ |
|         HNA           |<-------------->| Distribution Manager  | |
|+---------------------+|           | |  |+---------------------+| |
|| Public Homenet Zone ||Synchronization || Public Homenet Zone || |
||   (myhome.example)  || Channel   | |  ||  (myhome.example)   || |
|+---------------------+|<-------------->|+---------------------+| |
+-----------^-----------+           | |  +-----------------------+ |
            .                       | |           ^ Distribution   |
            .                       | |           | Channel        |
+-----------v-----------+           | |           v                |
| Homenet Authoritative |           | |  +-----------------------+ |
| Server(s)             |           | |  | Public Authoritative  | |
|+---------------------+|           | |  | Server(s)             | |
||Public Homenet Zone  ||           | |  |+---------------------+| |
||  (myhome.example)   ||           | |  || Public Homenet Zone || |
|+---------------------+|           | |  ||  (myhome.example)   || |
||     Homenet Zone    ||           | |  |+---------------------+| |
||     (home.arpa)     ||           | |  +-----------------------+ |
|+---------------------+|           | +----------^---|-------------+
+----------^---|--------+           |            |   |
           |   |           name resolution       |   |
           |   v                    |            |   v
 +----------------------+           | +-----------------------+
 |       Homenet        |           | |       Internet        |
 |    DNSSEC Resolver   |           | |    DNSSEC Resolver    |
 +----------------------+           | +-----------------------+

6. Control Channel

The DM Control Channel is used by the HNA and the DOI to exchange information related to the configuration of the delegation which includes information to build the Public Homenet Zone (Section 6.1), information to build the DNSSEC chain of trust (Section 6.2) and information to set the Synchronization Channel (Section 6.3). While information is carried from the DOI to the HNA and from the HNA to the DOI, the HNA is always initiating the exchange in both directions.¶

As such the HNA has a prior knowledge of the DM identity (X509 certificate), the IP address and port number to use and protocol to establish a secure session. The DM acquires knowledge of the identity of the HNA (X509 certificate) as well as the Registered Homenet Domain. For more detail to see how this can be achieved, please see Appendix A.1.¶

7. Synchronization Channel

The DM Synchronization Channel is used for communication between the HNA and the DM for synchronizing the Public Homenet Zone. Note that the Control Channel and the Synchronization Channel are by construction different channels even though there they may use the same IP address. Suppose the HNA and the DM are using a single IP address and let designate by XX, YYYY and ZZZZ the various ports involved in the communications. The Control Channel is between the HNA working as a client using port number YYYY (a high range port) toward a service provided by the DM at port number XX (well-known port such as 853 for DoT).¶

On the other hand, the Synchronization Channel is set between the DM working as a client using port ZZZZ ( another high range port) toward a service provided by the HNA at port XX.¶

As a result, even though the same pair of IP addresses may be involved the Control Channel and the Synchronization Channel are always distinct channels.¶

Uploading and dynamically updating the zone file on the DM can be seen as zone provisioning between the HNA (Hidden Primary) and the DM (Secondary Server). This can be handled via AXFR + DNS UPDATE.¶

The use of a primary / secondary mechanism [RFC1996] is RECOMMENDED instead of the use of DNS UPDATE [RFC2136]. The primary / secondary mechanism is RECOMMENDED as it scales better and avoids DoS attacks. Note that even when UPDATE messages are used, these messages are using a distinct channel as those used to set the configuration.¶

Note that there is no standard way to distribute a DNS primary between multiple devices. As a result, if multiple devices are candidate for hosting the Hidden Primary, some specific mechanisms should be designed so the home network only selects a single HNA for the Hidden Primary. Selection mechanisms based on HNCP [RFC7788] are good candidates.¶

The HNA acts as a Hidden Primary Server, which is a regular authoritative DNS Server listening on the WAN interface.¶

The DM is configured as a secondary for the Registered Homenet Domain Name. This secondary configuration has been previously agreed between the end user and the provider of the DOI as part of either the provisioning or due to receipt of DNS UPDATE messages on the DM Control Channel.¶

The Public Homenet Reverse Zone MAY also be updated either with DNS UPDATE [RFC2136] or using a primary / secondary synchronization.¶

8. DM Distribution Channel

The DM Distribution Channel is used for communication between the DM and the Public Authoritative Servers. The architecture and communication used for the DM Distribution Channels are outside the scope of this document, and there are many existing solutions available, e.g., rsync, DNS AXFR, REST, DB copy.¶

9. HNA Security Policies

The HNA as hidden primary processes only a limited message exchanges. This should be enforced using security policies - to allow only a subset of DNS requests to be received by HNA.¶

The HNA, as Hidden Primary SHOULD drop any DNS queries from the home network - as opposed to return DNS errors. This could be implemented via port binding and/or firewall rules. The precise mechanism deployed is out of scope of this document.¶

The HNA SHOULD drop any packets arriving on the WAN interface that are not issued from the DM - as opposed to server as an Homenet Authoritative Server exposed on the Internet.¶

Only TLS packet or potentially some DNS packets ( see XoT) packets SHOULD be allowed.¶

The HNA SHOULD NOT send DNS messages other than DNS NOTIFY query, SOA response, IXFR response or AXFR responses. The HNA SHOULD reject any incoming messages other than DNS NOTIFY response, SOA   query, IXFR query or AXFR query.¶

10. Public Homenet Reverse Zone

Public Homenet Reverse Zone works similarly to the Public Homenet Zone. The main difference is that ISP that provides the IP connectivity is likely also the owner of the corresponding reverse zone and act as a default DOI for it. If so, the configuration and the setting of the Synchronization Channel and Control Channel can largely be automated.¶

The Public Homenet Zone is associated with a Registered Homenet Domain and the ownership of that domain requires a specific registration from the end user as well as the HNA being provisioned with some authentication credentials. Such steps are mandatory unless the DOI has some other means to authenticate the HNA. Such situation may occur, for example, when the ISP provides the Homenet Domain as well as the DOI.¶

In this case, the HNA may be authenticated by the physical link layer, in which case the authentication of the HNA may be performed without additional provisioning of the HNA. While this may not be so common for the Public Homenet Zone, this situation is expected to be quite common for the Reverse Homenet Zone as the ISP owns the IP address or IP prefix.¶

More specifically, a common case is that the upstream ISP provides the IPv6 prefix to the Homenet with a IA_PD [RFC8415] option and manages the DOI of the associated reverse zone.¶

This leaves place for setting up automatically the relation between HNA and the DOI as described in [I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options].¶

In the case of the reverse zone, the DOI authenticates the source of the updates by IPv6 Access Control Lists. In the case of the reverse zone, the ISP knows exactly what addresses have been delegated. The HNA SHOULD therefore always originate Synchronization Channel updates from an IP address within the zone that is being updated.¶

For example, if the ISP has assigned 2001:db8:f00d::/64 to the WAN interface (by DHCPv6, or PPP/RA), then the HNA should originate Synchronization Channel updates from, for example, 2001:db8:f00d::2.¶

An ISP that has delegated 2001:db8:aeae::/56 to the HNA via DHCPv6-PD, then HNA should originate Synchronization Channel updates an IP within that subnet, such as 2001:db8:aeae:1::2.¶

With this relation automatically configured, the synchronization between the Home network and the DOI happens similarly as for the Public Homenet Zone described earlier in this document.¶

Note that for home networks connected to by multiple ISPs, each ISP provides only the DOI of the reverse zones associated with the delegated prefix. It is also likely that the DNS exchanges will need to be performed on dedicated interfaces as to be accepted by the ISP. More specifically, the reverse zone associated with prefix 1 will not be possible to be performs by the HNA using an IP address that belongs to prefix 2. Such constraints does not raise major concerns either for hot standby or load sharing configuration.¶

With IPv6, the reverse domain space for IP addresses associated with a subnet such as ::/64 is so large that reverse zone may be confronted with scalability issues. How the reverse zone is generated is out of scope of this document. [RFC8501] provides guidance on how to address scalability issues.¶

11. DNSSEC compliant Homenet Architecture

[RFC7368] in Section 3.7.3 recommends DNSSEC to be deployed on both the authoritative server and the resolver. The resolver side is out of scope of this document, and only the authoritative part of the server is considered.¶

It is RECOMMENDED the HNA signs the Public Homenet Zone.¶

Secure delegation is achieved only if the DS RRset is properly set in the parent zone. Secure delegation can be performed by the HNA or the DOIs and the choice highly depends on which entity is authorized to perform such updates. Typically, the DS RRset can be updated manually in the parent zone with nsupdate for example. This requires the HNA or the DOI to be authenticated by the DNS server hosting the parent of the Public Homenet Zone. Such a trust channel between the HNA and the parent DNS server may be hard to maintain with HNAs, and thus may be easier to establish with the DOI. In fact, the Public Authoritative Server(s) may use Automating DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance [RFC7344].¶

12. Renumbering

During a renumbering of the network, the HNA IP address is changed and the Public Homenet Zone is updated potentially by the HNA. Then, the HNA advertises to the DM via a NOTIFY, that the Public Homenet Zone has been updated and that the IP address of the primary has been updated. This corresponds to the standard DNS procedure performed on the Synchronization Channel and no specific actions are expected for the HNA (See Section 6.3).¶

The remaining of the section provides recommendations regarding the provisioning of the Public Homenet Zone - especially the IP addresses. Renumbering has been extensively described in [RFC4192] and analyzed in [RFC7010] and the reader is expected to be familiar with them before reading this section. In the make-before-break renumbering scenario, the new prefix is advertised, the network is configured to prepare the transition to the new prefix. During a period of time, the two prefixes old and new coexist, before the old prefix is completely removed. In the break-before-make renumbering scenario, the new prefix is advertised making the old prefix obsolete.¶

In a renumbering scenario, the HNA or Hidden Primary is informed it is being renumbered. In most cases, this occurs because the whole home network is being renumbered. As a result, the Public Homenet Zone will also be updated. Although the new and old IP addresses may be stored in the Public Homenet Zone, it is RECOMMENDED that only the newly reachable IP addresses be published. Regarding the Public Homenet Reverse Zone, the new Public Homenet Reverse Zone has to be populated as soon as possible, and the old Public Homenet Reverse Zone will be deleted by the owner of the zone (and the owner of the old prefix which is usually the ISP) once the prefix is no longer assigned to the HNA. The ISP SHOULD ensure that the DNS cache has expired before re-assigning the prefix to a new home network. This may be enforced by controlling the TTL values.¶

To avoid reachability disruption, IP connectivity information provided by the DNS SHOULD be coherent with the IP in use. In our case, this means the old IP address SHOULD NOT be provided via the DNS when it is not reachable anymore. Let for example TTL be the TTL associated with a RRset of the Public Homenet Zone, it may be cached for TTL seconds. Let T_NEW be the time the new IP address replaces the old IP address in the Homenet Zone, and T_OLD_UNREACHABLE the time the old IP is not reachable anymore.¶

In the case of the make-before-break, seamless reachability is provided as long as T_OLD_UNREACHABLE - T_NEW > 2 * TTL. If this is not satisfied, then devices associated with the old IP address in the home network may become unreachable for 2 * TTL - (T_OLD_UNREACHABLE - T_NEW). In the case of a break-before-make, T_OLD_UNREACHABLE = T_NEW, and the device may become unreachable up to 2 * TTL. Of course if T_NEW >= T_OLD_UNREACHABLE, the disruption is increased.¶

13. Privacy Considerations

Outsourcing the DNS Authoritative service from the HNA to a third party raises a few privacy related concerns.¶

The Public Homenet Zone lists the names of services hosted in the home network. Combined with blocking of AXFR queries, the use of NSEC3 [RFC5155] (vs NSEC [RFC4034]) prevents an attacker from being able to walk the zone, to discover all the names. However, recent work [GPUNSEC3] or [ZONEENUM] have shown that the protection provided by NSEC3 against dictionary attacks should be considered cautiously and [RFC9276] provides guidelines to configure NSEC3 properly. In addition, the attacker may be able to walk the reverse DNS zone, or use other reconnaissance techniques to learn this information as described in [RFC7707].¶

The zone is also exposed during the synchronization between the primary and the secondary. [RFC9103] only specifies the use of TLS for XFR transfers, which leak the existence of the zone and has been clearly specified as out of scope of the threat model of [RFC9103]. Additional privacy MAY be provided by protecting all exchanges of the Synchronization Channel as well as the Control Channel.¶

In general a home network owner is expected to publish only names for which there is some need to be able to reference externally. Publication of the name does not imply that the service is necessarily reachable from any or all parts of the Internet. [RFC7084] mandates that the outgoing-only policy [RFC6092] be available, and in many cases it is configured by default. A well designed User Interface would combine a policy for making a service public by a name with a policy on who may access it.¶

In many cases, and for privacy reasons, the home network owner wished publish names only for services that they will be able to access. The access control may consist of an IP source address range, or access may be restricted via some VPN functionality. The main advantages of publishing the name are that service may be access by the same name both within the home and outside the home and that the DNS resolution can be handled similarly within the home and outside the home. This considerably eases the ability to use VPNs where the VPN can be chosen according to the IP address of the service. Typically, a user may configure its device to reach its homenet devices via a VPN while the remaining of the traffic is accessed directly. In such cases, the routing policy is likely to be defined by the destination IP address.¶

Enterprise networks have generally adopted another strategy designated as split-DNS. While such strategy might appear as providing more privacy at first sight, its implementation remains challenging and the privacy advantages needs to be considered carefully. In split-DNS, names are designated with internal names that can only be resolved within the corporate network. When such strategy is applied to homenet, VPNs needs to be both configured with a naming resolution policies and routing policies. Such approach might be reasonable with a single VPN, but maintaining a coherent DNS space and IP space among various VPNs comes with serious complexities. Firstly, if multiple homenets are using the same domain name -like home.arpa - it becomes difficult to determine on which network the resolution should be performed. As a result, homenets should at least be differentiated by a domain name. Secondly, the use of split-DNS requires each VPN being associated with a resolver and specific resolutions being performed by the dedicated resolver. Such policies can easily raises some conflicts (with significant privacy issues) while remaining hard to be implemented.¶

In addition to the Public Homenet Zone, pervasive DNS monitoring can also monitor the traffic associated with the Public Homenet Zone. This traffic may provide an indication of the services an end user accesses, plus how and when they use these services. Although, caching may obfuscate this information inside the home network, it is likely that outside your home network this information will not be cached.¶

14. Security Considerations

This document exposes a mechanism that prevents the HNA from being exposed to the Internet and served DNS request from the Internet. These requests are instead served by the DOI. While this limits the level of exposure of the HNA, the HNA remains exposed to the Internet with communications with the DOI. This section analyses the attack surface associated with these communications, the data published by the DOI, as well as operational considerations.¶

15. IANA Considerations

This document has no actions for IANA.¶

16. Acknowledgment

The authors wish to thank Philippe Lemordant for his contributions on the early versions of the draft; Ole Troan for pointing out issues with the IPv6 routed home concept and placing the scope of this document in a wider picture; Mark Townsley for encouragement and injecting a healthy debate on the merits of the idea; Ulrik de Bie for providing alternative solutions; Paul Mockapetris, Christian Jacquenet, Francis Dupont and Ludovic Eschard for their remarks on HNA and low power devices; Olafur Gudmundsson for clarifying DNSSEC capabilities of small devices; Simon Kelley for its feedback as dnsmasq implementer; Andrew Sullivan, Mark Andrew, Ted Lemon, Mikael Abrahamson, and Ray Bellis for their feedback on handling different views as well as clarifying the impact of outsourcing the zone signing operation outside the HNA; Mark Andrew and Peter Koch for clarifying the renumbering.¶

At last the authors would like to thank Kiran Makhijani for her in-depth review that contributed in shaping the final version.¶

17. Contributors

The co-authors would like to thank Chris Griffiths and Wouter Cloetens that provided a significant contribution in the early versions of the document.¶

Appendix A. HNA Channel Configurations

Appendix B. Information Model for Outsourced information

This section specifies an optional format for the set of parameters required by the HNA to configure the naming architecture of this document.¶

In cases where a home router has not been provisioned by the manufacturer (when forward zones are provided by the manufacturer), or by the ISP (when the ISP provides this service), then a home user/owner will need to configure these settings via an administrative interface.¶

By defining a standard format (in JSON) for this configuration information, the user/owner may be able to just copy and paste a configuration blob from the service provider into the administrative interface of the HNA.¶

This format may also provide the basis for a future OAUTH2 [RFC6749] flow that could do the setup automatically.¶

The HNA needs to be configured with the following parameters as described by this CDDL [RFC8610]. These are the parameters are necessary to establish a secure channel between the HNA and the DM as well as to specify the DNS zone that is in the scope of the communication.¶

hna-configuration = {
  "registered_domain" : tstr,
  "dm"                : tstr,
  ? "dm_transport" : "DoT"
  ? "dm_port"        : uint,
  ? "dm_acl"         : hna-acl / [ +hna-acl ]
  ? "hna_auth_method": hna-auth-method
  ? "hna_certificate": tstr
}

hna-acl          = tstr
hna-auth-method  /= "certificate"

For example:¶

{
  "registered_domain" : "n8d234f.r.example.net",
  "dm"                : "2001:db8:1234:111:222::2",
  "dm_transport"      : "DoT",
  "dm_port"           : 4433,
  "dm_acl"            : "2001:db8:1f15:62e:21c::/64"
                   or [ "2001:db8:1f15:62e:21c::/64", ... ]
  "hna_auth_method"   : "certificate",
  "hna_certificate"   : "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMIIDTjCCFGy....",
}

Registered Homenet Domain (registered_domain)

The Domain Name of the zone. Multiple Registered Homenet Domains may be provided. This will generate the creation of multiple Public Homenet Zones. This parameter is mandatory.¶

Distribution Manager notification address (dm)

The associated FQDNs or IP addresses of the DM to which DNS notifies should be sent. This parameter is mandatory. IP addresses are optional and the FQDN is sufficient and preferred. If there are concerns about the security of the name to IP translation, then DNSSEC should be employed.¶

As the session between the HNA and the DM is authenticated with TLS, the use of names is easier.¶

As certificates are more commonly emitted for FQDN than for IP addresses, it is preferred to use names and authenticate the name of the DM during the TLS session establishment.¶

Supported Transport (dm_transport)

The transport that carries the DNS exchanges between the HNA and the DM. Typical value is "DoT" but it may be extended in the future with "DoH", "DoQ" for example. This parameter is optional and by default the HNA uses DoT.¶

Distribution Manager Port (dm_port)

Indicates the port used by the DM. This parameter is optional and the default value is provided by the Supported Transport. In the future, additional transport may not have default port, in which case either a default port needs to be defined or this parameter become mandatory.¶

Note that HNA does not defines ports for the Synchronization Channel. In any case, this is not expected to part of the configuration, but instead negotiated through the Configuration Channel. Currently the Configuration Channel does not provide this, and limits its agility to a dedicated IP address. If such agility is needed in the future, additional exchanges will need to be defined.¶

Authentication Method ("hna_auth_method"):

How the HNA authenticates itself to the DM within the TLS connection(s). The authentication method can typically be "certificate", "psk" or "none". This Parameter is optional and by default the Authentication Method is "certificate".¶

Authentication data ("hna_certificate", "hna_key"): : The certificate chain used to authenticate the HNA. This parameter is optional and when not specified, a self-signed certificate is used.¶

Distribution Manager AXFR permission netmask (dm_acl):

The subnet from which the CPE should accept SOA queries and AXFR requests. A subnet is used in the case where the DOI consists of a number of different systems. An array of addresses is permitted. This parameter is optional and if unspecified, the CPE uses the IP addresses provided by the dm parameter either directly when dm indicates an IP address or the IP addresses returned by the DNS(SEC) resolution when dm indicates a FQDN.¶

For forward zones, the relationship between the HNA and the forward zone provider may be the result of a number of transactions:¶

1. The forward zone outsourcing may be provided by the maker of the Homenet router. In this case, the identity and authorization could be built in the device at manufacturer provisioning time. The device would need to be provisioned with a device-unique credential, and it is likely that the Registered Homenet Domain would be derived from a public attribute of the device, such as a serial number (see Appendix C or [I-D.richardson-homerouter-provisioning] for more details ).¶
2. The forward zone outsourcing may be provided by the Internet Service Provider. In this case, the use of [I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options] to provide the credentials is appropriate.¶
3. The forward zone may be outsourced to a third party, such as a domain registrar. In this case, the use of the JSON-serialized YANG data model described in this section is appropriate, as it can easily be copy and pasted by the user, or downloaded as part of a web transaction.¶

For reverse zones, the relationship is always with the upstream ISP (although there may be more than one), and so [I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options] is always the appropriate interface.¶

The following is an abbridged example of a set of data that represents the needed configuration parameters for outsourcing.¶

Appendix C. Example: A manufacturer provisioned HNA product flow

This scenario is one where a homenet router device manufacturer decides to offer DNS hosting as a value add.¶

[I-D.richardson-homerouter-provisioning] describes a process for a home router credential provisioning system. The outline of it is that near the end of the manufacturing process, as part of the firmware loading, the manufacturer provisions a private key and certificate into the device.¶

In addition to having a assymmetric credential known to the manufacturer, the device also has been provisioned with an agreed upon name. In the example in the above document, the name "n8d234f.r.example.net" has already been allocated and confirmed with the manufacturer.¶

The HNA can use the above domain for itself. It is not very pretty or personal, but if the owner wishes a better name, they can arrange for it.¶

The configuration would look like:¶

{
  "dm" : "2001:db8:1234:111:222::2",
  "dm_acl"    : "2001:db8:1234:111:222::/64",
  "dm_ctrl"   : "manufacturer.example.net",
  "dm_port"   : "4433",
  "ns_list"   : [ "ns1.publicdns.example", "ns2.publicdns.example"],
  "zone"      : "n8d234f.r.example.net",
  "auth_method" : "certificate",
  "hna_certificate":"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMIIDTjCCFGy....",
}

The dm_ctrl and dm_port values would be built into the firmware.¶

Authors' Addresses