| Internet-Draft | auth-formats | April 2022 |
| Wiethuechter (Editor), et al. | Expires 1 November 2022 | [Page] |
This document describes how to include trust into the ASTM Remote ID specification defined in ASTM F3411 under Broadcast Remote ID (RID). It defines a few message schemes (sent within the Authentication Message) that can be used to authenticate past messages sent by a unmanned aircraft (UA) and provide proof of UA trustworthiness even in the absence of Internet connectivity at the receiving node.¶
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."¶
This Internet-Draft will expire on 1 November 2022.¶
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) are usually in a volatile environment when it comes to communication. UA are generally small with little computational (or flying) horsepower to carry standard communication equipment. This limits the mediums of communication to few viable options.¶
Observer systems (e.g. smartphones and tablets) place further constraints on the communication options. The Remote ID Broadcast messages MUST be available to applications on these platforms without modifying the devices.¶
The ASTM [F3411] standard focuses on two ways of communicating to a UAS for Remote ID (RID): Broadcast and Network.¶
This document will focus on adding trust to Broadcast RID via the Authentication Message by combining dynamically signed data with an Attestation of the UA's identity from a Registry.¶
The following [drip-requirements] will be addressed:¶
See Section 7.3 for further clarification.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
See [drip-requirements] for common DRIP terms.¶
The current standard for Remote ID does not, in any meaningful capacity, address the concerns of trust in the UA space with communication in the Broadcast RID environment. This is a requirement that will need to be addressed eventually for various different parties that have a stake in the UA industry.¶
A UA has the option of broadcasting using Bluetooth (4 and 5) or Wi-Fi (BEACON or NAN), see Section 7. With Bluetooth, FAA and other CAA mandate transmitting simultaneously over both 4 and 5. With Wi-Fi, use of BEACON is recommended. Wi-Fi NAN is another option, depending on CAA.¶
Bluetooth 4 presents a payload size challenge in that it can only transmit 25 bytes of payload where the others all can support 252 byte payloads.¶
The ASTM Authentication Message has provisions in [F3411] to allow for other organizations to standardize additional Authentication formats beyond those explicitly in [F3411]. The standardization of specific formats to support the DRIP requirements in UAS RID for trustworthy communications over Broadcast RID is an important part of the chain of trust for a UAS ID. No existing formats (defined in [F3411] or other organizations leveraging this feature) provide the functionality to satisfy this goal resulting in the work reflected in this document.¶
The ASTM Authentication Message (Message Type 0x2) is a unique message in the Broadcast [F3411] standard as it is the only one that is larger than the Bluetooth 4 frame size. To address this, it is defined as a set of "pages" that each fits into a single Bluetooth 4 broadcast frame. For other media these pages are still used but all in a single frame.¶
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Page Header | |
+---------------+ |
| |
| |
| Authentication Payload |
| |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
Page Header: (1 byte)
Authentication Type (4 bits)
Page Number (4 bits)
Authentication Payload: (23 bytes per page)
Authentication Payload, including headers. Null padded.
A single Authentication Message is akin to a UDP packet. The Authentication Message is structured as a set of up to 16 pages. Over Bluetooth 4, these pages are "fragmented" into separate Bluetooth 4 broadcast frames.¶
Either as a single Authentication Message or a set of fragmented Authentication Message Pages the structure(s) is further wrapped by outer ASTM framing and the specific link framing (Bluetooth or Wi-Fi).¶
[F3411] has the following subset of Authentication Type's defined and that can be used in the Page Header:¶
| Authentication Type | Description |
|---|---|
| 0x2 | Operator ID Signature |
| 0x3 | Message Set Signature |
| 0x5 | Specific Authentication Method |
This document leverages Authentication Type 0x5, Specific Authentication Method (SAM), defining a set of SAM Types in Section 6.3. Other Authentication Types are also used in DRIP and their use is defined in Section 6.¶
There is a technical maximum of 16 pages (indexed 0 to 15 in the Page Header) that can be sent for a single Authentication Message, with each page carrying a max 23-byte Authentication Payload. See Section 3.3.2 for more details.¶
The following is shown in its complete format.¶
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Authentication Headers |
| +---------------+---------------+
| | |
+---------------+---------------+ |
. .
. Authentication Data / Signature .
. .
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| ADL | |
+---------------+ |
. .
. Additional Data .
. .
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
Authentication Headers: (6 bytes)
Contains other header information for the Authentication
Message as defined in F3411.
Authentication Data / Signature: (0 to 255 bytes)
Opaque authentication data.
Additional Data Length (ADL): (1 byte - unsigned)
Length in bytes of Additional Data.
Additional Data: (0 to 255 bytes):
Data that follows the Authentication Data / Signature but
is not considered part of the Authentication Data.
Figure 2 is the abstract view of the data fields found in the Authentication Message as defined by [F3411]. This data is placed into Figure 1's Authentication Payload, spanning multiple pages.¶
When Additional Data is being sent, a single unsigned byte (Additional Data Length) directly follows the Authentication Data / Signature and has the length, in bytes, of the following Additional Data. For DRIP, this field is used to carry Forward Error Correction as defined in Section 4.¶
To keep consistent formatting across the different transports (Legacy and Extended) and their independent restrictions the authentication data being sent is REQUIRED to fit within the page limit of the most constrained existing transport can support. Under Broadcast RID the transport that can hold the least amount of authentication data is Bluetooth 5 and Wi-Fi BEACON at 9-pages.¶
As such DRIP transmitters are REQUIRED to adhere to the following when using the Authentication Message:¶
For Broadcast RID, Forward Error Correction (FEC) is provided by the lower layers in Extended Transports (Bluetooth 5.X, Wi-Fi NaN, and Wi-Fi BEACON). Legacy Transports do not have supporting FEC so with DRIP Authentication the following application level FEC scheme is used.¶
For any encoding the FEC data MUST start on new ASTM Authentication Page. To do this null padding is add before the actual FEC data starts and the length of the whole blob (null padding and FEC) is used as the Additional Data Length. To properly fit FEC data into an Authentication Page the number of parity-bytes is limited to 23 (or a multiple thereof). This means that the Page Header (and anything before it) is omitted in the FEC process.¶
To generate the parity a simple XOR operation using the previous and current page is used. Only the last 23-bytes are used during the XOR operation. For Page 0, a 23-byte null pad is used for the previous page. The resulting parity fills the Additional Data field of [F3411] with the Additional Data Length field being set to 23 or greater (depending on number of null pad bytes are needed to get onto the next page).¶
Page N-1: 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ | Page Header | | +---------------+ | | Authentication Data / Signature | | | | +---------------+---------------+---------------+ | | ADL=33 | | +---------------+---------------+ | | Null Padding | | | +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ Page N: 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ | Page Header | | +---------------+ | | | | Forward Error Correction | | | | | | | +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
For Multiple Page FEC there are two flavors: Frame Recovery and Page Recovery. Both follow a similar process, but are offset at what data is actually protected.¶
(Editor Note: to improve interop should we explicitly select a polynomial for Reed Solomon that DRIP must use?)¶
Take the following example of an Authentication Message that 3-pages of parity are to be generated for:¶
12 50 098960bf8c05 042001001000a00145aac6b00abba268b7 12 51 2001001000a0014579d8a404d48f2ef9bb9a4470ada5b4 12 52 ff1352c7402af9d9ebd20034e8d7a12920f4d7e91c1a73 12 53 dca7d04e776150825863c512c6eb075a206a95c59b297e 12 54 f2935fd416f27b1b42fd5d9dfaa0dec79f32287f41b454 12 55 7101415def153a770d3e6c0b17ae560809bc634a822c1f 12 56 3b1064b80a000000000000000000000000000000000000¶
For Page Recovery the first two columns are ignored (being the Page Header and any data before it), the last 23 columns are extracted and have Reed Solomon performed on it to produce parity bytes. For the example the following 3-bytes of parity are generated:¶
dc6c2b = ReedSolomon.encoder(0920ffdcf2713b)¶
Each set of parity is the placed into a pseudo-frame as follows (each byte in its own message in the same column):¶
00 00 dc00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00 00 6c00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00 00 2b00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000¶
The above data set produces the following full set of parity:¶
00 00 dc6657acd30b2ec4aa582049f52adf9f922e62c469563a 00 00 6c636a59145a55417a3895fd543f19e94200be4abc5e94 00 00 02bba5e28f5896d754caf50016a983993b149b5c9e6eeb¶
The last 23-bytes are then added into the Additional Data fields of their respective pages:¶
12 57 dc6657acd30b2ec4aa582049f52adf9f922e62c469563a 12 58 6c636a59145a55417a3895fd543f19e94200be4abc5e94 12 59 02bba5e28f5896d754caf50016a983993b149b5c9e6eeb¶
Frame Recovery uses the full ASTM Message and performs Reed Solomon over each byte. Below is an example of a number of messages.¶
10 42012001001000a0014579d8a404d48f2ef9000000000000 11 249600006efeb019ee111ed37a097a0948081c10ffff0000 12 50 098960bf8c05 042001001000a00145aac6b00abba268b7 12 51 2001001000a0014579d8a404d48f2ef9bb9a4470ada5b4 12 52 ff1352c7402af9d9ebd20034e8d7a12920f4d7e91c1a73 12 53 dca7d04e776150825863c512c6eb075a206a95c59b297e 12 54 f2935fd416f27b1b42fd5d9dfaa0dec79f32287f41b454 12 55 7101415def153a770d3e6c0b17ae560809bc634a822c1f 12 56 3b1064b80a000000000000000000000000000000000000 13 0052656372656174696f6e616c2054657374000000000000 14 02c2ffb019322d1ed3010000c008e40700fc080000000000 15 004e2e4f5031323334353600000000000000000000000000¶
Each column is extracted and has Reed Solomon performed on it to produce parity bytes. In the below example 5-bytes of parity are generated with Frame Recovery:¶
6c3f42b8a8 = ReedSolomon.encoder(101112121212121212131415)¶
Each set of parity is the placed into a pseudo-frame as follows (each byte in its own message in the same column):¶
6c000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 3f000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 42000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 b8000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 a8000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000¶
The above data set produces the following sets of parity:¶
6c86337bf7ab746f5d62bb7f8de954104b121585d3975f6e92 3f06c1bce165b0e25930d57a63c24f751145e1dd8dc115029b 42e9979580327a6a14d421c12a33aa2e1a2e517daaee581016 b8012a7b3964f7b2720d387bfa77e945556f1831cd477ef3a3 a85bb403aada89926fb8fc2a14a9caacb4ec2f3a6ed2d8e9f9¶
For Frame Recovery the above data would be placed into Authentication Pages like below:¶
12 57 6c86337bf7ab746f5d62bb7f8de954104b121585d3975f 12 58 6e923f06c1bce165b0e25930d57a63c24f751145e1dd8d 12 59 c115029b42e9979580327a6a14d421c12a33aa2e1a2e51 12 5a 7daaee581016b8012a7b3964f7b2720d387bfa77e94555 12 5b 6f1831cd477ef3a3a85bb403aada89926fb8fc2a14a9ca 12 5c acb4ec2f3a6ed2d8e9f900000000000000000000000000¶
Up to 240 (255 minus 15 pages max of FEC data) messages can be protected using Frame Recovery.¶
Due to the nature of Bluetooth 4 and the existing ASTM paging structure an optimization can be used. If a Bluetooth frame fails its CRC check, then the frame is dropped without notification to the upper protocol layers. From the Remote ID perspective this means the loss of a complete frame/message/page. In Authentication Messages, each page is already numbered so the loss of a page allows the receiving application to build a "dummy" page filling the entire page with nulls.¶
If Page 0 is being reconstructed an additional check of the Last Page Index to check against how many pages are actually present, MUST be performed for sanity. An additional check on the Length field SHOULD also be performed.¶
To determine if Single Page FEC or Multiple Page FEC has been used a simple check of the Last Page Index can be used. If the number of pages left after the Length of Authentication Data is exhausted than it is clear that the remaining pages are all FEC. The Additional Data Length byte can further confirm this; taking into account any null padding needed for page alignment.¶
Using the same methods as encoding, an XOR operation is used between the previous and current page (a 23-byte null pad is used as the start). The resulting 23-bytes should be data of the missing page.¶
To determine if Page Recovery or Frame Recovery is used two modulo checks with the ADL after the length of the null-pad is removed are needed. One against the value of 23, and the other against the value of 25. If 23 comes back with a value of 0 then Page Recovery is being used. If 25 comes back with 0 then Frame Recovery is used. Any other combination indicates an error.¶
To decode Page Recovery, dummy pages (pages with nulls as the data) are needed in the places no page was received. Then Reed Solomon can decode across the columns of the 23-bytes of each page. Erasures can be used as it is known which pages are missing and can improve the Reed Solomon results by specifying them.¶
To decode Frame Recovery, the receiver must first extract all FEC data from the pages; concatenate them and then break into 25-byte chunks. This will produce the pseudo-frames. Now Reed Solomon can be used to decode columns, with dummy frames inserted where needed.¶
The worst case scenario is when the Authentication Data / Signature ends perfectly on a page (Page N-1). This means the Additional Data Length would start the next page (Page N) and have 22-bytes worth of null padding to align the FEC in to the next page (Page N+1). In this scenario an entire page (Page N) is being wasted just to carry the Additional Data Length. This should be be avoided at all costs - in an effort to maintain efficiency.¶
To directly support Broadcast RID a variation of the Attestation Structure format of [drip-registries] SHOULD be used when running DRIP under the various Authentication Types (filling the Authentication Data / Signature field of Figure 2) and SAM Types (filling the SAM Authentication Data field (Section 6.3.1.2)). The notable changes of the structure is that the timestamps are set by the UA and the Attestor Identity Information is set to the DET of the UA.¶
When using this structure the UA is always self-attesting its DRIP Entity Tag (DET). The Host Identity of the UA DET can be looked up by mechanisms described in [drip-registries] or by extracting it from Broadcast Attestation (see Section 6.3.2 and Section 7.3).¶
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| UA |
| DRIP Entity Tag |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
. .
. Attestation Data .
. .
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Not Before Timestamp by UA |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Not After Timestamp by UA |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| UA Signature |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
UA DRIP Entity Tag (16 bytes):
The UA DET in byte form (network byte order).
Attestation Data (0 to 112 bytes):
Opaque attestation data.
Not Before Timestamp by UA (4-bytes):
Timestamp denoting recommended time to start trusting data.
Not After Timestamp by UA (4 bytes):
Timestamp denoting recommended time to stop trusting data.
UA Signature (64 bytes):
Signature over preceding fields using the keypair of
the UA.
Attestation Data is a field with a maximum of 112-bytes, containing data that the UA is attesting during its flight.¶
The Not After Timestamp and Not Before Timestamp MUST follow the format defined in [F3411]. That is a Unix-style timestamp
but with an epoch of 01/01/2019 00:00:00. Not Before Timestamp MUST be set to the time the structure is signed over. An additional offset is then added to push the Not After Timestamp a short time into the future to avoid replay attacks.¶
The offset used against the Unix-style timestamp is not defined in this document. Best practice identifying an acceptable offset should be used taking into consideration the UA environment, and propagation characteristics of the messages being sent and clock differences between the UA and Observers. A reasonable time would be to set Not After Timestamp 2 minutes ahead of Not Before Timestamp.¶
All formats defined in this section fill the Authentication Data / Signature field in Figure 2.¶
When sending data over a medium that does not have underlying Forward Error Correction (FEC), for example Bluetooth 4, then Section 4 MUST be used.¶
The existing ASTM [F3411] Authentication Type 0x2 can be used to send a static Self-Attestation of the Operator.¶
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| Operator |
| DRIP Entity Tag |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| |
| |
| Operator Host Identity |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Not Before Timestamp by Operator |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Not After Timestamp by Operator |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| Operator Signature |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
UA DRIP Entity Tag (16 bytes):
The Operator DET in byte form (network byte order).
Operator Host Identity (32-bytes):
HI of the Operator.
Not Before Timestamp by Operator (4 bytes):
Timestamp denoting recommended time to start trusting data.
Not After Timestamp by Operator (4 bytes):
Timestamp denoting recommended time to stop trusting data.
Operator Signature (64 bytes):
Signature over preceding fields using the keypair of
the Operator.
When running under Extended Transports, the existing ASTM [F3411] Authentication Type 0x3 can be used to sign over the adjacent ASTM Messages in the Message Pack (Message Type 0xF).¶
The concatenation of all messages in the Message Pack (excluding Authentication) before signing MUST be in Message Type order and be placed between the UA DRIP Entity Tag and Not Before Timestamp field.¶
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| UA |
| DRIP Entity Tag |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Not Before Timestamp by UA |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Not After Timestamp by UA |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| UA Signature |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
UA DRIP Entity Tag (16 bytes):
The UA DET in byte form (network byte order).
Not Before Timestamp by UA (4-bytes):
Timestamp denoting recommended time to start trusting data.
Not After Timestamp by UA (4 bytes):
Timestamp denoting recommended time to stop trusting data.
UA Signature (64 bytes):
Signature over preceding fields using the keypair of
the UA.
For ASTM Specific Authentication Method (Authentication Type 0x5) a special SAM Type field, specified as the first byte of the Authentication Data / Signature by [F3411], is used to multiplex between various formats.¶
Figure 7 is the general format to hold authentication data when using SAM and is placed inside the Authentication Data / Signature field in Figure 2.¶
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| SAM Type | |
+---------------+ |
. .
. SAM Authentication Data .
. .
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
SAM Type (1 byte):
Byte defined by F3411 to multiplex SAMs
SAM Authentication Data (0 to 200 bytes):
Opaque SAM authentication data.
The SAM Type field is maintained by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and for DRIP four are planned to be allocated:¶
| SAM Type | Description |
|---|---|
| 0x01 | DRIP Link (Section 6.3.2) |
| 0x02 | DRIP Wrapper (Section 6.3.3) |
| 0x03 | DRIP Manifest (Section 6.3.4) |
| 0x04 | DRIP Frame (Section 6.3.5) |
This field has a maximum size of 200-bytes, as defined by Section 3.3.2. When possible the Broadcast Attestation Structure (Section 5) should be used in this space.¶
This SAM Type is used to transmit Broadcast Attestation's. The Broadcast Attestation of the Registry (HDA) over the UA MUST be sent (see Section 7.3). Its structure is defined in [drip-registries] and an example of it can be found in Appendix B.¶
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
. .
. Broadcast Attestation .
. .
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
Broadcast Attestation: (136-bytes)
HDA over UA. Generated by a DRIP Registry during Session ID
registration.
This DRIP format MUST be used in conjunction with another DRIP SAM Type (such as Manifest or Wrapper) that contains data that is guaranteed to be unique and easily cross checked by the receiving device. A good candidate for this is using the DRIP Wrapper to encapsulate a Location Message (Message Type 0x2).¶
See Section 10.2 for details on why this structure is not dynamically signed.¶
This SAM Type is used to wrap and sign over a list of other [F3411] Broadcast RID messages. It MUST use the Broadcast Attestation Structure (Section 5).¶
The Attestation Data field is filled with full (25-byte) [F3411] Broadcast RID messages. The minimum number being 1 and the maximum being 4. The encapsulated messages MUST be in Message Type order as defined by [F3411]. All message types except Authentication (Message Type 0x2) and Message Pack (Message Type 0xF) are allowed.¶
To determine the number of messages wrapped the receiver can check that the length of the Attestation Data field of the DRIP Broadcast Attestation (Section 5) is a multiple of 25-bytes.¶
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| UA |
| DRIP Entity Tag |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| |
| ASTM Message |
| |
| |
| |
+ +---------------+---------------+---------------+
| | |
+---------------+ |
| |
| ASTM Message |
| |
| |
| |
+ +---------------+---------------+
| | |
+---------------+---------------+ |
| |
| |
| ASTM Message |
| |
| |
+ +---------------+
| | |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+ |
| |
| |
| ASTM Message |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Not Before Timestamp by UA |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Not After Timestamp by UA |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| UA Signature |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
UA DRIP Entity Tag (16 bytes):
The UA DET in byte form (network byte order).
ASTM Message (25 bytes):
Full ASTM Message.
Not Before Timestamp by UA (4-bytes):
Timestamp denoting recommended time to start trusting data.
Not After Timestamp by UA (4 bytes):
Timestamp denoting recommended time to stop trusting data.
UA Signature (64 bytes):
Signature over preceding fields using the keypair of
the UA.
The primary limitation of the Wrapper format is the bounding of up to 4 ASTM Messages that can be sent within it. Another limitation is that the format can not be used as a surrogate for messages it is wrapping. This is due to high potential a receiver on the ground does not support DRIP. Thus when Wrapper is being used the wrapper data must effectively be sent twice; once as a single framed message (as specified in [F3411]) and then again wrapped within the Wrapper format.¶
This SAM Type is used to create message manifests. It MUST use the Broadcast Attestation Structure (Section 5).¶
By hashing previously sent messages and signing them we gain trust in UAs previous reports. An observer who has been listening for any considerable length of time can hash received messages and cross-check against listed hashes. This is a way to evade the limitation of a maximum of 4 messages in the Wrapper Format and reduce overhead.¶
The Attestation Data field is filled with 12-byte hashes of previous [F3411] Broadcast messages. A receiver does not need to have received every message in the manifest to verify it. A manifest SHOULD typically encompass a single transmission cycle of messages being sent, see Section 7.4.¶
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| UA |
| DRIP Entity Tag |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| Previous Manifest Hash |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| Current Manifest Hash |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| ASTM Message Hash |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| ASTM Message Hash |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| ASTM Message Hash |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| ASTM Message Hash |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| ASTM Message Hash |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| ASTM Message Hash |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| ASTM Message Hash |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Not Before Timestamp by UA |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Not After Timestamp by UA |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| UA Signature |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
UA DRIP Entity Tag (16 bytes):
The UA DET in byte form (network byte order).
Previous Manifest Hash (12 bytes):
See Section 6.3.4.3.
Current Manifest Hash (12 bytes):
See Section 6.3.4.3.
ASTM Message Hash (12 bytes):
Hash of a single full ASTM Message. Multiple hashes should
be in Message Type order.
Not Before Timestamp by UA (4-bytes):
Timestamp denoting recommended time to start trusting data.
Not After Timestamp by UA (4 bytes):
Timestamp denoting recommended time to stop trusting data.
UA Signature (64 bytes):
Signature over preceding fields using the keypair of
the UA.
The hash algorithm used for the Manifest Message is the same hash algorithm used in creation of the DET [drip-rid] that is signing the Manifest.¶
An DET using cSHAKE128 [NIST.SP.800-185] computes the hash as follows:¶
cSHAKE128(ASTM Message, 96, "", "Remote ID Auth Hash")¶
Under this transport DRIP hashes the full ASTM Message being sent over the Bluetooth Advertising frame. For Authentication Messages all the Authentication Message Pages are concatenated together and hashed as one object. For all other Message Types the 25-byte message is hashed.¶
Under this transport DRIP hashes the full ASTM Message Pack (Message Type 0xF) - regardless of its content.¶
Two special hashes are included in all Manifest messages; a previous manifest hash, which links to the previous manifest message, as well as a current manifest hash. This gives a pseudo-blockchain provenance to the manifest message that could be traced back if the observer was present for extended periods of time.¶
A potential limitation to this format is dwell time of the UA. If the UA is not sticking to a general area then most likely the Observer will not obtain many (if not all) of the messages in the manifest. Examples of such scenarios include delivery or survey UA.¶
Another limitation is the length of hash, which is discussed in Section 10.1.¶
This SAM Type is for when the authentication data does not fit in other defined formats under DRIP and is reserved for future expansion under DRIP if required. This SAM Type SHOULD use the Broadcast Attestation Structure (Section 5).¶
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| UA |
| DRIP Entity Tag |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Frame Type | |
+---------------+ .
. Attestation Data .
. .
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Not Before Timestamp by UA |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Not After Timestamp by UA |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| UA Signature |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
UA DRIP Entity Tag (16 bytes):
The UA DET in byte form (network byte order).
Frame Type (1 byte):
Sub-type for future different DRIP Frame formats.
Attestation Data (0 to 111 bytes):
Opaque attestation data.
Not Before Timestamp by UA (4-bytes):
Timestamp denoting recommended time to start trusting data.
Not After Timestamp by UA (4 bytes):
Timestamp denoting recommended time to stop trusting data.
UA Signature (64 bytes):
Signature over preceding fields using the keypair of
the UA.
Byte to sub-type for future different DRIP Frame formats.¶
| Frame Type | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 0x00 | Reserved | Reserved |
| 0xC0-0xFF | Experimental | Experimental Use |
With the Broadcast Attestation Structure only 115-bytes of Attestation Data are free for use.¶
With Legacy Advertisements the goal is to attempt to bring reliable receipt of the paged Authentication Message. Forward Error Correction (Section 4) MUST be used when using Legacy Advertising methods (such as Bluetooth 4.X).¶
Under ASTM Bluetooth 4.X rules, transmission of dynamic messages are at least every 1 second. DRIP Authentication Messages typically contain dynamic data (such as the DRIP Manifest or DRIP Wrapper) and must be sent at the dynamic rate of 1 per second.¶
Under the ASTM specification, Bluetooth 5.X Wi-Fi NaN, and Wi-Fi BEACON transport of Remote ID is to use the Message Pack (Message Type 0xF) format for all transmissions. Under Message Pack messages are sent together (in Message Type order) in a single Bluetooth 5 extended frame (up to 9 single frame equivalent messages under Bluetooth 4.X). Message Packs are required by ASTM to be sent at a rate of 1 per second (like dynamic messages).¶
Without any fragmentation or loss of pages with transmission Forward Error Correction (Section 4) MUST NOT be used as it is impractical.¶
It is REQUIRED that a UA send the following Authentication Formats to fulfill the [drip-requirements]:¶
It is RECOMMENDED the following set of Authentication Formats are sent for support of offline Observers:¶
UAS operation may impact the frequency of sending DRIP Authentication messages. Where a UA is dwelling in one location, and the channel is heavily used by other devices, "occasional" message authentication may be sufficient for an observer. Contrast this with a UA traversing an area, and then every message should be authenticated as soon as possible for greatest success as viewed by the receiver.¶
Thus how/when these DRIP authentication messages are sent is up to each implementation. Further complication comes in contrasting Legacy and Extended Transports. In Legacy, each message is a separate hash within the Manifest. So, again in dwelling, may lean toward occasional message authentication. In Extended Transports, the hash is over the Message Pack so only few hashes need to be in a Manifest. A single Manifest can handle a potential two Message Packs (for a full set of messages) and a DRIP Link Authentication Message for the HDA UA assertion.¶
A separate issue is the frequency of transmitting the DRIP Link Authentication Message for the HDA UA assertion when using a Manifest Message. This message content is static; its hash never changes radically. The only change is the 4-byte timestamp in the Authentication Message headers. Thus, potentially, in a dwelling operation it can be sent once per minute, where its hash is in every Manifest. A receiver can cache all DRIP Link Authentication Message for the HDA UA assertion to mitigate potential packet loss.¶
The preferred mode of operation is to send the HDA UA assertion every 3 seconds and Manifest messages immediately after a set of UA operation messages (e.g. Basic, Location, and System messages).¶
The DRIP Wrapper MUST NOT be used in place of sending the ASTM messages as is. All receivers MUST be able to process all the messages specified in [F3411]. Only sending them within the DRIP Wrapper will make them opaque to receivers lacking support for DRIP authentication messages. Thus messages within a Wrapper are sent twice: in the clear, and authenticated within the Wrapper. The DRIP Manifest format would seem to be a more efficient use of the transport channel.¶
The DRIP Wrapper has a specific use case for DRIP aware receivers. For receiver plotting received Location Messages (Message Type 0x2) on a map display an embedded Location Message in a DRIP Wrapper can be colored differently to signify trust in the Location data - be it current or previous Location reports that are wrapped.¶
DRIP requests the following SAM Type's to be allocated:¶
This document requests a new number field for Frame Type with initial values as defined in Section 6.3.5.1.¶
For DRIP Manifest an 12-byte hash length has been selected by the authors for a number of reasons.¶
The astute reader may note that the DRIP Link messages, which are recommended to be sent, are static in nature and contain various timestamps. These Attestation Link messages can easily be replayed by an attacker who has copied them from previous broadcasts. There are two things to mitigate this in DRIP:¶
Note the discussion of Trust Timestamp Offsets here is in context of the DRIP Wrapper (Section 6.3.3) and DRIP Manifest (Section 6.3.4) messages. For DRIP Link (Section 6.3.2) messages these offsets are set by the Attestor (typically a registry) and have their own set of considerations as seen in [drip-registries].¶
The offset of the Trust Timestamp (defined as a very short Expiration Timestamp) is one that needs careful consideration for any implementation. The offset should be shorter than any given flight duration (typically less than an hour) but be long enough to be received and processed by Observers (larger than a few seconds). It recommended that 3-5 minutes should be sufficient to serve this purpose in any scenario, but is not limited by design.¶
Ryan Quigley and James Mussi of AX Enterprize, LLC for early prototyping to find holes in the draft specifications.¶
Soren Friis for pointing out that Wi-Fi implementations would not always give access to the MAC Address, originally used in calculation of the hashes for DRIP Manifest. Also, for confirming that Message Packs (0xF) can only carry up to 9 ASTM frames worth of data (9 Authentication pages) - this drove the requirement for max page length of Authentication Data itself.¶
ASTM Authentication has only 3 states: None, Invalid or Valid. This is because under ASTM the idea is that Authentication is done by an external service hosted somewhere on the Internet so it is assumed you will always get some sort of answer back. With DRIP this classification becomes more complex with the support of "offline" scenarios where the receiver does not have Internet connectivity. With the use of asymmetric keys this means the public key (PK) must somehow be obtained - [drip-registries] gets more into detail how these keys are stored on DNS and one reason for DRIP Authentication is to send PK's over Broadcast RID.¶
There are two keys of interest: the PK of the UA and the PK of the HDA (or Registry). This document gives a clear way to send the PK of the UA over the Broadcast RID messages - however the PK of the Registry is not. It can be using the same mechanism but is not required to do so due to potential operational constraints and implementation of a given UA transmitter. As such there are scenarios where you may have part of the key-chain but not all of it.¶
The intent of this appendix is to give some kind of recommended way to classify these various states and convey it to the user through colors and state names/text.¶
The table below lays out the RECOMMENDED colors to associate with state.¶
| State | Color | Details |
|---|---|---|
| None | Black | No Authentication being received |
| Partial | Gray | Authentication being received but missing pages |
| Unsupported | Brown | Authentication Type/SAM Type of received message not supported |
| Unverifiable | Yellow | Data needed for verification missing |
| Verified | Green | Valid verification results |
| Trusted | Blue | Valid verification results and HDA is marked as trusted |
| Questionable | Orange | Inconsistent verification results |
| Unverified | Red | Invalid verification results |
| Conflicting | Purple | Inconsistent verification results and HDA is marked as trusted |
This section gives some RECOMMENDED state flows that DRIP should follow.¶
o--------------o | PROCESS | o--------------o +--------------+ | STATE | +--------------+ ooooo o N o Transition N ooooo +-----> Transition Option False/No -----> Transition Option True/Yes
o---------------------o ooooo +------+
| Start |---->o 1 o+----->| None |
o---------------------o ooooo +------+
|
v
ooooo +-------------+
o 2 o+----->| Unsupported |
ooooo +-------------+
| ^
v |
+---------+ ooooo |
| Partial |<-----+o 3 o |
+---------+ ooooo |
| |
v +
ooooo ooooo o-------------o
o 4 o------>o 5 o------>| SAM Decoder |
ooooo ooooo o-------------o
+
|
v
o------------------o
| AuthType Decoder |
o------------------o
| Transition | Transition Query | Next State/Process/Transition (Yes, No) |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Receiving Authentication Pages? | 2, None |
| 2 | Authentication Type Supported? | 3, Unsupported |
| 3 | All Pages of Authentication Message Received? | 4, Partial |
| 4 | Is Authentication Type received 5? | 5, AuthType Decoder |
| 5 | Is SAM Type Supported? | SAM Decoder, Unsupported |
o-------------o ooooo o-----------------------------o
| SAM Decoder |---->o 6 o------>| DRIP Wrapper/Manifest/Frame |
o-------------o ooooo o-----------------------------o
+ | ^
| | |
v v |
o-----------o o--------------------o |
| DRIP Link |--->| Update State Cache | |
o-----------o o--------------------o |
| |
v |
o--------------o ooooo o----------------------o
| NOP / Return |<------+o 7 o----->| Extract Message from |
o--------------o ooooo | Verification Queue |
o----------------------o
| Transition | Transition Query | Next State/Process/Transition (Yes, No) |
|---|---|---|
| 6 | Is SAM Type DRIP Link? | DRIP Link, DRIP Wrapper/Manifest/Frame |
| 7 | Messages in Verification Queue? | Extract Message from Verification Queue, NOP / Return |
o-----------o ooooo ooooo +--------------+
| DRIP Link |----->o 8 o+----->o 9 o+----->| Unverifiable |
o-----------o ooooo ooooo +--------------+
| |
|-------------'
v
ooooo +------------+
o 10 o+----->| Unverified |
ooooo +------------+
|
v
o---------------------o
| Add UA DET/PK |
| to Key Cache |
o---------------------o
|
v
ooooo +----------+
o 11 o+------>| Verified |
ooooo +----------+
| ^
v |
o-------------------------o
| Mark UA DET/PK |
| as Trusted in Key Cache |
o-------------------------o
| Transition | Transition Query | Next State/Process/Transition (Yes, No) |
|---|---|---|
| 8 | Registry DET/PK in Key Cache? | 10, 9 |
| 9 | Registry PK found Online? | 10, Unverifiable |
| 10 | Registry Signature Verified? | Add UA DET/PK to Key Cache, Unverified |
| 11 | Registry DET/PK marked as Trusted in Key Cache? | Mark UA DET/PK as Trusted in Key Cache, Verified |
o-----------------------------o +--------------+
| DRIP Wrapper/Manifest/Frame | | Unverifiable |
o-----------------------------o +--------------+
| ^
v |
ooooo ooooo o--------------------o
o 12 o+----->o 13 o+----->| Add Message to |
ooooo ooooo | Verification Queue |
| | o--------------------o
| |
|-------------'
v
ooooo ooooo ooooo +------------+
o 14 o+----->o 15 o+----->o 16 o+----->| Unverified |
ooooo ooooo ooooo +------------+
| | |
v v |
ooooo +-------------+ |
o 17 o+----->| Conflicting | |
ooooo +-------------+ |
| |
v v
ooooo +--------------+
o 18 o---------------->| Questionable |
ooooo +--------------+
+
|
v
ooooo +----------+
o 19 o+----->| Verified |
ooooo +----------+
|
v
+---------+
| Trusted |
+---------+
| Transition | Transition Query | Next State/Process/Transition (Yes, No) |
|---|---|---|
| 12 | UA DET/PK in Key Cache? | 14, 13 |
| 13 | UA PK found Online? | 14, Add Message to Verification Queue |
| 14 | UA Signature Verified? | 17, 15 |
| 15 | Has past Messages of this type been marked as Trusted? | Conflicting, 16 |
| 16 | Has past Messages of this type been marked as Questionable or Verified? | Questionable, Unverified |
| 17 | Has past Messages of this type been marked as Conflicting? | Conflicting, 18 |
| 18 | Has past Messages of this type been marked as Questionable or Unverified? | Questionable, 19 |
| 19 | Is UA DET/PK marked as Trusted in Key Cache? | Trusted, Verified |
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| DRIP |
| Entity Tag of HDA |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| DRIP |
| Entity Tag of UA |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| |
| |
| Host Identity of UA |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Not Before Timestamp by HDA |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Not After Timestamp by HDA |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| Signature by HDA |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
DRIP Entity Tag of HDA: (16-bytes)
DET of HDA.
DRIP Entity Tag of UA: (16-bytes)
DET of UA.
Host Identity of UA: (32-bytes)
HI of UA
Expiration Timestamp by HDA (4 bytes):
Timestamp denoting recommended time to trust data to.
Signing Timestamp by HDA (4 bytes):
Current time at signing.
HDA Signature (64 bytes):
Signature over preceding fields using the keypair of
the HDA.
In this example the UA is sending all DRIP Authentication Message formats (DRIP Link, DRIP Wrapper and DRIP Manifest) during flight, along with standard ASTM Messages. The objective is to show the combinations of messages that must be received to properly validate a DRIP equipped UA and examples of their various states (Appendix A).¶
+-------------------+
.-----| Unmanned Aircraft |-----.
| +-------------------+ |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4
| | | |
O O O O
--|-- --|-- --|-- --|--
/ \ / \ / \ / \
A B C D
Broadcast Paths: Messages Received
1: DRIP Link
2: DRIP Link and DRIP Wrapper or DRIP Manifest
3: DRIP Wrapper or DRIP Manifest
4: None
Observers: Authentication State
A: Unverifiable
B: Verified, Trusted, Unverified, Questionable, or Conflicting
C: Unverifiable
D: None
¶
As the above example shows to properly authenticate both a DRIP Link and a DRIP Wrapper or DRIP Manifest are required.¶