| Internet-Draft | jose-cose-sphincs-plus | July 2024 |
| Prorock, et al. | Expires 9 January 2025 | [Page] |
This document describes JOSE and COSE serializations for SLH-DSA, which was derived from SPHINCS+, a Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) based digital signature scheme.¶
This document does not define any new cryptography, only seralizations of existing cryptographic systems described in [FIPS-205].¶
Note to RFC Editor: This document should not proceed to AUTH48 until NIST completes paramater tuning and selection as a part of the PQC standardization process.¶
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.¶
The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://cose-wg.github.io/draft-ietf-cose-sphincs-plus/draft-ietf-cose-sphincs-plus.html. Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-cose-sphincs-plus/.¶
Discussion of this document takes place on the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption Working Group mailing list (mailto:cose@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/cose/. Subscribe at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cose/.¶
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/cose-wg/draft-ietf-cose-sphincs-plus.¶
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."¶
This Internet-Draft will expire on 9 January 2025.¶
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶
SLH-DSA is derived from Version 3.1 of SPHINCS+, as noted in [FIPS-205].¶
SPHINCS+ is one of the post quantum cryptography algorithms selected in [NIST-PQC-2022].¶
TODO: Add complete examples for SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s, SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s, SLH-DSA-SHA2-128f... ( all of them? really?)¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
The SLH-DSA Signature Scheme is paramaterized to support different security level.¶
This document requests the registration of the following algorithms in [IANA.jose]:¶
| Name | alg | Description |
|---|---|---|
| SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s | SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s | JSON Web Signature Algorithm for SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s |
| SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s | SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s | JSON Web Signature Algorithm for SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s |
| SLH-DSA-SHA2-128f | SLH-DSA-SHA2-128f | JSON Web Signature Algorithm for SLH-DSA-SHA2-128f |
This document requests the registration of the following algorithms in [IANA.cose]:¶
| Name | alg | Description |
|---|---|---|
| SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s | TBD (requested assignment -51) | CBOR Object Signing Algorithm for SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s |
| SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s | TBD (requested assignment -52) | CBOR Object Signing Algorithm for SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s |
| SLH-DSA-SHA2-128f | TBD (requested assignment -53) | CBOR Object Signing Algorithm for SLH-DSA-SHA2-128f |
Private and Public Keys are produced to enable the sign and verify opertaions for each of the SLH-DSA Algorithms.¶
This document requests the registration of the following key types in [IANA.jose]:¶
| Name | kty | Description |
|---|---|---|
| SLH-DSA | SLH-DSA | JSON Web Key Type for the SLH-DSA Algorithm Family. |
This document requests the registration of the following algorithms in [IANA.cose]:¶
| Name | kty | Description |
|---|---|---|
| SLH-DSA | TBD (requested assignment 8) | COSE Key Type for the SLH-DSA Algorithm Family. |
The following considerations SHOULD apply to all parmeter sets described in this specification, unless otherwise noted.¶
Care should be taken to ensure "kty" and intended use match, the algorithms described in this document share many properties with other cryptographic approaches from related families that are used for purposes other than digital signatures.¶
All algorithms in that operate on public keys require first validating those keys. For the sign, verify and proof schemes, the use of KeyValidate is REQUIRED.¶
Implementations of the signing algorithm SHOULD protect the secret key from side-channel attacks. Multiple best practices exist to protect against side-channel attacks. Any implementation of the the Sphincs+ signing algorithms SHOULD utilize the following best practices at a minimum:¶
Constant timing - the implementation should ensure that constant time is utilized in operations¶
Sequence and memory access persistance - the implemention SHOULD execute the exact same sequence of instructions (at a machine level) with the exact same memory access independent of which polynomial is being operated on.¶
Uniform sampling - care should be given in implementations to preserve the property of uniform sampling in implementation and to prevent information leakage.¶
It is recommended that the all nonces are from a trusted source of randomness.¶
{
"kty": "SLH-DSA",
"alg": "SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s",
"pub": "V53SIdVF...uvw2nuCQ",
"priv": "V53SIdVF...cDKLbsBY"
}
{
"kty": "SLH-DSA",
"alg": "SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s",
"pub": "V53SIdVF...uvw2nuCQ"
}
TODO¶
{
"alg": "SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s"
}
eyJhbGciOiJ...LCJraWQiOiI0MiJ9\ .\ eyJpc3MiOiJ1cm46d...XVpZDo0NTYifQ\ .\ 5MSEgQ0dZB4SeLC...AAAAAABIhMUE
{ / COSE Key /
1: 8, / SLH-DSA Key Type /
3: -51, / SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s Algorithm /
-13: h'7803c0f9...3f6e2c70', / SLH-DSA Private Key /
-14: h'7803c0f9...3bba7abd', / SLH-DSA Public Key /
}
{ / COSE Key /
1: 8, / SLH-DSA Key Type /
3: -51, / SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s Algorithm /
-13: h'7803c0f9...3f6e2c70' / SLH-DSA Private Key /
}
TODO¶
{ / Protected /
1: -51 / SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s Algorithm /
}
18( / COSE Sign 1 /
[
h'a10139d902', / Protected /
{}, / Unprotected /
h'66616b65', / Payload /
h'53e855e8...0f263549' / Signature /
]
)
TODO acknowledge.¶