Internet-Draft | COSE Hash Envelope | August 2024 |
Steele, et al. | Expires 16 February 2025 | [Page] |
This document defines new COSE header parameters for signaling a payload as an output of a hash function. This mechanism enables faster validation as access to the original payload is not required for signature validation. Additionally, hints of the detached payload's content format and availability are defined providing references to optional discovery mechanisms that can help to find original payload content.¶
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.¶
The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://cose-wg.github.io/draft-ietf-cose-hash-envelope/draft-ietf-cose-hash-envelope.html. Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-cose-hash-envelope/.¶
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Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/cose-wg/draft-ietf-cose-hash-envelope.¶
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COSE defined detached payloads in Section 2 of [RFC9052], using nil
as the payload.
In order to verify a signature over a detached payload, the verifier must have access to the payload content.
Storing a hash of the content allows for small signature envelopes, that are easy to transport and verify independently.¶
Additional hints in the protected header ensure cryptographic agility for the hashing & signing algorithms, and discoverability for the original content which could be prohibitively large to move over a network.¶
COSE_sign1 envelope with an attached payload, providing for signature validation.¶
18( / COSE Sign 1 / [ h'a4013822...3a616263', / Protected / {} / Unprotected / h'317cedc7...c494e772', / Payload / h'15280897...93ef39e5' / Signature / ] )¶
COSE_sign1 envelope with a detached payload (nil
), which is compact but the payload must be distributed out of band to validate the signature¶
18( / COSE Sign 1 / [ h'a4013822...3a616263', / Protected / {} / Unprotected / nil, / Detached Payload / h'15280897...93ef39e5' / Signature / ] )¶
A hashed payload functions equivalently to an attached payload, with the benefits of being compact in size and providing the ability to validate the signature.¶
18( / COSE Sign 1 / [ h'a4013822...3a616263', / Protected / {} / Unprotected / h'935b5a91...e18a588a', / Payload / h'15280897...93ef39e5' / Signature / ] )¶
To represent a hash of a payload, the following headers are defined:¶
the hash algorithm used to generate the hash of the payload¶
the content type of the payload the hash represents¶
an identifier enabling a verifier to retrieve the full payload preimage.¶
Hash_Envelope_Protected_Header = { ; Cryptographic algorithm to use ? &(alg: 1) => int, ; Type of the envelope ? &(typ: 16) => int / tstr ; Hash algorithm used to produce the payload from content ; -16 for SHA-256, ; See https://www.iana.org/assignments/cose/cose.xhtml &(payload_hash_alg: TBD_1) => int ; Content type of the preimage ; (content to be hashed) of the payload ; 50 for application/json, ; See https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7252#section-12.3 &(payload_preimage_content_type: TBD_2) => int ; Location the content of the hashed payload is stored ; For example: ; storage.example/244f...9c19 ? &(payload_location: TBD_3) => tstr * int => any } Hash_Envelope_Unprotected_Header = { * int => any } Hash_Envelope_as_COSE_Sign1 = [ protected : bstr .cbor Hash_Envelope_Protected_Header, unprotected : Hash_Envelope_Unprotected_Header, payload: bstr / nil, signature : bstr ] Hash_Envelope = #6.18(Hash_Envelope_as_COSE_Sign1)¶
16 (typ), TBD_1 (payload hash alg) and TBD_2 (content type of the preimage of the payload) MUST be present in the protected header and MUST NOT be present in the unprotected header. TBD_3 (payload_location) MAY be added to the protected header and MUST NOT be presented in the unprotected header.¶
For example:¶
{ / alg : ES384 / 1: -35, / kid / 4: h'75726e3a...32636573', / typ / 16: application/hashed+cose / payload_hash_alg sha-256 / TBD_1: 1 / payload_preimage_content_type / TBD_2: application/jwk+json / payload_location / TBD_3 : storage.example/244f...9c19 }¶
Should we define this?¶
TODO Security¶
It is RECOMMENDED to align the strength of the chosen hash function to the strength of the chosen signature algorithm. For example, when signing with ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256, use SHA-256 to hash the payload.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
Name: SHAKE256¶
Label: TBD_2¶
Value type: int¶
Value registry: https://www.iana.org/assignments/named-information/named-information.xhtml¶
Description: SHAKE256 a described in https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.202.pdf¶
Name: ASCON128¶
Label: TBD_3¶
Value type: int¶
Value registry: https://www.iana.org/assignments/named-information/named-information.xhtml¶
Description: ASCON128 a described in https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/lightweight-cryptography/documents/round-2/spec-doc-rnd2/ascon-spec-round2.pdf¶
The following individuals provided input into the final form of the document: Carsten Bormann, Henk Birkholz, Antoine Delignat-Lavaud, Cedric Fournet.¶