CoAP Transport Indication

1.1. Terminology

Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts described in CoAP [RFC7252] and link format [RFC6690] (or, equivalently, web links as described in [RFC8288]).¶

Same-host proxy:

A CoAP server that accepts forward proxy requests (i.e., requests carrying the Proxy-Scheme option) exclusively for URIs that it is also the authoritative server for is defined as a "same-host proxy".¶

The distinction between a same-host and any other proxy is only relevant on a practical, server-implementation and illustrative level; this specification does not use the distinction in normative requirements, and clients need not make the distinction at all.¶

When talking of proxy requests, this document only talks of the Proxy-Scheme option. Given that all URIs this is usable with can be expressed in decomposed CoAP URIs, the need for using the Proxy-URI option should never arise. The Proxy-URI option is still equivalent to the decomposed options, and can be used if the server supports it.¶

1.2. Goals

This document introduces provisions for the seamless use of different transport mechanisms for CoAP. Combined, these provide:¶

1. Enablement: Inform clients of the availability of other transports of servers.¶

2. No Aliasing: Any URI aliasing must be opt-in by the server. Any defined mechanisms must allow applications to keep working on the canonical URIs given by the server.¶

3. Optimization: Do not incur per-request overhead from switching transports. This may depend on the server's willingness to create aliased URIs.¶

4. Proxy usability: All information provided must be usable by aware proxies to reduce the need for duplicate cache entries.¶

5. Proxy announcement: Allow third parties to announce that they provide alternative transports to a host.¶

For all these functions, security policies must be described that allow the client to use them as securely as the original transport.¶

This document will not concern itself with changes in transport availability over time, neither in causing them ("Please take up your TCP interface, I'm going to send a firmware update") nor in advertising their availability in advance. Hosts whose transport's availability changes over time can utilize any suitable mechanism to keep client updated, such as placing a suitable Max-Age value on their resources or having them observable.¶

2.1. Example

A constrained device at the address 2001:db8::1 that supports CoAP over TCP in addition to CoAP can self-describe like this:¶

Req: to [ff02::fd]:5683 on UDP
Code: GET
Uri-Path: /.well-known/core
Uri-Query: if=tag:example.com,sensor

Res: from [2001:db8::1]:5683
Content-Format: application/link-format
Payload:
</sensors/temp>;if="tag:example.com,sensor",
<coap+tcp://[2001:db8::1]>;rel=has-proxy;anchor="/"


Req: to [2001:db8::1]:5683 on TCP
Code: GET
Proxy-Scheme: coap
Uri-Path: /sensors/temp
Observe: 0

Res: 2.05 Content
Observe: 0
Payload:
39.1°C

Note that generating this discovery file needs to be dynamic based on its available addresses; only if queried using a link-local source address, the server may also respond with a link-local address in the authority component of the proxy URI.¶

Unless the device makes resources discoverable at coap+tcp://[2001:db8::1]/.well-known/core or another discovery mechanism, clients may not assume that coap+tcp://[2001:db8::1]/sensors/temp is a valid resource (let alone is equivalent to the other resource on the same path). The server advertising itself like this may reject any request on CoAP-over-TCP unless it contains a Proxy-Scheme option.¶

Clients that want to access the device using CoAP-over-TCP would send a request by connecting to 2001:db8::1 TCP port 5683 and sending a GET with the options Proxy-Scheme: coap, no Uri-Host or -Port options (utilizing their default values), and the Uri-Paths "sensors" and "temp".¶

2.2. Security context propagation

Any security requirements posed by a server or client application on a CoAP request MUST be applied independently of the transport that is used to perform the request. If a transport can not be used to satisfy the requirements, it is ineligible for use with the request (from a client's point of view), and unauthorized (from a server's point of view).¶

If the requirements contain transport layer security, the proxy needs to present the credentials required of the server to the client, and those of the client to the server; this is only practical when the proxy is a same-host proxy.¶

Some applications have requirements exceeding the requirements of a secure connection, e.g., (explicitly or implicitly) requiring that name resolution happen through a secure process and packets are only routed into networks where it trusts that they will not be intercepted on the path to the server. Such applications need to extend their requirements to the source of the has-proxy statement; a sufficient (but maybe needlessly strict) requirement is to only follow has-proxy statements that are part of the same resource that advertises the link currently being followed. Section Section 8.2 adds further considerations.¶

2.3. Choice of transports

It is up to the client whether to use an advertised proxy transport, or (if multiple are provided) which to pick.¶

Links to proxies may be annotated with additional metadata that may help guide such a choice; defining such metadata is out of scope for this document.¶

Clients MAY switch between advertised transports as long as the document describing them is fresh; they may even do so per request. (For example, they may perform individual requests using CoAP-over-UDP, but choose CoAP-over-TCP for requests with large expected responses). When the describing document approaches expiry, the client can use the representation's ETag to efficiently renew its justification for using the alternative transport.¶

2.4. Selection of a canonical origin

While a server is at liberty to provide the same resource independently on different transports (i.e. to create aliases), it may make sense for it to pick a single scheme and authority under which it announces its resources. Using only one address helps proxies keep their caches efficient, and makes it easier for clients to avoid exploring the same server twice from different angles.¶

When there is a predominant scheme and authority through which an existing service is discovered, it makes sense to use these for the canonical addresses.¶

Otherwise, it is suggested to use the coap or coaps scheme (given that these are the most basic and widespread ones), and the most stable usable name the host has.¶

2.5. Advertisement through a Resource Directory

In the Resource Directory specification [rfc9176], protocol negotiation was anticipated to use multiple base values. This approach was abandoned since then, as it would incur heavy URI aliasing.¶

Instead, devices can submit their has-proxy links to the Resource Directory like all their other metadata.¶

A client performing resource lookup can ask the RD to provide available (same-host-)proxies in a follow-up request by asking for ?anchor=<the-discovered-host>&rel=has-proxy. The RD may also volunteer that information during resource lookups even though the has-proxy link itself does not match the search criteria.¶

[¶

It may be useful to define RD parameters for use with lookup here, which'd guide which available proxies to include. For example, asking ?if=tag:example.com,sensor&proxy-links=tcp could give as a result:¶

<coap://[2001:db8::1]/s>;rt=tag:example.com,sensor,<coap+tcp://[2001:db8::1]/>;rel=has-proxy;anchor="coap://[2001:db8::1]/"¶

This is similar to the extension suggested in Section 5 of [I-D.amsuess-core-resource-directory-extensions].¶

]¶

3.1. Impact on caches

[ This section is written with the "there is implied URI aliasing" mindset; it should be possible to write it with the "compression" mindset as well (but there is no point in having both around in the document at this time).¶

It is also slightly duplicating, but also more detailed than, the brief note on the topic in Section 5 ]¶

When a node that performs caching learns of a has-unique-proxy statement, it can utilize the information about the implied URI aliasing: As long as the has-unique-proxy statement is fresh and trusted, requests for either of the origins can be served from the cache of the other origin.¶

3.2. Using unique proxies securely

The elision of the host name afforded by the unique-proxy relation is only possible if the required security mechanisms verify the scheme and host of the server.¶

This is given for OSCORE based mechanisms, where "unprotected message fields (including Uri-Host [...]) MUST not lead to an OSCORE message becoming verified".¶

With TLS based security mechanisms, name and scheme can not be completely elided in general. While the use of the SNI HostName field sets the default Uri-Host already, the scheme still needs to be sent in a Proxy-Scheme option to satisfy the requirement of Section 2.2.¶

[ It may be possible to relax this requirement if the host publishes a trustworthy statement about serving the same content on all schemes; however, no urgent need for this optimization is currently known that warrants the extra scrutiny. ]¶

3.3. Self-description as a unique proxy

The level of assurance a client needs from a server to elide the Uri-Host option in a request that was created from a URI with no IP address literal has been a controversial topic. [ Should we dig up old conversations, link to https://github.com/core-wg/wiki/wiki/CoAP-FAQ#q4, or just let the weight of a WG consensus-document-to-be do its work? ]¶

The has-unique-proxy relation provides an easy way for a server to indicate that this is in fact allowed: A server can publish a statement such as </>;rel=has-unique-proxy in its /.well-known/core file. A client that receives and understands it can thus elide the Uri-Host option in requests to the server as per the definition of the relation.¶

4.1. Generic proxy advertisements

A third party proxy may advertise its availability to act as a proxy for arbitrary CoAP requests. This use is not directly related to the transport indication in other parts of this document, but sufficiently similar to warrant being described in the same document.¶

The resource type "CPA-core.proxy" can be used to describe such a proxy.¶

Req: GET coap://[fe80::1]/.well-known/core?rt=CPA-core.proxy

Res:
Content-Format: application/link-format
Payload:
<>;rt=CPA-core.proxy

Req: to [fe80::1] via CoAP
Code: GET
Proxy-Scheme: http
Uri-Host: example.com
Uri-Path: /motd
Accept: text/plain

Res: 2.05 Content
Content-Format: text/plain
Payload:
On Monday, October 25th 2021, there is no special message of the day.

The considerations of Section 8.2 apply here.¶

A generic advertised proxy is always a forward proxy, and can not be advertised as a "unique" proxy as it would lack information about where to forward.¶

A proxy may be limited in the URIs it can service, for technical reasons (e.g. when none of the URI's transports are supported by the server) or for policy reasons (only accessing servers inside an organizational structure). Future documents (or versions of this document) may add target attributes that allow specifying the capabilities of a proxy. [ An earlier version of this document contained a proxy-schemes attribute. This was discontinued because it could already not express whether a proxy could access IPv4 or IPv6 peers, and because the use of schemes is becoming less useful given the new recommendation of incorporating details from registered name resolution into the transport selection. ]¶

The use of a generic proxy can be limited to a set of devices that have permission to use it. Clients can be allowed by their network address if they can be verified, or by using explicit client authentication using the methods of [I-D.tiloca-core-oscore-capable-proxies].¶

6.1. Discovering transport indication details from name resolution

When a host finds a CoAP transport from a URI and the URI's authority component does not contain a precise address literal, the resolution mechanisms which it may try generally depend on the CoAP transports and their variation which it supports. For example, if it supports CoAP-over-UDP and IPv6, it requests AAAA records through DNS and look them up in a host file.¶

This document extends this and registers the _coap and _coaps attrleaf labels in Section 9.4 using the pattern described as described in Section 10.4.5 of [RFC9460], and thus enables the use of SVCB records. This path is chosen over the creation of a new SVCB RR pair "COAP" / "COAPS" because it is considered unlikely that DNS implementations would update their code bases to apply SVCB behavior; this assumption will be revisited before registration.¶

These can be used during the resolution of URIs using the "coap" or "coaps" schemes, respectively. No such labels are registered for other CoAP schemes that have been registered, as it is expected that applications that use them will prefer leaving the more detailed transport choice to the parameters. The "coaps" scheme comes with the expectation of using a secured transport. While discovered parameters can override this, components and applications MUST NOT select a transport and security mechanism combination with a reduced security level.¶

[ There is no formal description of what the requirements following "coaps" really are. Would it make sense to only register "coap" here, unifying the scheme space even further, given that any applications needs to describe its security requirements anyway, and can just as well apply them to "coap"? ]¶

Some SVCB parameters have defaults; for those new services, these are: * port: 5683 for _coap, 5684 for _coaps * ALPN: empty for _coap, "co" for _coaps * coaptransport: "udp" for _coap, empty for _coaps¶

As SVCB records were not specified for the existing CoAP transports originally, generic CoAP clients are not required to use the SVCB lookup mechanism, but MAY attempt it opportunistically in order to obtain a usable transport (or to obtain it faster). Applications built on CoAP MAY require clients to perform this kind of discovery. Adding such a requirement is particularly useful if the application frequently advertises URIs with a scheme that defaults to a transport which its clients may not support, or when the application makes use of functionality afforded by [RFC9460] such as apex domain redirection. (Had the SVCB specification predated the first new CoAP transports, that mechanism might have been used in the first place instead of additional schemes).¶

The effects on a client of seeing SVCB parameters are similar to those of seeing a "has-proxy" link from the origin to the URI built using {#svcblit}. They differ in that SVCB parameters describe the server itself: Credentials expressed apply end to end (as opposed to credentials that describe the proxy in a "has-proxy" link), and the client could conclude that the implied proxy is a same-host proxy (if that had any impact on the client, which it does not).¶

6.2. Service Parameters

Several parameters are relevant in the context of CoAP, independently of whether they are used with SVCB records or Service Binding Parameters transported outside of SVCB records, and independently of whether they apply to the _coap / _coaps service or another service that can be used on top of CoAP (such as _dns):¶

• port: The CoAP service using the transport described in this parameter is reachable on this port (described in [RFC9460]).¶

• alpn: The ALPN "coap" has been defined for CoAP-over-TLS [RFC8323], and "co" for CoAP-over-DTLS in [I-D.lenders-core-coap-dtls-svcb].¶

  If an ALPN service parameter is found, this indicates that the ALPN(s) and thus the CoAP transport that can be used on this address / port. For example, "co" indicates that DTLS (and thus UDP) is used.¶

• coaptransport: This is a new parameter defined in this document, and similar to the ALPN parameter.¶

  If a coaptransport parameter is present, the indicated transport(s) can be used on this address / port.¶

  The names registered for existing transports are identical to the URI schemes that indicate their use in the absence of Service Binding Parameters.¶

  [ It is left for review by SVCB experts whether these are a separate parameter space or we should just take ALPNs for them, like eg. h2c does. ]¶

• edhoc-cred: This is a new parameter defined in this document, and describes that EDHOC can be used with the server, and which credentials can authenticate the server.¶

  The edhoc-cred parameter's value is a CBOR sequence of COSE Header maps as defined in [RFC9052]. If the parameter is present, it indicates that EDHOC [RFC9528] can be used on the transport, and that the server can be authenticated by any credential expressed in the sequence. This is similar to the TLSA records specified in [RFC6698].¶

  A COSE Header map can express many properties, not all of which are sufficient to authenticate a peer on any given security mechanism. Without excluding applications that may process other entries, a practical criterion for whether a header map is suitable for EDHOC is that the header map could also be used in EDHOC as ID_CRED_R if the credential is sent by value.¶

  For example, a header map with a kccs entry can be used to indicate a public key including a Key ID (kid), and that public key does not need to be sent during the EDHOC exchange. Alternatively, a header map with an x5t identifies the end entity certificate the server presents by a thumbprint (hash).¶

  It is up to the application to define requirements for the provenance of the edhoc-cred parameter, whether it needs to be provided through secure mechanism, or whether the server is strictly required to present that credential.¶

  This is unlike TLSA, which needs to be transported through DNSSEC, because a edhoc-cred parameter may be sent using other means than DNS (for example in DHCPv6 responses or Router Advertisements).¶

• edhoc-info: This is a new parameter defined in this document, describing how EDHOC can be used on the server.¶

  The value of the parameter is a CBOR map following the EDHOC_Information structure defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-edhoc-oscore-profile] and extended in [I-D.tiloca-lake-app-profiles].¶

  It is optional to provide and optional to process, but can help speed up the establishment of a security context.¶

• oauth-hints: This is a new parameter defined in this document, describing how ACE-OAuth [RFC9200] can be used with this service.¶

  Its value is a CBOR map containing AS Request Creation Hints as described in Section 5.3 of [RFC9200]. While an empty map can be useful (hinting that the client should use its configured ACE-OAuth setup), typical useful keys are 1 (AS, indicating the URI of the Authorization Server), 5 (audience, indicating the name under which the service is known to the Authorization Server), and 9 (scope, when discovering a particular service rather than just getting transport information for a host). That data is using the same shape the server might use when responding to an attempt at an unencrypted connection, and can not only speed up the discovery of the right AS, but can also protect that information (eg. when DNSSEC is used), and avoids the need for an unprotected first request.¶

  It is up to the application to define requirements for the use of such data. For example, it may require that the audience matches the requested host name, or may require that the scope matches the kind of service being discovered.¶

  When expressed in text format, e.g. in DNS zone files, the CBOR diagnostic notation [I-D.ietf-cbor-edn-literals] can be used.¶

6.3. Producing request for a discovered service

If a service's discovery process does not produce a URI but an address, host name and/or Service Binding Parameters, those can be converted to a CoAP URI, for which transport hints are already encoded in the parameters the URI is constructed from. An example of this is DNS server discovery [I-D.lenders-core-dnr].¶

While it is up to the service to define the service's semantics, this section applies to any service whose use with CoAP is defined by a normative referencing this section:¶

• The client tries the available serivces with their ALPNs and CoAP transports according to its capabilities and the priorities and mandatory parameters as defined for Service Bindings.¶

• The service either defines a well-known path, or it defines a Service Binding Parameter that describes the service's path on the described endpoint, or it defines both (and the well-known path is the default in absence of the defined parameter).¶

  Th value is a CBOR sequence [RFC8742] of text strings, which represent Uri-Path options in a CoAP request, or (equivalently) the path of a CRI reference [I-D.ietf-core-href].¶

  A parameter value that is not a well-formed CBOR sequence, or any item is not a text string, is considerd malformed.¶

  When expressed in text format, e.g. in DNS zone files, the CBOR diagnostic notation [I-D.ietf-cbor-edn-literals] can be used.¶

  To access the service, a client sets the text string values of the used Service Binding as Uri-Path options in the request.¶

  If the resource is unavailable, the client may continue with options that have a larger SvcPriority value associated (if such a property exists in the discovery method).¶

  An example of such an option is docpath as defined in [I-D.ietf-core-dns-over-coap]. (As that document precedes this one, it repeats the same rules explicitly rather than reusing these rules).¶

• A Service Binding is accompanied by a hostname: For example, this is the hostname of the Encrypted DNS Resolver or the Special-Use Domain Name in the case of [RFC9462] lookups, or the authentication-domain-name in case of [RFC9463] DHCP options or Router Advertisements.¶

  Unless its value is identical to the default value for Uri-Host (which is the case on transports with Server Name Indication (SNI)), the that name is added in the Uri-Host option.¶

• If the port Service Binding Parameter is set, the Uri-Port option is set to the port that set in the port prefix of the query (or the used CoAP transport's default port), unless that is its default value anyway.¶

• No Proxy-Scheme option is set.¶

By following the rules of Section 6.5 of [RFC7252] or the equivalent rules for the respective CoAP transport, the service can be translated into a URI. This implies URI aliasing between the composed URIs of all transports if any of the transports use different schemes.¶

The rules for setting Uri-Host and Uri-Port result in the authority component of the URI being equal to the Binding Authority defined in [RFC9461].¶

Note that since different security policies may apply to service discovery and other application components that dereference URIs, any connections established while using the service and cache entries created by it need to be treated carefully, for example by using separate connection and cache pools.¶

6.4. Expressing Service Parameters as literals

A method for expressing Service Parameters in URIs that do not use registered names is described in Appendix E.¶

Among other things, that mechanism allows encoding the full information obtained during service discovery in a URI instead of just the one choice taken. It is also required if different CoAP transports are using the same scheme (as is recommended in Section 7) with IP address literals in URIs, for which unlike for resolved names no service parameters are available.¶

8.1. Security context propagation

Clients need to strictly enforce the rules of Section 2.2. Failure to do so, in particular using a thusly announced proxy based on a certificate that attests the proxy's name, would allow attackers to circumvent the client's security expectation.¶

When security is terminated at proxies (as is in DTLS and TLS), a third party proxy can usually not satisfy this requirement; these transports are limited to same-host proxies.¶

8.2. Traffic misdirection

Accepting arbitrary proxies, even with security context propagation performed properly, would allow attackers to redirect traffic through systems under their control. Not only does that impact availability, it also allows an attacker to observe traffic patterns.¶

This affects both OSCORE and (D)TLS, as neither protect the participants' network addresses.¶

Other than the security context propagation rules, there are no hard and general rules about when an advertised proxy is a suitable candidate. Aspects for consideration are:¶

• When no direct connection is possible (e.g. because the resource to be accessed is served as coap+tcp and TCP is not implemented in the client, or because the resource's host is available on IPv6 while the client has no default IPv6 route), using a proxy is necessary if complete service disruption is to be avoided.¶

  While an adversary can cause such a situation (e.g. by manipulating routing or DNS entries), such an adversary is usually already in a position to observe traffic patterns.¶

• A proxy advertised by the device hosting the resource to be accessed is less risky to use than one advertised by a third party.¶

  The /.well-known/core resource is regarded as a source of authoritative information on the endpoint's CoAP related metadata, and can be queried early in the discovery process, or queried for verification (with filtering applied) after discovery through an RD. Other resources may be less trustworthy as they may be controlled by entities not trusted with the endpoint's traffic.¶

Appendix D describes an extension to [I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc] by which the client can verify that the proxy used by the client is recognized by the server. This is similar to querying /.well-known/core for any proxies advertised there, but happens earlier in the connection establishment, and leaves the decision whether the proxy is legitimate to the server.¶

It only conveys information about the URI of the proxy. The mapping of any host name inside it to an IP address, or of an IP address to a routing decision, is left to the security mechanisms of the respective layers.¶

8.3. Protecting the proxy

A widely published statement about a host's availability as a proxy can cause many clients to attempt to use it.¶

This is mitigated in well-behaved clients by observing the rate limits of [RFC7252], and by ceasing attempts to reach a proxy for the Max-Age of received errors.¶

Operators can further limit ill-effects by ensuring that their client systems do not needlessly use proxies advertised in an unsecured way, and by providing own proxies when their clients need them.¶

9.1. Link Relation Types

IANA is asked to add two entries into the Link Relation Type Registry last updated in [RFC8288]:¶

9.2. Resource Types

IANA is asked to add an entry into the "Resource Type (rt=) Link Target Attribute Values" registry under the Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Parameters:¶

[ The RFC Editor is asked to replace any occurrence of CPA-core.proxy with the actually registered attribute value. ]¶

Attribute Value: core.proxy¶

Description: Forward proxying services¶

Reference: [ this document ]¶

9.3. Service Parameter Key (SvcParamKey)

IANA is NOT YET requested to add the following entries to the SVCB Service Parameters registry ([RFC9460]). The definition of this parameter can be found in Section 7.¶

All entries have in common that their Reference is this this document, Section 6.2}¶

9.4. Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names

IANA is NOT YET requested to add the following entries to the Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names registry (in the DNS Parameters group) established in [RFC8552] and thus enables its use with SVCB records:¶

• SVCB, _coap, Section 6.1 of this document¶

• SVCB, _coaps, Section 6.1 of this document¶

The request for registration is deliberately not expressed at this point because it is yet to be revisited whether the creation of a "COAP" / "COAPS" RR pair similar to the "HTTPS" RR would be preferable.¶

B.1. On HTTP

The mechanisms introduced here are similar to the Alt-Svc header of [RFC7838] in that they do not create different application-visible addresses, but provide dispatch through lower transport implementations.¶

In HTTP, different versions of the protocol (i.e., different transports) are distinguished using a protocol identifier equivalent to an ALPN. This works well because all relevant transports use transport layer security and thus can use ALPNs. In contrast, the currently specified CoAP transports predate ALPNs, and specified per-transport schemes, which enable the use of URIs that indicate transports.¶

To accommodate the message size constraints typical of CoRE environments, and accounting for the differences between HTTP headers and CoAP options, information is delivered once at discovery time.¶

Using the has-proxy and has-unique-proxy with HTTP URIs as the context is NOT RECOMMENDED; the HTTP provisions of the Alt-Svc header and ALPN are preferred.¶

B.2. Using DNS

DNS Service Binding resource records (SVCB RRs) described in [RFC9460] can carry many of the details otherwise negotiated using the proxy relations. In HTTP, they can be used in a way similar to Alt-Svc headers.¶

SVCB records were not specified when CoAP was specified for TCP.¶

If at any point SVCB records for CoAP are defined, name resolution produces a set of transport details that can be used immediately without the need for a has-proxy link. Explicit has-proxy links would still be relevant for third party advertised proxies.¶

B.3. Using names outside regular DNS

Names that are resolved through different mechanisms than DNS, or names which are defined within the scope of DNS but have no universally valid answers to A/AAAA requests, can be advertised using the relation types defined here and CoAP discovery.¶

In Figure 5, a server using a cryptographic name as described in [I-D.amsuess-t2trg-rdlink] is discovered and used.¶

Req: to [ff02::fd]:5683 on UDP
Code: GET
Uri-Path: /.well-known/core
Uri-Query: rel=has-proxy
Uri-Query: anchor=coap://nbswy3dpo5xxe3denbswy3dpo5xxe3de.ab.rdlink.arpa

Res: from [2001:db8::1]:5683
Content-Format: application/link-format
Payload:
<coap+tcp://[2001:db8::1]>;rel=has-unique-proxy;
  anchor="coap://nbswy3dpo5xxe3denbswy3dpo5xxe3de.ab.rdlink.arpa"


Req: to [2001:db8::1]:5683 on TCP
Code: GET
OSCORE: ...
Uri-Path: /sensors/temp
Observe: 0

Res: 2.05 Content
OSCORE: ...
Observe: 0
Payload:
39.1°C

B.4. Multipath TCP

When CoAP-over-TCP is used over Multipath TCP and no Uri-Host option is sent, the implicit assumption is that there is aliasing between URIs containing any of the endpoints' addresses.¶

As these are negotiated within MPTCP, this works independently of this document's mechanisms. As long as all the server's addresses are equally reachable, there is no need to advertise multiple addresses that can later be discovered through MPTCP anyway. When advertisements are long-lived and there is no single more stable address, several available addresses can be advertised (independently of whether MPTCP is involved or not). If a client uses an address that is merely a proxy address (and not a unique proxy address), but during MPTCP finds out that the network location being accessed is actually an MPTCP alternative address of the used one, the client MAY forego sending of the Proxy-Scheme and Uri-Path option.¶

[ This follows from multiple addresses being valid for that TCP connection; at some point we may want to say something about what that means for the default value of the Uri-Host option -- maybe something like "has the default value of any of the associated addresses, but the server may only enable MPTCP if there is implicit aliasing between all of them" (similar to OSCORE's statement)? ]¶

[ TBD: Do we need a section analog to this that deals with (D)TLS session resumption in absence of SNI? ]¶

E.1. Motivation for new literal-ish names

IP literals were part of URIs from the start [w3address]. Initially, they were equivalent to host names in their expressiveness, save for their inherent difference that the former can be used without a shared resolver, and the latter can be switched to a different network address.¶

This equivalence got lost gradually: Certificates for TLS (its precursor SSL has been available since 1995 [evossl]) have only practically been available to host names. The Host header introduced in HTTP 1.1 Section 14.23 of [RFC2616] introduced name based virtual hosting in 1999. DANE [RFC6698], which provides TLS public keys augmenting the or outside of the public key infrastructure, is only available for host names resolved through DNSSEC. SVCB records [RFC9460] introduced in 2023 allow starting newer HTTP transports without going through HTTP/1.1 first, enables load balancing, fail-over, and enable Encrypted Client Hello -- again, only for host names resolved through DNS.¶

This document proposes an expression for the host component of a URI that fills that gap. Note that no attempt is yet made to register service.arpa in the .ARPA Zone Management; that name is used only for the purpose of discussion.¶

The structure and even more the syntax used here is highly preliminary. They serves to illustrate that the desired properties can be obtained, and do not claim to be optimal. As one of many aspects, they are missing considerations for normalization and for internationalization.¶

E.2. Structure of service.arpa

Names under service.arpa are structured into an optional custom prefix, an ordered list of key-value component pairs, and the common suffix service.arpa.¶

The custom prefix can contain user defined components. The intended use is labelling, and to differentiate services provided by a single host. Any data is allowed within the structure of a URI (ABNF reg-name) and DNS name rules (63 bytes per segment). (While not ever carried by DNS, this upholds the constraints of DNS for names. That decision may be revised later, but is upheld while demonstrating that the desired properties can be obtained).¶

Component pairs consist of a registered component type (no precise registry is proposed at this early point) followed by encoded data. The component type "--" is special in that it concatenates the values to its left and to its right, creating component values that may exceed 63 bytes in length.¶

Initial component types are:¶

• "6": The value encodes an IPv6 address in [RFC5952] format, with the colon character (":") replaced with a dash ("-").¶

  It indicates an address of a host providing the service.¶

  If any address information is present, a client SHOULD use that information to access the service.¶

• "4": The value encodes an IPv4 address in dotted decimal format [RFC1123], with the dot character (".") replaced with a dash ("-").¶

  It indicates an address of a host providing the service.¶

• "tlsa": The data of a DNS TLSA record [RFC6698] encoded in base32 [RFC4648].¶

  Depending on the usage, this describes TLS credentials through which the service can be authenticated.¶

  If present, a client MUST establish a secure connection, and MUST fail the connection if the TLSA record's requirements are not met.¶

• "edhoc-cred", "edhoc-info", "oauth-info": SvcbParams in base32 encoding of their wire format.¶

• "coaptransport": SvcbParam in its text encoding.¶

• "s": Other Service Parameters that do not have an explicit component type. SvcbParams in base32 encoding of their wire format.¶

  TBD: There is likely a transformation of the parameters' presentation format that is compatible with the requirements of the authority component, but this will require some more work on the syntax.¶

  If present, a client SHOULD use these hints to establish a connection.¶

  TBD: Encoding only the SvcParams and not priorities and targets appears to be the right thing to do for the immediate record, but does not enable load balancing and failover. Further work is required to explore how those can be expressed, and how data pertaining to the target can be expressed, possibly in a nested structure.¶

E.3. Syntax of service.arpa

name = [ custom ".-." ] *(component) "service.arpa"

custom = reg-name
component = 1*63nodot "." comptype "."
comptype = nodotnodash /  2*63nodot

; unreserved/subdelims without dot
nodot  = nodotnodash / "-"
; unreserved/subdelims without dot or dash
nodotnodash = ALPHA / DIGIT / "_" / "~" / sub-delims

; reg-name and sub-delims as in RFC3986

Due to [RFC3986]'s rules, all components are case insensitive and canonically lowercase.¶

Note that while using the IPvFuture mechanism of [RFC3986] would avoid compatibility issues around the 63 character limit and some of the character restrictions, it would not resolve the larger limitation of case insensitivity.¶

E.4. Processing service.arpa

A client accessing a resource under a service.arpa name does not consult DNS, but obtains information equivalent to the results of a DNS query from parsing the name.¶

DNS resolvers should refuse to resolve service.arpa names. (They would have all the information needed to produce sensible results, but operational aspects would need a lot of consideration; future versions of this document may revise this).¶

E.5. Examples

TBD: For SvcParams, the examples are inconsistent with the base32 recommendation; they serve to explore the possible alternatives.¶

• http://s.alpn_h2c.6.2001-db8--1.service.arpa/ -- The server is reachable on 2001:db8::1 using HTTP/2¶

• https://mail.-.tlsa.amaqckrkfivcukrkfivcukrkfivcukrkfivcukrkfivcukrkfivcukrk.service.arpa/ -- No address information is provided, the client needs to resort to other discovery mechanisms. Any server is eligible to serve the resource if it can present a (possibly self-signed) certificate whose public key SHA256 matches the encoded value. The "mail.-." part is provided to the server as part of the Host header, and can be used for name based virtual hosting.¶

• coap://coaptransport.tcp.edhoc-cred.ueekcandaeasabbblaqlxq2jmbjg5jgtf2kazljkenaurxocc6i2ckx3zowjgyr.--.ai3ouj4a.6.2001-db8--1.service.arpa/ -- The server is reachable using CoAP over TCP with EDHOC security at 2001:db8::1, and the service is identifiable by the use of a KCCS credential describing an X25519 public key.¶

• coap://edhoc-cred.ueekcandaeasabbblaqlxq2jmbjg5jgtf2kazljkenaurxocc6i2ckx3zowjgyr.--.ai3ouj4a.service.arpa/ -- The same server without any discoverability hints; it is up to the client to discover a (possibly short-lived) connection opportunities to the server identified by that key.¶