BRSKI with Pledge in Responder Mode (BRSKI-PRM)

3.1.1. Building Automation

In building automation a typical use case exists where a detached building or the basement is equipped with sensors, actuators, and controllers, but with only limited or no connection to the central building management system. This limited connectivity may exist during installation time or also during operation time.¶

During the installation, for instance, a service technician collects the device-specific information from the basement network and provides them to the central building management system. This could be done using a laptop, common mobile device, or dedicated commissioning tool to transport the information. The service technician may successively collect device-specific information in different parts of the building before connecting to the domain registrar for bulk bootstrapping.¶

A domain registrar may be part of the central building management system and already be operational in the installation network. The central building management system can then provide operational parameters for the specific devices in the basement or other detached areas. These operational parameters may comprise values and settings required in the operational phase of the sensors/actuators, among them a certificate issued by the operator to authenticate against other components and services. These operational parameters are then provided to the devices in the basement facilitated by the service technician's laptop. The Registrar-Agent, defined in this document, may be run on the technician's laptop to interact with pledges.¶

3.1.2. Infrastructure Isolation Policy

This refers to any case in which the network infrastructure is normally isolated from the Internet as a matter of policy, most likely for security reasons. In such a case, limited access to a domain registrar may be allowed in carefully controlled short periods of time, for example when a batch of new devices are deployed, but prohibited at other times.¶

3.1.3. Less Operational Security in the Target-Domain

The registration authority (RA) performing the authorization of a certificate request is a critical PKI component and therefore requires higher operational security than other components utilizing the issued certificates. CAs may also require higher security in the registration procedures. There may be situations in which the customer domain does not offer enough physical security to operate a RA/CA and therefore this service is transferred to a backend that offers a higher level of operational security.¶

5.6.1. Discovery of Registrar by Registrar-Agent

As a Registrar-Agent acts as representative of the domain registrar towards the pledge or may even be collocated with the domain registrar, a separate discovery of the registrar is likely not needed as Registrar-Agent and registrar are domain components and have a trust relation. Moreover, other communication (not part of this document) between the Registrar-Agent and the registrar is assumed, e.g., to exchange information about product-serial-number(s) of pledges to be discovered as outlined in Section 5.2. Moreover, as the standard discovery described in section 4 and the appendix A.2 of [RFC8995] does not support of registrars with an enhanced feature set (like the support of BRSKI-PRM), this standard discovery is not applicable.¶

As a more general solution, the BRSKI discovery mechanism can be extended to provide upfront information on the capabilities of registrars, such as the mode of operation (pledge-responder-mode or registrar-responder-mode). Defining discovery extensions is out of scope of this document. This may be provided in [I-D.eckert-anima-brski-discovery].¶

5.6.2. Discovery of Pledge by Registrar-Agent

The discovery of the pledge by Registrar-Agent in the context of this document describes the minimum discovery approach to be supported. A more general discovery mechanism, also supporting GRASP besides DNS-SD with mDNS may be provided in [I-D.eckert-anima-brski-discovery].¶

Discovery in BRSKI-PRM uses DNS-based Service Discovery [RFC6763] over Multicast DNS [RFC6762] to discover the pledge. Note that [RFC6762] Section 9 provides support for conflict resolution in situations when an DNS-SD with mDNS responder receives a mDNS response with inconsistent data. Note that [RFC8990] does not support conflict resolution of mDNS, which may be a limitation for its application.¶

The pledge constructs a local host name based on device local information (product-serial-number), which results in "product-serial-number._brski-pledge._tcp.local". The product-serial-number composition is manufacturer dependent and may contain information regarding the manufacturer, the product type, and further information specific to the product instance. To allow distinction of pledges, the product-serial-number therefore needs to be sufficiently unique.¶

In the absence of a more general discovery as defined in [I-D.eckert-anima-brski-discovery] the Registrar-Agent MUST use¶

• "product-serial-number._brski-pledge._tcp.local", to discover a specific pledge, e.g., when connected to a local network.¶

• "_brski-pledge._tcp.local" to get a list of pledges to be bootstrapped.¶

A manufacturer may allow the pledge to react on DNS-SD with mDNS discovery without his product-serial-number contained. This allows a commissioning tool to discover pledges to be bootstrapped in the domain. The manufacturer support this functionality as outlined in Section 10.4.¶

Establishing network connectivity of the pledge is out of scope of this document but necessary to apply DNS-SD with mDNS. For Ethernet it is provided by simply connecting the network cable. For WiFi networks, connectivity can be provided by using a pre-agreed SSID for bootstrapping, e.g., as proposed in [I-D.richardson-emu-eap-onboarding]. The same approach can be used by 6LoWPAN/mesh using a pre-agreed PAN ID. How to gain network connectivity is out of scope of this document.¶

6.1.1. Pledge-Voucher-Request (PVR) - Trigger

Triggering the pledge to create the PVR is done using HTTP POST on the defined pledge endpoint: "/.well-known/brski/tpvr"¶

The Registrar-Agent PVR trigger Content-Type header is: application/json. Following parameters are provided in the JSON object:¶

• agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert: base64-encoded registrar EE TLS certificate.¶

• agent-signed-data: base64-encoded JSON-in-JWS object.¶

The trigger for the pledge to create a PVR is depicted in the following figure:¶

{
  "agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert": "base64encodedvalue==",
  "agent-signed-data": "base64encodedvalue=="
}

Note that at the time of receiving the PVR trigger, the pledge cannot verify the registrar LDevID certificate and has no proof-of-possession of the corresponding private key for the certificate. The pledge therefore accepts the registrar LDevID certificate provisionally until it receives the voucher as described in Section 6.3.¶

The pledge will also be unable to verify the agent-signed-data itself as it does not possess the EE (RegAgt) certificate and the domain trust has not been established at this point of the communication. Verification SHOULD be done, after the voucher has been received.¶

The agent-signed-data is a JSON-in-JWS object and contains the following information:¶

The header of the agent-signed-data contains:¶

• alg: algorithm used for creating the object signature.¶

• kid: MUST contain the base64-encoded bytes of the SubjectKeyIdentifier (the "KeyIdentifier" OCTET STRING value) of the EE (RegAgt) certificate.¶

The body of the agent-signed-data contains an "ietf-voucher-request:agent-signed-data" element (defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-rfc8366bis]):¶

• created-on: MUST contain the creation date and time in yang:date-and-time format.¶

• serial-number: MUST contain the product-serial-number as type string as defined in [RFC8995], section 2.3.1. The serial-number corresponds with the product-serial-number contained in the X520SerialNumber field of the IDevID certificate of the pledge.¶

# The agent-signed-data in General JWS Serialization syntax
{
  "payload": "BASE64URL(ietf-voucher-request-prm:agent-signed-data)",
  "signatures": [
    {
      "protected": "BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header))",
      "signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
    }
  ]
}

# Example: Decoded payload representation in JSON syntax of
  "ietf-voucher-request-prm:agent-signed-data"

"ietf-voucher-request-prm:agent-signed-data": {
  "created-on": "2021-04-16T00:00:01.000Z",
  "serial-number": "callee4711"
}

# Example: Decoded "JWS Protected Header" representation
  in JSON syntax
{
  "alg": "ES256",
  "kid": "base64encodedvalue=="
}

6.1.2. Pledge-Voucher-Request (PVR) - Response

Upon receiving the voucher-request trigger, the pledge SHALL construct the body of the PVR as defined in [RFC8995]. It will contain additional information provided by the Registrar-Agent as specified in the following. This PVR becomes a JSON-in-JWS object as defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher]. If the pledge is unable to construct the PVR it SHOULD respond with a HTTP error code to the Registrar-Agent to indicate that it is not able to create the PVR.¶

The following client error responses MAY be used:¶

• 400 Bad Request: if the pledge detected an error in the format of the request, e.g. missing field, wrong data types, etc. or if the request is not valid JSON even though the PVR media type was set to application/json.¶

• 403 Forbidden: if the pledge detected that one or more security parameters from the trigger message to create the PVR were not valid, e.g., the LDevID (Reg) certificate.¶

The header of the PVR SHALL contain the following parameters as defined in [RFC7515] to support JWS signing of the object:¶

• alg: algorithm used for creating the object signature.¶

• x5c: contains the base64-encoded pledge IDevID certificate. It MAY optionally contain the certificate chain for this certificate. If the certificate chain is not included it MUST be available at the registrar for verification of the IDevID certificate.¶

The payload of the PVR MUST contain the following parameters as part of the ietf-voucher-request-prm:voucher as defined in [RFC8995]:¶

• created-on: SHALL contain the current date and time in yang:date-and-time format. If the pledge does not have synchronized time, it SHALL use the created-on time from the agent-signed-data, received in the trigger to create a PVR.¶

• nonce: SHALL contain a cryptographically strong pseudo-random number.¶

• serial-number: SHALL contain the pledge product-serial-number as X520SerialNumber.¶

• assertion: SHALL contain the requested voucher assertion "agent-proximity" (different value as in RFC 8995)..¶

The ietf-voucher-request:voucher is extended with additional parameters:¶

• agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert: MUST be included and contains the base64-encoded registrar LDevID certificate (provided as PVR trigger parameter by the Registrar-Agent).¶

• agent-signed-data: MUST contain the base64-encoded agent-signed-data (as defined in Figure 7) and provided as a PVR trigger parameter by the Registrar-Agent.¶

The enhancements of the YANG module for the ietf-voucher-request with these new leaves are defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-rfc8366bis].¶

The PVR is signed using the pledge's IDevID credential contained as x5c parameter of the JOSE header.¶

# The PVR in General JWS Serialization syntax
{
  "payload": "BASE64URL(ietf-voucher-request-prm:voucher)",
  "signatures": [
    {
      "protected": "BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header))",
      "signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
    }
  ]
}

# Example: Decoded Payload "ietf-voucher-request-prm:voucher"
  representation in JSON syntax
"ietf-voucher-request-prm:voucher": {
   "created-on": "2021-04-16T00:00:02.000Z",
   "nonce": "eDs++/FuDHGUnRxN3E14CQ==",
   "serial-number": "callee4711",
   "assertion": "agent-proximity",
   "agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert": "base64encodedvalue==",
   "agent-signed-data": "base64encodedvalue=="
}

# Example: Decoded "JWS Protected Header" representation
  in JSON syntax
{
    "alg": "ES256",
    "x5c": [
      "base64encodedvalue==",
      "base64encodedvalue=="
    ],
    "typ": "voucher-jws+json"
}

The PVR Media-Type is defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher] as application/voucher-jws+json.¶

The pledge MUST include this Media-Type header field indicating the included media type for the PVR. The PVR is included by the registrar in its RCR as described in Section 6.2.¶

6.1.3. Pledge-Enrollment-Request (PER) - Trigger

Once the Registrar-Agent has received the PVR it can trigger the pledge to generate a PER. As in BRSKI the PER contains a PKCS#10, but additionally signed using the pledge's IDevID. Note, as the initial enrollment aims to request a generic certificate, no certificate attributes are provided to the pledge.¶

Triggering the pledge to create the enrollment-request is done using HTTP POST on the defined pledge endpoint: "/.well-known/brski/tper"¶

The Registrar-Agent PER trigger Content-Type header is: application/json with an empty body by default. Note that using HTTP POST allows for an empty body, but also to provide additional data, like CSR attributes or information about the enroll type "enroll-generic-cert" or "re-enroll-generic-cert". The "enroll-generic-cert" case is shown in Figure 9.¶

{
  "enroll-type" : "enroll-generic-cert"
}

This document specifies the request of a generic certificate with no CSR attributes provided to the pledge. If specific attributes in the certificate are required, they have to be inserted by the issuing RA/CA. How the HTTP POST can be used to provide CSR attributes is out of scope for this specification.¶

6.1.4. Pledge-Enrollment-Request (PER) - Response

In the following the enrollment is described as initial enrollment with an empty HTTP POST body.¶

Upon receiving the PER trigger, the pledge SHALL construct the PER as authenticated self-contained object. The CSR already assures POP of the private key corresponding to the contained public key. In addition, based on the PER signature using the IDevID, POI is provided. Here, a JOSE object is being created in which the body utilizes the YANG module ietf-ztp-types with the grouping for csr-grouping for the CSR as defined in [I-D.ietf-netconf-sztp-csr].¶

Depending on the capability of the pledge, it constructs the pledge enrollment-request (PER) as plain PKCS#10. Note, the focus in this use case is placed on PKCS#10 as PKCS#10 can be transmitted in different enrollment protocols in the infrastructure like EST, CMP, CMS, and SCEP. If the pledge has already implemented an enrollment protocol, it may leverage that functionality for the creation of the CSR. Note, [I-D.ietf-netconf-sztp-csr] also allows for inclusion of certification requests in different formats used by CMP or CMC.¶

The pledge MUST construct the PER as PKCS#10. In BRSKI-PRM it MUST sign it additionally with its IDevID credentials to provide proof-of-identity bound to the PKCS#10 as described below.¶

If the pledge is unable to construct the PER it SHOULD respond with a HTTP 4xx/5xx error code to the Registrar-Agent to indicate that it is not able to create the PER.¶

The following 4xx client error codes MAY be used:¶

• 400 Bad Request: if the pledge detected an error in the format of the request or detected invalid JSON even though the PER media type was set to application/json.¶

• 403 Forbidden: if the pledge detected that one or more security parameters (if provided) from the trigger message to create the PER are not valid.¶

• 406 Not Acceptable: if the request's Accept header indicates a type that is unknown or unsupported. For example, a type other than application/jose+json.¶

• 415 Unsupported Media Type: if the request's Content-Type header indicates a type that is unknown or unsupported. For example, a type other than 'application/json'.¶

A successful enrollment will result in a generic LDevID certificate for the pledge in the new domain, which can be used to request further (application specific) LDevID certificates if necessary for operation. The Registrar-Agent SHALL use the endpoints specified in this document.¶

[I-D.ietf-netconf-sztp-csr] considers PKCS#10 but also CMP and CMC as certification request format. Note that the wrapping of the PER signature is only necessary for plain PKCS#10 as other request formats like CMP and CMS support the signature wrapping as part of their own certificate request format.¶

The Registrar-Agent enrollment-request Content-Type header for a signature-wrapped PKCS#10 is: application/jose+json¶

The header of the pledge enrollment-request SHALL contain the following parameter as defined in [RFC7515]:¶

• alg: algorithm used for creating the object signature.¶

• x5c: contains the base64-encoded pledge IDevID certificate. It MAY optionally contain the certificate chain for this certificate. If the certificate chain is not included it MUST be available at the registrar for verification of the IDevID certificate. The body of the pledge enrollment-request SHOULD contain a P10 parameter (for PKCS#10) as defined for ietf-ztp-types:p10-csr in [I-D.ietf-netconf-sztp-csr]:¶

• P10: contains the base64-encoded PKCS#10 of the pledge.¶

The JOSE object is signed using the pledge's IDevID credential, which corresponds to the certificate signaled in the JOSE header.¶

While BRSKI-PRM targets the initial enrollment, re-enrollment SHOULD be supported as described in a similar way as for enrollment in this document, if no other re-enrollment mechanism is supported. Note that in this case the current LDevID credential is used instead of the IDevID credential to create the signature of the PKCS#10 request.¶

# The PER in General JWS Serialization syntax
{
  "payload": "BASE64URL(ietf-ztp-types)",
  "signatures": [
    {
      "protected": "BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header))",
      "signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
    }
  ]
}

# Example: Decoded Payload "ietf-ztp-types" Representation
  in JSON Syntax
"ietf-ztp-types": {
  "p10-csr": "base64encodedvalue=="
}

# Example: Decoded "JWS Protected Header" Representation
  in JSON Syntax
{
  "alg": "ES256",
  "x5c": [
    "base64encodedvalue==",
    "base64encodedvalue=="
  ],
  "crit":["created-on"],
  "created-on": "2022-09-13T00:00:02.000Z"
}

With the collected PVR and PER, the Registrar-Agent starts the interaction with the domain registrar.¶

The new protected header field "created-on" is introduced to reflect freshness of the PER. The field is marked critical "crit" to ensure that it must be understood and validated by the receiver (here the domain registrar) according to section 4.1.11 of [RFC7515]. It allows the registrar to verify the timely correlation between the PER and previously exchanged messages, i.e., created-on of PER >= created-on of PVR >= created-on of PVR trigger. The registrar MAY consider to ignore any but the newest PER from the same pledge in the case the registrar has at any point in time more than one pending PER from the pledge.¶

As the Registrar-Agent is intended to facilitate communication between the pledge and the domain registrar, a collection of requests from more than one pledge is possible. This allows bulk bootstrapping of several pledges using the same connection between the Registrar-Agent and the domain registrar.¶

6.2.1. Connection Establishment (Registrar-Agent to Registrar)

In contrast to BRSKI [RFC8995] TLS client authentication to the registrar is achieved by using Registrar-Agent EE credentials instead of pledge IDevID credentials. Consequently BRSKI (pledge-initiator-mode) is distinguishable from BRSKI-PRM (pledge-responder-mode) by the registrar. The registrar SHOULD verify that the Registrar-Agent is authorized to establish a connection to the registrar based on the TLS client authentication. If the connection from Registrar-Agent to registrar is established, the authorization SHOULD be verified again based on agent-signed-data contained in the PVR. This ensures that the pledge has been triggered by an authorized Registrar-Agent.¶

With BRSKI-PRM, the pledge generates PVR and PER as JSON-in-JWS objects and the Registrar-Agent forwards them to the registrar. In [RFC8995], the pledge generates PVR as CMS-signed JSON and PER as PKCS#10 or PKCS#7 according to [RFC7030] and inherited by [RFC8995].¶

For BRSKI-PRM, the Registrar-Agent sends the PVR by HTTP POST to the same registrar endpoint as introduced by BRSKI: "/.well- known/brski/requestvoucher", but with a Content-Type header field for JSON-in-JWS"¶

The Content-Type header field for JSON-in-JWS PVR is: application/voucher-jws+json (see Figure 8 for the content definition), as defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher].¶

The Registrar-Agent sets the Accept field in the request-header indicating the acceptable Content-Type for the voucher-response. The voucher-response Content-Type header field is set to application/voucher-jws+json as defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher].¶

6.2.2. Pledge-Voucher-Request (PVR) Processing by Registrar

After receiving the PVR from Registrar-Agent, the registrar SHALL perform the verification as defined in section 5.3 of [RFC8995]. In addition, the registrar SHALL verify the following parameters from the PVR:¶

• agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert: MUST contain registrar's own registrar LDevID certificate to ensure the registrar in proximity of the Registrar-Agent is the desired registrar for this PVR.¶

• agent-signed-data: The registrar MUST verify that the Registrar-Agent provided data has been signed with the private key corresponding to the EE (RegAgt) certificate indicated in the "kid" JOSE header parameter. The registrar MUST verify that the LDevID(ReAgt) certificate, corresponding to the signature, is still valid. If the certificate is already expired, the registrar SHALL reject the request. Validity of used signing certificates at the time of signing the agent-signed-data is necessary to avoid that a rogue Registrar-Agent generates agent-signed-data objects to onboard arbitrary pledges at a later point in time, see also Section 10.3. The registrar MUST fetch the EE (RegAgt) certificate, based on the provided SubjectKeyIdentifier (SKID) contained in the "kid" header parameter of the agent-signed-data, and perform this verification. This requires, that the registrar has access to the EE (RegAgt) certificate data (including intermediate CA certificates if existent) based on the SKID. Note, the registrar may have stored the EE (RegAgt) certificate if used during TLS establishment between Registrar-Agent and registrar or it may be provided via a repository.¶

If the registrar is unable to validate the PVR it SHOULD respond with a HTTP 4xx/5xx error code to the Registrar-Agent.¶

The following 4xx client error codes SHOULD be used:¶

• 403 Forbidden: if the registrar detected that one or more security related parameters are not valid.¶

• 404 Not Found status code if the pledge provided information could not be used with automated allowance, as described in section 5.3 of [RFC8995].¶

• 406 Not Acceptable: if the Content-Type indicated by the Accept header is unknown or unsupported.¶

If the validation succeeds, the registrar performs pledge authorization according to [RFC8995], Section 5.3 followed by obtaining a voucher from the pledge's MASA according to [RFC8995], Section 5.4 with the modifications described below in Section 6.2.3.¶

6.2.3. Registrar-Voucher-Request (RVR) Processing (Registrar to MASA)

If the MASA address/URI is learned from the [RFC8995] Section 2.3 IDevID MASA URI extension, then the MASA on that URI MUST support the procedures defined in this document if the PVR used JSON-JWS encoding. If the MASA is only configured on the registrar, then a registrar supporting BRKSI-PRM and other voucher encoding formats (such as those in [RFC8995]) SHOULD support per-message-format MASA address/URI configuration for the same IDevID trust anchor."¶

The registrar SHALL construct the payload of the RVR as defined in [RFC8995], Section 5.5. The RVR encoding SHALL be JSON-in-JWS as defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher].¶

The header of the RVR SHALL contain the following parameter as defined for JWS [RFC7515]:¶

• alg: algorithm used to create the object signature¶

• x5c: base64-encoded registrar LDevID certificate(s) (It optionally contains the certificate chain for this certificate)¶

The payload of the RVR MUST contain the following parameter as part of the voucher-request as defined in [RFC8995]:¶

• created-on: current date and time in yang:date-and-time format of RVR creation¶

• nonce: copied from the PVR¶

• serial-number: product-serial-number of pledge. The registrar MUST verify that the IDevID certificate subject serialNumber of the pledge (X520SerialNumber) matches the serial-number value in the PVR. In addition, it MUST be equal to the serial-number value contained in the agent-signed data of PVR.¶

• assertion: voucher assertion requested by the pledge (agent-proximity). The registrar provides this information to assure successful verification of Registrar-Agent proximity based on the agent-signed-data.¶

• prior-signed-voucher-request: PVR as received from Registrar-Agent, see Section 6.1.2¶

The RVR MUST be extended with the following parameter, when the assertion "agent-proximity" is requested, as defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-rfc8366bis]:¶

• agent-sign-cert: EE (RegAgt) certificate or the EE (RegAgt) certificate including certificate chain. In the context of this document it is a JSON array of base64encoded certificate information and handled in the same way as x5c header objects. If only a single object is contained in the x5c it MUST be the base64-encoded EE (RegAgt) certificate. If multiple certificates are included in the x5c, the first MUST be the base64-encoded EE (RegAgt) certificate.¶

The MASA uses this information for verification that the Registrar-Agent is in proximity to the registrar to state the corresponding assertion "agent-proximity".¶

The object is signed using the registrar LDevID credentials, which corresponds to the certificate referenced in the JOSE header.¶

# The RVR in General JWS Serialization syntax
{
  "payload": "BASE64URL(ietf-voucher-request-prm:voucher)",
  "signatures": [
    {
      "protected": "BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header))",
      "signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
    }
  ]
}

# Example: Decoded payload "ietf-voucher-request-prm:voucher"
  representation in JSON syntax
"ietf-voucher-request-prm:voucher": {
   "created-on": "2022-01-04T02:37:39.235Z",
   "nonce": "eDs++/FuDHGUnRxN3E14CQ==",
   "serial-number": "callee4711",
   "assertion": "agent-proximity",
   "prior-signed-voucher-request": "base64encodedvalue==",
   "agent-sign-cert": [
     "base64encodedvalue==",
     "base64encodedvalue==",
     "..."
   ]
}

# Example: Decoded "JWS Protected Header" representation
  in JSON syntax
{
  "alg": "ES256",
  "x5c": [
    "base64encodedvalue==",
    "base64encodedvalue=="
  ],
  "typ": "voucher-jws+json"
}

The registrar SHALL send the RVR to the MASA endpoint by HTTP POST: "/.well-known/brski/requestvoucher"¶

The RVR Content-Type header field is defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher] as: application/voucher-jws+json¶

The registrar SHOULD set the Accept header of the RVR indicating the desired media type for the voucher-response. The media type is application/voucher-jws+json as defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher].¶

This document uses the JSON-in-JWS format throughout the definition of exchanges and in the examples. Nevertheless, alternative encodings of the voucher as used in BRSKI [RFC8995] with JSON-in-CMS or CBOR-in-COSE_Sign [RFC8152] for constraint environments are possible as well. The assumption is that a pledge typically supports a single encoding variant and creates the PVR in the supported format. To ensure that the pledge is able to process the voucher, the registrar MUST use the media type for Accept header in the RVR based on the media type used for the PVR.¶

Once the MASA receives the RVR it SHALL perform the verification as described in Section 5.5 in [RFC8995].¶

In addition, the following processing SHALL be performed for PVR contained in RVR "prior-signed-voucher-request" field:¶

• agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert: The MASA MAY verify that this field contains the registrar LDevID certificate. If so, it MUST correspond to the registrar LDevID credentials used to sign the RVR. Note: Correspond here relates to the case that a single registrar LDevID certificate is used or that different registrar LDevID certificates are used, which are issued by the same CA.¶

• agent-signed-data: The MASA MAY verify this data to issue "agent-proximity" assertion. If so, the agent-signed-data MUST contain the pledge product-serial-number, contained in the "serial-number" field of the PVR (from "prior-signed-voucher-request" field) and also in "serial-number" field of the RVR. The EE (RegAgt) certificate to be used for signature verification is identified by the "kid" parameter of the JOSE header. If the assertion "agent-proximity" is requested, the RVR MUST contain the corresponding EE (RegAgt) certificate data in the "agent-sign-cert" field of the RVR. It MUST be verified by the MASA to the same domain CA as the registrar LDevID certificate. If the "agent-sign-cert" field is not set, the MASA MAY state a lower level assertion value, e.g.: "logged" or "verified". Note: Sub-CA certificate(s) MUST also be carried by "agent-sign-cert", in case the EE (RegAgt) certificate is issued by a sub-CA and not the domain CA known to the MASA. As the "agent-sign-cert" field is defined as array (x5c), it can handle multiple certificates.¶

If validation fails, the MASA SHOULD respond with an HTTP 4xx client error status code to the registrar. The HTTP error status codes are kept the same as defined in Section 5.6 of [RFC8995] and comprise the codes: 403, 404, 406, and 415.¶

6.2.4. Voucher Issuance by MASA

The MASA creates a voucher with Media-Type of application/voucher-jws+json as defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher]. If the MASA detects that the Accept header of the PVR does not match application/voucher-jws+json it SHOULD respond with the HTTP status code "406 Not Acceptable" as the pledge will not be able to parse the response. The voucher is according to [I-D.ietf-anima-rfc8366bis] but uses the new assertion value specified Section 5.4.¶

Figure 13 shows an example of the contents of a voucher.¶

# The MASA issued voucher in General JWS Serialization syntax
{
  "payload": "BASE64URL(ietf-voucher:voucher)",
  "signatures": [
    {
      "protected": "BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header))",
      "signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
    }
  ]
}

# Example: Decoded payload "ietf-voucher:voucher" representation
  in JSON syntax
"ietf-voucher:voucher": {
  "assertion": "agent-proximity",
  "serial-number": "callee4711",
  "nonce": "base64encodedvalue==",
  "created-on": "2022-01-04T00:00:02.000Z",
  "pinned-domain-cert": "base64encodedvalue=="
}

# Example: Decoded "JWS Protected Header" representation
  in JSON syntax
{
  "alg": "ES256",
  "x5c": [
    "base64encodedvalue==",
    "base64encodedvalue=="
  ],
  "typ": "voucher-jws+json"
}

The pinned-domain certificate to be put into the voucher is determined by the MASA as described in section 5.5 of [RFC8995]. The MASA returns the voucher-response (voucher) to the registrar.¶

6.2.5. MASA issued Voucher Processing by Registrar

After receiving the voucher the registrar SHOULD evaluate it for transparency and logging purposes as outlined in Section 5.6 of [RFC8995]. The registrar MUST add an additional signature to the MASA provided voucher using its registrar EE credentials.¶

The signature is created by signing the original "JWS Payload" produced by MASA and the registrar added "JWS Protected Header" using the registrar EE credentials (see [RFC7515], Section 5.2 point 8. The x5c component of the "JWS Protected Header" MUST contain the registrar EE certificate as well as potential subordinate CA certificates up to (but not including) the pinned domain certificate. The pinned domain certificate is already contained in the voucher payload ("pinned-domain-cert").¶

(For many installations, with a single registrar credential, the registrar credential is what is pinned)¶

In [RFC8995], the Registrar proved possession of the it's credential when the TLS session was setup. While the pledge could not, at the time, validate the certificate truly belonged the registrar, it did validate that the certificate it was provided was able to authenticate the TLS connection.¶

In the BRSKI-PRM mode, with the Registrar-Agent mediating all communication, the Pledge has not as yet been able to witness that the intended Registrar really does possess the relevant private key. This second signature provides for the same level of assurance to the pledge, and that it matches the public key that the pledge received in the trigger for the PVR (see Figure 6).¶

The registrar MUST use the same registrar EE credentials used for authentication in the TLS handshake to authenticate towards the Registrar-Agent. This has some operational implications when the registrar may be part of a scalable framework as described in [I-D.richardson-anima-registrar-considerations], Section 1.3.1.¶

The second signature MUST either be done with the private key associated with the registrar EE certificate provided to the Registrar-Agent, or the use of a certificate chain is necessary. This ensures that the same registrar EE certificate can be used to verify the signature as transmitted in the voucher-request as also transferred in the PVR in the "agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert".¶

Figure 14 below provides an example of the voucher with two signatures.¶

# The MASA issued voucher with additional registrar signature in
  General JWS Serialization syntax
{
  "payload": "BASE64URL(ietf-voucher:voucher)",
  "signatures": [
    {
      "protected": "BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header (MASA)))",
      "signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
    },
    {
      "protected": "BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header (Reg)))",
      "signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
    }
  ]
}

# Example: Decoded payload "ietf-voucher:voucher" representation in
  JSON syntax
"ietf-voucher:voucher": {
   "assertion": "agent-proximity",
   "serial-number": "callee4711",
   "nonce": "base64encodedvalue==",
   "created-on": "2022-01-04T00:00:02.000Z",
   "pinned-domain-cert": "base64encodedvalue=="
}

# Example: Decoded "JWS Protected Header (MASA)" representation
  in JSON syntax
{
  "alg": "ES256",
  "x5c": [
    "base64encodedvalue==",
    "base64encodedvalue=="
  ],
  "typ": "voucher-jws+json"
}

# Example: Decoded "JWS Protected Header (Reg)" representation
  in JSON syntax
{
  "alg": "ES256",
  "x5c": [
    "base64encodedvalue==",
    "base64encodedvalue=="
  ]
}

Depending on the security policy of the operator, this signature can also be interpreted by the pledge as explicit authorization of the registrar to install the contained trust anchor. The registrar sends the voucher to the Registrar-Agent.¶

6.2.6. Pledge-Enrollment-Request (PER) Processing (Registrar-Agent to Registrar)

After receiving the voucher, the Registrar-Agent sends the PER to the registrar in the same HTTP-over-TLS connection. Which is similar to the PER processing described in Section 5.2 of [RFC8995]. In case the PER cannot be send in the same HTTP-over-TLS connection the Registrar-Agent may send the PER in a new HTTP-over-TLS connection. The registrar is able to correlate the PVR and the PER based on the signatures and the contained product-serial-number information. Note, this also addresses situations in which a nonceless voucher is used and may be pre-provisioned to the pledge. As specified in Section 6.1.4 deviating from BRSKI the PER is not a raw PKCS#10. As the Registrar-Agent is involved in the exchange, the PKCS#10 is wrapped in a JWS object by the pledge and signed with pledge's IDevID to ensure proof-of-identity as outlined in Figure 10.¶

EST [RFC7030] standard endpoints (/simpleenroll, /simplereenroll, /serverkeygen, /cacerts) on the registrar cannot be used for BRSKI-PRM. This is caused by the utilization of signature wrapped-objects in BRSKI-PRM. As EST requires to sent a raw PKCS#10 request to e.g., "/.well-known/est/simpleenroll" endpoint, this document makes an enhancement by utilizing EST but with the exception to transport a signature wrapped PKCS#10 request. Therefore a new endpoint for BRSKI-PRM on the registrar is defined as "/.well-known/brski/requestenroll"¶

The Content-Type header of PER is: application/jose+json.¶

This is a deviation from the Content-Type header values used in [RFC7030] and results in additional processing at the domain registrar (as EST server). Note, the registrar is already aware that the bootstrapping is performed in a pledge-responder-mode due to the use of the EE (RegAgt) certificate for TLS and the provided PVR as JSON-in-JWS object.¶

• If the registrar receives a PER with Content-Type header: application/jose+json, it MUST verify the wrapping signature using the certificate indicated in the JOSE header.¶

• The registrar verifies that the pledge's certificate (here IDevID), carried in "x5c" header field, is accepted to join the domain after successful validation of the PVR.¶

• If both succeed, the registrar utilizes the PKCS#10 request contained in the JWS object body as "P10" parameter of "ietf-sztp-csr:csr" for further processing of the enrollment-request with the corresponding domain CA. It creates a registrar enrollment-request (RER) by utilizing the protocol expected by the domain CA. The domain registrar may either directly forward the provided PKCS#10 request to the CA or provide additional information about attributes to be included by the CA into the requested LDevID certificate. The approach of sending this information to the CA depends on the utilized certificate management protocol between the RA and the CA and is out of scope for this document.¶

Note while BRSKI-PRM targets the initial enrollment, re-enrollment may be supported in a similar way with the exception that the current LDevID certificate is used instead of the IDevID certificate to verify the wrapping signature of the PKCS#10 request (see also Section 6.1.4).¶

The Registrar-Agent SHALL send the PER to the registrar by HTTP POST to the endpoint: "/.well-known/brski/requestenroll"¶

The registrar SHOULD respond with an HTTP 200 OK in the success case or fail with HTTP 4xx/5xx status codes as defined by the HTTP standard.¶

A successful interaction with the domain CA will result in a pledge LDevID certificate, which is then forwarded by the registrar to the Registrar-Agent using the Content-Type header: application/pkcs7-mime.¶

6.2.7. Request Wrapped-CA-certificate(s) (Registrar-Agent to Registrar)

As the pledge will verify it own certificate LDevID certificate when received, it also needs the corresponding CA certificates. This is done in EST [RFC7030] using the "/.well-known/est/cacerts" endpoint, which provides the CA certificates over a TLS protected connection. BRSKI-PRM requires a signature wrapped CA certificate object, to avoid that the pledge can be provided with arbitrary CA certificates in an authorized way. The registrar signed CA certificate object will allow the pledge to verify the authorization to install the received CA certificate(s). As the CA certificate(s) are provided to the pledge after the voucher, the pledge has the required information (the domain certificate) to verify the wrapped CA certificate object.¶

To support Registrar-Agents requesting a signature wrapped CA certificate(s) object, a new endpoint for BRSKI-PRM is defined on the registrar: "/.well-known/brski/wrappedcacerts"¶

The Registrar-Agent SHALL requests the EST CA trust anchor database information (in form of CA certificates) by HTTP GET.¶

The Content-Type header of the response SHALL be: application/jose+json.¶

This is a deviation from the Content-Type header values used in EST [RFC7030] and results in additional processing at the domain registrar (as EST server). The additional processing is to sign the CA certificate(s) information using the registrar LDevID credentials. This results in a signed CA certificate(s) object (JSON-in-JWS), the CA certificates are provided as base64 encoded "x5bag" (see definition in [RFC9360]) in the JWS payload.¶

# The CA certificates data with registrar signature in General JWS Serialization syntax
{
  "payload": "BASE64URL(certs)",
  "signatures": [
    {
      "protected": "BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header))",
      "signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
    }
  ]
}

# Example: Decoded payload "certs" representation in JSON syntax
{
  "x5bag": [
    "base64encodedvalue==",
    "base64encodedvalue=="
  ]
}


# Example: Decoded "JWS Protected Header" representation
  in JSON syntax
{
  "alg": "ES256",
  "x5c": [
    "base64encodedvalue==",
    "base64encodedvalue=="
  ]
}

6.3.1. Pledge: Voucher-Response Processing

The Registrar-Agent SHALL send the voucher-response to the pledge by HTTP POST to the endpoint: "/.well-known/brski/svr".¶

The Registrar-Agent voucher-response Content-Type header is application/voucher-jws+json and contains the voucher as provided by the MASA. An example is given in Figure 13 for a MASA signed voucher and in Figure 14 for the voucher with the additional signature of the registrar.¶

A nonceless voucher may be accepted as in [RFC8995] and may be allowed by a manufacture's pledge implementation.¶

To perform the validation of several signatures on the voucher object, the pledge SHALL perform the signature verification in the following order:¶

1. Verify MASA signature as described in Section 5.6.1 in [RFC8995], against pre-installed manufacturer trust anchor (IDevID).¶

2. Install trust anchor contained in the voucher ("pinned-domain-cert") provisionally¶

3. Validate the LDevID(Reg) certificate received in the agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert in the pledge-voucher-request trigger request (in the field "agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert")¶

4. Verify registrar signature of the voucher similar as described in Section 5.6.1 in [RFC8995], but take the registrar certificate instead of the MASA certificate for the verification¶

Step3 and step 4 have been introduced in BRSKI-PRM to enable verification of LDevID(Reg) certificate and also the proof-of-possession of the corresponding private key by the registrar, which is done in BRSKI based on the established TLS channel. If all steps stated above have been performed successfully, the pledge SHALL terminate the "PROVISIONAL accept" state for the domain trust anchor and the registrar LDevID certificate.¶

If an error occurs during the verification and validation of the voucher, this SHALL be reported in the reason field of the pledge voucher status.¶

6.3.2. Pledge: Voucher Status Telemetry

After voucher verification and validation the pledge MUST reply with a status telemetry message as defined in Section 5.7 of [RFC8995]. The pledge generates the voucher-status and provides it as signed JSON-in-JWS object in response to the Registrar-Agent.¶

The response has the Content-Type application/jose+json and is signed using the IDevID of the pledge as shown in Figure 17. As the reason field is optional (see [RFC8995]), it MAY be omitted in case of success.¶

# The "pledge-voucher-status" telemetry in general JWS
  serialization syntax
{
  "payload": "BASE64URL(pledge-voucher-status)",
  "signatures": [
    {
      "protected": "BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header))",
      "signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
    }
  ]
}

# Example: Decoded payload "pledge-voucher-status" representation
  in JSON syntax for success case
{
  "version": 1,
  "status": true,
  "reason": "Voucher successfully processed",
  "reason-context": {
    "pvs-details": "JSON"
  }
}

# Example: Decoded payload "pledge-voucher-status" representation
  in JSON syntax for error case
{
  "version": 1,
  "status": false,
  "reason": "Failed to authenticate MASA certificate because
  it starts in the future (1/1/2023).",
  "reason-context": {
    "pvs-details": "Current date: 1/1/1970"
  }
}

# Example: Decoded "JWS Protected Header" representation
  in JSON syntax
{
  "alg": "ES256",
  "x5c": [
    "base64encodedvalue==",
    "base64encodedvalue=="
  ]
}

If the pledge did not did not provide voucher status telemetry information after processing the voucher, the Registrar-Agent MAY query the pledge status explicitly as described in Section 6.4 and MAY resent the voucher depending on the Pledge status following the procedure described in Section 6.3.1.¶

6.3.3. Pledge: Wrapped-CA-Certificate(s) Processing

The Registrar-Agent SHALL provide the set of CA certificates requested from the registrar to the pledge by HTTP POST to the endpoint: "/.well-known/brski/scac".¶

As the CA certificate provisioning is crucial from a security perspective, this provisioning SHOULD only be done, if the voucher-response has been successfully processed by pledge as reflected in the voucher status telemetry.¶

The CA certificates message has the Content-Type application/jose+json and is signed using the credential of the registrar as shown in Figure 15.¶

The CA certificates are provided as base64 encoded "x5bag". The pledge SHALL install the received CA certificates as trust anchor after successful verification of the registrar's signature.¶

The verification comprises the following steps the pledge MUST perform. Maintaining the order of versification steps as indicated allows to determine, which verification has already been passed:¶

1. Check content-type of the CA certificates message. If no Content-Type is contained in the HTTP header, the default Content-Type utilized in this document (JSON-in-JWS) is used. If the Content-Type of the response is in an unknown or unsupported format, the pledge SHOULD reply with a 415 Unsupported media type error code.¶

2. Check the encoding of the payload. If the pledge detects errors in the encoding of the payload, it SHOULD reply with 400 Bad Request error code.¶

3. Verify that the wrapped CA certificate object is signed using the registrar certificate against the pinned-domain certificate. This MAY be done by comparing the hash that is indicating the certificate used to sign the message is that of the pinned-domain certificate. If the validation against the pinned domain-certificate fails, the client SHOULD reply with a 401 Unauthorized error code. It signals that the authentication has failed and therefore the object was not accepted.¶

4. Verify signature of the the received wrapped CA certificate object. If the validation of the signature fails, the pledge SHOULD reply with a 406 Not Acceptable. It signals that the object has not been accepted.¶

5. If the received CA certificates are not self-signed, i.e., an intermediate CA certificate, verify them against an already installed trust anchor, as described in section 4.1.3 of [RFC7030].¶

6.3.4. Pledge: Enrollment-Response Processing

The Registrar-Agent SHALL send the enroll-response to the pledge by HTTP POST to the endpoint: "/.well-known/brski/ser".¶

The Registrar-Agent enroll-response Content-Type header, when using EST [RFC7030] as enrollment protocol between the Registrar-Agent and the infrastructure is: application/pkcs7-mime. Note: It only contains the LDevID certificate for the pledge, not the certificate chain.¶

Upon reception, the pledge SHALL verify the received LDevID certificate. The pledge SHALL generate the enroll status and provide it in the response to the Registrar-Agent. If the verification of the LDevID certificate succeeds, the status property SHALL be set to "status": true, otherwise to "status": false¶

6.3.5. Pledge: Enrollment-Status Telemetry

The pledge MUST reply with a status telemetry message as defined in Section 5.9.4 of [RFC8995]. As for the other objects, the enroll-status is signed and results in a JSON-in-JWS object. If the pledge verified the received LDevID certificate successfully it SHALL sign the response using its new LDevID credentials as shown in Figure 18. In the failure case, the pledge SHALL use the available IDevID credentials. As the reason field is optional, it MAY be omitted in case of success.¶

The response has the Content-Type application/jose+json.¶

# The "pledge-enroll-status" telemetry in General JWS Serialization
  syntax
{
  "payload": "BASE64URL(pledge-enroll-status)",
  "signatures": [
    {
      "protected": "BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header))",
      "signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
    }
  ]
}

# Example: Decoded payload "pledge-enroll-status" representation
  in JSON syntax for success case
{
  "version": 1,
  "status": true,
  "reason": "Enrollment response successfully processed",
  "reason-context": {
    "pes-details": "JSON"
  }
}

# Example: Decoded payload "pledge-voucher-status" representation
  in JSON syntax for error case
{
  "version": 1,
  "status": false,
  "reason": "Enrollment response could not be verified.",
  "reason-context": {
    "pes-details": "no matching trust anchor"
  }
}

# Example: Decoded "JWS Protected Header" representation
  in JSON syntax
{
  "alg": "ES256",
  "x5c": [
    "base64encodedvalue==",
    "base64encodedvalue=="
  ]
}

Once the Registrar-Agent has collected the information, it can connect to the registrar to provide it with the status responses.¶

6.3.6. Telemetry Voucher Status and Enroll Status Handling (Registrar-Agent to Domain Registrar)

The following description requires that the Registrar-Agent has collected the status information from the pledge. It SHALL provide the status information to the registrar for further processing.¶

Preconditions in addition to Section 6.2:¶

• Registrar-Agent: obtained voucher status and enroll status from pledge.¶

The Registrar-Agent MUST provide the collected pledge voucher status to the registrar. This status indicates if the pledge could process the voucher successfully or not.¶

In case the TLS connection to the registrar is already closed, the Registrar-Agent opens a new TLS connection with the registrar as stated in Section 6.2.¶

The Registrar-Agent sends the pledge voucher status without modification to the registrar with an HTTP-over-TLS POST using the registrar endpoint "/.well-known/brski/voucher_status". The Content-Type header is kept as application/jose+json as described in Figure 16 and depicted in the example in Figure 17.¶

The registrar SHOULD log the transaction provided for a pledge via Registrar-Agent and include the identity of the Registrar-Agent in these logs. For log analysis the following may be considered:¶

• The registrar knows the interacting Registrar-Agent from the authentication of the Registrar-Agent towards the registrar using LDevID (RegAgt) and can log it accordingly.¶

• The telemetry information from the pledge can be correlated to the voucher response provided from the registrar to the Registrar-Agent and further to the pledge.¶

• The telemetry information, when provided to the registrar is provided via the Registrar-Agent and can thus be correlated.¶

The registrar SHALL verify the signature of the pledge voucher status and validate that it belongs to an accepted device of the domain based on the contained "serial-number" in the IDevID certificate referenced in the header of the voucher status.¶

According to [RFC8995] Section 5.7, the registrar SHOULD respond with an HTTP 200 OK in the success case or fail with HTTP 4xx/5xx status codes as defined by the HTTP standard. The Registrar-Agent may use the response to signal success / failure to the service technician operating the Registrar-Agent. Within the server logs the server SHOULD capture this telemetry information.¶

The registrar SHOULD proceed with collecting and logging status information by requesting the MASA audit-log from the MASA service as described in Section 5.8 of [RFC8995].¶

The Registrar-Agent MUST provide the pledge's enroll status to the registrar. The status indicates the pledge could process the enroll-response (certificate) and holds the corresponding private key.¶

The Registrar-Agent sends the pledge enroll status without modification to the registrar with an HTTP-over-TLS POST using the registrar endpoint "/.well-known/brski/enrollstatus". The Content-Type header is kept as application/jose+json as described in Figure 16 and depicted in the example in Figure 18.¶

The registrar MUST verify the signature of the pledge enroll status. Also, the registrar SHALL validate that the pledge is an accepted device of the domain based on the contained product-serial-number in the LDevID certificate referenced in the header of the enroll status. The registrar SHOULD log this event. In case the pledge enroll status indicates a failure, the pledge was unable to verify the received LDevID certificate and therefore signed the enroll status with its IDevID credential. Note that the signature verification of the status information is an addition to the described handling in Section 5.9.4 of [RFC8995], and is replacing the pledges TLS client authentication by DevID credentials in [RFC8995].¶

According to [RFC8995] Section 5.9.4, the registrar SHOULD respond with an HTTP 200 OK in the success case or fail with HTTP 4xx/5xx status codes as defined by the HTTP standard. Based on the failure case the registrar MAY decide that for security reasons the pledge is not allowed to reside in the domain. In this case the registrar MUST revoke the certificate. An example case for the registrar revoking the issued LDevID for the pledge is when the pledge was not able to verify the received LDevID certificate and therefore did send a 406 (Not Acceptable) response. In this case the registrar may revoke the LDevID certificate as the pledge did no accepted it for installation.¶

The Registrar-Agent may use the response to signal success / failure to the service technician operating the Registrar-Agent. Within the server log the registrar SHOULD capture this telemetry information.¶

6.4.1. Pledge-Status - Request (Registrar-Agent to Pledge)

The Registrar-Agent requests the pledge-status via HTTP POST on the defined pledge endpoint: "/.well-known/brski/qps"¶

The Registrar-Agent Content-Type header for the pledge-status request is: application/jose+json. It contains information on the requested status-type, the time and date the request is created, and the product serial-number of the pledge contacted as shown in Figure 21. The pledge-status request is signed by Registrar-Agent using the private key corresponding to the EE (RegAgt) certificate.¶

The following Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL) [RFC8610] explains the structure of the format for the pledge-status request. It is defined following the status telemetry definitions in BRSKI [RFC8995]. Consequently, format and semantics of pledge-status requests below are for version 1. The version field is included to permit significant changes to the pledge-status request and response in the future. A pledge or a Registrar-Agent that receives a pledge-status request with a version larger than it knows about SHOULD log the contents and alert a human.¶

<CODE BEGINS>
  status-request = {
      "version": uint,
      "created-on": tdate ttime,
      "serial-number": text,
      "status-type": text
  }

<CODE ENDS>

The status-type defined for BRSKI-PRM is "bootstrap". This indicates the pledge to provide current status information regarding the bootstrapping status (voucher processing and enrollment of the pledge into the new domain). As the pledge-status request is defined generic, it may be used by other specifications to request further status information, e.g., for onboarding to get further information about enrollment of application specific LDevIDs or other parameters. This is out of scope for this specification.¶

Figure 22 below shows an example for querying pledge-status using status-type bootstrap.¶

# The Registrar-Agent request of "pledge-status" in general JWS
  serialization syntax
{
  "payload": "BASE64URL(status-request)",
  "signatures": [
    {
      "protected": "BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header))",
      "signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
    }
  ]
}

# Example: Decoded payload "status-request" representation
  in JSON syntax
{
  "version": 1,
  "created-on": "2022-08-12T02:37:39.235Z",
  "serial-number": "pledge-callee4711",
  "status-type": "bootstrap"
}

# Example: Decoded "JWS Protected Header" representation
  in JSON syntax
{
  "alg": "ES256",
  "x5c": [
    "base64encodedvalue==",
    "base64encodedvalue=="
  ]
}

6.4.2. Pledge-Status - Response (Pledge - Registrar-Agent)

If the pledge receives the pledge-status request with status-type "bootstrap" it SHALL react with a status response message based on the telemetry information described in Section 6.3.¶

The pledge-status response Content-Type header is application/jose+json.¶

The following CDDL explains the structure of the format for the status response, which is:¶

<CODE BEGINS>
  status-response = {
    "version": uint,
    "status":
      "factory-default" /
      "voucher-success" /
      "voucher-error" /
      "enroll-success" /
      "enroll-error" /
      "connect-success" /
      "connect-error",
    ?"reason" : text,
    ?"reason-context": { $$arbitrary-map }
  }

<CODE ENDS>

Different cases for pledge bootstrapping status may occur, which SHOULD be reflected using the status enumeration. This document specifies the status values in the context of the bootstrapping process and credential application. Other documents may enhance the above enumeration to reflect further status information.¶

The pledge-status response message is signed with IDevID or LDevID, depending on bootstrapping state of the pledge.¶

• "factory-default": Pledge has not been bootstrapped. Additional information may be provided in the reason or reason-context. The pledge signs the response message using its IDevID(Pledge).¶

• "voucher-success": Pledge processed the voucher exchange successfully. Additional information may be provided in the reason or reason-context. The pledge signs the response message using its IDevID(Pledge).¶

• "voucher-error": Pledge voucher processing terminated with error. Additional information may be provided in the reason or reason-context. The pledge signs the response message using its IDevID(Pledge).¶

• "enroll-success": Pledge has processed the enrollment exchange successfully. Additional information may be provided in the reason or reason-context. The pledge signs the response message using its LDevID(Pledge).¶

• "enroll-error": Pledge enrollment-response processing terminated with error. Additional information may be provided in the reason or reason-context. The pledge signs the response message using its IDevID(Pledge).¶

The reason and the reason-context SHOULD contain the telemetry information as described in Section 6.3.¶

As the pledge is assumed to utilize its bootstrapped credentials (LDevID) in communication with other peers, additional status information is provided for the connectivity to other peers, which may be helpful in analyzing potential error cases.¶

• "connect-success": Pledge could successfully establish a connection to another peer. Additional information may be provided in the reason or reason-context. The pledge signs the response message using its LDevID(Pledge).¶

• "connect-error": Pledge connection establishment terminated with error. Additional information may be provided in the reason or reason-context. The pledge signs the response message using its LDevID(Pledge).¶

The pledge-status responses are cumulative in the sense that connect-success implies enroll-success, which in turn implies voucher-success.¶

Figure 24 provides an example for the bootstrapping-status information.¶

# The pledge "status-response" in General JWS Serialization syntax
{
  "payload": "BASE64URL(status-response)",
  "signatures": [
    {
      "protected": "BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header))",
      "signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
    }
  ]
}

# Example: Decoded payload "status-response" representation
  in JSON syntax
{
  "version": 1,
  "status": "enroll-success",
  "reason-context": {
    "additional" : "JSON"
  }
}

# Example: Decoded "JWS Protected Header" representation
  in JSON syntax
{
  "alg": "ES256",
  "x5c": [
    "base64encodedvalue==",
    "base64encodedvalue=="
  ],
  "typ": "jose+json
}

• In case "factory-default" the pledge does not possess the domain certificate resp. the domain trust-anchor. It will not be able to verify the signature of the Registrar-Agent in the bootstrapping-status request.¶

• In cases "vouchered" and "enrolled" the pledge already possesses the domain certificate (has domain trust-anchor) and can therefore validate the signature of the Registrar-Agent. If validation of the JWS signature fails, the pledge SHOULD respond with the HTTP 403 Forbidden status code.¶

• The HTTP 406 Not Acceptable status code SHOULD be used, if the Accept header in the request indicates an unknown or unsupported format.¶

• The HTTP 415 Unsupported Media Type status code SHOULD be used, if the Content-Type of the request is an unknown or unsupported format.¶

• The HTTP 400 Bad Request status code SHOULD be used, if the Accept/Content-Type headers are correct but nevertheless the status-request cannot be correctly parsed.¶

The pledge SHOULD by default only respond to requests from nodes it can authenticate (such as registrar agent), once the pledge is enrolled with CA certificates and a matching domain certificate.¶