| Internet-Draft | Mathematical Mesh Reference | September 2021 |
| Hallam-Baker | Expires 23 March 2022 | [Page] |
The Mathematical Mesh 'The Mesh' is an end-to-end secure infrastructure that facilitates the exchange of configuration and credential data between multiple user devices. The core protocols of the Mesh are described with examples of common use cases and reference data.¶
[Note to Readers]¶
Discussion of this draft takes place on the MATHMESH mailing list (mathmesh@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/search/?email_list=mathmesh.¶
This document is also available online at http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-security.html.¶
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 March 2022.¶
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document.¶
This section presents the related specifications and standard, the terms that are used as terms of art within the documents and the terms used as requirements language.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].¶
The terms of art used in this document are described in the Mesh Architecture Guide [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture].¶
The implementation status of the reference code base is described in the companion document [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer].¶
Classes that are derived from an assertion.¶
Parent class from which all assertion classes are derived¶
Fingerprints of index terms for profile retrieval. The use of the fingerprint of the name rather than the name itself is a precaution against enumeration attacks and other forms of abuse.¶
The time instant the profile was last modified.¶
A Uniform Notary Token providing evidence that a signature was performed after the notary token was created.¶
Parent class from which all condition classes are derived.¶
[No fields]¶
Abstract classes from which the Profile, Activation and Connection classes are derrived.¶
Contains the private activation information for a Mesh application running on a specific device¶
Classes describing Mesh Profiles. All Profiles are Assertions derrived from Assertion.¶
Parent class from which all profile classes are derived¶
The permanent signature key used to sign the profile itself. The UDF of the key is used as the permanent object identifier of the profile. Thus, by definition, the KeySignature value of a Profile does not change under any circumstance.¶
Describes a mesh device.¶
Description of the device¶
Base key contribution for encryption keys. Also used to decrypt activation data sent to the device during connection to an account.¶
Base key contribution for authentication keys. Also used to authenticate the device during connection to an account.¶
Base key contribution for signature keys.¶
Base class for the account profiles ProfileUser and ProfileGroup. These subclasses may be merged at some future date.¶
The account address. This is either a DNS service address (e.g. alice@example.com) or a Mesh Name (@alice).¶
The fingerprint of the service profile to which the account is currently bound.¶
Escrow key associated with the account.¶
Key currently used to encrypt data under this profile¶
Key used to sign connection assertions to the account.¶
Account assertion. This is signed by the service hosting the account.¶
Describes a group. Note that while a group is created by one person who becomes its first administrator, control of the group may pass to other administrators over time.¶
[No fields]¶
Profile of a Mesh Service¶
Connection assertions are used to authenticate and authorize interactions between devices and the service currently servicing the account. They SHOULD NOT be visible to external parties.¶
Connection assertion used to authenticate service requests made by a device.¶
The account address¶
The signature key for use of the device under the profile¶
The encryption key for use of the device under the profile¶
The authentication key for use of the device under the profile¶
Connection assertion stating that a particular device is¶
[No fields]¶
Describes the connection of a member to a group.¶
[No fields]¶
[No fields]¶
[No fields]¶
Contains activation data for device specific keys used in the context of a Mesh account.¶
The UDF of the account¶
Grant access to profile online signing key used to sign updates to the profile.¶
Grant access to Profile administration key used to make changes to administrator catalogs.¶
Grant access to ProfileUser account encryption key¶
Grant access to ProfileUser account authentication key¶
Grant access to ProfileUser account signature key¶
[No fields]¶
Classes describing data used in cataloged data.¶
Base class for contact entries.¶
The globally unique contact identifier.¶
Mesh fingerprints associated with the contact.¶
Network address entries¶
The physical locations the contact is associated with.¶
The roles of the contact¶
The Web sites and other online presences of the contact¶
Source(s) from which this contact was constructed.¶
Trust anchor¶
Source from which contact information was obtained.¶
Short name for the contact information.¶
The means of validation.¶
The contact data in binary form.¶
The contact data in enveloped form. If present, the BinarySource property is ignored.¶
Contact for a group, including encryption groups.¶
[No fields]¶
List of person names in order of preference¶
List of person names in order of preference¶
The name of an organization¶
The name of a natural person¶
If true, the name is not in current use.¶
The preferred presentation of the full name.¶
Honorific or title, E.g. Sir, Lord, Dr., Mr.¶
First name.¶
Middle names or initials.¶
Last name.¶
Nominal suffix, e.g. Jr., III, etc.¶
Post nominal letters (if used).¶
Provides all means of contacting the individual according to a particular network address¶
If true, the name is not in current use.¶
The network address, e.g. alice@example.com¶
The capabilities bound to this address.¶
The account profile¶
Public keys associated with the network address¶
The IANA protocol|identifier of the network protocols by which the contact may be reached using the specified Address.¶
Unique key.¶
Base class for cataloged Mesh data.¶
The set of labels describing the entry¶
Public device entry, indexed under the device ID Hello¶
UDF of the signature key of the device in the Mesh¶
UDF of the offline signature key of the device¶
UDF of the account online signature key¶
The Mesh profile¶
The device profile¶
The public assertion demonstrating connection of the Device to the Mesh¶
The activation of the device within the Mesh account¶
The activation of the device within the Mesh account¶
Application activations granted to the device.¶
A publication.¶
Unique identifier code¶
The witness key value to use to request access to the record.¶
Dare Envelope containing the entry data. The data type is specified by the envelope metadata.¶
Epiration time (inclusive)¶
[No fields]¶
The identifier of the capability. If this is a user capability, MUST match the KeyData identifier. If this is a serviced capability, MUST match the value of ServiceId on the corresponding service capability.¶
The key that enables the capability¶
One or more enveloped key shares.¶
The identifier of the resource that is controlled using the key.¶
The address of the resource that is controlled using the key.¶
The corresponding key is a decryption key¶
[No fields]¶
The corresponding key is an encryption key¶
The corresponding key is an encryption key¶
UDF of trust root under which request to use a serviced capability must be authorized. [Only present for a serviced capability]¶
The corresponding key is an administration key¶
[No fields]¶
The corresponding key is a key that may be used to generate key shares.¶
[No fields]¶
The corresponding key is a decryption key to be used in accordance with the Micali Fair Electronic Exchange with Invisible Trusted Parties protocol.¶
[No fields]¶
Unique key.¶
Enveloped keys for use with Application¶
[No fields]¶
[No fields]¶
[No fields]¶
A data structure that is passed¶
Unique per-message ID. When encapsulating a Mesh Message in a DARE envelope, the envelope EnvelopeID field MUST be a UDF fingerprint of the MessageId value.¶
Enveloped data that is authenticated by means of the PIN¶
Nonce provided by the client to validate the PIN¶
Pin identifier value calculated from the PIN code, action and account address.¶
Witness value calculated as KDF (Device.Udf + AccountAddress, ClientNonce)¶
If true, authentication against the PIN code is sufficient to complete the associated action without further authorization.¶
PIN code bound to the specified action.¶
The action to which this PIN code is bound.¶
Connection request message. This message contains the information¶
Connection request message generated by a service on receipt of a valid MessageConnectionRequestClient¶
The client connection request.¶
Respond to RequestConnection message to grant or refuse the connection request.¶
If true, requests that the recipient return their own contact information in reply.¶
Optional explanation of the reason for the request.¶
One time authentication code supplied to a recipient to allow authentication of the response.¶
[No fields]¶
For future use, allows logging of operations and results¶
The error report code.¶
Every Mesh Portal Service transaction consists of exactly one request followed by exactly one response. Mesh Service transactions MAY cause modification of the data stored in the Mesh Portal or the Mesh itself but do not cause changes to the connection state. The protocol itself is thus idempotent. There is no set sequence in which operations are required to be performed. It is not necessary to perform a Hello transaction prior to a ValidateAccount, Publish or any other transaction.¶
A Mesh Portal Service request consists of a payload object that inherits from the MeshRequest class. When using the HTTP binding, the request MUST specify the portal DNS address in the HTTP Host field.¶
Base class for all request messages.¶
Name of the Mesh Portal Service to which the request is directed.¶
A Mesh Portal Service response consists of a payload object that inherits from the MeshResponse class. When using the HTTP binding, the response SHOULD report the Status response code in the HTTP response message. However the response code returned in the payload object MUST always be considered authoritative.¶
Base class for all response messages. Contains only the status code and status description fields.¶
[No fields]¶
The Mesh Service protocol makes use of JSON objects defined in the JOSE Signatgure and Encryption specifications.¶
The following common structures are used in the protocol messages:¶
Describes a Key/Value structure used to make queries for records matching one or more selection criteria.¶
Specifies constraints to be applied to a search result. These allow a client to limit the number of records returned, the quantity of data returned, the earliest and latest data returned, etc.¶
Only data published on or after the specified time instant is requested.¶
Only data published before the specified time instant is requested. This excludes data published at the specified time instant.¶
Maximum number of data entries to return.¶
Maximum number of data bytes to return.¶
Specifies a page key returned in a previous search operation in which the number of responses exceeded the specified bounds.¶
When a page key is specified, all the other search parameters except for MaxEntries and MaxBytes are ignored and the service returns the next set of data responding to the earlier query.¶
Report service and version information.¶
The Hello transaction provides a means of determining which protocol versions, message encodings and transport protocols are supported by the service.¶
Request validation of a proposed name for a new account.¶
For validation of a user's account name during profile creation.¶
Describes the proposed account properties. Currently, these are limited to the account name but could be extended in future versions of the protocol.¶
Account name requested¶
If true, request a reservation for the specified account name. Note that the service is not obliged to honor reservation requests.¶
List of ISO language codes in order of preference. For creating explanatory text.¶
States whether the proposed account properties are acceptable and (optional) returns an indication of what properties are valid.¶
Note that receiving a 'Valid' responseto a Validate Request does not guarantee creation of the account. In addition to the possibility that the account namecould be requested by another user between the Validate and Create transactions, a portal service MAY perform more stringent validation criteria when an account is actually being created. For example, checking with the authoritative list of current accounts rather than a cached copy.¶
If true, the specified account identifier is acceptable. If false, the account identifier is rejected.¶
Specifies the minimum length of an account name.¶
Specifies the maximum length of an account name.¶
A list of characters that the service does not accept in account names. The list of characters MAY not be exhaustive but SHOULD include any illegal characters in the proposed account name.¶
Text explaining the reason an account name was rejected.¶
Request creation of a new portal account.¶
Unlike a profile, a mesh account is specific to a particular Mesh portal. A mesh account must be created and accepted before a profile can be published.¶
Request creation of a new portal account. The request specifies the requested account identifier and the Mesh profile to be associated with the account.¶
Account identifier requested.¶
Reports the success or failure of a Create transaction.¶
[No fields]¶
Request deletion of a portal account.¶
Deletes a portal account but not the underlying profile. Once registered, profiles are permanent.¶
Request deletion of a new portal account. The request specifies the requested account identifier.¶
Account identifier to be deleted.¶
Reports the success or failure of a Delete transaction.¶
[No fields]¶
Search for data in the mesh that matches a set of properties described by a sequence of key/value pairs.¶
Describes the Portal or Mesh data to be retreived.¶
Lookup by profile ID¶
Lookup by Account ID¶
List of KeyValue pairs specifying the conditions to be met¶
Constrain the search to a specific time interval and/or limit the number and/or total size of data records returned.¶
If true return multiple responses if available¶
If true, the client requests that the full Mesh data record be returned containing both the Mesh entry itself and the Mesh metadata that allows the date and time of the publication of the Mesh entry to be verified.¶
Reports the success or failure of a Get transaction. If a Mesh entry matching the specified profile is found, containsthe list of entries matching the request.¶
Publish a profile or key escrow entry to the mesh.¶
Requests publication of the specified Mesh entry.¶
[No fields]¶
Reports the success or failure of a Publish transaction.¶
[No fields]¶
Request the current status of the mesh as seen by the portal to which it is directed.¶
The response to the status request contains the last signed checkpoint and proof chains for each of the peer portals that have been checkpointed.¶
[Not currently implemented]¶
Initiates a status transaction.¶
[No fields]¶
Reports the success or failure of a Status transaction.¶
Time that the last write update was made to the Mesh¶
Time that the last Mesh checkpoint was calculated.¶
Time at which the next Mesh checkpoint should be calculated.¶
Last checkpoint value.¶
Request connection of a new device to a mesh profile¶
Initial device connection request.¶
Reports the success or failure of a ConnectStart transaction.¶
[No fields]¶
Request status of pending connection request of a new device to a mesh profile¶
Request status information for a pending request posted previously.¶
Reports the success or failure of a ConnectStatus transaction.¶
The signed ConnectionResult object.¶
Request a list of pending requests for an administration profile.¶
Specify the criteria for pending requests.¶
Reports the success or failure of a ConnectPending transaction.¶
A list of pending requests satisfying the criteria set out in the request.¶
If non-null, indicates that the number and/or size of the data records returned exceeds either the SearchConstraints specified in the request or internal server limits.¶
Post response to a pending connection request.¶
Reports the success or failure of a ConnectComplete transaction.¶
Reports the success or failure of a ConnectComplete transaction.¶
[No fields]¶
Perform a bulk transfer of the log between the specified transaction identifiers. Requires appropriate authorization¶
[Not currently implemented]¶
Request a bulk transfer of the log between the specified transaction identifiers. Requires appropriate authorization¶
Constrain the search to a specific time interval and/or limit the number and/or total size of data records returned.¶
Reports the success or failure of a Transfer transaction. If successful, contains the list of Mesh records to be transferred.¶
Is a regulatory requirement GDPR/HIPPA¶
Where they buried Aunt Agatha's jewelry but not where they buried Aunt Agatha.¶
Traffic analysis protection¶
Access control¶
Authentication / Integrity¶
Data Confidentiality¶
Non-Repudiation¶
Use of platform provided facilities to bind private keys in the Device profile to the device is highly desirable. Ideally, private keys should be protected against extraction by hardware techniques presenting a high degree of resistance.¶
Use strong mechanisms as described in RFC???¶
Use of key co-generation as described in part 8 is advised¶
Master profile keys should be escrowed¶
Escrow strategies for DARE should take account of the fact that users may want some but not all their data assets to survive them.¶
Check that the device credential has been signed by an administration device and that the administration device was properly authorized by the master profile.¶
Device catalog MUST be signed by the admin device.¶
Future ? provide protection against rollback attacks.¶
See the separate document on the trust model¶
Cert transparency type techniques¶
Every message is subject to access control¶
Mesh Services should perform abuse filtering on inbound mail¶
Mesh Services MUST apply user specified ingress control as specified in their contacts catalog.¶
Some applications may require egress control¶
For example, classified environments¶
Mail too stupid to send¶
Confirmation messages requiring payments¶
Need Accountability¶
Need to know the source of the accountability assertions¶
Should be distinguished from sender controlled part of a message¶
Authentication and consequences¶
This document comprises the security considerations for the use and implementation of the Mathematical Mesh.¶
All the IANA considerations for the Mesh documents are specified in this document¶
A list of people who have contributed to the design of the Mesh is presented in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture].¶