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This document describes an Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) extension mapping for the provisioning and management of Domain Name System security extensions (DNSSEC) for domain names stored in a shared central repository. Specified in XML, this mapping extends the EPP domain name mapping to provide additional features required for the provisioning of DNS security extensions.
This document incorporates feedback from early implementers on the PROVREG mail list and users.
This document is intended to obsolete RFC 4310.
This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as “work in progress.”
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on June 10, 2010.
Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the BSD License.
1.
Introduction
1.1.
Conventions Used in This Document
2.
Object Attributes
2.1.
Delegation Signer Information
2.1.1.
Public Key Information
2.2.
Booleans
2.3.
Maximum Signature Lifetime Values
3.
DS Data Interface and Key Data Interface
3.1.
DS Data Interface
3.2.
Key Data Interface
3.3.
Example DS Data Interface and Key Data Interface
4.
EPP Command Mapping
4.1.
EPP Query Commands
4.1.1.
EPP <check> Command
4.1.2.
EPP <info> Command
4.1.3.
EPP <transfer> Command
4.2.
EPP Transform Commands
4.2.1.
EPP <create> Command
4.2.2.
EPP <delete> Command
4.2.3.
EPP <renew> Command
4.2.4.
EPP <transfer> Command
4.2.5.
EPP <update> Command
5.
Formal Syntax
6.
Internationalization Considerations
7.
IANA Considerations
8.
Security Considerations
9.
Acknowledgements
10.
References
10.1.
Normative References
10.2.
Informative References
§
Author's Address
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This document describes an extension mapping for version 1.0 of the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) described in RFC 5730 [1] (Hollenbeck, S., “Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP),” August 2009.). This mapping, an extension of the domain name mapping described in RFC 5731 [2] (Hollenbeck, S., “Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Domain Name Mapping,” August 2009.), is specified using the Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 [3] (Sperberg-McQueen, C., Maler, E., Paoli, J., and T. Bray, “Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 (Second Edition),” October 2000.) and XML Schema notation ([4] (Beech, D., Thompson, H., Mendelsohn, N., and M. Maloney, “XML Schema Part 1: Structures,” May 2001.), [5] (Malhotra, A. and P. Biron, “XML Schema Part 2: Datatypes,” May 2001.)).
The EPP core protocol specification [1] (Hollenbeck, S., “Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP),” August 2009.) provides a complete description of EPP command and response structures. A thorough understanding of the base protocol specification is necessary to understand the mapping described in this document. Familiarity with the Domain Name System (DNS) described in RFC 1034 [11] (Mockapetris, P., “Domain names - concepts and facilities,” November 1987.) and RFC 1035 [12] (Mockapetris, P., “Domain names - implementation and specification,” November 1987.) and with DNS security extensions described in RFC 4033 [13] (Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, “DNS Security Introduction and Requirements,” March 2005.), RFC 4034 [6] (Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, “Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions,” March 2005.), and RFC 4035 [7] (Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, “Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions,” March 2005.) is required to understand the DNS security concepts described in this document.
The EPP mapping described in this document specifies a mechanism for the provisioning and management of DNS security extensions in a shared central repository. Information exchanged via this mapping can be extracted from the repository and used to publish DNSSEC delegation signer (DS) resource records as described in RFC 4034 [6] (Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, “Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions,” March 2005.).
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119 [8] (Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” March 1997.).
In examples, "C:" represents lines sent by a protocol client, and "S:" represents lines returned by a protocol server. "////" is used to note element values that have been shortened to better fit page boundaries. Indentation and white space in examples is provided only to illustrate element relationships and is not a mandatory feature of this protocol.
XML is case sensitive. Unless stated otherwise, XML specifications and examples provided in this document MUST be interpreted in the character case presented in order to develop a conforming implementation.
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This extension adds additional elements to the EPP domain name mapping [2] (Hollenbeck, S., “Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Domain Name Mapping,” August 2009.). Only new element descriptions are described here.
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Delegation signer (DS) information is published by a DNS server to indicate that a child zone is digitally signed and that the parent zone recognizes the indicated key as a valid zone key for the child zone. A DS resource record (RR) contains four fields: a key tag field, a key algorithm number octet, an octet identifying a digest algorithm, and a digest field. See RFC 4034 [6] (Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, “Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions,” March 2005.) for specific field formats.
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Public key information provided by a client maps to the DNSKEY RR presentation field formats described in section 2.2 of RFC 4034 [6] (Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, “Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions,” March 2005.). A DNSKEY RR contains four fields: flags, a protocol octet, an algorithm number octet, and a public key.
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Boolean values MUST be represented in the XML Schema format described in Part 2 of the W3C XML Schema recommendation [5] (Malhotra, A. and P. Biron, “XML Schema Part 2: Datatypes,” May 2001.).
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Maximum signature lifetime values MUST be represented in seconds using an extended XML Schema "int" format. The base "int" format, which allows negative numbers, is described in Part 2 of the W3C XML Schema recommendation [5] (Malhotra, A. and P. Biron, “XML Schema Part 2: Datatypes,” May 2001.). This format is further restricted to enforce a minimum value of one.
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This document describes operational scenarios in which a client can
create, add, remove, and replace delegation
signer (DS) information or key data information for a domain name. There are two different interfaces that a server can support. The first is called the "DS Data Interface," where the client is responsible for the creation of the DS information and is required to pass DS information when performing adds, removes, and replaces. The server is required to pass DS information for info responses. The second is the "Key Data Interface," where the client is responsible for passing the key data information when performing adds, removes, and replaces. The server is responsible to pass key data information for info responses. The server MUST support use of one specification form consistently.
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The DS Data Interface relies uses the <secDNS:dsData> element for creates, adds, removes, and replaces, as well as for info responses. The key data associated with the DS information MAY be provided by the client, but the server is not obligated to use the key data. The server operator MAY also issue out-of-band DNS queries to retrieve the key data from the registered domain's apex in order to evaluate the received DS information. It is RECOMMENDED that the child zone operator have this key data online in the DNS tree to allow the parent zone administrator to validate the data as necessary. The key data SHOULD have the Secure Entry Point (SEP) bit set as described in RFC 3757 [9] (Kolkman, O., Schlyter, J., and E. Lewis, “Domain Name System KEY (DNSKEY) Resource Record (RR) Secure Entry Point (SEP) Flag,” April 2004.).
The <secDNS:dsData> element contains the following child elements:
A <secDNS:keyTag> element that contains a key tag value as described in section 5.1.1 of RFC 4034 [6] (Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, “Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions,” March 2005.).
A <secDNS:alg> element that contains an algorithm value as described in section 5.1.2 of RFC 4034 [6] (Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, “Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions,” March 2005.).
A <secDNS:digestType> element that contains a digest type value as described in section 5.1.3 of RFC 4034 [6] (Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, “Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions,” March 2005.).
A <secDNS:digest> element that contains a digest value as described in section 5.1.4 of RFC 4034 [6] (Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, “Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions,” March 2005.).
An OPTIONAL <secDNS:maxSigLife> element that indicates a child's preference for the number of seconds after signature generation when the parent's signature on the DS information provided by the child will expire. A client SHOULD specify the same <secDNS:maxSigLife> value for all <secDNS:dsData> elements associated with a domain. If the <secDNS:maxSigLife> is not present, or if multiple <secDNS:maxSigLife> values are requested, the default signature expiration policy of the server operator (as determined using an out-of-band mechanism) applies.
An OPTIONAL <secDNS:keyData> element that describes the key data used as input in the DS hash calculation for use in server validation. The <secDNS:keyData> element contains the following child elements defined in Section 3.2 (Key Data Interface). The use of the <secDNS:maxSigLife> child element of <secDNS:keyData> MUST NOT be used for servers supporting the DS Data Interface.
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The Key Data Interface relies on the use of the <secDNS:keyData> element for creates, adds, removes, and replaces, as well as for info responses. The DS information is not provided by the client but is generated by the server. The attributes used for DS generation is based on server policy, where only key data is passed between the client and the server.
The <secDNS:keyData> element contains the following child elements:
A <secDNS:flags> element that contains a flags field value as described in section 2.1.1 of RFC 4034 [6] (Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, “Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions,” March 2005.).
A <secDNS:protocol> element that contains a protocol field value as described in section 2.1.2 of RFC 4034 [6] (Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, “Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions,” March 2005.).
A <secDNS:alg> element that contains an algorithm number field value as described in sections 2.1.3 of RFC 4034 [6] (Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, “Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions,” March 2005.).
A <secDNS:pubKey> element that contains an encoded public key field value as described in sections 2.1.4 of RFC 4034 [6] (Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, “Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions,” March 2005.).
An OPTIONAL <secDNS:maxSigLife> element that indicates a child's preference for the number of seconds after signature generation when the parent's signature on the DS information provided by the child will expire. A client SHOULD specify the same <secDNS:maxSigLife> value for all <secDNS:dsData> elements associated with a domain. If the <secDNS:maxSigLife> is not present, or if multiple <secDNS:maxSigLife> values are requested, the default signature expiration policy of the server operator (as determined using an out-of-band mechanism) applies.
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Example use of DS Data Interface for a create:
<secDNS:dsData> <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag> <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg> <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType> <secDNS:digest>49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC</secDNS:digest> </secDNS:dsData>
Example use of DS Data Interface with option key data for a create:
<secDNS:dsData>
<secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
<secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
<secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
<secDNS:digest>49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC</secDNS:digest>
<secDNS:keyData>
<secDNS:flags>256</secDNS:flags>
<secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
<secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
<secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4Q==</secDNS:pubKey>
</secDNS:keyData>
</secDNS:dsData>
Example use of Key Data Interface for a create:
<secDNS:keyData> <secDNS:flags>256</secDNS:flags> <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol> <secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg> <secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4Q==</secDNS:pubKey> </secDNS:keyData>
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A detailed description of the EPP syntax and semantics can be found in the EPP core protocol specification [1] (Hollenbeck, S., “Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP),” August 2009.). The command mappings described here are specifically for use in provisioning and managing DNS security extensions via EPP.
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EPP provides three commands to retrieve object information: <check> to determine if an object is known to the server, <info> to retrieve detailed information associated with an object, and <transfer> to retrieve object transfer status information.
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This extension does not add any elements to the EPP <check> command or <check> response described in the EPP domain mapping [2] (Hollenbeck, S., “Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Domain Name Mapping,” August 2009.).
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This extension does not add any elements to the EPP <info> command described in the EPP domain mapping [2] (Hollenbeck, S., “Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Domain Name Mapping,” August 2009.). However, additional elements are defined for the <info> response.
When an <info> command has been processed successfully, the
EPP <resData> element MUST contain child elements as described
in the EPP domain mapping [2] (Hollenbeck, S., “Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Domain Name Mapping,” August 2009.).
In addition, the EPP <extension> element MUST contain a child
<secDNS:infData> element that identifies the extension namespace. The <secDNS:infData>
element contains the following child elements:
One or more <secDNS:dsData> elements that describe the delegation signer data provided by the client for the domain or one or more <secDNS:keyData> elements that describe the key data provided by the client for the domain. Child elements of the <secDNS:dsData> element are described in Section 3.1 (DS Data Interface). Child elements of the <secDNS:keyData> are described in Section 3.2 (Key Data Interface).
Example <info> Response for a Secure Delegation
using the DS Data Interface:
S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
S: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
S: <response>
S: <result code="1000">
S: <msg>Command completed successfully</msg>
S: </result>
S: <resData>
S: <domain:infData
S: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
S: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
S: <domain:roid>EXAMPLE1-REP</domain:roid>
S: <domain:status s="ok"/>
S: <domain:registrant>jd1234</domain:registrant>
S: <domain:contact type="admin">sh8013</domain:contact>
S: <domain:contact type="tech">sh8013</domain:contact>
S: <domain:ns>
S: <domain:hostObj>ns1.example.com</domain:hostObj>
S: <domain:hostObj>ns2.example.com</domain:hostObj>
S: </domain:ns>
S: <domain:host>ns1.example.com</domain:host>
S: <domain:host>ns2.example.com</domain:host>
S: <domain:clID>ClientX</domain:clID>
S: <domain:crID>ClientY</domain:crID>
S: <domain:crDate>1999-04-03T22:00:00.0Z</domain:crDate>
S: <domain:upID>ClientX</domain:upID>
S: <domain:upDate>1999-12-03T09:00:00.0Z</domain:upDate>
S: <domain:exDate>2005-04-03T22:00:00.0Z</domain:exDate>
S: <domain:trDate>2000-04-08T09:00:00.0Z</domain:trDate>
S: <domain:authInfo>
S: <domain:pw>2fooBAR</domain:pw>
S: </domain:authInfo>
S: </domain:infData>
S: </resData>
S: <extension>
S: <secDNS:infData
S: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0">
S: <secDNS:dsData>
S: <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
S: <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
S: <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
S: <secDNS:digest>49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC</secDNS:digest>
S: </secDNS:dsData>
S: </secDNS:infData>
S: </extension>
S: <trID>
S: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
S: <svTRID>54322-XYZ</svTRID>
S: </trID>
S: </response>
S:</epp>
Example <info> Response for a Secure Delegation
using the DS Data Interface with OPTIONAL Key Data:
S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
S: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
S: <response>
S: <result code="1000">
S: <msg>Command completed successfully</msg>
S: </result>
S: <resData>
S: <domain:infData
S: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
S: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
S: <domain:roid>EXAMPLE1-REP</domain:roid>
S: <domain:status s="ok"/>
S: <domain:registrant>jd1234</domain:registrant>
S: <domain:contact type="admin">sh8013</domain:contact>
S: <domain:contact type="tech">sh8013</domain:contact>
S: <domain:ns>
S: <domain:hostObj>ns1.example.com</domain:hostObj>
S: <domain:hostObj>ns2.example.com</domain:hostObj>
S: </domain:ns>
S: <domain:host>ns1.example.com</domain:host>
S: <domain:host>ns2.example.com</domain:host>
S: <domain:clID>ClientX</domain:clID>
S: <domain:crID>ClientY</domain:crID>
S: <domain:crDate>1999-04-03T22:00:00.0Z</domain:crDate>
S: <domain:upID>ClientX</domain:upID>
S: <domain:upDate>1999-12-03T09:00:00.0Z</domain:upDate>
S: <domain:exDate>2005-04-03T22:00:00.0Z</domain:exDate>
S: <domain:trDate>2000-04-08T09:00:00.0Z</domain:trDate>
S: <domain:authInfo>
S: <domain:pw>2fooBAR</domain:pw>
S: </domain:authInfo>
S: </domain:infData>
S: </resData>
S: <extension>
S: <secDNS:infData
S: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0">
S: <secDNS:dsData>
S: <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
S: <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
S: <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
S: <secDNS:digest>49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC</secDNS:digest>
S: <secDNS:maxSigLife>604800</secDNS:maxSigLife>
S: <secDNS:keyData>
S: <secDNS:flags>256</secDNS:flags>
S: <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
S: <secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
S: <secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4Q==</secDNS:pubKey>
S: </secDNS:keyData>
S: </secDNS:dsData>
S: </secDNS:infData>
S: </extension>
S: <trID>
S: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
S: <svTRID>54322-XYZ</svTRID>
S: </trID>
S: </response>
S:</epp>
Example <info> Response for a Secure Delegation
using the Key Data Interface:
S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
S: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
S: <response>
S: <result code="1000">
S: <msg>Command completed successfully</msg>
S: </result>
S: <resData>
S: <domain:infData
S: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
S: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
S: <domain:roid>EXAMPLE1-REP</domain:roid>
S: <domain:status s="ok"/>
S: <domain:registrant>jd1234</domain:registrant>
S: <domain:contact type="admin">sh8013</domain:contact>
S: <domain:contact type="tech">sh8013</domain:contact>
S: <domain:ns>
S: <domain:hostObj>ns1.example.com</domain:hostObj>
S: <domain:hostObj>ns2.example.com</domain:hostObj>
S: </domain:ns>
S: <domain:host>ns1.example.com</domain:host>
S: <domain:host>ns2.example.com</domain:host>
S: <domain:clID>ClientX</domain:clID>
S: <domain:crID>ClientY</domain:crID>
S: <domain:crDate>1999-04-03T22:00:00.0Z</domain:crDate>
S: <domain:upID>ClientX</domain:upID>
S: <domain:upDate>1999-12-03T09:00:00.0Z</domain:upDate>
S: <domain:exDate>2005-04-03T22:00:00.0Z</domain:exDate>
S: <domain:trDate>2000-04-08T09:00:00.0Z</domain:trDate>
S: <domain:authInfo>
S: <domain:pw>2fooBAR</domain:pw>
S: </domain:authInfo>
S: </domain:infData>
S: </resData>
S: <extension>
S: <secDNS:infData
S: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0">
S: <secDNS:keyData>
S: <secDNS:flags>256</secDNS:flags>
S: <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
S: <secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
S: <secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4Q==</secDNS:pubKey>
S: </secDNS:keyData>
S: </secDNS:infData>
S: </extension>
S: <trID>
S: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
S: <svTRID>54322-XYZ</svTRID>
S: </trID>
S: </response>
S:</epp>
An EPP error response MUST be returned if an <info> command can not be processed for any reason.
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This extension does not add any elements to the EPP <transfer> command or <transfer> response described in the EPP domain mapping [2] (Hollenbeck, S., “Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Domain Name Mapping,” August 2009.).
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EPP provides five commands to transform objects: <create> to create an instance of an object, <delete> to delete an instance of an object, <renew> to extend the validity period of an object, <transfer> to manage object sponsorship changes, and <update> to change information associated with an object.
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This extension defines additional elements for the EPP <create> command described in the EPP domain mapping [2] (Hollenbeck, S., “Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Domain Name Mapping,” August 2009.). No additional elements are defined for the EPP <create> response.
The EPP <create> command provides a transform operation that allows a client to create a domain object. In addition to the EPP command elements described in the EPP domain mapping [2] (Hollenbeck, S., “Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Domain Name Mapping,” August 2009.), the command MUST contain an <extension> element. The <extension> element MUST contain a child <secDNS:create> element that identifies the extension namespace. The <secDNS:create> element MUST contain one or more <secDNS:dsData> elements or <secDNS:keyData> elements. Child elements of the <secDNS:dsData> element are described in Section 3.1 (DS Data Interface). Child elements of the <secDNS:keyData> are described in Section 3.2 (Key Data Interface).
The <secDNS:dsData> element and the <secDNS:keyData> element contains an OPTIONAL <secDNS:maxSigLife> element. The server MUST abort command processing and respond with an appropriate EPP error if the values provided by the client can not be accepted for syntax or policy reasons.
Example <create> Command for a Secure Delegation
using the DS Data Interface:
C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
C: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
C: <command>
C: <create>
C: <domain:create
C: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
C: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
C: <domain:period unit="y">2</domain:period>
C: <domain:ns>
C: <domain:hostObj>ns1.example.com</domain:hostObj>
C: <domain:hostObj>ns2.example.com</domain:hostObj>
C: </domain:ns>
C: <domain:registrant>jd1234</domain:registrant>
C: <domain:contact type="admin">sh8013</domain:contact>
C: <domain:contact type="tech">sh8013</domain:contact>
C: <domain:authInfo>
C: <domain:pw>2fooBAR</domain:pw>
C: </domain:authInfo>
C: </domain:create>
C: </create>
C: <extension>
C: <secDNS:create
C: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0">
C: <secDNS:dsData>
C: <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
C: <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
C: <secDNS:digest>49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC</secDNS:digest>
C: <secDNS:maxSigLife>604800</secDNS:maxSigLife>
C: </secDNS:dsData>
C: </secDNS:create>
C: </extension>
C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
C: </command>
C:</epp>
Example <create> Command for a Secure Delegation
using the DS Data Interface with OPTIONAL key data:
C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
C: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
C: <command>
C: <create>
C: <domain:create
C: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
C: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
C: <domain:period unit="y">2</domain:period>
C: <domain:ns>
C: <domain:hostObj>ns1.example.com</domain:hostObj>
C: <domain:hostObj>ns2.example.com</domain:hostObj>
C: </domain:ns>
C: <domain:registrant>jd1234</domain:registrant>
C: <domain:contact type="admin">sh8013</domain:contact>
C: <domain:contact type="tech">sh8013</domain:contact>
C: <domain:authInfo>
C: <domain:pw>2fooBAR</domain:pw>
C: </domain:authInfo>
C: </domain:create>
C: </create>
C: <extension>
C: <secDNS:create
C: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0">
C: <secDNS:dsData>
C: <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
C: <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
C: <secDNS:digest>49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC</secDNS:digest>
C: <secDNS:maxSigLife>604800</secDNS:maxSigLife>
C: <secDNS:keyData>
C: <secDNS:flags>256</secDNS:flags>
C: <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
C: <secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4Q==</secDNS:pubKey>
C: </secDNS:keyData>
C: </secDNS:dsData>
C: </secDNS:create>
C: </extension>
C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
C: </command>
C:</epp>
Example <create> Command for a Secure Delegation
using the Key Data Interface:
C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
C: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
C: <command>
C: <create>
C: <domain:create
C: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
C: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
C: <domain:period unit="y">2</domain:period>
C: <domain:ns>
C: <domain:hostObj>ns1.example.com</domain:hostObj>
C: <domain:hostObj>ns2.example.com</domain:hostObj>
C: </domain:ns>
C: <domain:registrant>jd1234</domain:registrant>
C: <domain:contact type="admin">sh8013</domain:contact>
C: <domain:contact type="tech">sh8013</domain:contact>
C: <domain:authInfo>
C: <domain:pw>2fooBAR</domain:pw>
C: </domain:authInfo>
C: </domain:create>
C: </create>
C: <extension>
C: <secDNS:create
C: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0">
C: <secDNS:keyData>
C: <secDNS:flags>256</secDNS:flags>
C: <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
C: <secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4Q==</secDNS:pubKey>
C: </secDNS:keyData>
C: </secDNS:create>
C: </extension>
C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
C: </command>
C:</epp>
When a <create> command has been processed successfully, the EPP response is as described in the EPP domain mapping [2] (Hollenbeck, S., “Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Domain Name Mapping,” August 2009.).
| TOC |
This extension does not add any elements to the EPP <delete> command or <delete> response described in the EPP domain mapping [2] (Hollenbeck, S., “Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Domain Name Mapping,” August 2009.).
| TOC |
This extension does not add any elements to the EPP <renew> command or <renew> response described in the EPP domain mapping [2] (Hollenbeck, S., “Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Domain Name Mapping,” August 2009.).
| TOC |
This extension does not add any elements to the EPP <transfer> command or <transfer> response described in the EPP domain mapping [2] (Hollenbeck, S., “Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Domain Name Mapping,” August 2009.).
| TOC |
This extension defines additional elements for the EPP <update> command described in the EPP domain mapping [2] (Hollenbeck, S., “Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Domain Name Mapping,” August 2009.). No additional elements are defined for the EPP <update> response.
The EPP <update> command provides a transform operation that allows a client to modify the attributes of a domain object. In addition to the EPP command elements described in the EPP domain mapping, the command MUST contain an <extension> element. The <extension> element MUST contain a child <secDNS:update> element that identifies the extension namespace and the location of the extension schema. The <secDNS:update> element contains a <secDNS:add> element to add security information to a delegation, a <secDNS:rem> element to remove security information from a delegation, or a <secDNS:chg> element to replace all security information with new security information. The <secDNS:add> and <secDNS:rem> can be used together to add and remove security information at the same time. <secDNS:chg> can not be used with either <secDNS:add> or <secDNS:rem>
The <secDNS:update> element also contains an OPTIONAL "urgent" attribute that a client can use to ask the server operator to complete and implement the update request with high priority. This attribute accepts boolean values as described in Section 2.2 (Booleans); the default value is boolean false. "High priority" is relative to standard server operator policies that are determined using an out-of-band mechanism.
The <secDNS:add> element is used to add security information to an existing set. The <secDNS:add> element MUST contain one or more <secDNS:dsData> or <secDNS:keyData> elements. Child elements of the <secDNS:dsData> element are described in Section 3.1 (DS Data Interface). Child elements of the <secDNS:keyData> are described in Section 3.2 (Key Data Interface).
The <secDNS:dsData> element and the <secDNS:keyData> element contains an OPTIONAL <secDNS:maxSigLife> element.
The <secDNS:rem> element contains one or more <secDNS:keyTag>, <secDNS:dsData>, or <secDNS:keyData> elements that are used to remove security data from a delegation. <secDNS:keyTag> and <secDNS:dsData> are part of the DS Data Interface and <secDNS:keyData> is part of the Key Data Interface.
<secDNS:keyTag> element MUST contain a key tag value as described in section 5.1.1 of RFC 4034 [6] (Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, “Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions,” March 2005.). Removing all DS information can remove the ability of the parent to secure the delegation to the child zone. The server SHOULD return an EPP error result code of 2305 if more then one DS record matches the <secDNS:keyTag>. <secDNS:dsData> should be used by the client if there is more then one DS record with the same <secDNS:keyTag>.
<secDNS:dsData> element is used to uniquely define the DS record to remove by using all four elements <secDNS:keyTag>, <secDNS:alg>, <secDNS:digestType>, and <secDNS:digest> that is guaranteed to be unique.
<secDNS:keyData> element is used to uniquely define the key data to remove along with the associated DS data. There can be more then one DS record created for each key, so removing a key could remove more then one DS record.
The <secDNS:chg> element is used to replace all existing security information with new security information. The <secDNS:chg> element MUST contain one or more <secDNS:dsData> or <secDNS:keyData> elements. Child elements of the <secDNS:dsData> element are described in Section 3.1 (DS Data Interface). Child elements of the <secDNS:keyData> are described in Section 3.2 (Key Data Interface) The data in these elements is used to replace whatever other data is currently archived for the delegation.
The <secDNS:update> element contains an OPTIONAL "urgent" attribute. The <secDNS:dsData> element contains OPTIONAL <secDNS:maxSigLife> and <secDNS:keyData> elements. In addition the <secDNS:keyData> element contains an OPTIONAL <secDNS:maxSigLife> element. The server MUST abort command processing and respond with an appropriate EPP error if the values provided by the client can not be accepted for syntax or policy reasons.
Example <update> Command, Adding and Removing DS
Data using the DS Data Interface:
C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
C: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
C: <command>
C: <update>
C: <domain:update
C: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
C: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
C: </domain:update>
C: </update>
C: <extension>
C: <secDNS:update
C: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0">
C: <secDNS:add>
C: <secDNS:dsData>
C: <secDNS:keyTag>12346</secDNS:keyTag>
C: <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
C: <secDNS:digest>38EC35D5B3A34B44C39B</secDNS:digest>
C: </secDNS:dsData>
C: </secDNS:add>
C: <secDNS:rem>
C: <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
C: </secDNS:rem>
C: </secDNS:update>
C: </extension>
C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
C: </command>
C:</epp>
Example <update> Command, Adding and Removing Key
Data using the Key Data Interface:
C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
C: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
C: <command>
C: <update>
C: <domain:update
C: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
C: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
C: </domain:update>
C: </update>
C: <extension>
C: <secDNS:update
C: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0">
C: <secDNS:add>
C: <secDNS:keyData>
C: <secDNS:flags>256</secDNS:flags>
C: <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
C: <secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4Q==</secDNS:pubKey>
C: <secDNS:maxSigLife>604800</secDNS:maxSigLife>
C: </secDNS:keyData>
C: </secDNS:add>
C: <secDNS:rem>
C: <secDNS:keyData>
C: <secDNS:flags>256</secDNS:flags>
C: <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
C: <secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:pubKey>APPJ////1R==</secDNS:pubKey>
C: <secDNS:maxSigLife>604800</secDNS:maxSigLife>
C: </secDNS:keyData>
C: </secDNS:rem>
C: </secDNS:update>
C: </extension>
C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
C: </command>
C:</epp>
Example <update> Command, Removing DS Data with
<secDNS:dsData> using the DS Data Interface:
C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
C: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
C: <command>
C: <update>
C: <domain:update
C: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
C: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
C: </domain:update>
C: </update>
C: <extension>
C: <secDNS:update
C: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0">
C: <secDNS:rem>
C: <secDNS:dsData>
C: <secDNS:keyTag>12346</secDNS:keyTag>
C: <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
C: <secDNS:digest>38EC35D5B3A34B44C39B</secDNS:digest>
C: </secDNS:dsData>
C: </secDNS:rem>
C: </secDNS:update>
C: </extension>
C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
C: </command>
C:</epp>
Example <update> Command, Removing DS Data with
<secDNS:keyTag> using the DS Data Interface:
C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
C: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
C: <command>
C: <update>
C: <domain:update
C: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
C: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
C: </domain:update>
C: </update>
C: <extension>
C: <secDNS:update
C: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0">
C: <secDNS:rem>
C: <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
C: <secDNS:keyTag>12346</secDNS:keyTag>
C: </secDNS:rem>
C: </secDNS:update>
C: </extension>
C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
C: </command>
C:</epp>
Example Urgent <update> Command,
Changing DS Data using the DS Data Interface:
C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
C: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
C: <command>
C: <update>
C: <domain:update
C: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
C: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
C: </domain:update>
C: </update>
C: <extension>
C: <secDNS:update urgent="1"
C: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0">
C: <secDNS:chg>
C: <secDNS:dsData>
C: <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
C: <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
C: <secDNS:digest>49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC</secDNS:digest>
C: </secDNS:dsData>
C: </secDNS:chg>
C: </secDNS:update>
C: </extension>
C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
C: </command>
C:</epp>
Example <update> Command, Changing DS Data with
OPTIONAL Key Data using the DS Data Interface:
C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
C: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
C: <command>
C: <update>
C: <domain:update
C: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
C: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
C: </domain:update>
C: </update>
C: <extension>
C: <secDNS:update
C: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0">
C: <secDNS:chg>
C: <secDNS:dsData>
C: <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
C: <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
C: <secDNS:digest>49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC</secDNS:digest>
C: <secDNS:maxSigLife>604800</secDNS:maxSigLife>
C: <secDNS:keyData>
C: <secDNS:flags>256</secDNS:flags>
C: <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
C: <secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4Q==</secDNS:pubKey>
C: </secDNS:keyData>
C: </secDNS:dsData>
C: </secDNS:chg>
C: </secDNS:update>
C: </extension>
C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
C: </command>
C:</epp>
Example <update> Command, Changing Key Data using
the Key Data Interface:
C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
C: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
C: <command>
C: <update>
C: <domain:update
C: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
C: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
C: </domain:update>
C: </update>
C: <extension>
C: <secDNS:update
C: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0">
C: <secDNS:chg>
C: <secDNS:keyData>
C: <secDNS:flags>256</secDNS:flags>
C: <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
C: <secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4Q==</secDNS:pubKey>
C: <secDNS:maxSigLife>604800</secDNS:maxSigLife>
C: </secDNS:keyData>
C: </secDNS:chg>
C: </secDNS:update>
C: </extension>
C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
C: </command>
C:</epp>
When an extended <update> command has been processed successfully, the EPP response is as described in the EPP domain mapping [2] (Hollenbeck, S., “Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Domain Name Mapping,” August 2009.). A server operator MUST return an EPP error result code of 2306 if an urgent update (noted with an "urgent" attribute value of boolean true) can not be completed with high priority.
| TOC |
An EPP object mapping is specified in XML Schema notation. The formal syntax presented here is a complete schema representation of the object mapping suitable for automated validation of EPP XML instances. The BEGIN and END tags are not part of the schema; they are used to note the beginning and ending of the schema for URI registration purposes.
Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
BEGIN
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<schema
targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0"
xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0"
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
elementFormDefault="qualified">
<annotation>
<documentation>
Extensible Provisioning Protocol v1.0
domain name extension schema
for provisioning DNS security (DNSSEC) extensions.
</documentation>
</annotation>
<!-- Child elements found in EPP commands. -->
<element name="create" type="secDNS:dsOrKeyType"/>
<element name="update" type="secDNS:updateType"/>
<!-- Child elements supporting either
the dsData or the keyData interface. -->
<complexType name="dsOrKeyType">
<choice>
<element name="dsData" type="secDNS:dsDataType"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<element name="keyData" type="secDNS:keyDataType"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</choice>
</complexType>
<!-- Definition for the maximum
signature life (maxSigLife) -->
<simpleType name="maxSigLifeType">
<restriction base="int">
<minInclusive value="1"/>
</restriction>
</simpleType>
<!-- Child elements of dsData used for
dsData interface -->
<complexType name="dsDataType">
<sequence>
<element name="keyTag" type="unsignedShort"/>
<element name="alg" type="unsignedByte"/>
<element name="digestType" type="unsignedByte"/>
<element name="digest" type="hexBinary"/>
<element name="maxSigLife" type="secDNS:maxSigLifeType"
minOccurs="0"/>
<element name="keyData" type="secDNS:keyDataType"
minOccurs="0"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
<!-- Child elements of keyData used for keyData interface
and optionally with dsData interface -->
<complexType name="keyDataType">
<sequence>
<element name="flags" type="unsignedShort"/>
<element name="protocol" type="unsignedByte"/>
<element name="alg" type="unsignedByte"/>
<element name="pubKey" type="secDNS:keyType"/>
<element name="maxSigLife" type="secDNS:maxSigLifeType"
minOccurs="0"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
<!-- Definition for the public key -->
<simpleType name="keyType">
<restriction base="base64Binary">
<minLength value="1"/>
</restriction>
</simpleType>
<!-- Child elements of the <update> command. -->
<complexType name="updateType">
<choice>
<element name="chg" type="secDNS:dsOrKeyType"/>
<sequence>
<element name="add" type="secDNS:dsOrKeyType"
minOccurs="0"/>
<element name="rem" type="secDNS:remType"
minOccurs="0"/>
</sequence>
</choice>
<attribute name="urgent" type="boolean" default="false"/>
</complexType>
<!-- Child elements of the <rem> command. -->
<complexType name="remType">
<choice>
<element name="keyTag" type="unsignedShort"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<element name="dsData" type="secDNS:dsDataType"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<element name="keyData" type="secDNS:keyDataType"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</choice>
</complexType>
<!-- Child response elements. -->
<element name="infData" type="secDNS:dsOrKeyType"/>
<!--
End of schema.
-->
</schema>
END
| TOC |
EPP is represented in XML, which provides native support for encoding information using the Unicode character set and its more compact representations including UTF-8 [14] (Yergeau, F., “UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646,” November 2003.). Conformant XML processors recognize both UTF-8 and UTF-16 [15] (Hoffman, P. and F. Yergeau, “UTF-16, an encoding of ISO 10646,” February 2000.). Though XML includes provisions to identify and use other character encodings through use of an "encoding" attribute in an <?xml?> declaration, use of UTF-8 is RECOMMENDED in environments where parser encoding support incompatibility exists.
As an extension of the EPP domain mapping [2] (Hollenbeck, S., “Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Domain Name Mapping,” August 2009.), the elements, element content, attributes, and attribute values described in this document MUST inherit the internationalization conventions used to represent higher-layer domain and core protocol structures present in an XML instance that includes this extension.
| TOC |
This document uses URNs to describe XML namespaces and XML schemas conforming to a registry mechanism described in RFC 3688 [10] (Mealling, M., “The IETF XML Registry,” January 2004.). Two URI assignments have been completed by the IANA.
Registration request for the extension namespace:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0
Registrant Contact: IESG
XML: None. Namespace URIs do not represent an XML specification.
Registration request for the extension XML schema:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:secDNS-1.0
Registrant Contact: IESG
XML: See the "Formal Syntax" section of this document.
| TOC |
The mapping extensions described in this document do not provide any security services beyond those described by EPP [1] (Hollenbeck, S., “Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP),” August 2009.), the EPP domain name mapping [2] (Hollenbeck, S., “Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Domain Name Mapping,” August 2009.), and protocol layers used by EPP. The security considerations described in these other specifications apply to this specification as well.
As with other domain object transforms, the EPP transform operations described in this document MUST be restricted to the sponsoring client as authenticated using the mechanisms described in sections 2.9.1.1 and 7 of RFC 5730 [1] (Hollenbeck, S., “Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP),” August 2009.). Any attempt to perform a transform operation on a domain object by any client other than the sponsoring client MUST be rejected with an appropriate EPP authorization error.
The provisioning service described in this document involves the exchange of information that can have an operational impact on the DNS. A trust relationship MUST exist between the EPP client and server, and provisioning of public key information MUST only be done after the identities of both parties have been confirmed using a strong authentication mechanism.
An EPP client might be acting as an agent for a zone administrator who wants to send delegation information to be signed and published by the server operator. Man-in-the-middle attacks are thus possible as a result of direct client activity or inadvertent client data manipulation.
Acceptance of a false key by a server operator can produce significant operational consequences. The child and parent zones MUST be consistent to secure the delegation properly. In the absence of consistent signatures, the delegation will not appear in the secure name space, yielding untrustworthy query responses. If a key is compromised, a client can either remove the compromised information or update the delegation information via EPP commands using the "urgent" attribute.
Operational scenarios requiring quick removal of a secure domain delegation can be implemented using a two-step process. First, security credentials can be removed using an "urgent" update as just described. The domain can then be removed from the parent zone by changing the status of the domain to either of the EPP "clientHold" or "serverHold" domain status values. The domain can also be removed from the zone using the EPP <delete> command, but this is a more drastic step that needs to be considered carefully before use.
Data validity checking at the server requires computational resources. A purposeful or inadvertent denial-of-service attack is possible if a client requests some number of update operations that exceed a server's processing capabilities. Server operators SHOULD take steps to manage command load and command processing requirements to minimize the risk of a denial-of-service attack.
The signature lifetime values provided by clients are requests that can be rejected. Blind acceptance by a server operator can have an adverse impact on a server's processing capabilities. Server operators SHOULD seriously consider adopting implementation rules to limit the range of acceptable signature lifetime values to counter potential adverse situations.
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The author would like to thank the following people who have provided significant contributions to the development of this document:
David Blacka, Howard Eland, Scott Hollenbeck, Ed Lewis, Klaus Malorny, Patrick Mevzek, David Smith, Andrew Sullivan.
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| [1] | Hollenbeck, S., “Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP),” STD 69, RFC 5730, August 2009 (TXT). |
| [2] | Hollenbeck, S., “Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Domain Name Mapping,” STD 69, RFC 5731, August 2009 (TXT). |
| [3] | Sperberg-McQueen, C., Maler, E., Paoli, J., and T. Bray, “Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 (Second Edition),” World Wide Web Consortium FirstEdition REC-xml-20001006, October 2000 (HTML). |
| [4] | Beech, D., Thompson, H., Mendelsohn, N., and M. Maloney, “XML Schema Part 1: Structures,” World Wide Web Consortium FirstEdition REC-xmlschema-1-20010502, May 2001 (HTML). |
| [5] | Malhotra, A. and P. Biron, “XML Schema Part 2: Datatypes,” World Wide Web Consortium FirstEdition REC-xmlschema-2-20010502, May 2001 (HTML). |
| [6] | Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, “Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions,” RFC 4034, March 2005 (TXT). |
| [7] | Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, “Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions,” RFC 4035, March 2005 (TXT). |
| [8] | Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997 (TXT, HTML, XML). |
| [9] | Kolkman, O., Schlyter, J., and E. Lewis, “Domain Name System KEY (DNSKEY) Resource Record (RR) Secure Entry Point (SEP) Flag,” RFC 3757, April 2004 (TXT). |
| [10] | Mealling, M., “The IETF XML Registry,” BCP 81, RFC 3688, January 2004 (TXT). |
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| [11] | Mockapetris, P., “Domain names - concepts and facilities,” STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987 (TXT). |
| [12] | Mockapetris, P., “Domain names - implementation and specification,” STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987 (TXT). |
| [13] | Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, “DNS Security Introduction and Requirements,” RFC 4033, March 2005 (TXT). |
| [14] | Yergeau, F., “UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646,” STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003 (TXT). |
| [15] | Hoffman, P. and F. Yergeau, “UTF-16, an encoding of ISO 10646,” RFC 2781, February 2000 (TXT). |
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| James Gould | |
| VeriSign, Inc. | |
| 21345 Ridgetop Circle | |
| Dulles, VA 20166-6503 | |
| US | |
| Email: | jgould@verisign.com |