RFC draft-brotman-dkim-fbl-00 | DKIM-FBL | September 2023 |
Brotman | Expires 25 March 2024 | [Page] |
Mechanism to discover a destination used to deliver user-supplied FBL reports to an original DKIM signer or other interested parties. This should allow the reporting entity to deliver reports via email for each party which has affixed a validating DKIM signature. The discovery is made via DNS and the record is constructed using items within the DKIM signature in the message.¶
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Historically, Feedback Loops (FBL), typically comprised of False Positive (FP) and False Negative (FN) reports, have allowed users the ability to inform their Mailbox Provider (MBP) that they disagree with a message's placement in the Inbox or Spam folder. In some situations, a MBP may then forward that complaint directly, or via an intermediary, to the original source system of that message. Additionally, these complaints reach the source system via a registration system, typically tying a set of IPs or DKIM-based domains to a specific reporting address.¶
By allowing reporters to discover the destination on their own, this should make getting FBLs to the original DKIM signer(s) easier.¶
The record will combine a label with the "d" value from the DKIM signature in the message being sent, as well as the selector. Such as the case where "d=example.org", and "s=contact":¶
_feedback.contact._domainkey.example.org¶
The DNS entry will contain a TXT record described below. By including the selector, this allows a domain to send feedback to be able to segment the feedback to various sources.¶
The DNS record should contain the information necessary for a report generator to send the feedback to the proper location.¶
v: A string identifying the record. The value must be "DKIMRv1"¶
ra: An email address destination for reports. The address should match the format defined in [RFC5321]. If there is a "rfr" entry, the "ra" may be omitted. If there is more than one target address, the entries must be separated by a comma (",").¶
rfr: An optional field to refer the reporter to another DNS entry.¶
c: Content flag. If set to 'n', the reporting entity SHOULD remove all content beyond the headers of the original message that is being reported.¶
h: The header by which the signer can identify the recipient, sender, and campaign. If a reporter is trying to create a minimalistic report, this would be the minimum amount of information to properly act to the report. This field is OPTIONAL, and may contain only one attribute.¶
f: Format requested by report receiver. Options are "arf" and "xarf". Default is "arf", and multiple values may be separated by a comma (,). If a report sender is unable to generate a report in a requested format, they SHOULD NOT send a report.¶
_feedback.contact._domainkey.example.org TXT
"v=DKIMRv1;ra=reporting@feedback.example.org"¶
_feedback.contact._domainkey.example.org TXT
"v=DKIMRv1;rfr=_feedback._domainkey.example.org"¶
_feedback.contact._domainkey.example.org TXT
"v=DKIMRv1;ra=fbl@example.org;rfr=_feedback._domainkey.example.org"¶
_feedback._domainkey.example.org TXT
"v=DKIMRv1;ra=other_fbl@example.org"¶
When the report format is specified as "arf", the report contents should adhere to [RFC5965].¶
When the report format is chosen as "xarf" [XARF], the report generator should reference the materials below as to the format. XARF follows a JSON format and the format may change over time to match that specification.¶
The current format can be referenced:¶
https://github.com/abusix/xarf/blob/master/schemas/3/spam.schema.json¶
In order to limit the possibility of misdirected reports, if the receiving entity domain does not match the d= of the DKIM signature, there must be a DNS record to verify the external destination.¶
Consider the record:¶
_feedback.foo._domainkey.example.org TXT
"v=DKIMRv1 ; ra=reporting@othersite.com"¶
In order for "othersite.com" to receive reports for this DKIM signature, a record must exist at specified location, and contain a specified value.¶
d=
and s=
from the original signature.¶
foo.example.org._report._feedback.othersite.com TXT "v=DKIMRv1"¶
If the receiving site is comfortable with such a configuration, they may wish to use a wildcard at "*._feedback.othersite.com" so that all lookups for the verification record would pass.¶
There is some concern that a MBP may provide some advantage or useful information to a malicious entity by providing them with FBL data. Each MBP should use their own judgement when deciding where to send reports. It is possible that an attacker could use this information to attempt to bypass anti-spam filters, or to validate a recipient at a given site.¶
Noting in [RFC5965] section 2.g, there should be enough information for most
senders to process a complaint without the content of the message. While the
c
flag allows the report receiver to state that they do not wish to receive
content, the report generator, as per [RFC5965] does not need to include that
information, regardless of the flag settings.¶
It is at the discretion of the report generator as to whether they supply False Positive reports to the report requester.¶
A report generator may place some requirements on the sender in order to be eligible to receive reports. This could include something such as a DMARC policy requirements, TLS usage, or some level of reputation.¶
In this document, only delivery via SMTP is specified. However, a separate document could be created to allow for feedback via HTTPS, UDP, or something yet to be defined.¶